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A b s t r a c t
This research aims at exploring the features of social insurance in China in the mid 
1990s. From the Marxist structuralist view social insurance is an institution built on the 
economic system of the country. In view of the inadequate research from this 
perspective, this research employs the proposition of sociological study on social 
insurance to identify the issues of social insurance including the funding formats, service 
provision patterns, coverage, and the people’s experiences and expectations on social 
insurance in China.
This research applied qualitative and quantitative strategies to collect the 
information. For qualitative research strategy this research traced the historical 
development of income maintenance services from the feudal stage to the 20th century in 
China. Also it arranged unstructured interviewing with government officials from 
various departments, the managers at work units, and the academic who are the experts 
on income maintenance in the country. This research also reviewed policy papers and 
internal documents on labour and social insurance in China. The most distinguished part 
of this study is the quantitative research work carried out in Guangzhou Shi, Guangdong 
Province in 1995. 25 managers from work units of different types of ownership were 
interviewed and 520 employees participated in the structured interviewing with 
questionnaires administered by extraordinary interviewers.
The research findings demonstrate that socialist ideology governs the provisions 
of social insurance in China. However, in the process of building up a socialist market 
economy, the Communist Party of China also mingled Confiician values with Marxist 
socialism that makes social insurance with the characteristics of Chinese socialism. The 
socialist economic system is still the main body of social insurance whilst Confucianism 
is the means. This appeals to the people to socialise the social insurance services that are 
heavily financed by state and operated within work units but cover only the categorised 
labour force in urban China.
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Technical Notes
1. The names of persons (e.g. Deng Xiaoping), places (e.g. Guangzhou Shi), and 
organisations (e.g. Guomindang) originally in Chinese script are romanized 
according to the Chinese Phonetic System (Hcmyu Pinyin). The pinyin system is used 
by the Chinese government and the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute and is 
described in ‘The Pinyin Chinese-English Dictionary’ published by the Commercial 
Press (1990).
2. For the terms used by the Chinese, e.g. social insurance (shehui baoxin), medical and 
sicknesses insurance (yiliao baoxin) the pinyin is placed in brackets and rendered in 
italics.
3. For names of persons in Chinese, the surname takes first order of precedence 
followed by the first and middle names combined as a single word. For example 
‘Mao Zedong’, ‘Deng Xiaoping’.
4. The exchange rate between pound sterling and renminbi or RMB (the Chinese 
currency) was £1 sterling to RMB 13.087 on 27 October 1995. On 9 March 2000 the 
buying rate set by the People’s Bank of China was £1 pound sterling to RMB 13.067. 
(Financial Times 12 March 2000)
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INTRODUCTION
Social insurance studies in capitalist developed countries exist in abundance. The most 
important reason is that social insurance started first and developed gradually in these 
countries like Germany, France, Britain, Austria and Switzerland. (Kohler et ah 1982) 
However, social insurance is different from country to country because it is an institution 
set up for solving the socio-political problems on the diversified economic structures. 
(Zacher, 1982). Thus, there are dissimilarities in social insurance services even between 
capitalist developed countries like Britain and Germany. For example Ongus (1982, p. 
150) states that “(social insurance) scheme which did emerge (in Britain) was different 
in significant respects from the German model.”
The previous paragraph brings out an issue that the features of social insurance of 
one country are unique to its history, culture, society, and politics framed by its 
economic base. In other words, the issues of social insurance like financing, coverage, 
types of services and levels of benefits are particularly related with the ‘mode of 
economy’ of the country and different from the others. Nevertheless, it is found that 
studies on social insurance in socialist countries is very inadequate and it is built upon 
the knowledge on the social insurance in these countries and enriches the field of social 
policy studies.
In order to complete the incomplete jigsaw of social policy, this research project 
aims at finding the features of social insurance in China with the case of Guangzhou Shi. 
This project will also make use of the Marxist structuralist view to explain the effects of 
public ownership system on the social moral and values as well as the roles and 
functions of state institutions in China. The first step to explore the features of social 
insurance in China is to establish a thesis. The thesis for this study is that social 
insurance is a social institution framed and determined by the economic structure of a 
country. There are two levels of study on this thesis. First, it is necessary to find out the 
details on the social institution. For the case of social insurance it includes the historical 
development, management and provision formats, and the services effects on society and 
people. At the second level the study applies the Marxist structuralist view to analyse the 
research results. This level of study will demonstrate how the economic base of China 
affects social insurance in China and differs from countries with a different economic
10
base.
In general, the study methodology of this study is a sociological approach that 
focuses on understanding the roles and functions of a social institution in relation with 
the national economic structure. Based on the ‘sociology of social security’ thesis 
proposed by Rys (1964) and Sigg (1985), this research project developed a sociological 
study method to explore the features of social insurance in China. The main concern of 
the sociological study on social insurance in China is to learn about the features of social 
insurance in the country in terms of its establishment, management, provisions, and 
reforms. This study approach also employs the Marxist structural view to understand the 
effects of the national economic structure of the social insurance services. In practice, 
the sociological study method in this project uses both quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques to collect the information needed. These include 540 questionnaires 
in total administered by trained interviewers and carried out in work units. Furthermore, 
review on policy documents, unstructured interviewing with policy makers, academics 
and officers from related government departments also contribute invaluable materials to 
this study.
Chapter One of this study starts the discussion by delineating the origins of social 
insurance in capitalist developed countries. It particularly points out that the value of 
providing social insurance in these countries is individual economic freedom. This 
ideology reflects the dominant liberal thinking and the value of individual in capitalist 
market system. It also directs the development of social institutions built upon it. 
Therefore, it is found that social insurance in capitalist developed countries is an income 
maintenance measure with the features of mutual help and risk pooling for achieving the 
objective of enhancing individual economic freedom. This implies the features of social 
institutions relate with the economic base of the country. However, the literature review 
in Chapter One reveals that research and articles on social insurance in China do not go 
deeply on this issue. The chapter also demonstrates that the studies on social insurance in 
China are seldom supported by quantitative study, and do not discuss its specific features 
and the effects of the socialist public ownership system. Therefore in Chapter One the 
research method, the main research question and the four sub-questions that guides this 
exploratory study on social insurance in China are outlined.
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Before going to the part on the field study carried out in Guangzhou Shi, 
Chapters Two and Three review the policy documents on social insurance in China. This 
review is important because it provides the insight on the development of social 
insurance in the country’s social and economic environment. Also, it can facilitate the 
understanding of the specific process under which social insurance in China was 
founded and developed. Chapter Two and Three present the provisions of income 
protection in China from the petty peasant economy in the feudal period to the ‘socialist 
market economy’ in the 1990s.
Particularly Chapter Two highlights the self-sufficiency and non-state 
intervention ideology of Confucianism. The Confiician individual-family-social system 
and discriminatory view on the values of capitalists has great impact on the development 
of statutory income maintenance services. Disregarding some formats of mutual help in 
kind at local levels are found, voluntary social relief rather than mandatory social 
insurance services prevailed in China as the main income protection approach before 
1949. Institutionalised income maintenance services including a Soviet style social 
insurance were started only after the Communist Party of China took power in 1949 for 
enhancing the socialist economic production objectives. The review in this chapter 
traced the development of social insurance in China in relation with the changes in the 
political lines in different periods directed by the interpretation on socialism. For 
example in the Great Leap Forward Movement in the early 1960s labour (social) 
insurance was despised under collectivism and the economic public ownership system.
Chapter Three of this study aims at presenting social insurance reforms in China 
in the modernisation era from 1980 to the mid 1990s. This chapter describes in detail 
what and how social insurance services are provided and reformed after the 
rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, a pragmatic line leader who prefers economic 
construction to political struggles. Under the leadership of Deng, modernisation changes 
China from, first, ‘collective communism’ to ‘market socialism’ and second, ‘closed- 
door policy’ to ‘open-door policy’. The first move is evidenced by the releasing of the 
central controls gradually for building a ‘socialist market system’. A series of economic 
measures like the initiation of contracting responsibility system, the emergence of 
private economic production units, and the implementation of new employment and 
salary structure have emerged since the mid 1980s. The other move from closed-door to
12
open door indicates the government’s acceptance by and of the outside world. The 
examples are the opening of the home market to foreign capitalists in various ways.
In the period of 1980-1995 the landmark of economic reforms is the dismantling 
of the commune system and reforms in state-owned work units for rejuvenating the 
national economy and facilitating the socialist transition. All of these change the 
peoples’ income source patterns in China that consequently lead to the reforms in social 
insurance in different aspects like coverage and funding formats. Among the many 
features of social insurance in China found in Chapter Three is the ‘occupational nature’ 
created by the close relationship between the state and work units under the socialist ‘all 
people’s ownership’ ideology. This social insurance feature exists with the ruling of the 
communist government in the country. The solid party-state-work units-individual 
relationship develops a specific type of social insurance services built up on the 
country’s economic production relationship.
The distinguishing achievement of this study is the field study carried out in 
China that greatly delineates the features of the social insurance services in the country. 
Before going to present and analyse the results of the quantitative study in 1995, Chapter 
Four firstly draws the reader’s attention to Guangzhou Shi, the provincial city of 
Guangdong Province that was selected as the primary sampling unit of the field research. 
This background information is important because it sets the background for the readers 
to comprehend the field research report on the features of social insurance in China in 
the subsequent four chapters.
Chapters Five to Eight report and analyse the data collected from a quantitative 
research on the characteristics of social insurance in China. This had had not been 
attempted before. The focus of this study is on the funding, provision formats, and 
coverage of social insurance. All of these issues of the sociology of social insurance are 
discussed thoroughly with charts and graphs in Chapters Five and Six. On the other 
hand, Chapters Seven and Eight summarise the findings and maintain that social 
insurance in China is a ‘dual service system’ for the labour force of different gender 
groups, education levels, household registration statuses and employment natures. In 
general, as pointed out in Chapter Eight, the features of social insurance in China include 
being non-contributory, occupational welfare in nature, and having indistinct roles and
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responsibilities between state, employers and individual. Apart from these, the people’s 
perception and expectations cultivated by Confucianism and communism have strong 
impacts on the social insurance services in the mid 1990s. The people’s values and 
attitude towards social insurance is apathetic and not confident. Furthermore, such a 
perception on social insurance also contrasts greatly with that in capitalist developed 
countries.
The final chapter that concludes the discussion of this study clearly spells out 
that, with the case of Guangzhou Shi, social insurance as a social institution in China is 
governed by the country’s economic structure. The features of social insurance in China 
found in this study embody discriminative coverage, heavy state financial inputs, non­
income protection oriented, and is occupational welfare in nature, an uninterested public 
and sluggish developmental process. These particularities are attributed to the 
Communist Party of China which strongly persists in Marxist socialism and skilfully 
makes use of the deep-rooted Chinese social culture especially Confucianism under the 
banner o f ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’.
In a nutshell, this exploratory study on the features of social insurance in China 
sets an example of using the sociological study method to understand the issues of social 
insurance. With this general study methodology it employs both quantitative and 
qualitative research strategies to find out the features of social insurance in China that 
have never been tried before. Finally, the results of this study evidence that social 
insurance is an institution strongly affected by the economic structure of a country.
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Chapter One 
The study of the features of social insurance
Introduction
This chapter begins with the examination of the original concepts and values of social 
insurance. It will then probe into the social insurance services in capitalist developed 
countries and socialist countries to review the areas where the notion and development 
of these social insurance systems relate to the original social insurance concepts and 
values discussed. However, the main purpose for making such a review is to highlight 
the economic system that determines the features of social insurance in a country. 
Hence, this chapter also reviews the literature on social insurance in China, a socialist 
developing country, to discern how and to what extent the features of social insurance 
are examined.
The first section of this chapter discusses the beliefs in individual freedom and 
social solidarity that drive the establishment of social insurance. These general values 
and objectives springing from liberal thinking since the Renaissance in view of the rising 
needs for economic security in the changing economic production modes and social 
support system in the past two centuries. Since neo-liberalism and industrialisation 
originated in capitalist developed countries the ideals and services of social insurance, to 
a great extent, are largely tinted with the particular characteristics of those countries and 
developed for realising pre-set objectives.
The second part reviews the roles, nature and objectives of social insurance in 
capitalist developed countries in order to see how far the general values and perspectives 
on social insurance are observed in these countries. Together with the part on social 
insurance in socialist countries, the subsequent section argues that the general values and 
perspectives on social insurance found in these countries are dissimilar from capitalist 
developed countries to some extent. This reflects the general values and objectives of 
social insurance that explains the unique features of social insurance in a country are 
affected by its political and economic systems. Accordingly, the specific social, 
economic and political environment in China, a socialist developing country, cultures the 
general values and perspective that sculpt its features of social insurance.
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Nevertheless, it is explained in the following part that literature on social 
insurance in China is rare, especially for understanding its features from the general 
values and perspectives on this contributory income maintenance service. Thus there are 
research questions and study methods set in the final part to spell out in detail how to 
examine the subject matter of this thesis.
Economic insecurity and social insurance: The origins and concepts
Social insurance is one of the income maintenance measures set up for satisfying the 
income needs of individuals in a society undergoing economic system changes. These 
needs can be found particularly in the transformation from small-scale economic 
production to the specialisation of labour in which the peoples’ way of gaining a 
livelihood is changed from petty production for self-sufficiency to the selling of labour 
power for money values in the labour market. One of the consequences of these changes 
is the break down of the family support and self-help system so that mutual-help is 
needed. Accordingly, institutionalised social services like education, health care, and 
welfare systems are established to replace the traditional family services on the one 
hand, and, on the other, to assist those who are less able because of various reasons.
The concept of and needs for mutually participatory support system is long 
standing. In earlier periods of human history, human beings already lived and grouped 
together in defence against natural disasters and for communal needs. This ignites the 
idea of social insurance against economic insecurity through mutual help. Nevertheless, 
the formats of self-help and mutual-help for safeguarding economic security are also 
changed in correspondence with the changes in the modes of production in human 
society so that the social and insuring natures of social insurance becomes more and 
more significant. In the following paragraphs the discussion will focus on economic 
insecurity and changes in human society before turning to outline the objectives, roles 
and functions of social insurance.
As mentioned above one’s need for economic security changes from time to 
time. In general, the more diversified the economic production systems the higher the 
needs of the people for economic security. In addition, the needs for income security
16
change in the dynamic social, economic, and political environment. Economic security 
was treated as the subject of the household or the clan under paternalism in primitive 
society. Later, religious and political freedom in 16th Century Europe after the 
Renaissance made economic and production systems change as well as the philanthropic 
values on the needs of the weak driven by monastic teaching.
Concepts of and approaches to economic security changed in the 18th and 19th 
centuries with the rise of utilitarianism and liberalism. Whilst Jeremy Bentham argues 
for the greatest happiness, J. S. Mill, on the other hand, supports positive freedom.1 
These philosophers sow the seeds of laissez faire and free economy that leads to large- 
scale public education and the speeding up of technological development. The use of 
machines, ample supply of waged labourers and the changed ownership mode of 
production materials after the Industrial Revolution increased the people’s economic 
insecurity. Karl Marx, applies dialectical materialism, to elaborate in Das Kapital that 
because of the rise of capitalism that alienates people from production materials and the 
exploitation of the surplus values by capitalists the working class lives in destitution.2 
Marx also notes that the unstable capitalist economic and production systems will 
inevitably be transformed by the proletariat or working class that has no land and capital. 
Marx’s view on the extended social instability and economic insecurity opened 
Bismarck’s eyes to the danger of revolution so that the world’s first social insurance 
legislation on labour sickness benefits was promulgated in Germany in 1883.
Economic insecurity becomes the main concern of the people in the changing or 
developing society. It is generally found that there are four aspects of economic 
insecurity. (Ke, 1990, p. 7-10) The first refers to the loss of real incomes, especially 
when one has not enough or no capital, savings or other resources to supplement one’s 
income up to the poverty line. The second aspect is the benefits that cover outgoings 
such as medical expenses or sickness or injury charged to oneself or one’s family. The 
third one is insufficient income from employment or other means in covering one’s 
needs or wants. The fourth is unstable incomes caused by unstable jobs such as seasonal 
or contract employment.
1 S ee Mill 1974, & Barber 1967.
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In countries of all systems, the causes of economic insecurity are various but in 
general they can be grouped into ‘economic’ such as substandard wages, price changes 
and ‘non-economic’ like premature death, ageing, sickness and injury, natural disaster, 
and personal reasons. (Ke 1990, p. 10-15) However, since the more developed the 
society is the more entangled the social fabric in which the causes are related. For 
example, unemployment may be caused by one’s personal characteristics such as skill, 
age, and health conditions, apart from the availability of job opportunities.
The above paragraphs suggest that economic insecurity is the manifestation of 
economic development and changed social conditions. It also relates to one’s 
adaptability and responses to the changing social and economic systems. Accordingly, 
there are four principles guiding the design of economic security plans. (Rejda in Ke 
1990, p. 21-22). First, the ‘principle of subsidiary’ determines the state and individual’s 
responsibility in overcoming economic instability. It also assigns the roles played by 
governments at different levels. This approach enhances a free economy with flexibility 
and creativity where state intervention is minimal. Second, the ‘principle of sovereignty 
of demand’ conditions the actions taken by democratic government as the responses to 
the needs of the people. In other words, this economic security measure is built upon a 
voting system for satisfying people’s needs and wants. Third, the ‘principle of 
prevention and rehabilitation’ for preventive and rehabilitative purposes to minimise 
social costs. This implies the augmentation of economic and social benefits by 
alleviating the economic losses within the society. Finally, the ‘principle of diversity’ 
encourages the use of all means to solve the problems of economic insecurity. For 
example unemployment insurance, creation of employment opportunities, and retraining 
of the unemployed are all necessary to ameliorate poverty and unemployment.
The above discussions on economic security spell out the backgrounds and 
rationales of providing social insurance in most capitalist developed countries like 
England and the United States. It reflects that, apart from the functions and objectives of 
satisfying basic human needs, social insurance is also a mutual help system for the 
people to join for social good. In addition, social insurance pursues the maintaining of a 
free society since it recognises the limitations of individual members in society in doing
2 S ee Barber 1967, p. 124-153.
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away with economic insecurity. Such ideology, values and thinking of social insurance 
are in fact influenced by utilitarianism and liberalism prevailing in Europe since the last 
century. In sum, it is very clear that social insurance is set up for ameliorating the 
income problems and living difficulties of individuals in society. However, the 
orientation of social insurance is non-economical in terms of its belief in enhancing 
social consolidation and guarding the existence of a positive free society. These 
generalities of social insurance are found in most countries with democratic political 
systems and free economy. The following section will examine to what extent these 
general values and beliefs of social insurance are observed in capitalist developed 
countries, which are the pioneers of social insurance services.
Social insurance in capitalist developed countries
The main objective of this section is to study the specific roles, nature and objectives of 
social insurance in order to demonstrate how they are rooted in promoting individual 
freedom and the acceptance of responsibility and enhancing social solidarity in capitalist 
developed countries. This section will highlight the views and perspective on social 
insurance of the International Labour Organisation and distinguished academics like 
Richard Titmuss for achieving the aforementioned objective.
Social insurance is part of the social security system. Social security was 
described as ‘a jigsaw puzzle’, which ‘is assembled’ to cover all people and “the various 
contingencies which threaten the wages and income and thus the quality and standard of 
living, of working people”.3 (ELO 1984, p. 2) Nevertheless, social security systems have 
some specific characteristics. First, they are started and developed in “countries which 
are now regarded as ‘industrialised nations’.” (ILO 1984a, p. 1) The example is the 
development from old age pension schemes to “social security” in the United States. 
(Social Security Bulletin 1992, p. 63) Second, they evolve from various statutory poor 
relief services and mutual help programmes like the cooperative or friendly societies in 
Britain. Third, ‘social security’ is a collective term for state assistance provided to 
people with contingent income needs. Accordingly, the ELO defines social security as 
the follows:
3 Michel (1970, p. 82) raised this point that "social protection appeared a s  a m osaic of 
independent schem es, distinct in scope with multiple sources of financing and granting of very
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“(Social Security is) the protection which society provides for its members, 
through a series of public measures, against the economic and social distress that 
otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earning 
resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, 
invalidity, old age and death; the provision of medical care; and the provision of 
subsidies for families with children.” (1984a, p. 3)
According to the ILO social security is a comprehensive state system for income 
protections that includes: “social insurance; social assistance; benefits financed by 
general revenue; family benefits; and provident funds, together with supplementary 
provisions made by employers, and the ancillary and complementary programmes which 
have developed around social security.” (ILO 1984a, p. 3) In summarising the nature of 
different social security programmes in capitalist developed countries, Hill j(1992, p.l) 
observes insurance and means-tested benefits as the two main forms.
Although social insurance is a part of social security system, Midgley states that 
not all countries use the term ‘social insurance’ to describe the actual social insurance 
system. For example, ‘social security’ is used in France whilst in the United States it 
describes the income maintenance programmes that have an insurance nature. (1984, p. 
90) In other countries like China the term ‘labour insurance’ was widely used before the 
mid-1980s and, in some occasions, the terms ‘social security’ and ‘labour insurance’ are 
still being mixed with social insurance in the country even in the 1990s. This situation 
illustrates the diversities of social insurance services in countries of different cultural, 
political, economic and social backgrounds. In order to avoid the ambiguities, Hill uses 
‘income maintenance’ but not social security to cover social insurance and social 
assistance services. (1996, p. 61)
No matter what terminology is used, social insurance is the ‘social security 
systems related to transactions by government ... of meeting comparable needs and 
contingencies through the operation of direct taxation.” (Titmuss, 1974 p. 88) This 
insight highlights the important elements of social insurance in capitalist developed 
countries: state transactions, contingent needs, and taxation through a mandatory 
enforced contributory system. As refers to the experiences of the countries discussed 
above, social insurance means statutory or mandatory income maintenance services or 
programmes supported by a multi-party contribution system for insuring against the loss 
of incomes of the eligible. Thus ‘sharing’ in terms of the risks and costs is the
varied types of benefits."
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momentum for establishing and developing social insurance whilst ‘contributing’ and 
‘participating’ are the means for achieving the ends o f ‘risk pooling’ and ‘mutual help’.
‘Sharing’ in social insurance reflects the recognition of the individual’s 
incapability or the risks in dealing with income loss under a system of specialisation of 
production that might hinder the achieving of individual freedom.4 On the other hand, 
the values of participation are on the provision of accesses for individuals to express 
their risks and satisfy their contingent income needs with mutual help. Furthermore, 
these risks are anticipated within one’s life-span so that the individuals who contribute 
can enjoy their eligible portions when the needs rise through a redistribution 
mechanism.5 Thus Titmuss elaborated that social insurance has the effects of meeting 
one’s ‘future presumptive need’ that makes it different from the satisfaction of 
‘immediate demonstrated need’ with public assistance payments. (1974, p. 88) More 
importantly, social insurance also has redistributive effects in addition to risk sharing or 
pooling and mutual help. With the example of Britain, Titmuss (1974, p. 87) maintained 
that the redistribution function is the crux of social policy and public insurance, 
especially when the services are supported by taxable incomes collected from employers 
and employees.
Nevertheless, as Titmuss pointed out, the redistributive effects may be 
‘unintended or unforeseen’ because the political, administrative or technical factors 
affect the objectives of social insurance that depends on the role of taxation. (1974, p. 
89) For capitalist developed countries, Titmuss summarised that the compulsory social 
insurance in Germany in the 1880s and the National Insurance for unemployed and 
sickness in Britain in 1911 belonged to an ‘individualised actuarial model’, which were 
‘part of the residual welfare model of social policy.’ (1974, p. 90) Titmuss explained that 
this model of social insurance makes reference to the assumptions in the private 
insurance model, which is based on risk theory and honoured the insured according to 
the terms and conditions agreed in a contract. (Titmuss 1974, p. 90)
Social insurance in Britain in later days, for example, the 1959 graduated pension
4 The understanding on the relationships between income protection and individual freedom can 
refer to Maslow’s  human hierarchy of needs in which he identified basic hum an needs like 
security, shelter, food, etc. are  essential for one to actualise on e’s  own ability.
5 According to Titmuss, the needs for income protection arise from old age, widowhood, 
sickness, disability, unemployment, the dependant needs of children, etc. (1974, p. 88)
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scheme was developed from the ‘individualised actuarial model’ that framed 
‘ideologically and semantically... the social security system in Britain and other 
countries’. (Titmuss 1974, p. 90) However, the ‘group insurance model’ in the mid 20th 
century, as termed by Titmuss, formed a ‘contractual sharing group’ that ‘the risks are 
said to be pooled or shared.’ (1974, 91) Although Titmuss queried the effectiveness of 
risk pooling and sharing because of the inadequate statistical and economic studies, it is 
clear that social insurance in capitalist developed countries espouses certain consistent 
high ideals.
It has been mentioned earlier that social insurance has insurance and mutual help 
natures that make it different from other social security services. The ILO notes that 
“...the insurance principle (that) gave expression to the solidarity of the workers ... and 
to the interest of both sides of industry in financing a scheme whose results would be 
beneficial not only to the work force but also to the management.” (1984a, p. 4) This 
observation gives prominence to mutual aid in social insurance that cannot be found in 
other social security programmes. In addition, this perspective latently concedes the 
‘antidote effects’ of social insurance in countries with a growing labour force and the 
growing disparity of interests between the working class and the capitalists in capitalist 
countries.6
One of the recent studies on social insurance in capitalist developed countries is 
by Spicker (1993). Spicker identifies three different models of social insurance among 
capitalist developed countries, namely, the ‘Bismarck Model’ of Germany, the 
‘Beveridge Model’ of England, and the ‘French Model’ of France. Spicker argues that 
all of these social insurance systems can only partly accomplish the work of poor relief 
but in general they are set up for promoting social stability and providing social 
protection to those with contingent income needs. More importantly, the ‘three-model’ 
analysis carries the message close to Titmuss that risk pooling for meeting contingent 
income needs and enhancing social stability are the commonly found objectives in 
capitalist developed countries, albeit such services in these countries are not monotonous
6 For exam ple Cockburn s ta tes  that social security "...m ay be seen  a s  a stabilising factor both in 
the workplace and in the widest community." Furthermore, Cockburn also m entions that "social 
security m easu res are therefore not only econom ic in impact but also social, psychological and 
political, serving a s  a stabilising influence in societies experiencing rapid social change." (1980, 
p.357)
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and have diversified characteristics.
The discussions on social insurance in this section can be summarised into two 
points. First, social insurance is financed by a multilateral contributory system that 
“...sustains the sense of responsibility of the contributor and the dignity of the 
beneficiary.” (ILO 1984a, p. 115) Second, social insurance programmes or services 
support “...what is in effect a mutual benefit society on a national scale...” which is 
promoted by “citizens with a social conscience (who) understand the moral and material 
value of social security....” (ILO 1984a, p. 115) These two issues spell out that the 
values and practices of contemporary social insurance in capitalist developed countries 
have strong links with its original ideals and objectives. Nevertheless, it is found that the 
service pattern varies from country to country because of the different political, 
administrative and economic factors.7 Hence it is assigned in the following section to 
examine how far social insurance is different in other political and economic systems.
Review of social security and social insurance in socialist countries
The previous section presented the values and patterns of social insurance in capitalist 
developed countries. All of these countries, in fact, established their social insurance 
systems long ago. For instance, Germany under Bismarck in 1889 was the first nation in 
the world to set up social insurance services, with Austria, Britain, Luxembourg and 
Sweden following in 1906, 1908, 1911 and 1913, respectively. (Nie et a l 1995, p. 4-5) 
Social insurance as an income maintenance service is developed in these countries from 
the ideal of transforming economic production as well as maintaining individual freedom 
at the same time. These ideologies turn to be the postulates of social insurance, which to 
a great extent moulds the pattern of social insurance in capitalist developed countries. It 
is for this reason that most of the studies on social insurance programme concentrate on 
capitalist developed countries but not the countries of other economic and political 
systems.8 This section is going to describe a picture of social insurance programmes in 
socialist countries before turning to address the case of China with a literature review.
7 S ee, for exam ples, Titmuss (1974, p. 89), Rys (1964).
8 The exam ples of studies on social insurance in capitalist developed countries are  Flora et at. 
(1981), Kohler ( 1982), Gould (1993), Spicker (1993), Flora (1998), etc.
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Because of the very limited number of published studies on social insurance in
socialist developing countries, this review of social insurance in socialist countries is
based largely on the literature on socialist developed economies like the former USSR.
Furthermore, these articles only touch on particular social insurance programmes instead
of discussing the whole system in a comprehensive manner. For example Deacon (1983)
reviews the health, income maintenance and housing services in selected socialist
countries in order to understand ‘socialist social policy in Britain’. On the other hand
Porket (1979) examined the coverage, entitlement, and levels of benefits of the old age
pension schemes and their social effects in the Soviet Union, Hungary and Poland.
Nevertheless these pioneers share their insights on social insurance in socialist countries.
For instance Porket says in his paper that “.. .in the countries discussed, egalitarianism is
far from being a reality...” and social insurance services were provided for purposes
other than income maintenance.
“The functions of social security depending on the nature of the Communist 
system, though also influenced by the stage reached and the momentary situation, 
include especially to legitimise the take-over of power and the stabilised system; 
to strengthen work discipline; to raise labour productivity; to reduce absenteeism 
and labour turnover, and to maintain, restore and improve the capacity for work.” 
(Porket 1979, p. 31-32)
The illustration of the pension schemes in three East European countries offered 
by Porket shows that social insurance in socialist developed countries plays a significant 
role in labour management. For these countries the roles and objectives of social 
insurance are for controlling the social productivity that it is significantly different from 
the capitalist developed countries discussed before. Such an approach reflects the 
uniqueness of social insurance in the countries of a socialist nature. In 1980, George and 
Manning studied the social welfare system in the USSR including the social security 
system. Their conclusion, in referring to the three principles set out by Lenin, is close to 
Porket’s view that social insurance in a socialist country is highly related to economic 
production. They found that the social insurance system in the former USSR was a form 
of ‘occupational welfare’ that “...the Soviet system rewards labour in difficult and 
unhealthy occupations (whilst) the occupations of capitalism reward middle-class and 
white-collar labour.” (1980, p. 59) The social security system in the USSR was “either 
regressive or neutral” because “there is no unemployment and assistance benefit which 
usually benefits the low paid.” Another comment on the Soviet social insurance is that it 
is a ‘system of state managerialism ... with greater involvement of trade union members
24
at the local level.” (George et a l , 1980, p. 62)
In sum, according to George and Manning, social insurance services in socialist 
countries with the example of the former USSR has several features different from 
capitalist countries. First, regarding the coverage these services protect only those who 
work hard for the socialist state. Second, the systems are managed by the state for 
occupational purposes. Furthermore, social insurance in socialist countries is the means 
for labour and production control under the state’s direction. In a nutshell, the accesses 
to social insurance programmes in socialist countries are determined by one’s 
participation in socialist production and social insurance usually only covers the 
production forces in state-owned units.9 Apart from limited coverage, social insurance 
services in socialist countries are alienated from the risk pooling that is a relatively 
significant aim in most capitalist developed countries like Britain and the United States. 
With the strong and direct intervention by the state, mutual help is mobilised by 
collectivism for economic growth, political stability and social cohesiveness. In socialist 
countries, the risk-pooling objective is effected through the centralised economic and 
political systems that social insurance openly plays the occupational welfare role. The 
exposition of the Soviet social insurance system made by George et al provides a good 
reference to study social insurance in other socialist countries like China that is still a 
blank page.
Trofimyuk, the Head of the State Social Insurance Department of the Central 
Council of Trade Unions in the USSR, mentioned two special objectives of social 
insurance in the country citing the case of medical services in 1981. First, it was “...to 
ensure safe and healthy working conditions for working people”. Second, it was “...to 
give effect to the principle of prevention in the health services provided for the workers.” 
(1981, p. 169-170) According to Trofimyuk, the former is for economic efficiency 
purposes whilst the latter is for social purposes. The illustration of the medical services 
demonstrates two outstanding features of the Soviet social insurance. First, the eligibility 
to and provision of insurance benefits is based on one’s productivity. Second, non­
productive forces only have lower priority or are even barred from getting the services. 
Both of these features are far removed from the functional objectives of risk pooling for
9 P lease se e  the exam ple of medical services in the former Soviet Union in Trofimyuk (1981).
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income maintenance, and social solidarity stems from the ideals of protecting the 
individual’s freedom in economic changes as in capitalist developed countries.
It is rather clear that ‘productivity’ is the basic criteria for one to access social 
insurance services in socialist countries. This contrasts with the ‘duty-right’ contractual 
relationship realised through contribution and entitlement in capitalist social insurance 
systems. Political orientation and the recognition of the applicant’s achievements are the 
significant features of socialist social insurance. Political orientation and personal 
achievements refer to one’s productivity whether it enhances the development of 
socialist economy and society or not. Hence the nature of socialist social insurance is 
political-occupational rather than protecting one’s freedom in economic 
transformation.10 Moreover, the political-occupational approach satisfied more the 
‘immediate demonstrated needs’ of the state than the ‘future presumptive needs’ of 
individuals. The coverage of the social insurance in socialist countries is therefore 
discriminative and selective.
In another study on social security system in former USSR, George (1991)
highlights the specific political-occupational nature from reviewing its historical
development. This article is a very good piece of work in spelling out the driving forces
for the development of the social insurance in the country: “...authoritarian rule, party
membership and heavy industrialisation.” The general features of social security in
former USSR, as described by George, are that:
“Benefits were paid on the strength of a person’s work record, the amount 
depended on previous earnings, the distinction between ordinary and privileged 
work was maintained, special pensions to high government and party dignitaries 
continued and, above all, benefits remained static, without any indexation to 
either prices or wages.” (George 1991, p. 49)
In concluding the paper, George argues that the socialist social security system 
“...helped to alleviate poverty ... (but it) never became a central aim of that system 
because the resources were allocated for other purposes.” (1991, p. 62) It seems
10 For example, Kozlov (1989) mentioned that the m em bers of kolkhozes (collective farms) and 
sovkhozes (large, agricultural enterprises owned by the sta te  and other agricultural enterprises) 
were eligible for old-age pensions a s  were those m anual workers and salaried em ployees of the 
state. He also remarked that "the social security schem e pays pensions to disabled ex- 
servicem en and allowances to m others of large families, single m others, low-income families 
and other groups...." (1989, p. 62) This clearly shows the political-occupational nature of social 
insurance program m es and the different provisions to the productive and non-productive
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therefore that social insurance services in socialist countries are not targeted at providing 
income maintenance to those in need. Rather, they are assigned with politically 
determined duties that are extraneous to social insurance. The specific roles and duties of 
social insurance for political and economical development are very unique to social 
insurance in socialist country.
Another special feature of social insurance system in socialist countries is the 
management of the contributions and benefits. Trofimyuk (1981) mentioned in his 
article that the Central Council of Trade Unions was responsible for managing social 
insurance in the former USSR. Trade unions in socialist countries are one of the many 
organisations in managing labour related issues. Unlike trade unions in capitalist 
countries that are mainly self-developed interests groups for people sharing a way of 
making a living, trade unions in socialist countries as the former USSR and China are 
quasi-governmental organisations formed and maintained under the instructions of the 
ruling parties and categorised as ‘social and political groups’.11 Among the many 
assigned functions trade unions in China are the ‘links for the communist party to tie 
with the masses’. (Zhu et a l 1991, p. 669, my translation) Such links have wide impacts 
from mobilising the members for political movements to collecting the views on and 
assisting in the implementation of social insurance policies. Therefore the management 
of social insurance by labour unions and work units in socialist countries is another 
distinguishing characteristic.
Other distinguishing features of social insurance in socialist countries are 
‘multilateral-managed organisations’, ‘unidentifiable employer’ and ‘unitary funding 
source’. ‘Multilateral-managed organisations’ is the by-product of the practice of public 
ownership in socialist countries. For example, in China, the state controls social 
insurance through resource allocation and legalisation. At the same time, work units and 
trade unions are assigned to implement social insurance services. Thus the close state-
m em bers in society.
11 S ee, for example, Zhu et al. state  that the earliest trade unions were formed am ong the 
workers in wool processing and spinning industries in England in the mid-18th Century as 
mutual-help and aid groups. Similar workers’ organisations in China can be traced back to 1912 
but the first formal trade union ‘Machinery W orkers’ Trade Union’ w as founded in 1920 in 
Shanghai ‘under the guidance of Marxism’. In May 1925, the ‘All China Trade Unions’ was 
established by T h e  Secretariat for the Realignment of Labour Forces in China (Quanguo 
Laodong Zuhe Shujibu)’ as  the institution for ‘leading the workers’ m ovem ents in the country’. 
(1991, p. 669)
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enterprise relationships are found in economic production as well as social 
administration.12 Since both the work units and the trade unions are state agents for 
labour management they take part in social insurance management. In other words, there 
is no definitely or specifically assigned organisation which deals specially with social 
insurance.
The second concern is that neither the work units nor the trade unions are 
employers in the socialist public ownership system and the tripartite social insurance 
system extant in Western countries is hardly found in socialist countries. Last but not 
least social insurance funding in socialist countries is supported by a centralised re­
allocation system in that work units have to turn over all the profits to state first and then 
ask for an apportion to meet the expenses of social insurance. By such action 
contributions from work units are latent but their roles in managing the insurance 
benefits are still active.
The review in this section demonstrates that the approaches and objectives of 
social insurance in socialist countries with the case of the former USSR are dissimilar to 
those in capitalist developed countries mentioned above. The case reflects that social 
insurance in the USSR is directed by its collective economic system set up for securing 
the communist regime by enhancing economic production. Social insurance in the USSR 
emerges from the collective, or, more precisely, the ruling party’s need in managing the 
labour force in the country’s work units. This explains why the government, work units 
and trade unions managed social insurance in the USSR jointly and covered mainly 
employees in state-owned units. On that ground individual needs are left out of the 
account or disregarded.
In a nutshell, the ideologies of social insurance services in socialist countries are 
not in line with those in capitalist countries. The most distinguishing difference is the 
emphasis on the collective needs in socialist countries whilst in capitalist nations it is on 
the individual’s. Social insurance in socialist countries is expected to enhance the 
development of socialism by providing income maintenance to the socialist labour force.
12 Lu (1989, p. 71) defines "the social organisations or institutions in which the people work - 
factories, shops, schools, hospitals, research institutes, cultural groups, party and political 
institutions, etc. are called ‘units’". In this study “work unit’ or ‘unit’ connotes the sam e m eaning.
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On the other side, social insurance in capitalist countries is for promoting social 
conscience in dealing with the externalities on the people in capitalist economic 
development. At the operational level, expenses for social insurance in socialist 
countries is part of the planned economic system that risks and contingent income needs 
of the labour force are cared for by the state, with assistance from employers and trade 
unions. Social insurance in capitalist developed countries, however, is supported by a 
multiparty contributory system that is separate from the control of employers.
It is apparent that socialist social insurance is built on a set of values and 
objectives that is distinctive from the general conception of social insurance in capitalist 
developed countries. These values and perspectives explain why the features of social 
insurance in socialist countries are a kind of occupational welfare, cover selected groups 
of people, and is heavily supported by state resources. This finding sustains the argument 
that the features of social insurance are conditioned by the values and perspectives on 
social insurance held in the country. Accordingly, an observation is derived that the 
different social and economic systems in socialist countries make its features of social 
insurance distinct from those found in capitalist developed countries. In order to examine 
this notion this study will explore social insurance in China to find out what are its 
specific features of social insurance in its particular social system and economic mode of 
production. Before that, it is necessary to review the studies on social insurance in China 
to find out how far the scholars tried to explore this area of study.
Literature review on social insurance in China
It is seen from the discussions above that the characteristics of social insurance are 
unique to the country because of its social and economic systems that culture certain 
values and perspectives. Hence, the studies on social insurance in capitalist developed 
countries and the former USSR are neither sufficient nor appropriate to understanding 
social insurance in China, a socialist developing country. Accordingly, an important 
question is ‘What are the characteristics of social insurance in China?’ Before 
proceeding to answer this question it is necessary to review the literature on the Chinese 
social insurance in order to see to what extent and how the scholars research the Chinese 
social insurance services.
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Studies on the characteristics of social insurance in China are meagre. There are 
studies on the values and ideologies of welfare in China like Chan and Chow (1992). 
Chan et a l reviews the provision pattern of welfare in the country after 1949 in order to 
find out the welfare ideology in the country. The book by Chan and Chow is a good 
examination of the welfare pattern and strategies in China although it does not study 
social insurance, especially its particularities. Some other studies analyse the ‘Chinese 
model of social welfare’ from the administrative structure of the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (Wong 1995), or generally discuss the various aspects of welfare services in 
China (Wong and MacQuarrie, 1986). These studies, however, do not mention the non­
welfare social policy such as social insurance in China, nor do they explore the features 
of social insurance.
A pioneer on the studies on social security in China is John Dixon. The book 
written by Dixon (1981) focuses on the financial implications and administrative 
difficulties of the entire social security system in China. In this book Dixon makes a 
comprehensive examination of the ‘social assistance system’ in China from 1949-1979. 
This is a very good book for those who want to know the founding and development of 
occupational welfare and social relief systems in China under Mao’s leadership. 
However, this study has not discussed labour insurance or social insurance in China, not 
to mention the distinctions of its social insurance.
In general, there are five dimensions found in the literature on the social 
insurance in China after 1979. The first is about financial resources. The second is about 
reforms of the services in general. The third is about emerging or changing needs under 
the reforms. The fourth is about the service structure or system and policy legislation. 
The final one is about the need to examine deeply the changing social insurance policies 
and the effectiveness of its reforms in China. However, none of these digs deep into the 
characteristics of the services.
Regarding the financial matters in social security in China, Chow (1988) studied 
the financing mechanism and problems in social security in China. Chow analysed the 
financial administration of social security in China in the first few years of the reforms. 
In mainland China, a book titled “The Economics of Social Security” by Ge (1990) 
makes a special study of the financial management of social security in China. One of
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the important areas in this book is a review on resource allocation for the provisions of 
service. It is particularly useful for evaluating how the quality of the services is affected.
Yet, some other studies on social insurance in China are rather general. Yan 
(1993) describes social insurance policies in China after the reforms. On the other hand, 
the book on social security edited by the State Economic Systems Reforms Commission 
(SESRC) (1995) discusses different social insurance programmes in the early 1990s with 
some examples drawn from different regions along the eastern coast of the country. 
However, these books neither provide a panoramic view of the development of social 
insurance, nor highlight the features of social insurance in China under the control of the 
communist government. On the other hand, Zhu and Pan (1995) review the development 
of social insurance from the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 to the reform era in the 
1980s. This book provides lots of information on social insurance development and also 
forecasts the changes in the reforms so that readers can grasp the rather comprehensive 
view on the social insurance system in China. In addition, Chen (1996), an officer from 
the Planning and Financing Department of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, evaluates 
generally the social security programmes as well as predicting the trend of social relief 
work and social insurance in China in the mid 1990s.
An example of the study on the reforms in social security in China is Hussain’s 
paper (1994) that reviews and analyses the development and the difficulties. In fact 
Hussain and others at The Development Economics Research Programme of the London 
School of Economics have been actively participating in the research on social security 
programmes in China. In 1989 Hussain and Liu complied a list of references on Chinese 
social security that is an excellent start to research on income maintenance services in 
the country. Atkinson (1993), on the other hand, offered an analysis on the newly 
introduced unemployment insurance and the impacts in 1990. Ahmad and Wang (1991) 
review the impacts of the development of market socialism in China on poverty in the 
first decade of economic growth from 1979. In 1993 and 1994, Hussain’s two papers 
concentrated on the reforms of social security system in China. In his paper titled 
‘Reform of the Chinese Social Security System’ Hussain points out four main features of 
the Chinese social security system: segmentation, diversified management and financing, 
variation, and occupational nature (1993, p. 14-17). This discussion offers stimulating 
and valuable insight to initiate this study.
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In comparing the book written by SESRC mentioned before, with a chapter by 
Chow (1995) which describes generally the reforms in social security with the case of 
Shenzhen, Chow also discloses some features of Chinese social security, i.e. the 
neglected peasants, inefficient services, and alienation from Chinese culture. (1995, p. 
28-31) In referring to the proposition made by the Chinese government in 1985 that the 
country is planning for ‘...a socialist security system with Chinese characteristics,’ 
Chow makes two comments. First, there is no clear definition of ‘socialist social 
security’ and second, the ‘Chinese characteristics’ seems to mean the return to ‘mutual 
assistance among relatives, friends and neighbours.’ The two points raised by Chow are 
very innovative and stimulate the study on the characteristics of social insurance system 
in China. Nevertheless there are no studies which have ever explored these issues 
specifically. Another study on income protection schemes takes the case of Shenzhen in 
China. This is the chapter contributed by Wong and Lee (1996). This particular chapter 
assigned a part to discuss the rising needs and management problems of social insurance 
in this Special Economic Zone in southern China.
To study social insurance in China is a broad issue. There is a rural-urban 
dichotomy in that the two social insurance systems are mostly incompatible. Most 
researchers on Chinese social insurance, e.g. Hussain (1993), Chow (1995), and Wong 
(1995), mention the ‘party-state-enterprises’ issues as one of the notable features. In 
view of the significant state role in social insurance, a paper by Cui (1988), the former 
Minister for Civil Affairs in China, provides a structural review to understand the 
practical issues such as management and financing of social insurance in China. These 
two pieces of work point out the significance of understanding the financial pattern of 
social insurance from the close relationships between politics and economy in China.
In referring to the ideology of income maintenance programmes in China, some 
scholars examine the social security system from the people’s changing values and 
attitudes on financial supports for the elderly. For example, Davin (1993) finds that the 
roles and functions of family on caring for the elderly are deteriorating. She also 
mentions that there are some policies such as Family Law and Heritage Law which are 
set-up for correcting this trend. The message brought out by Davin is that social value
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and supports are changed in different economic and political environments that 
ultimately affect income maintenance services. In other words, it is necessary to explore 
the features of a country’s social insurance from understanding the social values and 
expectations.
Regarding materials referring to the applied studies on social insurance, a rather 
particular piece of work is provided by Shao (1991, p. 175-183). This focuses on the 
attitudes of the participants in the individual economy towards old age pensions in 
Shanghai. In the introduction of the study Shao said “In order to understand the greatest 
affordability of the people on social security, it is necessary to understand the most 
flexible part of the labour system, that is, participants in individual economy and their 
psychological preparation for social security.” (My translation) Shao’s view is rather 
limited. It is necessary to study this “psychological preparation” of the employees in 
general in the changing employment and economic ownership systems in China. Such an 
approach can also reflect one of the features of the Chinese social insurance, that is, the 
ideology of the people in China on social insurance.
Another social research project relates to the themes of social insurance in China 
which was carried out in 1993 by Guangzhou Shi Social Science Academy. (GSK, 1995) 
The report “A Study on the Concepts Of Social Security of the Residents in Guangzhou 
Shi”, prepared by Cai, discloses that the ‘work unit orientation’ is very significant and 
strong among local residents. This situation is even stronger among older people and 
those who work in state organisations. (GSK, 1995, p. 47) The paper spells out the 
strong relationships between the work unit and employees and this extends the party- 
state-units relationships to party-state-units-individuals. This linkage determines social 
insurance provisions in China. In brief, this paper is a very good reference material in 
seeking an understanding of the features of Chinese social insurance from the 
employees’ perspective.
The Chinese social insurance services can also be distinguished by the changes in 
the reforms such as the labour system, the welfare system, the enterprise reforms, the 
ownership system, etc. The case of China is that reforms from a planned to a ‘socialist 
market’ economy leave commodity prices difficult to control. Wages have been rising in 
formal employment sectors. It seems that those who have incomes generated from
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formal employment or other alternatives can escape from living in relative poverty. To 
take the elderly as the example that . over the decade wage-rises protected the majority 
of those in regular employment from the economic effects of this inflation, but the value 
of pensions was seriously eroded.” (Davin 1993, p. 110) In this sense, financial support 
to people with long-term needs such as the elderly becomes more striking when there are 
“high inflation and uncertainties of life in the conditions of rapid social, economic and 
political change.” (Davin 1993, p. 112) To understand the features of Chinese social 
insurance an in-depth field study is required and an account of its policies and services 
development should be made.
In sum, most of the studies on social insurance in China focus on certain areas: 
financial and policy implications, sectional needs such as the elderly and the peasants, 
values of the people on social security, etc. In fact, the particular features of social 
insurance in China have not been fully explored. Although it is learnt that Chinese social 
insurance is patterned on systems devised in the former USSR, the immature economic 
development, distinct interpretation of socialism, and social traditions in China 
constitute a macro environment that makes the characteristics of the service dissimilar.
Conceptual framework, research questions and research methodology
After having completed the literature review on social insurance in countries of different 
political and economic systems, it is found that there is no related framework for 
understanding the features of the Chinese social insurance. This section will look for an 
analytical framework from the proposition of ‘the sociology of social insurance’, set up 
the research questions and design the methodology to carry out this study.
The ‘sociology of social insurance’ maintains that social insurance is a ‘social 
institution’ within the social structure.13 Structural functionalists such as Radcliffe- 
Brown, Talcott Parsons and Emile Durkheim propose that the social institution is part of 
the social structure and change. In applying the structural functionalist perspective, 
social insurance is a social institution that has specific norms and roles because of its 
particular types of activities and sphere of life. However, social insurance is one of the
13 See, for example, Titmuss (1974) also u ses  ‘institution’ in his discussion to describe the public 
insurance system s and services.
34
social institutions in the social structure whose existence is dependent on the others. 
Furthermore, the emergence, development and reforms of social insurance bear upon the 
economic and political systems of the country as other social institutions.
Another ‘structural’ perspective for distinguishing the features of social 
insurance refers to the social ‘base and superstructure’ viewed by Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels. In addition to feudal societies, Marx categorises all societies in general 
into capitalist and socialist according to their modes of economy. Marx and Engels 
propose that there is a social substructure (or base) that refers to the mode of economy 
(or economic structure) of the society. The substructure determines the superstructure 
that refers to the state in terms of political and social institutions and social 
consciousness that generate specific ‘social relations of production’ in society.14 In brief, 
social insurance is a social institution determined by the particular economic mode of the 
society and directed or affected by the production relations set up for responding to the 
changing social conditions. Marx’s structural view explains how and why human society 
is different and developed. It also suggests why social insurance services are provided 
differently between capitalist and socialist countries and in various economic conditions. 
The Marxist structural view on society is used in this study to explain the features of 
social insurance in China found in this study.
Both the structural functionalists and the Marxist structuralists provide a general 
concept to understand social insurance from the social institution perspective. However, 
these perspectives do not offer practical methods to demonstrate what the products (i.e. 
the social institutions) look like (i.e. the features) in relation to the particular social 
system or economic production mode. The research method of finding out the features of 
social insurance in a country therefore refers to the ‘sociological study of social 
insurance’ proposed by Rys (1964) and Sigg (1985), whilst the Marxist structuralist 
perspective is used for explaining the research results. Rys remarks on the study method 
of ‘sociological study of social security’ that the development of social security is 
conditioned by internal and external factors. For internal factors it refers to population, 
economy, social structure, politics, pressure groups, and social psychology. On the other 
hand the external factors include the spread of culture, technological development,
14 For detail explanation on ‘social base  and superstructure’ p lease refer to Bottomore (1983) p. 
42-45.
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international cooperation, and technical aid.
The two main points raised by Rys are the ‘changing forces behind the emerging 
and development of social security’ and ‘social security system is a social institution’. 
The first point directly points out the controlling forces that create and reform social 
security system. The second point stresses that as a social institution social security 
performs some expected roles and functions in achieving pre-set objectives. For 
instance, the social security system is built for keeping the set living standard (e.g. at or 
just above the poverty line) of the waged working class when they have contingent 
income needs. Furthermore, the influential and affected pressure groups like trade 
unions, employers’ associations, professional medical groups, etc. may counter check or 
work hand in hand with politicians in reforming the contents and benefit levels of social 
security.
In echoing Rys, Sigg proposed that there are several sociological factors in social 
security schemes and they can be grouped into those “...relating essentially to a national 
entity” and those that “...transcended a national level.” (1985, p. 4) The former 
comprises the country’s demography, economy, social structure, politics and pressure 
groups, the development of institutions, and social psychology. On the other hand the 
latter includes the spread of culture, the development of techniques, standards, technical 
assistance and international cooperation.
In a way different from Rys, Sigg does not only spell out the ‘national and 
transcendent-national level’ factors in the development of social security but also the 
need to synthesise all of them. According to Sigg two different levels of sociological 
study on social security could be carried out. At the macro-sociological level the study 
should include the cultural, historical and institutional factors whilst at the micro- 
sociological level, the research topics are social needs, social security management 
related issues like the techniques, organisation, structure and operation and 
administration. (1985, p. 5)
In contrast to Rys, Sigg argues that “sociology has no clear perception of what is 
at stake in social security.” (1985, p. 7) Therefore Sigg suggests five aspects in the study 
of social security through the sociological perspective. These include ‘evaluating social
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security programmes’, ‘the functioning of the institution of social security’, ‘the 
development of the institution of social security’, ‘a sociological definition of social 
security’ and ‘the need for sociological research in social security’. (1985, p. 11-17) Sigg 
also suggests some topics or areas like the structure of means of livelihood, inequality 
and life styles, or even social structures in this particular field of study. (1985, p. 11) In 
brief, sociological analysis on social security calls for a holistic perspective that includes 
the institution, historical development, services, and effectiveness of income protection.
Both Rys and Sigg suggest some areas that reflect the characteristics of social 
insurance of a country, but for China the social, economic and political conditions are 
unique. First, the country was isolated for a long time so that influence from other 
countries on the setting up, development and reforms of social insurance have been 
weaker. Second, the Chinese social insurance system is different from the capitalist 
developed countries in that the social classes, apart from the workers and peasants, are 
insignificant and do not play an active role in social insurance development.15 Hence, 
this study on the features of social insurance in China will exclude the external factors 
but include the people’s experiences and views on social insurance in the macro- 
sociological factors group. Furthermore, this study will focus on the social sectors like 
employees in state-owned work units, residents with permanent household status, etc. 
since this grouping method is more appropriate in China.
In sum, social insurance is a social institution whose founding, objectives, 
management, and effects relate with the social system or economic production mode of 
the country. The features of social insurance in China, however, were not described in 
detail in the past, irrespective of the structural functionalists or Marxist structuralists 
offering good analytical framework to understand how and why these features come 
about. For the case of China this study will employ the two-level sociological approach 
that will only take into account the national factors. Thus the sociological study on social 
insurance in this study will explore the internal determinants including the cultural, 
historical and institutional elements, as well as the management of social insurance and 
the views of the people to outline the features of social insurance in the country.
15 On this particular point Rys (1964) m entions the influence of the growing middle and low- 
income c lasses in formulating social security through election and legislation but th ese  are 
insignificant in China.
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The above discussed conceptual framework and study methodology aim at 
finding out the answers for the main research question “What are the specific features of 
social insurance in China in its particular social system and economic mode of 
production?” In achieving this study objective, there are four sub-questions set for this 
study:
i.) How was social insurance founded and developed in China?
ii) How are the social insurance services provided and managed in China?
iii) Who and to what extent are the people covered, benefited, or neglected by
social insurance in China?
iv) How do the people react towards the social insurance services and what are
their expectations?
The first question will focus on the historical development of social insurance in 
China from the feudal stage to the mid 1990s. It will also present the Confucian and 
communist ideologies on income maintenance and its effects on the development of 
social insurance in the country. Apart from these, this part of the study will also review 
the rules, policies and regulations on social insurance from 1949, the year in which the 
Communist Party of China took over the country and initiated labour insurance for its 
‘socialist labour force’. The chronological study on social insurance in China in parallel 
with the changing social systems and economic production mode will give the insight on 
the social values and ideologies that govern and mould the social insurance system. The 
answers for this question will therefore facilitate the study on the characteristics of social 
insurance in China with a concrete and detailed background.
In referring to the second question the study focus is put on the practices and 
provisions of social insurance in China. This inquiry will touch on how the services were 
designed and delivered in different periods, especially after 1949 the Communist Party 
of China had set up a formal income maintenance system including social insurance 
across the country. This review on the provisions of the services will also bring out the 
financing pattern and other management features like the types of benefits, benefit 
levels, the revisions of benefits, entitlement criteria, disbursement of benefits, social 
insurance service structure, etc. In addition, it will also highlight the roles and
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responsibilities of state, employers and individuals in social insurance services in China. 
All of these materials are important in understanding the specific features of social 
insurance in a country.
The third question relates to the effects of social insurance in China. Particularly, 
this question will improve exploring the coverage issue in social insurance that can 
reflect largely the objectives and approaches of the social insurance. For example, in 
exploring the question of ‘Who are being covered and to what extent these people are 
covered?’ will also lead the discussion to another question that is ‘Why are they covered 
in that way?’ This logical method of finding out the answers for the related questions 
will provide evidence to substantiate the propositions on some features of social 
insurance in China.
The fourth question touches on the experiences and expectations of the people on 
social insurance. This research question focuses on the social effects of the social 
insurance in China that reflects the effectiveness and operation of the services within the 
entire social, economic and political structure. In other words, with this indirect 
approach the features of social insurance are brought to light from the ‘social 
perspective’.
These four questions target the seeking out of features of the social insurance in 
China in four different areas: the development of social insurance, the management 
issues of social insurance, the social insurance policy effects, and the social effects of 
social insurance services. All these four areas depict a picture of the features of social 
insurance in the particular social system and economic production mode in China that 
has not been tried before. Most importantly, the findings in this study will also evidence 
in what area and to what extent social insurance in a socialist developing country, with 
the example of China, are different from those found in capitalist developed countries. In 
order to find out the answers for these four questions the research strategies employed in 
this study are mainly literature review, unstructured individual interviewing and 
structured interviewing with questionnaires, and statistical analysis. In the following all 
these research strategies will be presented in detail, especially on how they were applied 
and which research question they addressed.
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It is stated above that this project is a sociological study that focuses on finding 
out the particular features of a social institution in a socialist developing country. To 
achieve this objective it needs ample information or data to outline the characteristics of 
such a social institution in the country. For this study the research strategies can 
generally be grouped into quantitative research strategies like structured interview with 
questionnaires and statistical analyses, and qualitative research strategies like literature 
review and unstructured interview. Qualitative research strategies like literature review 
and unstructured interviews are mainly used for collecting materials and information for 
the first and second research questions. It is important to look into the research reports, 
policy documents, and materials collected from interviewing the experienced officials 
and related people to get insights on the issues like the historical development and 
reforms of social insurance. It is also necessary to understand the features of social 
insurance from the published materials and views of the service providers about their 
values on social insurance, the types, organisation, financing, policies and regulations of 
social insurance services in the country.
For the third and fourth research questions, quantitative research strategies are 
the best in finding out the answers. Quantitative research strategies like structured 
interviewing with questionnaires and statistical analysis quantify the issues and 
situations that facilitate the conceptualisation of the features of the services. For 
example, the data collected from interviewing with structured questionnaires are counted 
and cross-tabulated to get the frequencies of and the correlation between different 
variables. The results derived from the statistical analyses facilitate the understanding, 
for example, which groups of the urban employees are covered by social insurance and 
under what situations they benefit, etc. in China.
In applying the research strategies mentioned above some research techniques 
are used in this study. These include the draft of a list of organisations and people to be 
interviewed, the access to policy and internal documents concerning social insurance 
services in the country, the networking with the related government and civic bodies, the 
design, draft and test of the questionnaires, the use of machines, computers and 
computer software to analyse the data, etc. In the following pages, all of the research 
techniques applied in this study and the organisations and people contacted are 
presented.
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First, the qualitative research strategy adopted unstructured interviewing with 
social insurance professionals and experts to elicit the concepts of social insurance in 
China. This is crucial since the perception and views of the experts extracted from 
interviews facilitated establishing the validity of the orientation, ideology and values of 
social insurance in the country. These unstructured but focussed interviews were 
arranged by the researcher and evolved over a period of time. The list of interviewees 
includes mainly those officers working in relevant state organisations. It also 
incorporates the views of the distinguished academics on the issue.16 During 
interviewing tape recorders were used with consent gained beforehand.
Unstructured interviewing was carried out in the period from late 1994 to mid 
1996. Visits were paid to the Social Insurance Section of the Economic Systems 
Reforms Committee of Guangdong Province, the Social Insurance Services Bureau of 
Guangdong Province, the Guangdong Province Society of Social Insurance. Among 
these organisations, the Guangdong Province Society of Social Insurance is a quasi- 
govemmental organisation affiliated to the Social Insurance Services Bureau of 
Guangdong Province and formed by the veterans of the Labour Bureau, a state organ 
that managed all labour services including labour insurance in China prior to the 
reforms.
The interviewing of the officials from the Guangdong Province Society of Social 
Insurance is invaluable, especially because of their practical experiences and the 
materials they compiled on the roads of development of the Chinese social insurance. 
These internal materials contain the views and updated information on the rationales and 
changes in social insurance in different regions of Guangdong Province that outline the 
features of urban social insurance in the province. In relation to the Society, the two state 
organisations that are charged with the responsibility to look into social insurance 
reforms also proved very helpful. Although the Social Insurance Services Bureau is a 
section independent of the Labour Bureau, in 1992, it was doing well in centralising the 
planning and management of social insurance in the country, especially the initiating of 
new social insurance services like unemployment benefits and reforming other long-
16 A full list of the persons contacted is found in Appendix.
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established items. In the interviews with its deputy head, Mr. Long Huisi, in Guangzhou 
Shi, this project was enriched with his insights and experiences on the principles and 
objectives of socialist social insurance, the financial resources patterns and the future 
development of social insurance in the country.
The contacts with the Social Insurance Section of the Guangdong Province 
Economic Systems Reforms Committee provided opportunities to build up relationships 
with other related state organisations for this study. In acknowledgment of all the 
invaluable assistance provided this project special significance is attached to other state 
organisations visited: the Systems Reforms Committee assisted the researcher to access 
the Labour Bureau, the Social Insurance Services Bureau and even the Zhongshan 
University that provided the researcher with extraordinary field workers to administer 
the structured questionnaires.
Systems Reforms Committees were formed in the early 1980s as the think tanks 
of the governments at different levels. With support from the central authority of the 
government, or precisely, the Premier of the State Council, the Systems Reforms 
committees have very strong links with all the state and non-state owned work units 
across the country. For the specific purpose of this study, the Social Insurance Section of 
the Systems Reforms Committee of Guangdong Province was enlisted. The Social 
Insurance Section at the provincial level centralises the research and planning of new 
initiatives on social insurance service at different localities within the province. In other 
words the Section maintains the most comprehensive and current materials available on 
the provisions of the services. In fact the close contacts with Mr. Dong Binguang, the 
deputy head of the Section allowed the researcher access to the data, share his 
knowledge, and interview other officials directly.
Unstructured interviewing also extended to the Labour Bureau of Guangzhou 
Shi. The offices of the Labour Bureau at local levels are responsible for implementing 
the labour management policy from job allocation to the provisions of labour insurance. 
Since the early 1990s labour bureaux are also charged with the duties of registering and 
retraining those unemployed who were discharged because of enterprise reforms 
(xiagang). The Ministry of Labour at the central level and the labour bureaux at local 
levels have different directly controlled and subsidiary units to carry out its roles in
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unemployment management.17 For this research project the ‘Unemployment and 
Management Section’ was visited. The Section provided information on the policies and 
services for the unemployed. Furthermore, the researcher also held in-depth discussions 
with the section heads on the emerging of unemployment benefits in the Labour Bureau 
in the mid 1990s and the transference of the service to Social Insurance Services Bureau. 
In the course of several visits to Labour Bureau of Guangzhou Shi, the researcher 
received strong support from the officials like the Deputy Head of the Bureau Ms Jiang 
Yuan, leading personnel from the Unemployment and Management Section Mr Ye 
Wuxiong and Mr Yang Bingzhao, as well as Ms Zhang Qiuhong, the Head of the 
General Office. Interviewing the officers from the Labour Bureau enhanced the 
understanding of the changes and development of labour insurance, as well as the 
motivating ideals and rationales in providing insurance services to urban workers.
In order to get a full picture on the living standards of those on social relief, the 
researcher also visited the Social Relief Section of the Guangzhou Shi Civil Affairs 
Bureau. The Ministry of Civil Affairs is a designated state organisation that works on 
poor and disaster relief in urban and rural areas.18 One of its important assignments since 
the modernisation in the 1980s is to quantify the poverty line used as the standard for 
poor relief. Although the design is in its initial stage, the poverty line in China is also the 
basis for determining the social insurance benefits levels. Thus the visits are meaningful 
because the information reflects the extent to which social insurance services are 
effective in income maintenance in China. In general the visits were very fruitful. The 
researcher obtained the official views on determining benefit levels, the characteristics 
of the beneficiaries and the relations between social relief and social insurance that 
provides a closer insight into the social policies designed to meet the people’s contingent 
income needs in the country.
In order to strengthen the understanding of the features of the Chinese social
17 There are  three ministries responsible for the m anagem ent of the xiagang (suspended) and 
shiye (unemployed) workers. The Ministry of Civil Affairs looks into the social relief for these 
urban workers. The Ministry of Labour assists  th ese  workers to live independently from state 
relief like retraining and encouraging them  to run small business. The Social Insurance Services 
Bureau that w as m ade an implementation unit of the newly founded Ministry of Social Security in 
1998 is responsible for the m anagem ent of unem ploym ent benefits.
18 For a com prehensive study on the services of the Ministry of Civil Administration p lease refer 
to W ang (1995).
43
insurance, the researcher also interviewed the academics who have special expertise in 
this area of study. Among these scholars Professor Cai He from the Sociology 
Department of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou Shi proved the most helpful. 
Professor Cai is a sociologist specialising in urban sociology and social services in 
China. Although social policy studies is not a well developed field in China, Professor 
Cai has been trying to apply a range of sociological perspectives on social institution 
studies in the country. Specifically, Professor Cai assisted the researcher to understand 
the Chinese social insurance from the academic view, helped in making contacts with 
the targeted work units and in organising an interviewing team to carry out the field 
study. The researcher also benefited from the interviews with other professors in China 
and discussed with them the related issues like enterprise and employment systems 
reforms and the growth of the non-state owned system and its impacts on social 
insurance. The significant contributions of these experts are their insights into the related 
areas of social insurance and their concrete research experiences in China. Briefly 
speaking, the largest part of the background knowledge of this study is derived from a 
review of the literature of policy documents and the transcriptions worked out from the 
recordings of the interviews. Through systematic collection, classification and analysis 
of the facts collected from interviewing and literature review new concepts are generated 
for further analysis on the features of the Chinese social insurance.
The research techniques of structured interviewing methods include 
questionnaire design and pilot testing, training of interviewers, sampling and selection of 
the target units, use of hard- and software in data input and analysis. For this study there 
are two different sets of questionnaires which were administered by the interviewers. 
One set of the questionnaires were formulated for the management of social insurance in 
25 work units whilst the other set were designed for the 520 employees. A thorough 
description of the samplings and success rate is presented in Chapter 5.
The field study with structured questionnaires was targeted at the management of 
the service and the employees completed the inquiry into the features of the Chinese 
social insurance system together with the interviewing and literature review. On the 
management side 25 work units of state and non state-owned organisations were 
identified. These work units were all located within Greater Guangzhou Shi and consist 
of significant types of business. In these work units the staff who are responsible for the
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management of social insurance were interviewed. For most of the work units these were 
factory managers or unit heads who have direct access to the data and information about 
the services provided in the units.19
On the employee side, initially 520 employees were contacted and interviewed in 
their work units. The management of the work units and the researcher arranged the time 
and place of the interviews with the employees. These managers were absent from the 
interviewing after having introduced the interviewers. After they left the interviews were 
carried out in a random manner on the spot. Nevertheless the managers were provided 
with a sample of the questionnaire beforehand. The process of interviewing went very 
smoothly since all the interviewers were recruited from a local university that is well 
known and respected by all the people in the vicinity. The interviewees were very 
cooperative with the student interviewers for two reasons. First it was made known to 
them the study was for academic study purposes and second, the managers notified them 
in advance and allowed the interviews to be carried out in an environment familiar and 
comfortable to them. The whole interviewing process lasted four weeks in the period 
before the start of the Chinese New Year in mid February 1995. The completed 
questionnaires were returned to the research team stationed at the Zhongshan University 
in Guangzhou Shi for counter checking. The data in the successful questionnaires were 
then input and saved in the computer with the statistical computer program ‘SPSS for 
Windows’. The ‘SPSS for Windows’ software was also used to analyse the frequencies 
of and correlation between different variables.
Before proceeding to summarise this section it is necessary to mention the 
limitations of this research. First, this study only focuses on the social insurance services 
for waged workers in cities in spite of the facts that the majority of the population is 
termed as rural and the major part of the country’s labour force is agricultural.20 The 
waged labour groups included employees in individual economic units, private economic 
units, collective units, foreign capital-related units, joint ventures, and state-owned units. 
Hence, the discussions and findings of this study only reflect the social insurance 
services for the labour force in urban China that can be found in other countries.
19 Details of the background and a list and nam es of the work units are provided in Appendix 2.
20 In 1994 the rural population in China was 71.38% (Table 3-1, p. 59, China Statistical Yearbook 
1995) and the employment in the fanning, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery’ sec to r w as
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Second, this study explores more in-depth with a field study on the social 
insurance services in China in the 1990s because the services have been undergoing a 
series of developments and reforms in relation to the transformation of the national 
economic system. For example, the use of the terms such as ‘social insurance’, 
‘unemployment benefits’, etc., reflect changes in the social and political ideologies on 
social insurance. In addition, the rejuvenation of private economy and the initiation of 
contract employment in state-owned and non state-owned work units have great impacts 
on the social insurance services built up by the communist government in the country. 
The far most important reason of centring the study on the mentioned period is the rapid 
growth of waged labour in the modernisation period that contrasts can be made between 
the labour forces of different status, e.g. permanent labour, contract labour, urban 
household, migrant workers, state-owned work unit employees, etc. All of these provide 
invaluable information to understanding the unique features of social insurance in China.
Third, facing difficulties like the great number of the target population, limited 
resources, and fragmentary sampling frame in China, this study uses the ‘non-probability 
quota-sampling method’ to carry out the structured interviewing of the employers and 
employees with about 520 questionnaires in 25 work units.21 The number of work units 
set for the study is based on the considerations of the scale of this study and the 
researcher’s capability. Hence, this sampling method does not cover all target units 
selected from the sampling process that might lead the conclusions of the research to be 
random. However, the success of this project demonstrates a practical way for other 
researchers to follow, or revise and develop it to carry out social research on social 
insurance in other cities in China or in other socialist developing countries.
Fourth, this study examines social insurance regulations in Guangdong Province 
and the implementation of the services in its capital city Guangzhou Shi, a relatively 
developed and industralised city at the southern end of China. The main reason of 
selecting Guangdong Province and Guangzhou Shi as the case is that the social and
54.31% of the national employment (Table 4-3, p. 86, China Statistical Yearbook 1995).
21 For explanations on ‘non probability quota sam pling’ please refer to Nachm ias (1981, p. 298- 
300) and Bulmer et al. (1993, p. 97-98).
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economic features of this region resemble that of the country.22 In addition, this southern 
province has also built up an advanced and comprehensive social insurance system 
relative to other places in China. Thus Guangzhou Shi is an ideal environment to carry 
out the field study for accomplishing the tasks of this study and the results of this 
research reflect to a great extent the features of social insurance in big cities in China 
such as Guangzhou Shi.
Last but not least, in this study, the definition of social insurance in China refers 
to the non-relief or non-welfare income maintenance services initiated by the communist 
government. It embraces ‘labour insurance’ in the period before the mid 1980s and 
‘social insurance’ in the later period.23 These two interchangeable terms refer to six 
direct services: retirement pensions, medical insurance, maternity allowance, 
occupational injury, sickness and handicap insurance, survivors’ and funeral benefits, 
and the newly implemented unemployment insurance.
In sum, this section presented the core and structure of this study: the conceptual 
framework, the research methodology and research questions. In this study social 
insurance is regarded as a social institution whose features are determined by the social 
system and economic mode production in the country. The theoretical framework and 
research methodology of this study refers to the ‘sociological study on social insurance’ 
adapted from Rys and Sigg. Also, this study will apply the Marxist structuralist 
perspective on the relationship between state institution and economic structure to 
explain the found features of social insurance. For the research operation it is learned 
that there are two levels of sociological study on social insurance: the national and 
international levels. However, for the case of China it is necessary to concentrate on the 
national factors because of its specific social and political development. Accordingly, 
this study set up four sub-questions to explore first, the breadth of social insurance in 
China in its historical development and change in the policies and regulations and the 
social values and ideologies. On the other hand, these questions also study the depth of
22 For a detail comparison please refer to C hapter 5 of this study.
23 The use of the term ‘labour insurance’ has two main reasons. First, it refers to the services 
provided under the 1951 ‘Regulations on Labour Insurance in P eople’s  Republic of China’. 
Second, because  of its limited coverage on em ployees in major state-ow ned work units only and 
em phases on the insurance for the working class but not the ‘exploitative bourgeoisie’ in the 
country. (Fu et al. 1994, p. 2-3) Except for unemployment insurance, the service items of labour 
insurance are generally the sam e a s  social insurance in the 1980s in China.
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the social insurance services in China on its practices and provisions issues like 
financing, eligibility and the criteria, level of benefits, etc. In addition, it also studies the 
effects of the services such as the coverage, and experiences and expectations of the 
people towards the services. All of these are the parameters of the social insurance in the 
particular social system and economic production mode in China. Finally, this section 
also spells out the research strategies and techniques used in the study. In general for 
information collection and background studies literature review and unstructured 
interview are used, whilst structured interview with questionnaires and statistical 
analyses are utilised for collecting and processing the statistical data to understand the 
features of the social insurance in the country.
Summary and conclusions
The literature review in this chapter finds that social insurance is a social institution 
founded and developed upon a country’s social and economic systems. Accordingly, 
social insurance services in capitalist developed countries are not necessarily the same as 
those in capitalist developing countries. Similarly, although China and the former USSR 
are categorised as socialist countries and the Chinese social insurance services model 
followed that of the USSR, their features of social insurance are not necessarily the 
same.
Studies on social insurance in the past did not pay any special attention to the 
features of the Chinese social insurance. The literature review shows that most scholars 
made great efforts to examine social insurance in capitalist developed countries but only 
a handful of them tried to investigate the Chinese social insurance services. In addition, 
although there was a body of literature on the Chinese social security system, hardly any 
one examined its features from the social institution perspective with structured and 
unstructured interviewing methods.
This chapter also discusses the conceptual framework for analysing a country’s 
features of social insurance. It finds that there are two main groups of factors used for 
accomplishing the task. However, for China the national factors such as social and 
economic changes and institutional factors like policies, financing and service delivery 
are the most appropriate for exploring the features of the Chinese social insurance.
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Practically, this research project looks into both the macro and micro levels of the 
‘sociological study of social insurance’ by answering four sub-questions that are 
developed from the main research question. Briefly speaking these four questions range 
from historical and institutional factors to social insurance management issues and the 
effects on the people.
This chapter also presented both the qualitative and quantitative research 
strategies. For qualitative study unstructured interviewing and literature review 
especially on the policy and regulations were carried out for conceptualising the Chinese 
social insurance. This process involved focused interviews with the officers from the 
relevant state departments and academics in the country. The review of services, policy 
papers and regulations of social insurance from the feudal stage to 1995 in the country 
bring out the insights on the designs and contents of the services that enhance the tracing 
out of the features. However, the conclusions of the study are also supported by the data 
collected from quantitative research techniques like structured questionnaires and 
statistical analyses. The quantitative fieldwork has not been conducted in the past and 
the materials obtained are invaluable, especially for delineating the features of the 
Chinese social insurance. In the following two chapters there will be a review on social 
insurance in China from the feudal stage to mid 1995.
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Chapter Two 
Income Maintenance Services in China Before 1980
Introduction
To build up a consolidated society with mutual help is an abiding desire for the Chinese. 
In The Book o f Rites (Liji: Liyun Bicm) compiled by Confucian scholars some two 
thousand years ago it says that a consolidated society is a utopia in which the old are 
attended, the young can utilise their ability, whilst the children are raised and the less 
capable are cared for. It further delineated that money is shared among the people and 
the able-bodied help those in need. According to The Book o f Rites such an ideal society 
emerged in the Qin and Han periods (300 BC to 87 BC) in China. Such a perfect society 
was later termed as the Great Harmony or Datong that is always adduced to by many 
politicians and government officials. (Cui, 1990, p.l)
Although the needs for building up the great harmony are emphasised in the long 
history of China, the approaches change with the rulers of the country. The road to Great 
Harmony proposed by the communist government after 1949, for example, is explicitly 
directed by socialist ideologies. In his Report on the Draft o f the Revised Constitution o f 
the People’s Republic o f China (PRC) in 1982, Peng Zhen talked about the integration of 
“the general truth of Marxism and Chinese socialism” in order to build up “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics”.
The description of China is “a socialist country under the people’s dictatorship 
that is led by the working class and based on the alliance between workers and 
peasants.” (Chapter 1, Article 1, Constitution of the PRC) and the aim of the communist 
government of China is the building of a thoroughly modem country. In this socialist 
country, “The basis of the socialist economic system is socialist public ownership of the 
means of production, namely ownership by the whole people and collective ownership 
by the working people. The system of socialist public ownership supersedes the 
exploitation system of man by man; it applies the principle of ‘from each according to 
his abilities and to each according to his work’.” (Chapter 1, Article 6, Constitution of 
the PRC, my emphasis)
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In order to realise the Chinese socialist Great Harmony, the communist 
government states in the Constitution (1982) that the “Citizens of the People’s Republic 
of China have the right to material assistance from the state and society when they are 
old, ill or disabled. The state develops social insurance, social relief, and medical and 
health services that are required to enable citizens to enjoy this right.” (Article 45)
This chapter tries to examine the development of social insurance in China after 
1949 by reviewing the policy documents and interviewing government officials. 
Nevertheless, it will first present the income protection policies in the feudal period prior 
to describing the labour insurance provided by the Chinese communist party from 1949 
to 1980. The historical development of income maintenance services in the country is 
presented in line with the particular characteristics in the period. Nonetheless, there are 
also analyses of the particular ways in which the services developed as well as an 
analysis of the general effects and impacts.
Residual income maintenance services in China before 1949
Social insurance in China is also termed labour insurance.24 According to Zhu, labour 
insurance in China includes: medical and health insurance; occupational injury and 
sickness benefits; maternity benefits; retirement pensions, death benefits and funeral 
supplements to the family dependants of the related workers for relieving their living 
hardships. Nevertheless, for a long time in the history of income maintenance in China, 
contributory social insurance hardly existed.
24 The term labour insurance or laodong baoxian is interchangeably used with social insurance 
or shehui baoxian. Zhu explained that “labour insurance is a social security system  provides to 
labour force when one losses productivity permanently or temporary. Labour insurance is a 
mandatory insurance provided to staff and workers only. It is a part of the social insurance.” 
(1991, p. 483, my translation) In explaining the term social insurance, he said it is the assistance 
offered by the sta te  or society for assisting the less able bodies such a s  elderly, sick, 
handicapped and those living with difficulties. In these  se n se s  he differentiated labour insurance 
from social insurance since the former is restricted to employers in state-ow ned units only. He 
also elaborated that the first legislation on labour insurance in China is the “Regulations on 
labour Insurance of the People’s Republic of China" in 1951. (Zhu 1991, p. 489)On the  other 
hand, Zhao (1993, p. 31) explains that social insurance is a system  to assist “citizens or workers” 
when they have living difficulties because  of old age; being sick, handicapped, unemployed, etc. 
He also m entions the five aspects in social insurance: sickness and maternity, work injury, old 
age and retirement; death; and unemployment. Furthermore, he s tre sse s  that social insurance 
and labour insurance has no differences in nature. “Social insurance is a m ore widely covered 
insurance for the labour force in society. ... In the past, the term  'social insurance' is found in 
som e of the regulations som etim es whilst 'labour insurance' is used by the leaders in the other 
time.” (Zhao 1993, p. 34, my translation)
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State intervention in kind as relief to the people was started more than two 
thousand years ago in feudal China. According to Fu et a l (1994, p. 43) in the Western 
Zhou (Xizhou) period (1025 B. C. to 721 B. C.) the emperors assigned government 
officials to provide means of living supports to people in need.25 For example, those who 
were at the age of seventy or above and at ten or below were eligible for the state’s relief 
in kind. Other poor relief measures included the provision of housing and the state’s 
supply of staple foods. Later in the Northern Wei (Beiwei) period (386-439 A. D.), the 
emperors promulgated edicts that community supports should be organised for the 
elderly, handicapped and poor who could not live on their own. The Northern Wei 
emperors also initiated “Land Equalisation Policy”j(7w«to2 Zhi) to promote the ‘self- 
supporting’ ideology in poor relief. This policy stipulated that those who were of the 
age of fifteen or above, irrespective of gender and social class, should be allocated 
farmland. In addition, the males should assist widows or those families with no mature 
male members. This policy also exempted widows and those who were aged over 
seventy from paying rent on farmland.
In the Tang Dynasty (618-939 A. D.), the ‘self-supporting’ belief was 
maintained. For example, the Tang emperors implemented “Land Allocation Policy” as 
one of the income maintenance programmes. In addition, a progressive tax system was 
implemented in 780 A. D. for releasing the burdens of the poor. In 628 A. D. a Tang 
emperor followed the system o f ‘collecting crops to aid the destitute’ (7/ cang) that was 
started in the Sui Dynasty (581-618 A. D.) by asking the productive force to contribute 
and prepare for rainy days. Furthermore, a system that collected the crops from 
households proportionately in the community was also set up. This system resembles 
contemporary contributory social insurance system in that both the state and citizens are 
involved in a statutory scheme. These arrangements are probably the earliest social 
insurance approach income maintenance in Chinese history. In brief, social insurance in 
China, as in most Western capitalist countries, is founded on residual social relief 
programmes. However, since the socialisation of production emerges very recently in 
China and the development of capitalism is discouraged by Confucianism and 
communism, the practice of Western style social insurance does not follow in the same
25 The chronological history of China can be referred to G em et 1985, p. 680-735.
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manner.
Social relief services were more institutionalised in China in later period. For 
example, Fu et a l (1994, p. 44-45) finds that the emperors in the Song Dynasty (960- 
1271 A. D.) established the homes (Futian Yuan) to accommodate in cold weather the 
poor elderly and children who had no families. Other institutions such as Juyang Yuan 
and Anji Fang provided more permanent services to the widowed, orphans, elderly and 
handicapped. A rather innovative step made by the Song emperors was the legislation of 
income maintenance services. The ‘Housing and Subsistence Law’ (Juyang Fa) 
stipulated that those who lived in Juyang Yuan were supplied with rice and beans as the 
staple food. On the other hand, the poorest families who lived in Anji Fang were eligible 
for benefits both in cash and in kind as well as medical services. In expanding the mutual 
help concept, the Song emperors promoted co-operative crediting services at community 
level. Participants were allowed to borrow from co-operatives with very low interest 
rates to meet their contingent needs. Such assistance and relief services for income 
maintenance were maintained for a long time till the national revolution in the early 20th 
century. The pursuit of 'people's livelihoods' advocated by Dr. Sun Yatsen aimed at 
establishing a social security system is one of the 'Three People's Principles (Sanmin 
Zhuyi)' still being avowed by the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) in Taiwan.26
Many studies point out that statutory social insurance for wage-workers in China 
was started in the 1920s.27 (Zhao 1993; Fu et a l 1994; ZSBZ 1995) In 1921 the newly 
formed Communist Party of China set up a Secretariat for Labour to co-ordinate labour 
movements in China and to educate the working class to help themselves. In February
26 The Nationalist Party or Guomindang w as formed by a group of military graduates in 
Guangzhou in early 1910s. One of these  young military officers Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) 
w as selec ted  to succeed  Dr Sun Yatsen after his death in 1925 to lead the Nationalist 
governm ent and carry out Sun’s  Three People’s  Principles in China. However, the Nationalist 
governm ent under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi moved to Taiwan in 1949 at the failure of the 
Suppress Com munist Movements. Since then the T h ree  People’s  Principles’ is claimed as  the 
social, econom ic and political guidelines for the Nationalist party in Taiwan.
27 The term  'statutory' is controversial in som e aspects. The communist governm ent controlled 
certain regions (Soviet Autonomous Regions) in the Civil W ar period whilst the nationalist 
governm ent w as recognised in the international issues. According to Ke (1990, p.351) the 
nationalist governm ent started social insurance co-operatives for workers in salt-works in 
northern Sichuan in 1943. "In 1947 the nationalist governm ent put social security with social 
insurance a s  the  national policy." (Ke 1990, p. 351, my translation) B ecause of the particular 
situations in China in this period, 'statutory' here does not completely equal to the rules and 
regulations se t by the official government. It refers to the actions taken or laws promulgated by 
the governm ent in its own sphere of influences.
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1922, the National Meeting of Labour resolved that a worker’s daily working hours 
should be limited to eight per day. (Fu 1994, p. 643-644) Afterwards, the Secretary for 
Labour of the Communist Party drafted and proposed the “Outlines For Labour Law 
(Laodong Fa Dagang)" to be included in the constitution written by a warlord in August 
1922. About half of the 19 articles of the Laodong Fa Dagang related to workers’ 
benefits that included state and employer social insurance contributions for the labour 
force. (ZSBZ 1995, p. 65)
In the period between the First National Meeting for Labour and the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party of China designed several other 
policies on labour insurance. Among these an important one is the “Labour Law in 
Chinese Soviet Areas” in 1931 which was part of the economic policies in the 
“Constitutional Outline for the Chinese Soviet Areas”.28 (Wang 1995, p. 2) The 1931 
Labour Law outlined a more comprehensive insurance system for the social productive 
force. It provided benefits for workers suffering long-term sickness and disease, 
maternity leave, retirement pensions, and unemployment relief. (Shao 1991, p. 24) The 
labour law also stipulated that employers had to make a contribution to social insurance 
equal to about 10-15% of the payroll. (ZSBZ 1995, p. 65) A revised Labour Law was 
implemented from October 1933 which adjusted the employers' contributions equivalent 
to 5-10% of the payroll payable to the Social Insurance Bureau. The Labour Law 
specified that employers were not allowed to collect social insurance funding from 
workers or make deductions from their wages. The main aim of these revisions was to 
halt the unreasonable expenses on benefits of the 1931 policy. (Wang 1995, p. 2)
The prototype of the communist labour insurance in China was finally completed 
in the Sixth National Meeting for Labour. The policies were not implemented because of 
the unfavourable and unstable social and economic conditions in the Chinese Soviet 
Areas. (Shao 1991, p. 25) After the Long March, in the late 1930s, labour protection 
systems including labour insurance services, were started in the Chinese Liberated 
Areas. These social security measures incorporated insurance services such as sickness,
28 Before 1949 the Communist Party built up the “Soviet Autonomous Regions” (hereafter called 
SAR) as  their bases to struggle with the nationalist government. The use of the word ‘soviet’ 
reveals first, the C hinese com m unists were greatly influenced by the Communist International 
that w as controlled by the Russians. Second the Communist Party of China in that period 
wanted to practise the communist society that is m anaged by the proletariat.
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death, maternity and handicapped benefits for the workers. (Shao 1991, p. 26)
According to Shao, the resources for supporting social insurance in the Chinese 
Liberated Areas were very scarce. (1991, p. 26) Therefore the guiding principle of the 
policies was “to provide the insurance benefits at moderate levels to those who lost 
productivity, i.e. at the level a bit higher than the peasants’ income.” (Shao 1991, p. 26, 
my translation) Based on this principle some benefits were provided in kind and in 
services such as the caring for the aged. In addition, Mao Zedong claimed in April, 1945, 
that “ ... it will protect the interests of the workers, institute an eight- to ten-hour working 
day according to circumstances, provide suitable unemployment relief and social 
insurance and safeguard trade union rights....”29 The purpose of these measures, as 
stated explicitly by Mao, is for “...adjusting the interests of labour and capital (in) the 
new democratic state system.”30 Mao’s views affected the development of social 
insurance in China greatly. Ge (1991, p. 27) comments that the implementation of labour 
insurance in the Liberated Areas was guided by Mao. Most importantly, the political 
functions of social insurance are also assigned.
In brief, the eagerness to provide social insurance under such socio-economic 
conditions features the strong political ideal of “to each according to his needs”. The 
insufficient national resources and inefficient management system for social insurance 
consequently led to the decentralisation of the management and provisions of labour
29 P lease refer to “On Coalition Governm ent” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 1975, Volume 
III, p. 254.
30 Ditto. The m eaning of ‘new -dem ocratic s tate  system ’ can be refereed in “On New Democracy" 
in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 1975, Volume II, p. 339-384. According to Mao, “the politics 
of New Dem ocracy are the concentrated expression of the econom y of New Democracy". The 
economy of New Democracy “must develop along the path of the “regulation of capital” and the 
“equalisation of land ownership”, and must never be “privately owned by the few”; we m ust never 
permit the few capitalists and landlords to “dominate the livelihood of the people"; we m ust never 
establish a capitalist society of the European-American type or allow the old sem i-feudal society 
to survive." W hen discussing about the new-dem ocratic s ta te  system , Mao stated  that it is a 
‘republic under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary c lasse s’ and a “transitional form for 
state to be adopted in the revolutions of the colonial and semi-colonial countries.” In Mao’s  
understanding, the situations of China in the early 1940’s  were “different from the old European- 
American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship, which is the old dem ocratic 
form and already out of date. On the other hand, it will also be different from the socialist republic 
of the Soviet type under the dictatorship of the proletariat which is already flourishing in the 
U SSR ....” (Mao, 1975, p. 350) In brief, social insurance a s  viewed by Mao and the Communist 
Party of China is for ameliorating the adverse conditions of the C hinese working class under the 
exploitation of the imperialists and colonialists. Income protection schem es initiated by the 
Communist Party of China were politicised as  part of the class struggles at the national level and 
part of the nationalist activities at the international level.
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insurance to work units. This model held sway into the early 1990s, and has many 
unique features inviting exploration.
In anticipating the victory in the Civil War, the Chinese soviet government 
promulgated the “Provisional Labour Insurance Regulations for Publicly Owned 
Enterprises in North-eastern Areas in the Wartime” (Dongbei Gongying Qiye Zhanshi 
Zanxing Laodong Baoxian Tiaoli or DGQLB) in December 1948 and started to apply it 
in the Chinese Liberated Areas in February 1949. (Table 2-1) These regulations were 
practised in state-owned railways, postal services, mines, military logistical industries, 
energy resources industries and spinning and weaving industries. (ZSBZ 1995, p. 66) 
“This was a more comprehensive set of social insurance regulations before the liberation 
of the country. It is also the basic reference for the legislation of labour insurance in the 
post-liberation period.” (ZSBZ 1995, p. 66, my translation) In other words, the DGQLB 
is the starting point to study social insurance and its reforms in China after 1949.31 
Table 2-1 The details of the DGQLB
Type of insurance Provider Benefit
Occupational injury Work Unit Free medical expenses and full-paid leave
Occupational
handicapped
Work Unit 50-60% of the wage according to the levels of 
seriousness and causes.
Non occupational 
handicapped
Work Unit Up to 50% of the wage for occupational 
handicapped.
Sickness or non 
occupational sickness
Work Unit Free medical services in the work unit's clinic; living 
supplements equal to 50-100% of the wage if leave 
is less than 3 months; relief equal to 30-60% of the 
wages if leave is longer than three months
Retirement pensions Work Unit 30-60% of the wage based on the length of the 
working period.
Maternity benefit Work Unit Full paid leave for 45 days.
Sickness benefits for 
family dependants
Work Unit Free medical services in the work unit's clinic, lower 
rates for medicine.
Funeral supplements 
for family dependants
Work Unit One third of the monthly salary of the worker
Collective welfare Work Unit Convalescent hospital, rest home, homes for elderly, 
home for the handicapped, etc.
Source: Extracted from ZSBZ 1995, p. 66.
31 The impacts of DGQLB are far-reaching. Dixon com m ents that “as  a forerunner of the nation­
wide 1951 labour insurance program, the CCP em barked on an experimental program in 
Manchuria toward the end of 1948. ... This course of action w as taken to consolidate the C PC ’s 
position am ong the workers in this vital industrial centre; to provide them  with a g reater work 
incentive; and to give CCP cadres practical experience in administering labour insurance, so 
necessary  if a nationwide program w as to be successfully introduced in the near future." (Dixon 
1981, p. 27-28)
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This section provides a historical account of the income maintenance services in 
China from the feudal period to the dawn of the communist regime. In the discussion it 
is found that income maintenance services in China are founded on social relief that 
emerged two thousand years ago. These relief services, residual in nature, were provided 
in kind and institutional care. Contributory social insurance was not well developed in 
China before 1949 because of the insignificant size of the capitalist and working class 
and the retarded development in the socialisation of production. Residual income 
maintenance was reserved until the social, economic and political systems were changed 
by the communists. The literature shows that socialist income maintenance is of an 
occupational welfare nature because it has a strong relationship with the work unit.
In brief, non-contributory funding by state in terms of central and local 
government is a major feature of Chinese social insurance. This non-contributory 
characteristic arises from the values calling for self-reliance, family-centred and non­
state intervention that are highly touted by Confiician teaching. In addition 
Confucianism also discriminates against business people and artisans. This consequently 
delays the rise of the capitalists and a wage labour force in society. On the other hand, 
the Chinese socialists have been working hard since the late 1910s to realise 
communism. In order to evince the highest spirit of 'to each according to his needs', 
unrealistic labour insurance services were shouldered solely by the state, in disregard of 
the underdeveloped condition of the national economy. Since the state's responsibility 
for social insurance sees a transfer of the administration to the work units this makes a 
contrast in delivery of the services practised in capitalist developed countries and 
requires in-depth investigation.
Socialist movements and social insurance in China in 1949-1980
The Communist Party of China tried out a specific social insurance system in its spheres 
of influences that was comprehensive in scope and characterised by direct intervention. 
Apparently it is for political reasons that the communist government provides social 
insurance to the 'exploited proletariat'. Accordingly, the Chinese labour insurance system 
seems to have two ends: to stress the exuberance of socialism and to procure supports 
from the proletariat. In this section the discussion is focused on the development of
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social insurance after 1949 but it will delineate the term ‘social insurance’ used in China 
first.
Shao (1991) finds that the existing ‘social insurance system’ {shehui baoxian 
zhidu) in China has three main groups: social security benefits {shehui baozheng daiyu), 
means of living supplements {shenghuo buzhu fei), and collective welfare facilities (Jiti 
fuli sheshi). This grouping may not specifically reflect the social insurance functions. 
For example, Zhu et a l explains that the means of living supplements are “the 
provisions of services and cash supplements to solve the daily living problems.” (1991, 
p. 450, my translation) The examples are barber shops, nurseries, supplements for non­
staple food, etc. From this perspective, Zhu e ta l  put this group of benefits into “welfare 
benefits” {shenghuo full) to pinpoint its particular nature. On the other hand, collective 
welfare facilities are “for satisfying the common needs of the staff and workers of two 
main kinds. The first is the provision of services such as canteen and dormitory to 
facilitate the daily accommodation of the employees whilst the other one is the provision 
of facilities for promoting the quality of life of staff and workers, especially the cultural 
aspects typified by clubs, libraries and sports centres, etc.” (Zhu et a l 1991, p. 464, my 
translation) Thus in strictly speaking both of living supplements and collective welfare 
facilities should not be identified as part of social insurance services.
The terms ‘social security’ {shehui baozheng) and ‘social insurance’ {shehui 
baoxian) are even more ambiguous in China. Shao offers the example of 'social security 
benefits' which includes retirement pensions, medical benefits, disability allowances, and 
work injury benefits. (1991, p. 82) In most other countries, such benefits are grouped 
under social insurance. In turn, Zhao explains that the concepts of social security and 
social insurance are different. “Social insurance is an important part of social security... 
Social insurance and social security are the mechanisms for providing assistance in kind 
and cash. However, the differences lie in their objectives, targets and formats of 
assistance.” (1993, p. 32-33, my translation) In the previous part in this chapter the 
definition of social insurance in China was made and the cited example is the 
“Regulations for Labour Insurance in the People’s Republic of China”. Accordingly, 
social insurance should be treated as the “stipulated assistance given by state, society or 
related government departments to the productive force or citizens when they are old, 
sick or have lost their working abilities and have difficult living.” (Zhu et a l, 1991, p.
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489, my translation) Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that, no matter whether the 
term ‘social security’ or ‘social insurance’ in China is used, it includes six main services 
or programmes: medical and sickness benefits, maternity benefits, occupational related 
injury and disability allowances, retirement pensions, unemployment benefits, and 
survivor's benefits and funeral supplements.32 As a result, ‘collective welfare’ and 
‘welfare benefits’ as well as state relief for the most needy in urban areas (e.g. sanwu 
and wubao) are excluded in this study.
The ZSBZ states that there are six different subsystems in the social security 
system in China: the social insurance subsystem, the social relief subsystem, the social 
welfare subsystem, the protection for servicemen subsystem, the medical protection 
subsystem and the subsystem of other protections.33 (ZSBZ 1995, p. 45) In the social 
insurance subsystem there are six different programmes: retirement pensions, 
unemployment insurance, medical social insurance, occupational injury and sickness 
social insurance, maternity benefits, and social insurance for other purposes. (ZSBZ 
1995, p. 46) Except for medical social insurance, all of the programmes or services 
within the social insurance subsystem are unique and not related to other subsystems in 
social security. Nevertheless, medical social insurance should be treated as part of the 
social insurance subsystem because of its strong insurance nature. (ZSBZ 1995, p. 48)
Social insurance in China, therefore, includes the following items: retirement 
pensions, medical and sickness benefits, occupational related injury and sickness 
benefits, maternity benefits, unemployment benefits and survivor's benefits and funeral 
supplements. This categorisation is widely accepted in the studies on social insurance in 
China.34 However, it is necessary to remark that in the 1951 “Regulations for Labour
32 Zhao explains that in Article 45 of the 1982 Constitution of China the term ‘social insurance’ is 
used to refer to the s ta te ’s  assistance to the old, sick, and those who lost working ability. “The 
developm ent of the country should react to the people’s  rights in getting social insurance, social 
relief and medical and health services. The state  and society should protect the livings of the 
handicapped ex-servicem en, to give com passionate grants to the martyrs and their family 
dependan ts.” (1991, p. 32)
33 The ‘medical protection subsystem ’ is mainly the public health services. For example, the 
immunisation program mes, co-operative medical services in rural areas, and special medical 
supplem ents to the families in need, etc. (ZSBZ 1995, p. 48)
34 S ee, for examples, Su (1994) puts labour insurance that includes retirem ent pensions, 
occupational related injury and sickness benefits, medical insurance and waiting-for-job 
insurance in the section titled ‘Social Insurance’. In addition, the ZSBZ (1995) groups these  
mentioned insurance program m es in C hapter Two of the book under the heading of ‘Social 
Insurance System ’.
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Insurance of the People’s Republic of China” the ‘waiting-for-job’ or unemployment 
insurance was not mentioned. In the period of 1949-1980, unemployment benefits did 
not exist because of first, the efficient and effective centralised 'job allocation policy'. 
Second, the Communist Party of China held a unique view on unemployment different 
from capitalist countries. In general, waiting-for-job means the labour force is ready to 
take up the jobs assigned by state but for some reasons such as the great demand from 
graduates that the allocation mechanism cannot cater for the needs immediately. 
Therefore waiting-for-job is only an administrative problem which is transitional and 
temporary. In contrast, unemployment in capitalist countries is a necessary and 
permanent feature of the economic structure, an echo from the Last Supper might be for 
the capitalist is that the unemployed are always with you. For example, surplus labour 
emerges from technological changes and the restructuring of the mode of production. 
Unemployment is ineluctable in the process of modifying the supply and demand of 
labour in capitalist economy. In such situations some workers are dismissed from 
economic production. In brief the incidence of waiting-for-job is because of an 
administrative problem in a certain period while unemployment is the necessary 
condition of the capitalist system.
According to ZSBZ, the development of social insurance from 1949 to 1980 can 
be differentiated into three main periods: 1949-1957, 1958-1965, and 1966-1976. (1995, 
p. 69) A similar work in marking the periods is also provided by Ahmad and Hussain 
(1993). They schematised the periods as Wang et al. (1995) in their study on the 
development of social security in rural and urban China after 1949. It is also interesting 
to find that the development of the Chinese welfare system as reviewed by Dixon (1981) 
is very close to the others as mentioned. Dixon demarcates the periods as ‘the creation of 
social assistance system’ from 1949 to 1958; the ‘consolidation of the system’ from 
1958-1965; and the ‘reconstruction of the system’ from 1966 to 1979.
A rather different perspective is offered by Wang et a l (1995, p. 4-14) in that he 
dates the second period from 1958-1978, i.e. longer than that specified by the others. 
Their differences, however, are centred on the emphases on first, collectivisation and 
rapid industrialisation in the period 1958-1960 and, second, the turbulent social, 
economic and political conditions in the ten years of the Great Cultural Revolution from 
1966-1976. The argument made in the ZSBZ is that:
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“In the ten years of social riots, social insurance services were seriously disturbed 
as in other economic and cultural areas under the chaotic conditions in the 
country. The collection and management of the funding for social insurance were 
interrupted. Social insurance organisations were abolished and this led to the 
suspension of the retirement pension system.” (1995, p. 69-70, my translation)
In referring to the similar period and issue, Wang et a l comment that
“In the twenty years from 1958 to 1978, social security was disturbed and 
stopped. In this period, the government initiated many policy measures that 
changed the approaches, levels of benefits and coverage. However, the principles 
and rationales of social security were still maintained as those set at the founding 
stage.” (1995, p. 9, my translation)
It seems that the two different periods marked by Wang et a l and ZSBZ are 
compatible. In fact, social insurance development in China in these two periods was 
strongly affected by the political movements. First, at the initial stage from 1949 to 1957 
the country carried hard work on establishing and developing a socialist social insurance 
system. Second, the social insurance system was interrupted by national economic and 
political struggles from 1958 to 1978. It is obvious that social insurance in China in 
these two periods has a strong political flavour. For instance, the social insurance laws 
were based on and revised on those used in the Chinese Liberated Areas. The main 
features are the emphases on the protection of the working people and maintaining the 
close state-unit-employees relationship. (Yan 1987, p. 302) On the other hand, Wang et 
al elaborates that social insurance programmes were only implemented in the “cities and 
towns” and for “the protections of the staff and workers in state-owned units that the 
collective-owned enterprises at county level or above could follow voluntarily.” (1995, 
p. 5, my translation) This explicitly shows that, for political and economic purposes, 
labour insurance in China favour the urban production forces that work for 'socialist 
construction' (shehui zhuyi jianshe).
According to Wang (1995, p. 5) there were two main social insurance systems in 
this period. The first was “Labour Insurance” (Laodong Baoxian or Laobao) which was 
designed for the staff and workers in state-owned enterprises. The other one was “Social 
Insurance” (,Shehui Baoxian) that included medical services (Gongfei Yiliao) and 
compassionate grants for death (siwang fuxu). The following discussion will focus on 
these two groups of social insurance programmes.
Labour insurance originated from the 1951 “Regulations for Labour Insurance in
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the People’s Republic of China” as the outcome of the joint efforts of the Ministry of 
Labour {Laodong Bu) of the State Council and the All-China Trade Unions (Zhonghua 
Quanguo Zhonggonghui). “These regulations were applied in state-owned units, state- 
private joint ventures, and their subsidiary units including factories, mines, railway 
shops, transportation, postage and communication industries with employees of one 
hundred or over.” (Zhao 1993, p. 64)
The first reform in labour insurance was made in 1953 in order to address “the 
needs of mass scale economic constructions” in the First Five-Year Plan.35 (Zhao 1993, 
p. 64) In order to achieve this objective labour insurance was extended to cover those 
engaged in factories, mines and transportation services and who were ignored by the 
previous regulations. The 1953 reform in labour insurance also covered the state-owned 
building and construction business and raised the levels of benefits. In 1956 a further 
revision was made to extend the coverage to those engaged in business and financial 
services, co-operatives, marine products and agricultural industries, etc. Consequently, 
labour insurance was provided in most state-owned enterprises until the mid 1960s.
In government departments {guojia jiguari) the staff (i.e. cadres or ganbu) were 
not covered by labour insurance in the early years of the communist regime because of 
the practice of the ‘supply system’ {gongji zhi)}6 (Zhao 1993, p. 64) According to Zhao, 
the first set of social insurance policy for cadres was the “Regulations on Compassionate 
Grants to Staff with Occupational Injury or Death in Revolution” in 1950. (1993, p. 64) 
After 1952, social insurance measures for cadres on medical, maternity and retirement 
benefits were issued. All of these measures, however, were promulgated separately and 
were not related or compatible with labour insurance.
The unified social insurance programmes for both staff and workers {zhigong) in 
state-owned units was started in the 1958 ‘Provisional Regulations on the Management
35 The revision w as m ade in January  1953, i.e. two years after the first version in 1951.
36 ‘Supply System ’ or gongji zhi is ‘a benefit system  in kind practised during the revolutionary 
wars and in the early days of the People’s  Republic to supply with primary necessities in the 
daily life of the personnel and their dependants." (Beijing Waiyu Xueyuan 1991, p. 237) Zhu 
treats this a s  incom es of the labour force and it w as originally se t up for the  purposes of 
maintaining the spirit of frugality and communism am ong cad res and the army. Gongji Zhi was 
changed into ‘a paym ent system  in kind and cash ’ (baogan zhi) in 1954, and then changed into 
wage system  (gongzi zhi) in 1955. (Zhu 1993, p. 422)
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of the Retirement of Workers and Staff’.37 In some senses this move settled the 
discordance between ‘supply system’ and ‘wage system’ in earlier period. The centre of 
attraction of the 1958 policy, however, was on the modification of the retirement 
system.38 For examples, zhigong might apply for early retirement (tuizhi) if the applicant 
could produce a medical certificate to prove the loss of working ability and being unfit to 
work. (Item 3, Article 2) Another change was to raise the benefit levels by 5% for those 
who had made a special contribution to the country. Furthermore, for those who had to 
withdraw from production because of occupational injury or sickness were guaranteed to 
get the benefits. (Article 5) In March of the same year another policy paper titled “Draft 
on the Provisional Regulations on the Management of the Staff and Workers in Early 
Retirement” was issued by the State Council. This set of regulations clearly worked out 
the details of early retirement of staff and workers in state-owned units.39
In sum, there are four specific features of social insurance in ‘the establishing 
period of social insurance’ in China. First, with the experiences in the Chinese Soviet 
Areas, social insurance under the communist regime was developed quickly and 
methodically. In contrast with the Guomindang in the 1920-193Os in China,40 the 
communist government set up a relatively comprehensive social insurance system in a 
short time.41 Second, the development and changes in social insurance are motivated by
37 P lease  refer to W ang (1995, p. 339-340) for the details of the docum ent.
38 “Draft on the Provisional Regulations for the M anagem ent of Retirem ent of W orkers and Staff “ 
revised and passed  by the S ta te  Council in February 1958.
39 The term  ‘early retirem ent’ in Chinese is tuizhi. Zhao (1993, p. 249) explains that tuizhi m eans 
“the staff and workers do not satisfy the requirem ents for retirem ent but withdraw from 
production or the work post because  of the jloss of working ability". This group of people is 
protected by the regulations on retirement.
40 Shao et ai. record that the Nationalist government had proposed som e social insurance 
|policies. In 1924 the governm ent claimed that “the Chinese workers’ living is not guaranteed. Our
proposition is to give state  relief to the unemployed. The state  should also m ake the labour law 
to improve the workers’ livings, the caring for the young and old, to provide education to the 
public, e tc .” The proclamation also included the setting up and facilitating the developm ent of 
workers’ groups a s  well as  to implement social insurance. (Shao 1991, p. 15) Furthermore, in 
S eptem ber 1927 the Bureau of Farming and Industry revised the ‘General Laws for Factory” to 
“Regulations for Factory”. In Article 20 it stipulated that “The owner of the factory should insure 
for the workers on injury and sickness. Before the insurance policy is m ade effective, the owner 
of the factory has to give the grants to the injured or sick worker a s  stated  in the regulations." 
(Shao 1991, p. 16)The “Factory Law" w as initiated in D ecem ber 1929 by the nationalist 
governm ent of China. The contents and details were similar a s  the form er rules and regulations. 
However, since “the nationalist governm ent could not be independent in politics and econom y 
that it w as impossible to carry out the centralised social insurance system . (Shao et al. 1991, p. 
17)
41 For example, Shao et al. (1991, p. 25) describe that the revolutionary b ase s  of the Chinese 
com m unists implemented the ‘supply system ’ which w as an all-embracing welfare model. This 
model affects the designs of the social insurance system  in the later period.
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the desire for economic growth and the realisation of political ideals. For example, the 
reforms of social insurance in the 1950s were targeted at facilitating the two five-year 
plans. Third, in most insurance items only the staff and workers in state-owned units 
were covered. Such an approach has great impacts on the social insurance policies in the 
period after 1979 and this will be discussed later in this chapter. Fourth, the different and 
incompatible social insurance systems provide for the white collar (often cadres) and 
blue collar workers exposes the government’s lack of confidence and experience in 
managing a unified nation-wide social insurance system. In addition, the change from 
‘supply system’ to ‘wage system’ demonstrates the difficulties in building up a 
communist type of social insurance, especially for the whole of society as China faced a 
serious shortage of resources. Most importantly, these measures reflect social insurance 
in China after 1949 is a social institution greatly influenced by the country’s mode of 
economic production and political ideologies.
The Communist Party of China established the income maintenance system with 
social insurance, which is governed by the particular economic system and oriented 
towards political ideals. Such a social insurance system is distinguished from those in 
capitalist developed countries in various aspects like the function, coverage, 
management, etc. Social insurance defined in this manner is highly vulnerable to 
changes in political lines. This is evidenced in the Great Leap Forward movement in the 
late 1950s and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Great Leap Forward movement, which started in the late 1950s was fuelled 
by an over-confidence in the success of communist economic system and the eagerness 
to transit to socialism. The party leaders maintained that, through the enthusiastic 
participation of the masses in economic production, the country would be rapidly 
developed into one of the top economic giants in the world. In practice the main 
strategies were rapid development of heavy industry and transmigration policies.42
According to Zhu, the Great Leap Forward movement was part of the Movement
42 Oberai (1983) elaborates this term as  the collective migration actions organised by the 
Indonesian governm ent in the colonial and the present period. In China the m ass m ovem ent of 
the peop\e\(shangshan xiaxiang)specially the young in the G reat Leap Forward period had the 
similar connotation.
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of the Three Red Banners.43 The objective of this movement was to industrialise China 
in a short period by concentrating on the development of heavy industry. In urban areas 
the government promoted the ‘Buying and Selling Extravagantly’ movement {Dagou 
Daxiu).M (Zhu 1989, p. 286-287) Some of the results of the movement were the fast 
growing number of staff and workers and heavy consumption of production capital in 
enterprises. In 1955 there were 21.62 million staff and workers. In 1957 the number 
rose to 31.01 million and in 1960 it was 59.69 million. (CSPH 1996, Table 1-8, p. 9) 
The growth rate in the number of staff and workers in a span of five years was 176.1% 45
The sudden growth of the socialist production force had adverse effects on labour 
insurance. The rapidly expanded production force consequently formed a vast base of 
retired employees in the 1980s and 1990s. The CSPH report shows that in the period 
from 1955 to 1960 the number of employees in secondary industry was changed from 
19.13 million to 41.12 million, peaking at 70.76 million in 1958. In the meantime, the 
number of employed in primary industry dropped from 185.92 million in 1955 to 170.16 
million in 1960, with the lowest level recorded at 154.9 million in 1958. (CSPH 1996, 
Table 1-8, p. 9) These figures show the sudden growth of salaried workers and the 
needs for income protection from social insurance.
In responding to the previously mentioned issues two measures were initiated by 
the government in the early 1960s. First, to streamline the units by cutting the number of 
employees. Second, to allow the beneficiaries to receive the benefits from any local 
office other than that in his household town. (Yan 1987, p. 319-320) In June 1962 the 
State Council announced “Several Policy Regulations on Settling the Discharged Staff 
and Workers”. This document stipulated that the discharged staff and workers who 
fulfilled the requirements were also eligible for retirement pensions whilst the others 
should be treated as early retirement and allowed to receive retirement benefits. For 
those who had no supportive family members they were eligible for a relief at the
43 T h ree  Red B anners’ m eans the  realisation of the three socialist ideals that included The 
General Line for Socialist Construction, the G reat Leap Forward M ovement and the People’s 
Communes.
44 The purpose of Dagou Daxiu w as to simplify the trading process in order to connect the 
producers with the purchaser directly. However, since the production results at local levels were 
exaggerated in order to fawn on the higher ranks that the quality products w as out of control and 
the labour force w as enlarged quickly. (Zhu, 1989, p. 287)
45 The percentage of the employed people in total population w as only increased from 36.3% in 
1955 to 39.1% in 1960.[(CSPH 1996, Table 1-8, p.9)
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maximum of 40% of their original wages from the Bureaux of Civil Affairs. The 
document also stipulated exceptional treatment for intellectuals who were old and weak, 
and cadres who joined the revolution before August 1948.46 Furthermore, if the staff and 
workers who were employed before August 1957 went back to their hometowns with 
family dependants they were eligible for other benefits such as ‘food and transportation 
supplements’ and ‘resettlement benefits’ that was equal to one to three months of the 
employee’s wage. (Yan 1987, p. 319) In general, this policy aimed at minimising urban 
surplus labour after the Great Leap Forward movement. The objective was to replace 
older staff and workers with a young labour force who returned from the countryside 
after the Great Leap Forward Movement. From this point of view social insurance plays 
an important role in facilitating labour as well as population policies. In a nutshell, all of 
these policies are designed for dealing with the economic difficulties caused by political 
disruption.
Another specific policy designed for such purposes was allowing the eligible for 
the insurance benefits in other places. In July 1960, the All-China Trade Unions 
recommended the “Measures for Providing Long Term Labour Insurance Benefits in 
Other Places”. This recommendation was effected from January 1963 and stipulated that 
benefit recipients might apply for long term benefits such as retirement pensions, 
compassionate grants for occupational injury, relief for occupational handicap or death, 
etc. from the organisations in other places. For example, the transfer payment was 
handled by trade unions whilst the medical services were offered by local medical 
institutes to the account of the trade unions. Yan comments that this strategy “facilitated 
the staff and workers who wanted to move to other places and lightened the burden of 
work units.” (1989, p. 320, my translation) This shows social insurance in China is an 
administrative means to adjust or control the people's geographical and occupational 
mobility. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the involvement of trade unions in socialist 
social insurance system is significant. Trade unions are effective 'mass organisations' in 
mobilising productivity and managing the benefits of the labour force, especially at the 
time when specialised social insurance organisations are still missing. The last but not 
least is that decentralisation is a solution for the problems of the cumbersome and 
inflexible all-embracing occupational nature of labour insurance.
46 The treatm ent is based on the ‘Provisional M easures for the  Living Benefits of Staff in Leaving 
for Sick in S tate Organisations".
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In concluding the development of social insurance in this period, Zhao states that 
“from 1958 to 1965, social insurance was further improved in our country.” (1993, p. 
65) On the other hand, Dixon argues that this is “a period of readjustment and 
consolidation ” (1981, p. 93) He states that labour insurance was expanded to all state- 
owned and jointly managed enterprises and the number of workers with cover rose from 
9 million in 1960 to 20 million in 1965. (Dixon 1981, p. 94) These remarks may only be 
correct if viewed from its coverage on state-related units. However, social insurance in 
China was becoming more and more overtly politically oriented, although such 
happenings were very subtle. After the beginning of the Cultural Revolution from 1966, 
the major parts of labour insurance system were destroyed and the funding for the 
services ran out. In the following parts these will be discussed in more detail and one 
will find that social insurance was developed fitfully but directed by political ideology 
and within the economic system.
The Cultural Revolution lasted for some ten years from May, 1966, when the 
“Notice of the Sixteenth of May” (Wuyiliu Tungzi) was issued. In the period between the 
Great Leap Forward Movement and the Cultural Revolution, as described by Zhu (1989, 
p. 409-413), China became immersed in the “movement of criticism in the ideological 
field” - a period that was criticised later as the ‘wrong step to the development of 
leftism’.47 The climax of the leftist movement was the promulgation of the Sixteen Items 
(Shiliu Tiao) or “Decisions on the Proletariat Class Cultural Revolution” in August 1966 
with a clearly stated objective of “breaking down the sects of the power holders and the 
capitalist roaders.” (Zhu 1989, p. 426) With the main approaches of “struggle, criticism, 
and correction” (dou, pi, gai) economic production and social order in the country were 
greatly disturbed.48
47 The first half of the 1960s w as the period of searching for identity of the Communist Party of 
China. Zhu records that China broke her relationship with the R ussians on ‘dogm atism ’ and 
‘revisionism’ in the road of developm ent of communism. Internally, the failure of the G reat Leap 
Forward M ovement in the late 1950s pushed the Communist Party of China led by Mao Zedong 
to the corner for the great devastation brought to the Chinese society. Mao and his followers 
concluded in April 1966 that in the cultural area “there w as a black socialist line that is 
antagonistic to the thoughts of Chairman Mao.” The resolution that the Communist Party of 
China m ade w as “to organise a socialist revolution in the battle line in cultural area." Since then 
the label of ‘black line’ (heixin) w as used to describe those who deviated from the Mao's road of 
socialism.
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In the Cultural Revolution production in work units was interrupted that caused a
striking effect on social insurance. Zhu describes that from late December, 1966 radical
political movements such as the “January Storm” and the “Seizing of Powers” mobilised
by the Red Guards raged over the country. Most of the staff and workers in the
revolution periods were asked to join the study groups to learn about the ‘lines of
struggle’.49 Zhu comments on the outcome of this “total civil war” as that:
“...government mechanisms and institutions were out of control that the whole 
nation’s economy was out of order.... Criticisms on the regulations and policies 
affected the processes and qualities of production. For example criticisms such as 
“profit making centred”, “productivity oriented”, “material incentive”, “contract 
responsibility and self-initiative”, etc. deterred production.” (1989, p. 453, my 
translation)
Shao comments that the period from 1966 to 1976 was the ‘internal disorder’ of 
the country. He outlines four changes in social insurance in this period. (Shao 1991, p. 
62-66) First, social insurance was criticised as the “the cancer that grows from 
revisionism”. According to Shao, some of the leaders of the 'cultural revolutionary line' 
such as Chen Badai attacked the conservatives such as Zhou Enlai for his support to the 
establishment of social insurance for staff and workers. Shao (1991, p. 62) raises an 
example that the revolutionary fraction changed the method of determining retirement 
pensions in Shijiazhuang, a city near Beijing, to disregard the individual’s service period 
and current wage level. Second, social insurance institutions were abolished and the 
personnel were sent for ‘re-education’. (Shao 1991, p. 63) This measure disrupted the 
social insurance system. The repercussions of such moves were the generation of 
insufficient data and experience, which restrict the reforms in social insurance in the 
1980s and 1990s. This is also the reason of the flourishing of legislation on social 
insurance after 1979.
The third aspect was the liquidation of social insurance fund for staff and 
workers. Shao records that in February 1969 the Ministry of Finance stipulated that “all 
state-owned enterprises could no longer be financed with social insurance funds. Instead 
they have to pay the retirement pensions and wages to staff and workers with chronic
48 P lease refer to Zhu 1989, p. 426-469.
49 There were two contradictory lines in the Cultural Revolution. O ne is the “bourgeoisie anti- 
revolutionary line” (zhichang zheze fandong luxin) while the other w as the “proletarian’s  cultural 
revolution line" (wuchang zheze wenfa dagamin luxin). (Zhu 1989, p. 429-430) In short, the 
struggles in Cultural Revolution were between the “two classes" and “two lines”.
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illness from their own accounts.” (Shao 1991, p. 63, my translation) Shao comments
that this practice had long term negative effects on social insurance in China, especially
“it changed social insurance to ‘enterprise insurance’. It shifted the expenses of 
social insurance to be paid by enterprises, which dries out their resources. In 
addition, such hardships were various according to the sizes and age groupings of 
employees of the units. The enterprises that employ younger employees can save 
much more while those have older employees have to spend a lot. This affects 
the incentive of production.” (1991, p. 63-64, my translation)
The comment made by Shao elaborates the destruction of the labour insurance 
system in the Cultural Revolution and the emerging work unit's role in the service. This 
particularity demonstrates the power of politics and its significant impacts on the setting 
up and development of social insurance in the country. Comprehensive labour insurance 
in the Chinese Soviet Areas and Liberated Areas was the example of the result of the 
political moves for winning over the masses. Under the strong party-state-enterprises- 
labour insurance relationships labour insurance in China is institutionalised and directed 
for political objectives. The provisions of social insurance services, as shown by the 
example of Cultural Revolution, are highly vulnerable to the political lines set by the 
dominant fraction in the Party. The last but not least is that even though social insurance 
legislation in China was started by the communist party in the 1920s, it mainly covers 
those working in state-owned units and its legislation in the country is politically 
oriented.
The fourth is ‘extended retirement’ of the old staff and workers in the Cultural 
Revolution period. According to Shao, retirement in this period was charged as “half­
way revolution” and it was “dishonourable”. (1991, p. 64) Under this situation, those 
who had reached the retirement age stayed with the unit. This consequently caused rapid 
ageing problems among the staff and workers in state-owned work units after the 
Cultural Revolution. (Shao 1991, p. 64) It is recorded in the CSPH Yearbook that in 
1978 there were 3.14 million retirees. The number rose to 5.96 million in 1979, and 8.16 
million in 1980. In relative terms the growth rates from 1978 to 1979 was 89.8% and 
from 1979 to 1980 36.9%.|(CSPH 1996, Table 10-1, p. 511) These data evidence the 
sudden increase of retirees after the Cultural Revolution. In responding to this situation, 
the enterprises had to seek additional funding to pay for retirement pensions, medical 
and health services and other long term insurance for these people. The growth rate for 
retirement pensions paid by units from 1978 to 1979 was 85.1% and from 1979 to 1980
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was 53.6%. (CSPH 1996, Table 10-17, p. 527) Another effect is the stagnant or negative 
growth in the ‘average rate of pensions for retirees’ at the turn of the two decades. Such 
growth rates in state-owned units from 1980 to 1981 was 2.2%, but dropped to -0.9% 
from 1981 to 1982. In the subsequent three years the growth rates were at about 2% to 3 
% per year. (CSPH 1996, p. 527) This situation underlies two issues in the existing 
social insurance in China: financial difficulties in the units and the living difficulties 
among the retirees. Both of these are the basic problems that the government has been 
faced with in social insurance reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, and which will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
From the downfall of the ‘Gang of Four’ in 1976 to the return of Deng Xiaoping 
in 1977, the social insurance system was changed a lot “to cater for the needs of the new 
period.” (Yan 1987, p. 324) By using the example of retirement pensions in state-owned 
work units Yan identifies five changes. (1987, p. 324-329) First, there were revisions on 
the stipulations on retirement and early retirement. In 1978 the State Council 
promulgated the “Provisional Measures on Settling the Old and Weak Cadres” and 
“Provisional Measures on Retirement and Early Retirement of Workers”. Yan points out 
that one of the differences between the 1958 and 1978 regulations on retirement is that 
the latter spell out the special conditions and treatments for cadres. He explains further 
that “the previous regulations did not reflect on the special situations of cadres, 
especially those who are very experienced and have a long history in the revolution. It is 
necessary to make some special arrangements for them in the Four Modernisations.” 
(1987, p. 325, my translation)
Second, the retirement conditions for some higher rank cadres were eased. For 
examples, party secretaries and deputy party secretaries at county level who joined the 
Party before 1942 were eligible for early retirement with the benefits equivalent to their 
original closing wage levels. The third is the raising of retirement pension levels. As 
stated in the two policies that were mentioned above, the retirement pension level was 
increased from 40-70% to 60-80% of the basic wage of the retirees. A higher rate was 
set for those who joined the production force before 1949. In addition, those who lost 
working ability at work can get up to 90% of his original closing wage, and a caring 
supplement at about the monthly wage. The fourth concern is to change the method of 
lump sum payment for the early retiree to monthly benefits. The rate was set at 40% of
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the retiree’s basic wage. Finally, the bottom line of retirement pension was set. For 
retired employees the level was set at 25 yuan per months, while for those in early 
retirement the minimum monthly benefits standard was 20 yuan. These benefit levels 
were revised in June 1983, whilst the living supplements for retirees were adjusted in 
November 1979 (5 more yuan per head) and May 1985 (12-17 more yuan per head) in 
view of the rapid inflation in the country. (Yan, 1987, p. 326)
Apart from retirement pensions the State Council also reviewed medical and 
sickness benefits for cadres. The Council issued the “Regulations on Living Benefits in 
Sick Leave for Staff’ in April 1981. The main concern of this document was to raise the 
benefit levels. For example, full-paid sick leave was extended from one month to two 
months, at 70-100% of the employee’s standard monthly salary, to four months at 90- 
100%. This document also allowed cadres to get 70-80% of their standard salaries from 
the seventh month and on, depending on the length of their working periods.
Social insurance changes in the post-Cultural Revolution period were more 
favourable to cadres than workers. For example, the two regulations in 1978 provided 
different treatment to these two groups of employees in state-owned work units. This 
decision, as explained by Yan (1987) and Shao (1991), is that cadres should be treated 
differently because of their important contributions to the revolution. The implications of 
these actions are as follows. First, social insurance is maintained as a reward system that 
is designed for recognising those who contributed to the socialist revolution. Second, the 
role of workers is undermined in national development programmes such as the ‘Four 
Modernisations’. Third, insurance benefits are actually the compensations offered by 
government to the group of employees who lost out and were ill-treated in the Cultural 
Revolution. In brief, social insurance in China is the means to achieve the ends of 
socialist revolution rather than a mutual aid mechanism to provide financial assistance in 
meeting the people’s short or long term contingent income needs.
From 1949 to 1979 is the period that social insurance system was 
institutionalised, developed but also mangled in China. The measures in this period were 
mostly the responses to the needs of the old and weak labour force in state-owned units 
who asked for retirement pensions, medical insurance, and death benefits for their 
dependants. Maternity benefit was not reviewed and unemployment benefit had not been
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built up until the mid 1980s. Apparently, the generous retirement pensions and medical 
benefits provided for salaried cadres only favoured salaried white collars. The dark side 
of this approach, however, is that the social and political movements in this period 
makes the beginning of the occupational nature of social insurance in China. State- 
owned enterprises are therefore encumbered with the immense financial expenses of 
social insurance which needs to be reformed in order to achieve socialist transition by 
building up a socialist market economy since the mid 1980s.
Summary and conclusions
This chapter reviewed the establishment and changes of social insurance in China before 
1980. There are two main issues rise in the discussion. The first is the main 
characteristics and impacts of social insurance in the period. The second is the 
relationships between social insurance and the social system and economic mode of 
production in the country. Concerning the first point, the chapter shows that first, 
although there were some measures close to social insurance services for the people, the 
approach was in fact analogous with co-operative self-relief program at community level 
in China before 1949. On the other hand, as an involuntary income maintenance program 
that was established, managed and funded by state after 1949, labour insurance was part 
of the collective occupational welfare system set up by the communist government for 
maintaining the labour force in the socialist economic production. In brief, contributory 
social insurance was inessential and had not been built up. Instead, residual welfare with 
the emphasis on self-help and occupational welfare for enhancing the socialist 
productivity prevailed.
Another feature of social insurance in this period is the absence of a specialised 
social insurance organisation. In fact, social insurance was not an indispensable income 
maintenance mechanism when the services provided by families and state collectives 
were comprehensive. The discussions at above demonstrate that the relationships 
between individual and family in Chinese society were very intimate. Family functions 
as the first and last resort for one whenever the needs rise. Collectives under socialist 
system in the later period replace and expand the services provided by family at one 
time. It also turned the social relationship to be political and economic. This relationship 
is formalised and maintained through work units, which are the institutions founded for
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socialist economic production, political control and social management. Although work 
units are not social insurance agencies, they are charged with the responsibilities to 
satisfy the income needs of their members. Because of the strong roles of family and 
work units, social insurance has not been developed as a unique and important income 
maintenance system in the country. Furthermore, social insurance management in work 
units causes complications to social insurance reforms in the 1990s.
Apart from the fanatic changes in state intervention, less organised | petty 
capitalists and inactive labour force is the other characteristics in the development of 
social insurance in the period. This situation can especially be found in the feudal stage 
that the number of salaried labour force was very minimal. Working class and capitalist 
class were still relatively small after 1949 because the government discouraged or 
suppressed private production in trying hard to build up the socialist economic system. 
China's economic history shows that the rise of salaried labour force is very late. 
Furthermore, the emergence of these labour forces was planned by state rather than 
spontaneous. The examples are the modernisation programs in mid 19th century and after 
1 9 4 9  5° Furthermore, the labour force in China has stronger reliance on the traditional 
family functions and services. Thus the working class in China is passive and introvert 
that it is more difficult to organise them. All of these constitute difficulties in identifying 
the contingent needs of the working class, as well as to solicit their views on the pattern 
of services and benefit levels.
The last but not least is the indefinite objectives and role of social insurance in 
China. Because of the particular cultural, political and economic systems, the objectives, 
planning and management of social insurance services in China are unique. In general, 
state-involved income maintenance programmes before 1949 were hardly found, let 
alone contributory social insurance. On the other hand, labour insurance after 1949 is not 
an independent income maintenance program. Rather it explicitly aims at facilitating 
production incentives for political purposes. The provisions of social insurance are 
additional welfare benefits for the protection of the 'socialist labour force' that,
50 The first industrialisation or modernisation w as happened in 1860s in China under the 
leadership of a Qing courtier Li Hongzhang. The C hinese nam ed this a s  “Self-Strengthening 
Movement" (Ziqiang Yuandong or Yangwu Yuandong). The approach w as mainly to ask the 
capitalists to se t up the factories under the supervision and controls of the governm ent (Guandu 
Shangban). T hese enterprises were mainly the arsenals and shipyards to m ake the w eapons
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consequently, mixed up with other occupational welfare like 'living supplements'. 
Because of its non-contributory nature, labour insurance also functioned as the gratuity 
for meeting the income needs of the work force in retirement or with long-term illness. 
In addition to the unspecified roles of work units, the distorted functions of social 
insurance makes the management chaotic, the financing unstable, and the concept of 
mutual help through contribution is unclear.
In exploring the second issue, two outstanding phenomena, or more precisely, 
hindrances to the development of social insurance in China were noted. First the state's 
role in social insurance changes greatly from extremely minimal before 1949 to 
centralise the planning, financing and management after. It is learned from the 
discussion that contributory social insurance is doomed to failure with too weak or too 
strong state intervention. Second, specialisation and socialisation of production is 
controlled by the state that it deters the rise of capitalists and a salaried labour force in 
China.
Contributory social insurance systems in capitalist developed countries, as 
discussed in Chapter One, involve three main parties in society: state, capitalists and a 
salaried labour force. In most cases contributory social insurance systems take place 
after industrialisation since the prevailing social relief services could not function well in 
meeting the rising social needs. Contributory social insurance system can hardly be 
founded in China because of Confucianism and, or socialism. In Confucian society only 
petty production can grow whilst in socialist society the public ownership of production 
materials and processes govern the development, roles and functions of social 
institutions.51 In both cases only very limited spaces exist for capitalists to perform their
such as  w arships and cannons for war with the foreigners.
51 This w as maintained by the commanding Confucianism in old China that since first, only the 
less educated who found no place in the scholar class becam e m erchants and second, 
m erchants did not contribute to production that they were not respected in society. T h e  Four 
Kinds of P eop le’ (simian) in old day’s  China put scholars at the top, p easan ts  at the second, 
workers at the third and m erchants at the fourth. The definitions of simian in the Third Part of the 
Six S ets  of Law (Ludian) se t by the Ministry of R evenue (Hubu) in Tang Dynasty w as that “those 
who learn literature and martial arts are scholars; those who farm and plant are  peasants; those 
who process the m aterials are workers; those who buy and resell are m erchants." (Ciyuan, 1995, 
p. 346) This social classification had then been recognised in C hinese society till mid 20th 
Century. In the 1950s the communist governm ent of China wanted to prom ote the people’s 
com m unes for collectivisation. Mao Zedong outlined one of the advan tages of com m unes in 
August 1958 as  the centralised administrative social, political and econom ic organism  for the 
people from different walk of life such a s  workers, peasan ts , m erchants, students and
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activities. As for the salaried labour force they are insignificant in terms of social status 
and number in Confucian society but manipulated in the socialist state. This is reflected 
by the legislation of labour insurance for getting their supports in the 1940s in the 
Chinese Liberated Areas and the revisions to suit the country's economic needs in the 
1960s and 1970s in the country. Nevertheless, the strength of socialist state is the hearty 
motivation to set up income protection system for salaried labour force, in view of the 
changing needs in society. On the other hand, this turns to be the weakness since the 
mutable political lines controls the direction of the services. From the 1980s and on, 
changes in political lines have been settled with the reinstatement of the paramount party 
leader. Labour insurance has been reforming for enhancing the socialist economic 
system in China. In the coming chapter the dynamics of the Chinese social insurance in 
the period will be discussed in more detail.
servicem en. (Zhu, 1989, p. 283-284) This signifies the change of the social position of 
capitalists in the class system . However, capitalist w as one of a ‘Five Sinister C lasses’ (Hei 
Wulei) that w as criticised in the Great Cultural Revolution in mid 1960s.
Chapter Three 
Social insurance in China from 1980-1995
Introduction
Reforms in China in the 1980s can be described as the ‘blossoming of the hundred 
flowers’. Pragmatism commands all sectors following Deng Xiaoping’s return to power. 
In April 1983 Deng said, “Practice is the only measure by which we can check whether 
the line, guiding principle and policy is correct.” (Deng, 1993, p. 28, my translation) 
Under this guiding principle, socialist transition was reinterpreted and applied in various 
aspects. In practice, Deng urged the Chinese people to make a breakthrough between 
socialism and capitalism with his saying that ‘It does not matter whether a cat is white or 
black, so long as it catches mice.’ This was a very influential endorsement of efficacy in 
socialist economic development and had a huge impact on implementing reforms across 
the country.
In 1992, Deng bluntly encouraged the Chinese ‘to reform and open daringly’. 
After his visit to Shenzhen in spring 1992, he commented that “We have to try with 
courage and we can’t act like a bound-foot woman.” (Deng, 1993, p. 372, my 
translation) The manoeuvre of Deng was to push the reforms in the country more far 
beyond the debates on capitalism and socialism. “The sole criteria of correctness of the 
line is whether it favours the development of productivity in socialist society, and 
whether it can strengthen the multiple national power of a socialist country.” (Deng, 
1993, p. 372, my translation)
Reforms in the country since 1980 aim at building a comfortably well off society 
(xiaokang) that is different from the earlier line of political struggle in China.52 These 
reforms take place in the ownership system, employment structure, and labour insurance.
52 In the Twelfth National C ongress of the CPC in 1982, xiaokang w as proposed a s  the aim of 
economic developm ent before the end of this century. The standard  of comfortably well-off 
(xiaokang shuiping), according to Li, is that “the broad m asses  of people are  satisfied with the 
basic m eans of livelihood; food structure and nutritional quality are  ameliorated; the quantity and 
quality of clothing is distinctly improved; the num ber of durable consum er goods increases fairly; 
urban and rural housing conditions are significantly upgraded; a nine year compulsory education 
is earned out in all urban areas and most rural areas; senior high school education or the 
equivalent vocational education is basically popularised in big cities; that people’s  cultural life is 
more enriched and colourful, medical and health conditions and environmental sanitation are 
improved; and the general level of people's health further im proves.” (1993, p. 378)
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Labour insurance services are restructured with respect to both the objectives and 
measures for realising the social conditions of xiaokang.53 All of these changes are the 
driving forces for the development of social insurance in China after 1980 that will be 
reviewed in this chapter. The first part of this chapter is about reforms and development 
of social insurance in the country in the 1980s. The subsequent part will be a review of 
the changes as well as the impacts of social insurance in the 1990s. The third part will 
then provide a closer look into the five main social insurance features, namely: 
retirement pensions, sickness and medical insurance, unemployment insurance, 
occupational injury, sickness, and handicapped insurance, and maternity insurance in the 
mid 1990s. The ending of the discussion is an analysis of the specific characteristics of 
social insurance in China.
Reforms and development of social insurance in China in the 1980s
For China the 1980s was a period of drastic economic changes. The country’s economic 
ownership system was diversified albeit the state-owned system still dominated. Under 
the banner of economic reforms there were also changes in state-owned enterprises and 
the employment system. For example, the non state-owned sector has been growing with 
the lifting of the restrictions on private enterprise. These changes have therefore 
unfolded the forces pushing the reforms in social insurance schemes. The primary aim of 
this section is to review the changes in different social insurance programmes in the 
1980s.
The first social insurance programme to be discussed is retirement pensions. As 
found in last chapter, the retirement pension is not a standardised insurance scheme in 
China. There are early retirement programmes (lixiu)54 for older cadres (lao ganbu)55 and
53 Xiaokang is a social condition that is contrasted with Datong. In the Book of Rites it describes 
xiaokang that: “Since the G reat Harmony is hard to find today that the ruling of the country turns 
into a family business. The people now only concern about their own relatives, care for their own 
children, and mind their own property. The rules and institutions are se t up to guide the people’s 
behaviour and govern the social order. Thus the people are  more interested in their own 
achievem ents, s ta tus and rewards that consequently m akes them  calculating and causes 
warfare between nations."
54 Lixiu is the short form f o r 'lizhi xiuyang'. Zhao explains that lizhi xiuyang w as originally called 
‘long term offers’ (chagnqi gongyang). (1993, p. 223) Zhu says that lizhi xiuyang is “a legitimate 
employment condition for staff and workers to leave their posts for recuperation. In the lixiu 
period the employment relationship has not been ended. T here are two main forms of lixiu:
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retirement schemes (tuixiu) for staff (cadres or ganbu)56 and workers (gongren) 
respectively. These services as well as the benefits vary between different groups of 
people because of their dissimilar backgrounds.57
For older cadres, lixiu programme had only been changed minimally in the early 
1980s. According to Zhao (1993, p. 224) the State Council extended the insurance 
service in October 1980 to some grades of cadres. These include those who had 
participated in the two revolutions and the anti-Japanese war, whose grades were 18 or 
above and assigned with administrative duties, and the administrative staff in the 
Chinese Liberated Areas at Grade 14 before liberation (i.e. 1949).58 In the subsequent 
years, there were other policies regarding the details of retirement of this group of state 
employees. For example, the regulations promulgated in April 1982 stipulated the 
benefits and age for retirement. (Wang 1995, p. 407) In brief, lixiu scheme covered all 
those who had participated in the socialist revolution and was made clearer than before.
Cadres in lixiu schemes can enjoy the benefits both in kind and cash. In cash 
terms they are eligible for receiving benefits for early retirement (lixiu fei), various kinds 
of living supplements (shenghuo baotie), special care supplements (huli fei) and welfare 
benefits (fuli fei). For the benefits in kind, they may continue to live in the housing units 
allocated by their work units and use the medical services such as outpatient clinics and
temporary lixiu (e.g. workers at the posts leave for convalesce) and lixiu for old cadres". (1991, 
p. 510, my translation) Strictly speaking, lixiu for old cadres can be trea ted  a s  retirement 
because by age definition this cadre should has retired, although in principle he still maintains 
the employment relationship with the work unit.
55 Zhao finds that an early-retired cadre should fulfil the two conditions for early retirement: the 
time for one who joined the revolutionary work and the benefits got before the founding of the 
communist China. The second is on e’s  age. The age requirem ents are different according to 
one’s  rank, post and sex. (1993, p. 224-225)
56 Cadre or ganbu is referred to staff in state-ow ned units. Luo (1993, p. 201) s ta te s  that “broadly 
speaking, there are six main groups of sta te  cadres. T hese include cad res in sta te  organisations, 
cadres at all levels of the Communist Party of China a s  well a s  in other political parties. Others 
include the servicem en at the rank of platoon leader or above in the P eople’s  Liberation Army 
and the m anagem ent staff at different levels of the People’s  Political Consultative Conference, 
trade unions, Communist Youth League, W om en’s  Federation and other social organisations. 
There are also cadres with professional skill and professional m anagem ent staff in business and 
enterprise units.” (my translation)
57 Under the principle of ‘maintaining the political s tatus and better treatm ents in living’ old 
cadres can enjoy the more generous income m aintenance benefits than the workers and also 
maintain their working relationships with the units. This is stated  in Item Three of “The Several 
Regulations on the Leave for Convalesce for Older C adres” prom ulgated by the S ta te  Council on 
10 April 1982. Zhao (1993, p. 223-227)
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hospitals. In some regions the medical services even include convalescence facilities
specially set up for these cadres.
Early retirement pension benefits for cadres in lixiu had been revised for
maintaining the living standards in the 1980s. Cadres in early retirement had priority
access some benefits in kind over blue-collar cadres. For example, Zhao states that 
“cadres under lixiu should have priority obtaining the service in their work unit’s own 
convalescence facilities.” (1993, p. 229, my translation) A similar principle was also 
applied in the allocation of housing units. On the other hand, the retirement benefits in 
cash of these early-retired people were generally maintained to the current wage levels. 
For example, in wage reform in 1985, the then Bureau of Labour and Personnel 
(.Laodong Renshi Bu) stated that lixiu fei should be set at “one point higher than the 
existing wage level”. (Zhao 1993, p. 227, my translation) In October 1989, the bottom 
lines for lixiu fei were set. These bottom lines were all kept at the same level as or even 
higher than the current wage levels. The same principle was also applied to other early 
retirement benefits in cash such as shenghuo baotie and fuli fei. (Zhao 1993, p. 227-229)
Retirement pensions (tuixiu fei) are provided to workers and cadres under two 
independent schemes. For cadres the document ‘Provisional Measures About the 
Placement of Old and Feeble Cadres’ was applied whilst for workers there was the 
‘Provisional Regulations on Retirement and Leaves of Workers’. The State Council 
promulgated these two policy documents on 24 May 1978. (Fu et a l , 1994, p. 690-695) 
Zhao states that “ ...basically the treatment for cadres and workers were similar under 
these two regulations. But in 1982 ‘retirement pensions for cadres in early retirement’ 
was expanded to the cadres who joined the revolutionary work before the founding of 
the country.” (1993, p. 235) Retirement pension programs were then diversified between 
cadres (or staff) and workers. However, the condition common to them is that they 
should have been employed in either the “organs of political parties and government 
departments, mass organisations, collective owned enterprises and business units” (Zhao 
1993, p. 237) In other words the employees in non state-owned sector are beyond the 
scope of the programmes.
58 S ee  “The Provisional Regulations for Early Retirem ent of Old Cadres".
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In sum, retirement pensions for cadres are multifarious and generous. 
Irrespective of the reforms in social insurance system, the lixiu system was only 
modified to be more favourable to older cadres. Furthermore, the 1982 policy marked 
different treatments between cadres and workers.59 Retirement pension reforms in the 
1980s in China did not include the rising number of employees in the non state-owned 
sector. Rather it was designed for streamlining state-owned units by trimming out the 
less productive labour force in the transition.
Reforms in retirement pension for cadres are tremendously coloured by 
institutional and cadre reforms in the modernisation. The ‘Provisional Measures About 
the Settlement of Old and Feeble Cadres’ states that “to treat the settlement work for old 
and weak cadres gravely has significant meanings in ... founding socialist revolution 
and socialism.” Similar elaboration on the implication of the policy is also found in 
‘Provisional Regulations about Retirement and Leave of Workers’ that “this facilitates 
the maintenance of an intelligent and capable work force and realises the Four 
Modernisation of our country.” These two policy documents are the cornerstones for 
retirement pensions reforms in the 1990s in China. (Zhu 1991, 502)
Unemployment insurance is the second social insurance programme to be 
discussed. For a long time after 1949 unemployment was seen neither as an economic 
nor social challenge.60 Centralised job allocation policy was the tool of the communist 
government to realise the ideal of ‘from each according to his ability’. The approach 
guaranteed all productive forces in the country access to jobs but at the same time it 
developed equivocal relationships between the state, work units, and individual staff and 
workers. Because of the pervasiveness of the illusion that full employment is tenacious 
under socialist planning unemployment insurance was not on the list of social insurance 
services.
59 For example, in Item One of the docum ent nam ed “The Several Regulations on the Leave for 
C onvalesce for Older C adres” promulgated by the S tate Council on 10 April 1982 s ta tes  that 
those cadres who are qualified under the mentioned policy should change from ‘retirem ent’ to 
‘leave for convalescence’. (Wang etal. 1995, p. 407)
60 In China the term ‘waiting-for-job’ has been used since 1949. According to Zhu the meaning of 
waiting-for-job is ‘a social phenom ena that deno tes part of the productive population which 
cannot be em ployed’. Furthermore, he em phasised that waiting-for-job in socialist country is not 
the sam e as  unemployment in capitalist country because waiting-for-job is only a lem porary 
situation’ while unemployment is an ‘inevitable result’. (1991, p. 190)
80
The matter of contemplating unemployment insurance was raised in the 
statement issued by the State Council in August 1980 titled “To Accomplish the Work 
on Employment for the Labour Force in Cities and Town”. This policy paper describes 
the heavy demands on waged employment in that period as the result of fast 
urbanisation, rapid natural growth of population and the limited growth in material 
resources. (Fu et a l, 1995, p. 743) However, the recommendations in the statement were 
rather conservative. It suggested the measure of centrally allocating the possible 12 
million workers who constituted the surplus labour forces in state-owned work units. 
The only innovative views were the promotion of individual economy, the setting up of 
labour services companies and changing the working conditions to absorb the surplus 
labour. (Fu et a l, 1994, p. 744-745) In the later period the roles of collective enterprise 
and individual economy were discussed again in another document in a similar tone.
As mentioned in the previous section economic reforms lead to changes in the 
employment system. These changes also give and stimulate the new needs among the 
people. Rural surplus labour could no longer be absorbed by township enterprises and 
individual economy that the government had to face with the fast growing unemployed 
population. The waiting-for-job question was openly addressed by the then Bureau of 
Labour and Personnel in the policy paper “Measures For the Registration and 
Management of Waiting-for-job People in Urban Areas and Towns” in March 1984. 
Under this regulation the waiting-for-job youth are defined as those aged 16-25 and not 
attending junior or senior secondary schools. It also includes the idled, aged 25-50 for 
men and 20-45 for women.
Throughout the last few years of the 1980s, there were only three policy 
documents on income maintenance concerned with unemployment.61 Although 
collective units and individual economies were also involved in dealing with those 
waiting-for-job, the government only referred to their functional roles in absorbing
61 According to W ang et al. the three policy papers are first, the “Provisional Regulations on 
Waiting-for-job Insurance for Staff and W orkers in State-owned Enterprises" in July 1986 by the 
S tate Council. Second, the “M anagem ent M ethods for the Funding for Waiting-for-job Staff and 
Workers in State-owned Enterprises" by the Bureau of Labour in April 1989. Third, the “Note on 
the discussion on the Operation of Waiting-for-job Insurance in Som e of the Provinces” issued 
by the Bureau of Labour in August 1989. (1995, p. 1017-1217)
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surplus labour rather than thorough plans for the changes in employment tenure. An 
example is the 1986 initiative that the coverage was limited only to staff and workers, 
including those sacked or whose contracts were not renewed, in state-owned enterprises 
which were facing insolvency, reorganisation, or streamlining.62 This policy set the relief 
level for waiting-for-job at 120-150% of the local social relief (shehui jiuji) levels.63 The 
covering period of waiting-for-job relief was 12 months for those who had worked 
continuously for one to five years, or 24 months for five or more years. For those who 
are unable to get jobs after the period are transferred to get social relief from the 
Bureaux of Civil Affairs. The two policy documents in 1989 issued by the Ministry of 
Labour also stipulated that those waiting-for-job are also eligible for medical 
supplements and death supplements as the employed.
The 1986 regulations for waiting-for-job insurance are obviously political 
decisions. Insolvency and the termination of permanent employment tenures in state- 
owned units since the mid 1980s might not be possible without the initiation of waiting- 
for-job insurance. Waiting-for-job insurance is clearly designed to help the government 
out from the predicament because surplus labour had been growing rapidly. In brief, 
faced with the intensifying unemployment problem in the country, the issue is 
reinterpreted as an ‘inevitable result’ of economic transformation and modernisation. 
This viewpoint was elaborated by Meng et a l that the “ ...labour market will become 
more developed with the establishment and operation of the socialist market economy. 
Some people should become idle when productive force are restructured and re-deployed 
in enterprises. This means the occurrence of unemployment.” (1994, p. 138, my 
translation)
The regulations on unemployment insurance focused on state-owned enterprises, 
rather than covering the work units of different ownership and revealed two concerns. 
First, politically, the Chinese government has to show its concern for those who 
participated in ‘socialist construction’. Obviously the socialist government needs to 
consolidate the support of the loyalists, especially in the transitional period from 
socialism to communism. Although it was pointed out that the market is not a feature
62 S ee  W ang etal. 1995, p. 1017.
63 The term ‘waiting-for-job relief is used by Zhao (1993, p. 257) that it reflects to a certain extent 
the conservative view on unemployment insurance.
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exclusive to capitalist society and does not play the upper hand in socialist society, the 
legitimacy of the socialist government is institutionalised by the Constitution and the 
National People’s Congress that are guided by the communist ideology.64 Disregarding 
the effects, it is an instinctive orientation of the Chinese government to protect their 
vested interests.
Second, economically, in the transitional period the Chinese government has to 
revitalise private economy in order to comprehensively develop the national economy. 
The modification of the socialist public ownership system, however, also means the 
initiation of market competition. It is recognised that to be more competitive the 
collective economic units like state-owned enterprises must be less cumbersome and 
more sensitive to the market. In other words, the less the control on the market, the 
deeper the reforms in state-owned enterprises. The results of such changes cannot be 
predicted. Neither Karl Marx nor Deng Xiaoping can tell to what extent they can 
accommodate the planned economy to the open market. But pragmatically, to stay alive, 
state-owned enterprises have to be restructured and reorganised. Hence, it is clear from 
the functional view that social insurance serves state-owned enterprises and the 
employment system in the reforms. Nevertheless, the waiting-for-job relief exposes the 
neglect of employees in the non state-owned sector in the 1980s. It is also a very 
significant matter in the study of the features of the Chinese social insurance system. In 
the following parts the discussion will then turn to the medical and sickness insurance to 
see the other distinctive characteristics of social insurance in China.
Medical and health insurance in China can generally be divided into ‘sickness 
and non occupational injury insurance’ (jibing, feiyingong fushang baoxiari) and 
‘medical insurance’ (yiliao baoxian) which are put under two different categories: 
‘medical benefits for workers (laobao yiliao)' and ‘medical benefits for cadres or staff 
(gongfei yiliao)'. In the 1980s there was only one significant change in ‘sickness and 
non-occupational injury insurance’ whilst all of the sickness benefits were kept 
unchanged as they were originally set before the modernisation programme. In July 1986 
the “Provisional Regulations on the Practice of Contract Systems in State-owned 
Enterprises” was issued. It states that paid sickness leave for contract system employees
64 S ee, for example, Deng Xiaoping m ade these  points in his speech  after the visit to southern
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is different from that of the permanent employees. (Zhao 1993, p. 264) According to the 
‘Labour Insurance Regulations of the People’s Republic of China” issued in 1953, 
permanent staff and workers are eligible for sickness leave with pay up to 60% of their 
standard wages if the leave is longer than 6 months, until death or until proven 
handicapped. The paid sickness leave for contract system employees, however, lasts 
only for three to twelve months, except for those who have worked as contract system 
labour in work units for more than 20 years. Furthermore, contract system employees 
who are dismissed after sickness leave can only get the medical supplement equal to 
three to six months standard wage of their standard wage. (Zhao 1993, p. 264) A similar 
approach was also applied to rotation labourers (nongmin lunhuan gong).65 Zhao states 
that according to the “Regulations on the Practice of the System of Labourers Working 
in Mining Enterprises” in June 1984 rotation labourers can get no more than three 
months sickness leave for non occupational injury. But if they cannot go back to work 
after the leave period the enterprise can terminate the employment. In such cases rotation 
labourers are only compensated with medical supplements equal to one to two months of 
their basic wages.
Another unequal treatment is that contract system workers are excluded from the 
eligibility to the 50% subsidised medical expenses on operation and medicine from work 
units for their family dependants. In addition, the medical benefits for retired contract 
system employees are different from retired permanent workers. Furthermore, contract 
system employees cannot get the benefits if they get the lump sum retirement pensions 
and have only worked for a short period in the work units.
Reforms in gongfei yiliao (medical benefits for cadres or staff) are stated in the 
“Provisional Measures for Living Conditions of The Staff on Sickness Leave in State 
Organs” issued in April 1981. The benefit levels set in this regulation for the service 
recipients are more generous than that in laobao yiliao. For example the claimant can 
enjoy full-paid sickness leave for the first two months, and up to 90-100% in the
China in 1992. (Deng, 1993, p. 372-373)
65 Rotation labourers are employed under the ‘System  of labourers Working in Factories and in 
the Field’. According to Li, the system  is explained as  “the employment of rural labour by som e 
Chinese industrial enterprises. The period of employment is fixed. T hese rural labour job-share 
perm anent positions for fixed periods of employment. With this system , there is no change in the 
registration of residence of the labourers. It is a suitable form of ... industries which provide
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subsequent third to sixth months. The recipients can even get as high as 70% of the 
wages from the eighth month and onwards. For some ‘special recipients’ such as model 
staff who have been awarded by local government can get even higher level benefits.
Another change in medical benefits for staff or cadres is the stipulation on the 
salary levels in sickness leave. In November 1985 the then Ministry of Labour and 
Personnel announced that only the ‘basic wage’, ‘duty wage’ and ‘service period wage’ 
were included in the reformed wage system. Such measures cut the number of 
determinants of salary levels that consequently scale down the sickness leave benefits 
for cadres and staff. Most importantly, it started the move towards readjusting the 
disproportionately generous benefit levels for this group of employees.
Nevertheless, the most significant reform in gongfei yiliao is the issue of the 
“Measures for the Management of Medical Benefits for Cadres or staff’ in August 1989. 
This policy document states the administrative matters for medical insurance for cadres 
in nine chapters. (Wang 1995, p. 964-968) It also specifies that only the enlisted tenure 
staff in state-financed organisations, political parties and mass organisation can enjoy the 
benefits. Thus non-permanent staff such as temporary, seasonal, part-time, etc. are 
excluded from gongfei yiliao. (Zhao 1993, p. 272)
The changes in medical and sickness insurance demonstrates that these are 
reforms responding to the changing needs in national economy. One of the examples is 
the stipulation on the compositions of salary. Second, there are benefit disparities 
between laobao yiliao for workers and gongfei yiliao for cadres or staff, as well as 
between employees in permanent and non-permanent employment systems. This 
constitutes a particular feature of the social insurance system that the benefit levels are 
determined by the claimant’s ranking or employment tenure but not his monetary 
contributions and degree of needs. In general, the waged non-permanent employees are 
less protected. Third, laobao in China in the 1980s was not included in social insurance 
system. Rather, they were covered under an independent set of regulations for the 
specific group of employees. This also exposes the superficial social insurance reforms 
and its designated supplementary role in economic reforms in the period of 1980s.
unattractive and hazardous work, or dem and the employment of physical labour." (1993, p. 237)
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The last but not least change in medical and health insurance in the 1980s is the 
emergence of the mutual help type of medical insurance. Zhao mentions that in May 
1987 a state enterprise in Beijing began a scheme called ‘Centralised Fund for Serious 
Sickness’ (Dabing Yiliao Jijin Tongchou). The purpose of this programme is to 
‘moderate the unbalanced burdens of medical expenses among staff and workers in 
enterprises.” (Zhao 1993, p. 289, my translation) At the beginning the work unit made 
deductions from the monthly bonus of every staff member and workers at the rate of 3 
yuan each and the money was put in a special bank account. In 1988 at the change of 
the taxation system, the work unit appropriated from the unit’s post tax collective 
welfare fund to support the programme. The enterprise requested all of its subsidiaries or 
branches to contribute to the fund and those which failed to do so for three months were 
not allowed the benefit.
The above mentioned case is interesting because, although the mutual 
contributory sickness insurance is only work unit-based, it started the social insurance 
with mutual help concept. This is also an important step since it marked the change from 
non-contributory to contributory. As Zhao describes that following disclosure of this 
case many other regions in China developed their own medical insurance systems based 
on this model. (1993, p. 289)
Another social insurance programme related to sickness and injury is 
‘occupational injury, sickness and handicapped benefit’ (OISH). Non occupational 
injury and sickness matters will not be discussed here since the employees should seek 
help from sickness benefits. OISH benefits can be differentiated into supplementary 
benefits (buzho fei) to the partly handicapped employees, and compassionate benefits 
(fuxui fei) to the totally handicapped. In general, the workers and staff members (or 
cadres) enjoy benefits differently from OISH programmes. Injured workers are classified 
into ‘totally handicapped’ and ‘partly handicapped’ whilst there are six gradings for 
cadres. In most cases OISH for workers is more comprehensive than staff (Zhao 1993, 
p. 291) This is the only insurance programme in China that the blue collars can enjoy 
more protections.
However, the weakness of the OISH programme in the 1980s is its inadequate
86
benefits to support the increasing needs of workers in the 1980s. The OISH services and 
benefits in the 1980s were based on the Regulations on Labour Insurance of the 1950s. 
The classification of the degree of handicap was not revised and standardised until 
March, 1992, after the requests on ‘building up a comprehensive social security system’ 
was officially made in the Eighth Five Year Plan. (Zhao 1993, p. 299)
In June 1978, the State Council stipulated that those who lost total working 
abilities or were totally handicapped were eligible for retirement benefits. This group of 
people was allowed to get retirement pensions at higher (80-90% of his standard wages) 
rates than those from the retirement programme of the labour insurance. In addition, 
special supplements at the median wage level of a worker’s ‘Five-grade Wage System’ 
that was started in 1985 were granted to those who could no longer care for themselves. 
The ‘Five-grade Wage System’ also boosted the minimum benefit level of the OISH 
programmes up from 40 yuan in August 1983 to 60 yuan in 1989 in view of the rising 
living standard in the economic reforms.
Another OISH programme is supplementary benefits for the partly handicapped. 
The Labour Insurance governed that this benefit covers one’s income lost at the 
maximum of 30% of his original wage for occupational injury or sickness reasons. This 
benefit was revised with upward modifications for the worst cases. However, the 
function of this OISH benefit is unimportant since most work units in the early 1990s do 
not cut the wage incomes of the partly handicapped even if their productivity is lower 
than before. (Zhao 1993, p. 296)
Supplementary benefits of the OISH programmes for cadres or staff was 
administered under the regulations stipulated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1989. 
This group of employees enjoyed the ‘in-service handicapped benefits’ (zhaizhi 
chanfeijin) which is dispensed annually in six different grades for those who are 
handicapped because of war or other official duties. However, those who were 
handicapped in war serving the country can get higher level benefits.
In sum, OISH programmes in the 1980s were distinguished by a trend for 
building up a comprehensive benefit system. Nevertheless, in view of the various modes 
of ownership and production rise in the period, the obsolete OISH insurance could not
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cope with the growing needs in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The standard and definition 
of occupational injury were therefore revised in 1992 to ameliorate the defects. The 
weakest part of OISH programme, however, is the double standard set for white collar 
staff (e.g. cadres and police) and blue collar workers (e.g. workers in enterprises). Even 
among state-owned enterprises, the procedures for the assessment of the seriousness of 
the case and the determination of benefits levels were not unified. For forty years from 
1949 these measures were developed according to the experiences of large-scale 
enterprises in northeastern China (e.g. Heilongjiang) and had not been revised. (Zhao 
1993, p. 299)
The specific feature of this approach was the uniform nature that assumed all 
working units have strong and efficient management as the large ones. In reality this 
approach does not fit the changed social conditions and economic production modes 
since the reforms. With the lifting of the controls on geographical mobility in the country 
more and more members of the labour force migrate from one city to another or from 
rural areas to cities to make their living. These migrant workers are mostly employed in 
relatively unfavourable conditions. This explains why enterprises funded by investors, 
local or from abroad, can compete in the global market - by making use of the cheaper 
factors of productions. It is found that foreign capital-related enterprises in the Pearl 
River Delta Region in Guangdong always recruit the most productive labourers and 
discard the older and weaker ones. Thus it seems naive to expect the OISH programmes 
to cover the non-permanent migratory workers rise in the socialist market economy. In 
the long run, the rural or underdeveloped areas will become more deprived because they 
have to shoulder the burden of caring for the returned seriously injured workers. These 
underdeveloped areas will be filled with the unproductive labour that requires heavy 
inputs for social services.66 In sum, the OISH programmes reflect the serious unequal 
treatment between migrant and local workers, as well as between blue and white-collar 
employees.
66 Zhao (1993, p. 304) s ta tes  that for the rotation workers who cannot be recovered from the 
sickness or injury in 6 months they will be sen t back to their own villages. In this case  the 
enterprises have to pay the com passionate benefits to the related village. In addition, it is also 
stated  in the “Regulations for Rotation W orkers in Mining Enterprises" that the returned rotation 
workers in totally handicapped or with d isease  should be allocated with lower price food from the 
local food supply units.
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Similar to the stagnant application of OISH services, maternity insurance did not 
change radically in the 1980s. In addition, the changes are driven by the overall needs of 
modernisation but not of the particular employees. In July, 1988 the State Council issued 
the “Regulations on Labour Protection for Women Staff and Workers” which was later 
elaborated on by the Ministry of Labour in the document titled “Notice About the 
Several Questions on Maternity Insurance for Women Staff and Workers”. These two 
policy documents strengthened the maternity insurance under the labour insurance that 
had been practised since the 1950s. Zhao mentions four specific features about the new 
initiatives but the most prominent one is the barring from benefits women who give birth 
but are not married, or have not reached the approved marriage age, or have not 
observed the national birth control policies.67
Maternity insurance benefits outlined in the 1988 policy paper were generous. 
All maternity related expenses such as regular check up, labour, operation, hospital 
charges and medicine are all supported by the employee’s work unit. As mentioned, 
maternity insurance was divided into maternity supplements (shengyu buzhufei) and paid 
maternity leave (<chanjia). However, maternity supplements were abolished in September 
1988. For paid maternity leave, the 1988 Regulations also supersedes that declared in the 
1950s that 90 days of paid maternity leave is allowed.68 Postnatal leave was extended 
aiming for better protections to the new bom and then achieve the ‘extended 
reproduction of the productive force’.” (Zhao 1993, p. 308)
Although the changes in maternity insurance are not extensive, yet the values and 
rationale of this insurance programme are functional. The exclusion of those not married 
or who give birth of a child without the permission from the units is an example of the 
special features of social insurance in China. This political function (i.e. the reproduction 
of socialist production force) goes beyond the practices of social insurance. Furthermore, 
this measure alienated the beneficiary’s relationship with social insurance because her 
accessibility is determined by whether she observes the non-social insurance related
67 According to the Marriage Law of the People’s  Republic of China, the minimum age for 
m arriage for the man is 22 and for the woman is 20. It is stipulated that the registration offices for 
m arriage are not allowed to process m arriage registration if the either side has not reached the
m arriage age. (Cui 1990, p.351)
68 It w as stated  in the 1988 Regulations that pregnant women em ployees are  eligible to 15 days 
antenatal leave and 75 days of postnatal leave. (Wang 1995, p. 1049)
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regulations. In brief, as Liu (1995, p. 181) comments that the 1988 regulations on 
maternity insurance have not solved the problem of “enterprise insurance”. This ‘carrot 
and stick’ approach creates many side effects in society including unnecessary or forced 
abortion, physical risks to pregnant women employees, and poverty to those families not 
covered by the benefit.
This section reviewed in general the changes in the five main social insurance 
services in China in the 1980s. The obvious change is the reinterpretation of 
unemployment that ultimately leads to the setting up of unemployment insurance 
benefits. In contrast, the other four social insurance items, namely, retirement pensions, 
OISH, medical and sickness insurance, and maternity insurance only muddled through in 
radical social and economic changes, without regard for the new needs. A common 
feature, however, emerges from all of these social insurance programmes that, as in the 
past 30 years since 1949, the contributory nature is still missing and the objective of 
income maintenance is not of primary importance. In view of the larger revolutionary 
changes in the countiy’s economic system, the following part examines social insurance 
in China in the early half of the 1990s.
Reforms in social insurance in the early 1990s and the implications
Changes in economic ownership and employment systems in the 1980s touched off the 
reforms in labour insurance. The previous section has just shown that most parts of 
social insurance in China were not revised in the first decade of modernisation after 
1979. Nevertheless, social insurance was remodelled in the 1990s with an important 
move towards multi-party contribution. Before proceeding to explore what these changes 
are, the following paragraphs will first present the rationales for labour insurance 
reforms.
First, in order to construct a socialist market economy, streamlining the state’s 
structure by changing its relationships with work units and employees in terms of labour 
insurance is necessary. It is stated in Article 72 of Labour Law 1995 that “social 
insurance funds are established towards social contributions. Employers and the labour 
force should join and contribute to social insurance.” In addition, Article 75 of the 
Labour Law states that “the state encourages employers to build up supplementary
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insurance (buchong baoxian) whenever conditions allow. The state advocates social 
insurance with a saving nature for individuals to join.”
Second, social insurance reforms facilitate enterprise reforms in modernisation. 
In more explicit terms, social insurance is a state mechanism that serves the regime in 
effecting social and economic policies. For example, maternity benefits are both ‘carrot 
and stick’ for women employees under the ‘Single Child Policy’. It is stated in Article 
15 of the ‘Regulations On Labour Protection For Women Staff and Workers’ that 
“women staff and workers who violate the related state policy on child bearing are not 
covered”. In Beijing, it is stipulated that these women staff and workers have to pay the 
expenses for medical and hospital services themselves, as well as being deprived of the 
wages and all benefits from their work units.69 On the other hand, those women staff and 
workers who are married or give birth of the first child at an older age can get their 
maternity leave of one more month as the extra reward.
Third, social insurance reforms restructure the redistribution system in China and 
then reserves much more state finance for economic development. It is noted that in 
order to realise the ‘Four Modernisations’ within the plan the country has to maintain the 
average annual economic growth rate at 7.2%. (Su 1983, p. 33) In order to achieve this 
predetermined aim, the state’s expenses must be controlled tightly. Thus social 
investment growth rates including the state’s share in social insurance should be 
readjusted. Consequently, the national economic growth will be faster. (Table 3-1)
Table 3-1 below shows that in economic terms China has developed very fast in 
the past 15 years. For example, the central government revenue increased by 19.7% per 
year in the period. In this period, the gross output value of industry in this agricultural 
country soared at an average annual rate 14.9%. This significant expansion in the values 
of industrial products came from vigorous investment in state-owned (15.5%) and 
collectively owned units (31.6%). However, the growth in social services like education 
and health is another story. The inputs in education, especially in basic education such as 
primary and secondary schools were recorded with negative growth. In addition, the 
growth rates of medical and health care in terms of the number of hospital beds and
69 P lease s e e  “The Methods of Penalising those violating the Regulations on Birth Control in 
Beijing City".
91
paramedical staff were lower than that of the government revenue and investments in 
state related enterprises. According to the CSPH, the number of medical technical 
personnel in every 1000 population increased only from 3.22 in 1985 to 3.5 in 1994. 
(1995, Table 19-18, p. 670)
Table 3-1 Changes in average real growth rates in national economy, 1979-1994
Item Growth rate 
(%)
Population 1.4
Gross national Product 9.8
Gross Domestic Product 9.8
Central government revenue 19.7
Local government revenue 5.7
Investment in state-owned units 15.5
Investment in urban collective owned units 31.6
Gross output value of farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 6.2
Gross output value of industry 14.9
Students enrolled in higher education institutions 7.7
Students enrolled in regular secondary schools -1.7
[Students enrolled in primary schools -0.8
Number of hospital beds 2.7
Number of professional medical persons (except doctors) 3.4
Source: CSPH 1995, Table 2-2, p.20-25.
The previous discussion shows certain aspects where the Chinese government 
controlled and distributed her resources after 1979. Thus it is also indubitably clear that 
the inexorable trend to restructure social insurance, disregards the changes in political, 
economic and social demands in the 1990s. In 1994, the total funding for labour 
insurance and welfare in the total wages for the whole country was 29.4%. Furthermore, 
in this approximate sum of RMB 2,000 billion, 83.2% were paid through state-owned 
units. (CSPH 1995, Table 19-40, p. 685) For the government the reforms in labour 
insurance is particular desperate on medical care in state-owned units. It is found that 
63 .8% of the funds for collective insurance were consumed by medical care. (CSPH 
1995, Table 19-421. p. 686) Moreover, in view of the ageing population and 
streamlining policy in enterprise reforms in China, more and more staff and workers are 
forced to resign or take early retirement from their posts. It is found that in the period of 
1978 to 1994 the growth rate of the number of retirees in the country was 52%. Among 
the 22.5 million resigned and retired staff and workers {Lixiu Tuixiu Renyuan or RRSW)
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and veteran cadres who stepped down and retired (Tuizhi Renyuan or VCSR) from state- 
owned units in 1994, 98.8% were financially supported by their original units, with the 
rest assisted by the Civil Affairs Bureau.70 (CSPH 1995, Table 19-43, p. 688)
All in all, social insurance reforms are pushed forward by the needs for 
modernisation, especially for the realisation of socialist market economy. Social 
insurance services are deliberately designed to facilitate the changes in state-owned 
enterprises, the rising unemployment problems, and the centralised population policies, 
etc. These national economic and political forces guided and formed social insurance 
policies in China with particular characteristics, the unique objectives, and the unusual 
administrative mechanism. The founding of social insurance in China is revolutionary as 
the communist government was taking over and changing the country. Nevertheless the 
development of social insurance is evolutionary at a very conservative pace. In general, 
the national political and economic forces initiate the establishment, development and 
reforms of social insurance in China that makes it no different from the other income 
maintenance programmes. This explains why social insurance in China looks more like 
occupational welfare but does not have a contributory mechanism for risk sharing. The 
focus of the following discussion will shift to the restructuring of labour insurance 
institutions.
The Ministry of Labour and trade unions in the current Chinese government 
structure are the two main organisations playing significant roles in labour insurance in 
enterprises. In the 1982 institutional reforms in China, the State Council incorporated the 
Ministry of Labour (Laodong Bu) with the Ministry of Personnel (Renshi Bu) and two 
other central government organisations to form the Ministry of Labour and Personnel 
(Laodong Renshi Bu). (Su et al. 1994, p. 605) Two of the main subdivisions of the 
former Ministry of Labour, namely, the Insurance and Welfare Department (Baoxian
70 The SSRW  and VCSR are different. First, staff and workers (zhigong) are  the main force in 
enterprises who are responsible for the production or direct services. In contrast, cad res {ganbu) 
are those who participate in the m anagem ent process. They can especially be found in 
governm ent offices or political and social organisations. Second, retirement m eans to quit from 
the post because  of physical or age problems. C adres and staff and workers are provided with 
retirem ent pensions according to the s ta te ’s  Labour Law. On the other hand, there are  two main 
forms of resignation from job in China. The first is the maintaining of the employment relationship 
although resigned. For example, staff and workers may resign for retraining or convalescence 
and return to work in due courses. Another format is the termination of the employment 
relationship under the Labour Law. For detail definitions p lease refer to Zhu (1991).
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Fuli Si) and the Social Insurance Services Bureau (Shehui Baoxian Shiye Ju), were 
specifically assigned to manage social insurance for staff and workers. On the other 
hand, the former Ministry of Personnel was changed into the Wage, Insurance and 
Welfare Department (Gongzi Baoxian Fuli Si) to look after the fringe benefits and labour 
insurance in the civil service system.71
Because of the specially assigned duties and relationships with the party and 
government, the trade unions in China is a quasi-govemmental body rather than an 
autonomous labour organisation representing the immediate interests of the member 
workers. Zhu and Zhang (1995, p. 24) elaborate that, trade unions, especially the All 
China Trade Unions (Zhonghua Quanguo Zhonggonghui), plan social insurance with the 
Ministry of Labour at the central level. Chiang (1990, p. 81) comments that trade unions 
in this socialist country have “...assumed the dual role of mobilising workers for 
production and consolidating the Party’s leadership.” Before the Cultural Revolution this 
‘dual roles’ was found both in policy implementation and policy making and 
explanation. In the period between the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
and enterprise reforms in 1982, the management and control of the labour insurance 
services for staff and workers were shared between the Ministry of Labour (LadongBu) 
and the personnel offices of the government departments and business units. The Labour 
Personnel Bureau (Laodong Renshi Bu) which was set up in 1982 was assigned to 
centralise the work on social insurance for cadres from policy making to the 
management of the insurance benefits.72 (Shao 1991, p. 237-238)
71 In the institutional reforms, the C hinese governm ent tries to build up a civil service system  
from the cadre system  in the past. Cadre or 'ganbu' is a term  generally m eans the staff in sta te  
related units. Luo s ta tes  that “‘state  cadres' m eans all s ta te  personnel except workers and staff 
with odd-jobs. In general, there are six main groups of s ta te  cadres who hold public office: (1) 
cadres in state  organisations; (2) cadres who are responsible for the organisation work in the all 
levels of the Communist Party of China a s  well a s  in other political parties; (3) the servicem en at 
the rank of platoon leader or above in the People’s  Liberation Army; (4) the m anagem ent staff at 
different levels of the People’s  Political Consultative Conference, trade unions, Communist 
Youth League, W om en’s  Federation and other social organisations; (5) cadres with professional 
skills; (6) professional m anagem ent staff in business and enterprises units." (1993, p. 201, my 
translation) In the fading-in civil service system , there are 15 g rades from the premier (grade 1) 
to a general clerical worker (grade 10-15). The recruitment and m anagem ent of civil servants in 
China are also changed from the central allocation for cadres in the past, to open recruitment, 
examination and appraisal. For details P lease  refer to the Policies and Regulations Departm ent 
of the Ministry of Personnel (1993).
72 According to Su et al. (1994, p. 605) the Ministry of Labour Personnel combined the Ministry 
of Labour, Ministry of Personnel, Committee for S ta te  and the Bureau for Scientific C adres of the 
State Council. The newly formed Ministry has 9 main duties and m any of them  are the
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In 1988, the Labour Personnel Bureau was dissolved. The responsibility of 
delivery of social insurance services in state organisations and business units was 
returned to the personnel offices of the related units whilst the Ministry of Labour got 
back the co-ordination work of social insurance in the country. Zhao comments on these 
changes that:
“Although there are reforms and restructuring in social insurance in these years, 
there has been some confusion of the system because the Ministry of Labour, 
Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Health, trade unions, 
and the Economic Systems Reforms Committees all strive for controlling the 
administration work, disregarding the fact that none of these units provide 
comprehensive service.” (1993, p. 402-403, my translation)
Reforms in social insurance in China show that not a single task that can be 
accomplished by one single move. Rather, it is complicated by the struggle for power 
and the interests among governmental organisations. The intractable administration of 
social insurance in China needed legislation to require those intransigent state 
organisations to relinquish their vested interests. For this reason in 1991 the State 
Council promulgated “Decisions on the Reforms in Old Age Pensions for Staff and 
Workers in Enterprises”. In this policy document the Ministry of Labour was assigned 
the task of overseeing retirement pensions in urban non state-owned enterprises. The 
personnel offices in state-owned units are responsible for the management of retirement 
pensions in their own units. On the other hand, the Bureau of Civil Affairs puts its 
efforts in rural old age pensions and social relief in cities and towns. The conflicts had 
not been resolved although an independent organisation named Social Insurance 
Services Bureau {Shehui Baoxian Shiye Ju) was proposed in 1988 and finally set up in 
1993.73 This Bureau, as explained by Zhu and Zhang, is a ‘business unit’ charged with 
the main responsibility of managing social insurance for staff and workers (including 
contract system workers) in enterprises.
According to Zhu and Zhang (1995, p. 26-27) social insurance management in
m anagem ent of human resources in the government.
73 The dissensions betw een Bureau of Labour and Social Insurance Services B usiness Bureau 
goes on in the 1990s, irrespective of a policy docum ent issued by S ta te  Council which stated  
that “All local governm ents should establish com m ittees on the Funding for Retirem ent Pension 
which are com posed of the heads from the D epartm ents of Finance, Planning, Trade Union, 
Labour, etc. The m anagem ent office of the Committee is se t in the Labour Bureau.” (Zhao 1993,
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China in early 1990s has three levels. The top level is a ‘central management 
organisation’ ’which heads the whole system and makes decisions. This level is also 
responsible for comprehensive planning, guiding and supervising the implementation of 
services. The mid level is composed of local governmental units and departments, which 
is responsible for implementing social insurance policies, drawing up local social 
insurance policies and supplementary regulations. The bottom level is mainly for 
operational purposes including collecting the contributions, dispensing the benefits, 
recordings and filings, etc. (Chart 3-1)
Chart 3-1 The three-tier social insurance management in China in the 1990s
Top tier: Central planning and supervision 
Ministry of Labour &
All China Trade Unions
Bottom tier: Operation 
Branch offices of local government 
departments and 
Social Insurance Services Bureau
Mid tier: Assist in policy making and 
transmitting views 
Local government offices, e.g.
Bureau of Labour and 
! Bureau of Civil Affairs
The effectiveness of the three-tier system is challenged by the rising demands in 
the mid 1990s because of the rapidly growing unemployed in society. It is found from 
the above chart that the government only centralised the operational level of social 
insurance in enterprises through the Social Insurance Services Bureau. There are still big 
gaps between policy planning and implementation, between different social insurance 
services enjoyed by staff and workers, between state-owned and non-state-owned units, 
between employees of different employment conditions, and even between urban and 
rural areas. But the most important implication is that economic-political factors, e.g. the 
involvement of trade unions, determine the policies, objectives and management of the 
services. In March 1998 the Ministry of Labour was changed to Ministry of Labour and
p. 403, my translation)
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Social Security in the reshuffle of the State Council. (Mingpao Daily, 19 March 1998) 
This innovative move reflects the state’s concern for the needs for income protection in 
economic system transformation in the country. Yet one has to wait and see the results 
because social and economic changes in the country depend very much on the party’s 
guidelines. The following parts will present the reforms in the five main social insurance 
services in China before turning to highlight the characteristics of social insurance in this 
period.74
A review of social insurance in China in the early 1990s
I) Reforms in retirement pensions in China
Social insurance reforms in China started with retirement pensions in 1984. According to 
Zhao, the primary objective of the reform is to build up a centralised system to collect, 
manage and allocate retirement funds. (1993, p. 218) In China, this approach is termed 
as (shehui tongchou) or ‘social co-ordination’, which implies the withdrawal of the state 
from its role of strong intervention. The meaning of ‘social’ is weak state or minimal 
government controls but strong family or community commitments. In social insurance 
the government formed specialised organisations to provide the services. For example 
the government in Guangdong Province set up social insurance companies. Later, these 
local social insurance organisations were merged into a two-tier management system at 
the provincial level.
Reforms in retirement pensions include reviews on the regulations on retirement 
pensions. Last chapter shows that retirement pension schemes were separately provided 
for cadres and workers in the past. (Zhao 1993, p. 220) There was a standard stipulation 
method to determine the benefit levels for cadres in state organs, party offices, and mass 
organisations.75 The general principle of this standardised scheme is to disburse the
74 Survivors’ benefits and funeral supplem ents will not be included because there has been no 
major revision since the promulgation of the “Regulations for Labour Insurance of the People’s 
Republic of China" in 1951. In view of the rising living standards after the modernisation, work 
units usually issue benefits with som e special considerations apart from referring to the 
stipulations in the Regulations. First, there is a lump sum  com passionate grant for the family 
dependants. Second, the funeral supplem ents are higher than the level se t in the 1951 
Regulations. Third, family dependants of the concerned em ployee might get regular or irregular 
relief grants at or below the local social relief level. In addition, the relief grant should be higher if 
the family dependants are widowed elderly or orphans.
75 The term m ass organisation refers to the social organisation under the control of the
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benefits directly from financial allocation and management. In this case one’s working 
years and salary level and modes, i.e. basic salary (jiban gongzi), salary for the post 
(zhiwu gongzi), and supplements according to working years (gongling jintie) are 
significant in determining one’s benefit level in a work unit. On the other hand, a ‘multi­
layer’ (duocengci) retirement pensions system was set up to collect the contributions 
from the state, the unit, and individual employees.
Reforms in retirement pensions in the 1990s have two parts: the ‘State Stipulated 
Basic Retirement Fund’ (Guojia Jiben Yanglao Jijiri) and the ‘Enterprise Supplementary 
Retirement Fund’ (Qiye Buchong Yanglao Jijiri). The former is set at the lower level 
than the standard retirement pensions for cadres in state organs but the total benefit of 
this multi-layer system is higher than that provided only by state organs and mass 
organisations. In brief, the state’s contributions are cut whilst the inputs from units and 
individual employees are raised.
The specific characteristics of these two retirement pension components are two. 
First, the nature of occupational welfare is still strong in state organs and organisations. 
The state has to play the employer’s role in allocating resources for and managing social 
insurance. Second, different treatments between state-owned units still exist. State- 
owned enterprises and the staff and workers have to contribute to retirement pension, 
with a minimal part supply from government. This approach also reflects the state 
resources for income protections are apportioned mainly for salaried employees rather 
than waged workers.
In view of the growth in the numbers of contractual workers in China, there are 
also accompanying devices for social insurance. The regulations on contractual workers 
since 1986 aim at building up a retirement pension system for these employees.76 A 
tripartite system is developed to involve the state, work unit, and the individual 
contractual worker.77 Basically the funding for these retirement pension programmes are
Communist Party. The exam ples are trade unions, the Communist Youth League, the All China 
Federation of W omen, etc.
76 For example, the “Regulation on the Practice of Labour Contract System  in State-owned 
Enterprises” in July 1987.
77 S ee, for example, the “Decisions on the Reforms on Retirem ent P ensions in State-owned 
Enterprises” promulgated by the S tate Council in June 1991.
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self-supported with no state assistance save in the event of financial crisis in the funding. 
Work units are encouraged to contribute for their employees with money appropriated 
from their pre-taxed profits. By so doing the taxable profit is smaller. Last but not least 
the benefit levels in effect are similar to those for permanent employees. (Zhao 1993, p. 
222)
In principle the benefits for contractual employees are much the same as 
permanent employees because there are stipulations in the regulations. However, since 
the rapid growing of this type of employees as well as the non state-owned economic 
units, there are discrepancies in coverage between the non-permanent and permanent 
employees in both sectors in practice. This phenomenon will be verified later by a 
quantitative research in this study. Before going to study this specific characteristic of 
the Chinese social insurance, the following parts will present reforms in the country’s 
sickness and medical insurance.
II) Sickness and medical insurance reforms in China
Sickness and medical insurance in China is an almost free service. (Tang 1994, p. 1128) 
Similar to the retirement pensions, sickness and medical insurance is also divided into 
labour medical insurance for staff and workers in enterprises (laobao yiliao), and 
medical benefits for cadres or staff in state organs (gongfei yiliao). (Tang et al 1994, p. 
1128) Yan et a l (1987, p. 338) state that laobao yiliao is regulated by Labour Insurance 
whilst gongfei yiliao is administered independently. In medical insurance reforms, Zhao 
(1993, p. 224) comments that there is only one single objective, i.e. to contract out in 
diversifying the funding sources of the services. The methods of contracting out medical 
services are various. First, fixed amounts of money are given to individual employee for 
a certain period of time. The employee is allowed to keep the residue or claim for 
reimbursement on any overspending. The second format allows employees to claim part 
of the overspent allowance. The third is to ‘link between the service providers and 
individual employees’ by sub-contracting the service to hospitals so that the demand side 
of the service is controlled by the supply side. This is a reward-control arrangement. 
Medical personnel are allowed to share the unused part of money in the contract so that 
they check the misuse of the service as well as the induced consumption. The final one is 
to contract out to individual employees that one can save up all the money but, on the
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other hand, one cannot ask for supplements under any circumstances.
Speaking in general, as Zhao comments, medical and sickness insurance reforms 
in state-owned enterprises are more thorough than in state organs. Moreover, he 
observes that the smaller the size of the enterprise the more radical the reforms in 
sickness and medical insurance, and the weaker the relationship of the unit with the state 
the deeper the reforms. Zhao explains that large scale, well established and profit making 
state-owned enterprises are reluctant to make the reforms because they do not want to 
see the incentive and productivity of their workers affected. (1993, p. 224) Another 
problem rises from this reform is the low level of ‘socialisation’.78 (Tang et a l 1994, p. 
1128-1129) He proposes that the government, as the sole provider of the service, is faced 
with difficulties in solving the enduring problems like misuse of the services and the 
wasting of public money. It is for this reason that, in most big cities of the country, as the 
case is in Guangdong Province, sickness and medical insurance reforms are put at the 
bottom of the list. (Dong 1995 & 1996, my interviewing records)
Reforms in sickness and medical insurance highlight two problems in social 
insurance in China. First, work units, especially the state-owned ones, are the main 
obstacles in the reforms of social insurance. As already mentioned, work units are basic 
social units in China, which perform social, economic and even political functions in 
society. Production in work units not only supply the state, but most importantly also the 
daily needs of the staff and workers. The occupational welfare function of social 
insurance in work units is significant and for some employees welfare benefits are part 
of their regular incomes. Thus to a certain extent, this is the vested interest of work units 
and the affiliated members.
Apart from the self-centred and self-interested attitude among work units, the 
medical service market in China is in fact a producer-controlled system. The medical 
and health system is independent of the social insurance organisations and individual 
users. In contrast, medical institutes and the profession are all under a state-owned 
system. In addition, work units or trade unions collectively represent all individual
78 The m eaning of socialisation bears a similar connotation to privatisation in W estern countries. 
The Chinese governm ent prefers to describe the process of transferring the s ta te ’s  responsibility 
to individuals and work units a s  ’socialisation’, that is, everyone in the society has the
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consumers so that individual consumer powers or influences are very insignificant. It can 
hardly be seen that without changing the consumer-provider relationship the sickness 
and medical insurance can be improved.
Reforms in sickness and medical insurance in China focus on cutting the 
expenses by curtailing the demands on the services. It seems that the government is still 
allowing the occupational welfare nature of insurance to exist in the early 1990s. The 
government has not touched on changing the provider-consumer relationship which 
involves a radical transformation in the linear connection between party, state, unit, and 
individual. It is foreseeable that the ‘marketisation’ of medical services in the rising 
socialist market economy will greatly affect the people who have unstable employment 
(e.g. migrant workers in non permanent employment) or limited income (e.g. the elderly 
on retirement pensions). The consequence will be the deteriorating health conditions that 
nobody in the country would like to see but has to face. In contrast to the established 
medical and insurance, the following part will demonstrate the development in 
unemployment insurance, a rather new social insurance programme in China.
IQ) Unemployment insurance in China
Unemployment insurance in China is a brand new income maintenance measure. 
According to Su (1994, p. 138), the term ‘waiting-for-job (daiye)' was usually used in 
China. Nevertheless, some others would argue that in the present socialist stage the 
natures are different between waiting-for-job and unemployment.79 The term waiting- 
for-job applies to two main types of people. First, school leavers who reach the 
production age but lack the skills to get a job. Second, those who have lost their jobs and 
have not yet been allocated a new one. In March 1984, the “Methods of Registering and 
Managing the Waiting-for-job in Cities and Towns” differentiates between the ‘waiting- 
for-job youth’ (daiye qingniari) and ‘waiting-for-job staff and workers’ (daiye zhiqong). 
(Su 1994, p. 138)
Tang et a l proposes a moderate view to clarify these two terms. They maintain 
that “at present our country is building a socialist market economy and it is necessary to
responsibility to provide the service or share the expenses.
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set up a mechanism to facilitate labour mobility and the utilisation of the productive 
resources. Unemployment arises unavoidably and it is meaningless to differentiate 
between waiting-for-job and unemployment. Waiting-for-job is unemployment. Waiting- 
for-job insurance (daiye baoxicm) is unemployment insurance (shiye baoxian).” (1994, p. 
1139, my translation) In the 1995 China Statistical Yearbook, the term ‘unemployment’ 
is used officially. The Yearbook also elaborated that “unemployment refers to those non- 
agricultural population within working age (16-50 for male and 16-45 for female) who 
are able and willing to work but unemployed and registered in local employment service 
agencies.” (CSPH 1995, p. 132) In brief, the perception on surplus labour has been 
changed after the re-emergence of private economy and contractual employment system 
in the past 15 years. Based on the proposition made by Tang et al and the definition 
made in the CSPH, unemployment is more apt to describe urban surplus labour in 
today’s China.
As a rather new social insurance service, unemployment insurance in China is 
established in a more direct way with much less impact from the historical development 
as retirement pensions and sickness and medical insurance. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the first regulation on unemployment insurance in China was published in July 
1986 titled “The Provisional Regulations on Waiting-for-job Staff and Workers in State- 
owned Enterprises”. Based on the 1986 regulations a permanent set of policies was put 
into force from April 1993. The objective of this regulation is to facilitate enterprise and 
employment reforms. For example, in Article One of Chapter One of the 1986 
Provisional Regulation it stated that “This is for the needs of reforms in the labour 
system, promoting the reasonable mobility of the labour force, protecting the basic living 
needs of the waiting-for-job staff and workers in state-owned enterprise....” (My 
translation) Similar wording also appeared in the 1993 Regulation that “...for 
consummating the labour system in state-owned enterprises, protecting the basic living 
of the waiting-for-job staff and workers, maintaining social stability....” (My translation)
According to the 1993 Regulations on Waiting-for-job Insurance, staff and 
workers in state-owned units who are being dismissed or lose their jobs because of 
insolvency, re-structuring, and stoppage of production are eligible for benefits. This
79 For example, Zhu, 1991, p. 160.
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regulation also stipulates three funding sources for this insurance: contributions from 
enterprises, interest from the insurance funds, and the state’s financial supplements.
In responding to the existing unemployment benefits Tang et a l (1994, p. 1141) 
make four comments. First, the coverage is too narrow and the funding is not enough. 
Tang et a l explained that the contribution level for enterprises is set at 1% of their total 
expenses on the standard wage (biaozhun gongzhi).80 However, since the standard wage 
only constitutes about 50% of the total income of the staff and workers that the 
proportion in their total income is rather low.81 (Tang et a l, 1994, p. 1141) It is for this 
reason that the funding is only enough for employees in state-owned sector. In other 
words, this benefit cannot provide income maintenance for those who work in the non 
state-owned sector.82
Second, the management and administration of the funding for unemployment 
insurance are ineffective. Because social insurance legislation has not yet been 
completed that the management of the insurance is only part of the labour administrative 
process within the work unit. Tang et a l comment that misuse, appropriation and 
transference of the funds are common. But the worst is the unwillingness of the Ministry 
of Labour to transfer the management of unemployment benefits to the centralised social 
insurance organisation.83 (1994, p. 1142) In brief, inappropriate management is the 
general problem of unemployment benefits. The crux of this problem is the vested
gn
In Article Five, C hapter Two of the 1993 Regulations it sta tes that “enterprises have to 
contribute 0.6% of the total wage expenses of the unit. Enterprises can adjust the level of 
contribution with the local governm ent’s  approval if they have not enough or more 
unemployment insurance fund. N evertheless the highest contribution rate should not be higher 
than 1 % of the total standard wage of the staff and workers of the unit." (my translation)
81 According to Zhu et al. (1991, p.424) ‘standard w age’ is the alternative nam e of 'basic w age’ 
(jiben gongzhi). Standard w age is fixed of a certain period of time and used a s  the basic facto in 
determining the benefit levels of retirement pensions and other insurance related services for 
staff and workers. Zhu et al. Suggest that the optimum standard w age should not be higher than 
70% of the total wage of staff and workers.
82 P lease s e e  Table 2-3 in C hapter Two.
83 The officers of the Guangzhou Shi Bureau of Labour also mentioned this point in my interview 
in April and June 1995. They disagreed with the handover of the m anagem ent of unemployment 
benefits to the Social Insurance Services Bureau because  first, from the historical perspective, 
the Bureau of Labour is the only government organ that m anages waiting-for-job staff and 
workers. Second, in policy implementation, the Bureau of Labour has strong connections with 
trade unions that look after the benefits of the labour force. The conflicts between the Bureau of 
Labour and social Insurance Services Bureau were also confirmed by the officer of the Social 
Insurance Section of the Guangdong Province Economic System  Reforms Committee in my 
interviewing.
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interests, the misunderstanding, and the limited knowledge of the state organs and 
government officials in ensuring the effectiveness of a comprehensive social insurance 
system.
The third problem is the lack of experienced officials to plan the service and 
manage the fund. Tang et a l comments that “if the fund cannot grow then its protection 
effects will not be seen.” (1994, p. 1142, my translation) Tang et a l are doubtful about 
the capability of the officials. They argue that this funding should be put in some 
investments that are “reliable, short term, and can be accessed immediately” such as 
bank deposits or short-term government bonds. Under the conditions of a lack of 
comprehensive legislation and supervisory systems in the country, high calibre officials 
are needed to manage the investments. The point raised by Tang et a l is understandable 
since first, the officials in the Ministry of Labour are not specialised in financial 
management. Second, administrative intervention may not be the effective and rational 
measure to manage the unemployment insurance fund.
The final problem is the emerging negative feeling of “insuring for no risk” 
iyoubao wuxian) and “facing the risk with no insurance” (youxian wubao). Tang et al 
(1994, p. 1142) explain that the unemployment rate (6%) is higher in small towns where 
most of the work units are non state-owned. That is, on the one hand, the employees who 
are not employed by state-owned units are usually excluded from this provision. On the 
other hand, staff and workers in state-owned units can enjoy the benefits without 
contributing. The specific nature of the sole responsibility of state-owned enterprise in 
unemployment benefits causes “the problem of an unbalanced relationship between risks 
and insurance”. (Tang et a l 1994, p. 1142, my translation) Furthermore, one can also see 
that social insurance in China is unequally provided to employees in economic units of 
different ownership. In sum, the provision of unemployment benefit in China raises the 
issues in social policy such as discrimination, equality, and citizenship right.
IV) Occupational injury, sickness, and handicapped insurance (OISH) in China
Occupational injury, sickness, and handicap insurance (OISH) has a long history in the 
Chinese labour insurance system. According to Zeng, the existing OISH insurance 
system is based on the 1951 “Regulations on Labour Insurance in the People’s Republic
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of China”. (1995, p. 175) There are four specific natures to this insurance. First, it 
applies only to those who are employed in state-owned enterprises. Second, it is financed 
by enterprise only. Third, the benefit levels have not been revised since 1950s. Fourth, 
there is no specific organisation to determine the degree of severity and the benefit 
levels. (Zeng 1995, p. 175-176) Following are the discussions based on these comments.
In Articles Twelve and Thirteen in Chapter Three of the “Regulations on Labour 
Insurance in the People’s Republic of China” in February 1951, the OISH benefits are 
basically designed. These regulations were later revised in 1953. In 1992 the detail 
definition of OISH was elaborated.84 The risk coverage of this social insurance is on two 
main areas: injuries and death caused in work or by work related diseases. The basic 
criteria for getting the benefits are three.85 (Zeng 1991, p. 102) First, the injury or death 
occurred during the execution of duties assigned by the enterprise. Second, the injury or 
death occurred during the execution of the duties in an emergency without the 
assignment from the enterprise. Third, the injury or death occurred in improving or 
inventing the technique while on the job. In the further explanation made by the Ministry 
of Labour and the trade unions, one can claim this benefit from one’s own work unit if 
the injury or death occurred while participating in a social or political movement, rescue 
in disaster, training in the people’s militia, etc.
In the past 40 and odd years, OISH insurance has been changed incrementally 
and fragmentarily. Wang et al (1995) listed in detail the state’s regulations and policies 
on the insurance in the period. It shows that these documents are generally concerned 
about defining the causes and issues, determining the severity levels, and the way to 
compensate the victims. However, as commented by Zeng and mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, the weakness of OISH insurance exists in its narrow coverage. 
This is particularly serious in the reform era that “there are higher work accident rates in 
(non state-owned) enterprises because of their inferior management and working 
conditions. Nearly half of the total number of work accidents happened in township
84 Please refer to the “Notice on determining the level of the injury and d isease s  at work for staff 
and workers (On Trial)" issued by the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Health, and the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions in March, 1992.
85 According to Tang et al. (1994, 1133-1134), the content of the OISH insurance includes: 
medical benefit, living supplem ents during medical treatm ent, handicapped benefit, treatm ents, 
convalescence, and death benefits (different from the death  benefit of other cau ses  in
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enterprises.” (Zeng 1995, p. 175, my translation)
Zeng’s comments reflect that the existing OISH insurance is rather outdated that 
cannot meet the changed mode of economic production. This reflects social policy in 
China indicating a lack of dynamism. The weakness of OISH insurance exposes the 
ignorance of policy makers in China who are insensitive to changes in society, 
comparable with the short term behaviour of private investors and the transformation 
from labour intensive production method to the application of sophisticated machines 
and technology. The higher accident rates in non state-owned units also imply the 
incapability of the government in enforcing the health and safety regulations in the 
workplace. Privately owned work units have been growing at a very fast speed in the 
country but most of the laws including those for social insurance cannot be effectively 
enforced because manpower is lacking. (Dong 1996, my interview) This explains why 
only the staff and workers in state-owned sector are protected, although it is stipulated 
that OISH insurance measures apply to work units of all natures.
Another phenomenon raised in the previous paragraph is the ‘work unit-based’ 
principle. On the surface it seems that this approach does not require the government or 
individual employees to contribute. In fact, the government is the employer who should 
have to take the responsibility to compensate for the loss of the injured. Because of the 
dominance of state-owned units in the country’s economy, the consequence will be 
limited funding from the government, low degree of socialisation and difficult to share 
the risks. (Tang et al 1994, p. 1135, my translation) The case of OISH insurance 
demonstrates that the nature of social insurance in China is occupational since the state’s 
employer role is very significant.
In sum, four issues arise from the obsolete OISH insurance. First, OISH 
insurance is clearly an occupational welfare for employees in state-owned units. 
‘Socialisation of social insurance’ with the example of OISH seems very difficult to be 
realised because most of the employers in the private sector are reluctant to contribute. 
In addition, staff and workers in non state-owned sector do not want to contribute 
indirectly through their work units to a social insurance item that seems alienated from
employment).
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them. Furthermore, because of the inability of the state, OISH can hardly be 
implemented in non state-owned units. As just mentioned, OISH has evolved from state- 
owned units since the early 1940s. However, in the 1990s, most of the private economic 
units that arise from the transformed ownership system are removed from the state’s 
direct control. The state can only use legislative control but not administrative means to 
regulate these units. Thus for effective management of the service, sufficient supply of 
professional officers and comprehensive legislation procedures are needed. Third, the 
stipulation of benefit levels is also a concern. As mentioned in above, OISH benefit 
levels in the 1990s is based on the standard wage of staff and workers in state-owned 
units. This scheduled benefit level cannot satisfy the needs of the claimants because first, 
the standard wage is higher for employees in non state-owned units since they have no 
other living supplements or fringe benefits. Second, inflation has become a problem for 
all members of society since modernisation. (Tang 1994, p. 1134-1135)
The last but not least is the lack of a centralised body to determine the severity of 
injury and needs of the claimants with standardised appraisal methods. It has been 
mentioned before that the provision of OISH insurance is work unit based. The 
management of the insurance benefit very much relies upon the knowledge, and 
experience of the officials in the work unit and the way they value income protection. It 
is rather difficult, for example, for the managers in work units to assess or determine 
which is the most (Grade One) or least (Grade Ten) serious even when instructed by the 
1992 Regulations.86 Although it is proposed in the 1992 regulations that medical 
specialists on work accidents can provide professional advice, it is up to the work unit to 
make the ultimate decision on whom, what, and how should be provided. In brief, as 
Tang et al. suggest, there should be a set of comprehensive state regulations on OISH 
insurance which have mandatory power to guide and supervise work units. (1994, p. 
1135-1136)
86 The 1992 Regulations sta te  that “There are 10 g rades in the loss of working ability of staff and 
workers. G rades 1 to 4 refer to the total loss of working ability. G rades 5 and 6 imply the loss of 
major part of working ability. G rades 7 to 10 m eans partly loss the working ability." Example for 
grades 1 to 4 is the loss of three or all limbs of the victim. Example for g rades 5 and 6 are the 
total loss of spoken ability. Finally, the w eak and limp in one of the limbs is the exam ple for 
grades 7 to 10. The determination on which level should be applied is based on the results of
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V) Maternity insurance in China
Maternity insurance, as OISH insurance, has been provided since 1950s in the country. It 
is stated in Article 16 of the 1951 ‘Labour Insurance in the People’s Republic of China’ 
that women staff and workers are eligible for enjoying 56 days full pay leave for 
maternity. Apart from this, the staff and workers who have new bom babies are also 
eligible for the benefits in kinds at the value equivalent to “the local market price of a 
piece of red cloth of one third of a meter in length.” (Item D, Article 16, my translation)
Generally speaking, maternity insurance in China in the 1990s involves very 
strong value judgement in both social and political senses. First, maternity insurance 
benefit is used as the means to penalise unmarried mothers. In the reply letter from the 
Ministry of Labour to the Bureau of Labour (LadongJu) in Gansu in 1965, it was stated 
that “unmarried pregnant women staff and workers cannot enjoy maternity benefits as 
listed in Labour Insurance. Neither can they get pay from work unit during the leave 
period.” (‘Reply on Whether Unmarried Women Staff and Workers Can Enjoy Labour 
Insurance’, 10 September 1965, my translation)
Another example of state intervention in maternity benefits is the use of this 
service to control population growth. In 1965, the State Council issued a notice that only 
those who aborted or sterilised for physical reasons can get sickness benefit.87 This 
stipulation, however, was changed afterwards to a great move towards birth control in 
China. Birth control in China was started in 1964 with a document issued by the 
Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance. It stated that all expenses on abortion of 
staff and workers should be supported under the ‘Supplementary Medical and Health’ 
items, and the expenses of the cadres for the same purpose are met by the ‘Public 
Medical Expenses’ or their work units.88 The 1982 document co-issued by the Central 
Committee and the State Council explicitly stated that “For those who do not observe the 
state’s population policy should have some economic restrictions....” (Instructions on a
medical treatm ents.
87 P lease refer to Document No. 78 on “Notice on the Benefits and Leave for Staff and Workers 
who have Abortion or Sterilisation B ecause of S ickness” issued by the S ta te  Council on 12
October 1957.
88 Please s e e  the Document (64) No. 140 on “Stipulations on the ex p en ses  on birth control” 
issued by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance that w as endorsed by the S ta te  Council
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Step Forward to Work for Better Birth Control, 9, February 1982, my translation)
In the early 1990s, the Ministry of Labour promulgated a revised set of 
regulations on maternity benefits. As stated by the Ministry of Labour, these new 
measures are designed for “...facilitating the Labour Law and the realisation of the 
protection on the legal rights of women staff and workers in enterprises.” (Document 
No. 1994-504 on 14 December 1994 of the Ministry of Labour, my translation) The new 
set of policies, titled “The Measures on Maternity Benefits for Staff and Workers in 
Enterprises (For Trial)” were put into practice from the first day of January, 1995, and 
coincides with the implementation date of the Labour Law 1995.
The 1995 ‘maternity benefits measures’ have sixteen articles. It clearly states that 
the resources for maternity benefits come from society (Shehui Tongchou or 
socialisation), i.e. only work units contribute to ‘maternity insurance fund’ which is 
collected, paid and managed by social insurance organisation under the Ministry of 
Labour. (Articles 3, 4 and 8) Eligible employees are covered by the fund for the 
expenses of check-ups, labour, operation and hospitalisation and medicines. It also 
covers the expenses on health related problems but does not include non-medical 
materials or services. (Article 6) Furthermore, the fund also covers the wages of the 
concerned employees during the leave. (Article 5)
In sum, the 1995 maternity insurance policy aims at realising the ‘socialisation of 
social insurance’ by designing a single-party contribution system. Socialisation of social 
insurance in China is apparently the means to facilitate the state to reduce the state- 
enterprise-individual relationships. This approach attempts to transform the work unit 
based social insurance to a collective system that pools resources from all work units. 
However, since ‘socialisation’ is a horizontal redistribution of resources between work 
units it raises inequality between state-owned and non state-owned units as well as 
between old and young work units. For the newer work units that employ more 
unmarried employees have to subsidise the old state-owned units through the pool.
Apart from its strong occupational nature, maternity insurance in China has a
on 4 April 1964.
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significant role to facilitate socio-economic policy in China in the 1990s, e.g. the Single 
Child Policy. Zhao (1993) states that one of the characteristics of maternity insurance is 
that “it only applies to women staff and workers who reach the legal age for marriage 
and act in accordance with the birth control policies of the country. Those who have not 
met the criteria are not eligible for the insurance benefits.” (1993, p. 308, my translation) 
Tang et a l (1994) echo with Zhao that protection for women employees in China 
includes other regulations under the theme o f ‘protecting women labours at work5.89 The 
discriminatory nature of social insurance policy is not only found in maternity insurance 
but also in other work related welfare services. Under such conditions one can find that 
neither citizenship nor past contribution determines one's eligibility to access income 
protection in this socialist developing country. Such an approach has intentionally put 
the political element in the management of income protection policies. It violates the 
principle of social insurance that the insurance should effectively protect the people who 
joined the scheme and are in need of the service. In brief, the case of maternity insurance 
brings out the political features of social insurance in China.
Summary and conclusions: The particularities of social insurance in China
This chapter has discussed social insurance in the 1980s and early 1990s in China. It 
generally outlines the impacts of economic reforms on the development of social 
insurance. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, social insurance services in this 
period are transformed from the work unit based occupational welfare to a multi party 
contributory system in the name of socialisation. In a precise way, this approach tries to 
change the state's weighty role as the employer of a thousand million employees in the 
country. Being propelled by political and economic drives, socialisation of social 
insurance will ultimately shift the state's employer liability in social insurance provision, 
e.g. OISH and maternity benefits, to individual work units in the restructured economic 
ownership system. Accordingly, three main features of social insurance in China are 
found from its particular political and economic environment. These features include: a 
‘dual service system’, unclear objective and indeterminate roles, and the social control
89 For exam ple, the “Maternity medical insurance benefits for wom en staff and workers” issued in 
1988 by the Ministry of Labour. This official notice spelled out the work units full responsibility on 
the expenses related to maternity of women staff and workers.
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functions.90
The previous sections also demonstrate that the dual service system, as a specific 
characteristic of social insurance services in China, which emerges from the persistent 
political orientation, as well as the changes in social and economic systems since 
modernisation. This dual service system which differentiates employees of different 
backgrounds shows that social insurance coverage is narrow. In general, in the early 
1990s social insurance services in China were still assigned with occupational welfare 
functions within work units. In addition, the controlling purpose of social insurance can 
clearly be found in the social, economic and political arenas like demographic changes, 
productivity, internal migration, party and political identification, and even nationalism. 
Thus the ultimate service objectives are set for facilitating socialist transition or 
‘transition to market socialism’ but not a risk pooling insurance system for income 
protection. The impacts of these practices might be found from the objectives, pattern, 
provision, and effectiveness of social insurance services in the country. In sum the social 
insurance system and services in China are unique in the sense that its driving forces 
stem from socialist political objectives and in safeguarding the economic system. The 
features of social insurance in China will be examined in detail in the following chapters 
with a field study of social insurance in a provincial city in southern China in 1995 but 
before that next chapter we will review the socio-economic development of the sampled 
city - Guangzhou Shi.
90 The ‘dual service system ’ refers to the groups of ‘eligible’ and ‘not eligible’ em ployees under 
the sam e social insurance system  in China. Detail explanations can be found in C hapter 9.
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Chapter Four
Social insurance in Guangzhou Shi, Guangdong Province
Introduction
The last two chapters discussed the founding, development and reforms of social 
insurance in China to 1995. It also identified the main driving forces and features of 
social insurance in this socialist developing country. In order to understand the features 
of Chinese social insurance with a selected case, this chapter explores the social 
insurance services provided at local and regional level. This task is accomplished by 
studying the socio-economic setting and social insurance services in Guangzhou Shi in 
Guangdong Province where the quantitative study was carried out.
This chapter has four parts. Part One will discuss the social and economic 
development in Guangdong Province. Part Two focuses on the changes in social and 
economic aspects in Guangzhou Shi after 1949. Part Three will go into more detail of 
different social insurance programmes: retirement pensions, medical and sickness 
insurance, unemployment insurance, the OISH programmes, and the maternity insurance 
in the locality. The final part is the summary of the chapter that highlights the features of 
social insurance in China with the case of Guangzhou Shi.
Social and economic development of Guangdong Province in the national context
Guangdong Province has a prominent place in contemporary China. Historically it was 
one of the Treaty Ports in the 19th Century. After the Treaty of Nanking {Nanjing) in 
1842 that concluded the Opium War between China and Great Britain, Guangzhou (the 
capital city of Guangdong Province, and called Canton by the Portuguese) and some 
other coastal provinces and cities such as Xiamen (or Amoy) and Shanghai were opened 
to foreigners. According to the Treaty, the foreigners, especially the British, gained 
concessions from the Qing Emperor of China in free trading and setting up consulates. In 
addition, Guangdong was the place of origin of many revolutionary movements in the 
country. Some outstanding examples are the Revolution of 1911 {Xinhai Geming) and 
the Northern Expedition {Beifa Zhanzheng) from 1926 to 1927. (Zhang, 1992)
112
Economically, since Guangdong was opened as a port to trade with foreigners, it 
has developed into a trading centre of the country and built up secondary and tertiary 
industries. As the country’s ‘Southern Gate’ (Nan Damen), Guangdong has been playing 
an important role in economic construction since the ‘Four Modernisations’ in the late 
1970s. Shenzhen, was the first special economic zone initiated by the Communist Party 
of China, situates at the southern end of Guangdong Province.91 In the spring of 1992, 
Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the “Four Modernisations”, came to visit Guangdong 
Province and Shenzhen. In concluding the visit, Deng remarked that socialist market 
economy is possible in the country and the reforms should go ahead.
Guangdong Province locates at the southern part of the country. (Appendix, Map
1) It has a long coastal line stretching from Zhanjiang City to Chaozhou City. On her 
178 thousand square kilometres of land about 66.89 million people were living at the end 
of 1994. (CSPH, 1995) The total population of Guangdong was 5.58% of the country. In 
this sense Guangdong was the fifth largest province on the national list. Guangdong has 
a rather high migrant population. According to the 1995 China Statistical Yearbook, 
5.88% (3.93 million) of the total population in Guangdong were migrants.92 The average 
rate of migrants in all other places in the country was 2.85%. Among the various reasons 
of migration, 58.66% claimed that they came to the province for ‘being engaged in 
services and business’; another 2.86% claimed that their job placement had been 
arranged by work units whilst 7.9% changed their jobs. (CSPH, 1995, Table 3-12) In 
brief, nearly 70% of the migrants came to Guangdong for economic purposes.
In terms of household registration, 27.47% of the population in Guangdong 
Province were registered as non-agricultural at the end of 1993.93 According to the
91 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is not under the jurisdiction of the provincial governm ent of 
Guangdong. According to the Constitution of the People’s  Republic of China, all special zones, 
including Hong Kong and Macau, which were taken back by the C hinese governm ent a s  Special 
Administrative Regions in 1997 and 1999 respectively, are directly governed by the central 
government.
92 ‘Migrants’ here denotes the people in internal migration. It refers to the people who live in the 
regions without perm anent household status. For example, th e  rural migrants who go to stay in 
urban a reas  and the people who move from one province to another.
93 Household registration is a control system  in various asp ec ts  in China. Everyone has to 
register with the local Public Security Bureau and there a household record is m ade. In the days 
when the country lacked supplies of many consum er goods, the  household record allowed one 
to be apportioned with the daily necessities such a s  rice and edible oil. This record also eligibles 
one’s  a c ce ss  to other services provided by the governm ent such a s  education and medical care.
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classification of cities, Guangdong has four ‘extra big’ cities that have a population over 
5 million and another 12 big cities each with a population more than 2 million. 
Guangdong Province also has another two cities with populations over 1 million and two 
special economic zones, namely, Zhuhai and Shenzhen, with a population of less than 1 
million each. (GNS, 1994, p. 142)
Table 4-1 Social and economic indicators of Guangdong Province and China in 
1993
China Guangdong
1. Administrative categorisation
Number of cities at prefecture level 206 21
Cultivable marine area (in hectares) 2,600.11 835.67
2 Social indices
Total population (10 thousands) 119,850 6,689
Birth rate (0/00) 17.70 18.20
Death rate (0/00) 6.49 5.78
Natural population growth rate (0/00) 11.21 12.42
Population age 65 and over (%) 6.23 7.28
Members per households age 65 and over (%)* 19.58 27.28
3. Economic indices
Employment in primary industry (%) 54.3 41
Employment in secondary industry (%) 22.7 28.1
Employment in tertiary industry (%) 23.0 30.9
Urban unemployment rate (%) 2.80 2.4
Total investment in fixed asset by ownership (%)
State-owned units 56.95 41.38
Collective owned units 16.16 19.47
Individuals economic units in urban areas 12.04 9.21
Foreign capital related units (including overseas 
Chinese, from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan)
10.45 26.11
Others (including share holding and joint owned 
economic units)
4.40 3.83
Sources: *1994 Statistical Yearbook of China, Table 3-15, others are extracted from 
various tables in 1995 Statistical Yearbook of China.
Table 4-1 shows the social and economic indicators of Guangdong Province and 
China. In local administration in China, the provincial government of Guangdong rules 
over 21 cities at prefecture level out of 206 of the whole country.94 In terms of the
Som e people, for example, those w hose children were bom out of the ‘single child policy’, are 
not allowed to get the status and welfare a s  his parent. The m ost significant function of the 
system , in brief, is to discourage the people to migrate from villages to cities.
94 This categorisation excludes Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai since they are the metropolitan 
areas  (zhixiashi) under the direct jurisdiction of the S tate Council.
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number of cities at prefecture levels, Guangdong is the biggest in the country since its 
population sizes as well as economic position are ahead of other provinces in the 
country. Thus in economic terms Guangdong is much more important nationally than 
other heavily populated provinces such as Sichuan.95 The growth in the number of 
prefecture cities in Guangdong marks the significant economic achievements of the 
province after modernisation. In 1992, Shunde and Nanhai were the two cities of 
Guangdong taxed more than 1 billion yuan by the central government and were placed 
as the top two. (GNS 1994, p. 136)
Guangdong is a very resource rich region. Its natural resources include the 
coastal areas for ocean liners to anchor as well as for marine cultivation. Table 4-1 
shows that 32.1% of the cultivable marine area of China is in Guangdong Province. 
Under this favourable condition, fishery is very well developed. But the most notable 
usage of the marine resources is its deep harbours and well connected land transportation 
for international trading. This is one of the reasons why secondary and tertiary industries 
are much more developed than her primary industry.
The social conditions
The population of Guangdong was 66.9 million in the year-end of 1994. The natural 
population growth rate for Guangdong in that year was marginally higher than the 
national figure. In explaining the rather high population growth rate in Guangdong, Cai 
et al. argue that it is because “a big group of people who were bom in the 1960s are now 
at the marriage and fertility age. Irrespective of these conditions families are allowed to 
give birth to only one child, the birth rate is still high because the population base is 
vast.” (1990, p. 6, my translation) In other words, the growth of population in 
Guangdong in the past decade is because of the rapid rise in the number of families. 
According to Cai et a l (1990), the growth rate in total population was 17.1% in the 
period from 1982 to 1990 whilst for family units was 24.7%.
The reasons for rapid growing population are various. Hu finds that many rulers 
in Chinese history supported the idea of developing the national economy with a bigger
95 At the end of 1994, the population of Sichuan w as 112.14 million. (CSPH, 1995, Table 3-3)
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population. Basically, the Confucian values and the patriarchal clan system (zongfa 
zhidu) in China have significant influences on reproducing next generations.96 (Hu 1989, 
p. 47) This cultural factor is in fact the main force of population growth in Guangdong. 
In addition, families in Guangdong were more inclined to live with older generations. 
Household heads with children living with their parents or in-laws in Guangdong were 
higher than in other big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Extended families in 
Guangdong (26.09%) are more popular than in Shanghai (19.95%) and Beijing (17.5%) 
as well as the whole country (18.59%). On the other hand, nuclear families are fewer in 
Guangdong (58.15%) than the whole country (71.64%), Beijing (70.27%) and Shanghai 
(64.17%). (CSPH 1995)97
Large family ideology among the people in Guangdong, however, does not mean 
the elderly are fully supported by their families.98 The live-alone elderly in China in 
1993 were 10.36% of the population while for Guangdong the figure was 11.28%. 
Households with two elderly persons were 23.1% for the country and 21.4% for 
Guangdong. Finally, households with three or more elderly are also weighted higher 
than for the whole country (0.25%) than in Guangdong (0.1%). In brief, there are more 
elderly living alone and fewer families live with more than one elderly in Guangdong. 
(CSPH 1994, Table 3-15, p. 75)
In concluding these observations, it seems that the elderly are selectively or 
functionally living with their families in Guangdong. The selective functions of elderly 
within the family are determined by their abilities in reproduction and production, i.e. 
their roles in the family as a helper to look after the children, to do the housework, and 
even to participate in the family business. It is found that the live-alone elderly in 
Guangdong are usually rather old. The implication is that either the parents of the 
husband or the wife lives with the family to take up some of the family’s duties. Thus it 
implies that, in view of the growing ageing population under the improved health and 
living conditions, income protection schemes are needed for maintaining one’s living
96 Patriarchal clan system  is a social norm that governs on e’s  sta tu s in inheriting family property. 
The position of the m ale in the  extended family is the general principle of the system . Confucian 
teaching maintains that it is necessary  to reproduce m ale su ccesso rs  for preserving the  family’s  
social sta tu s in tenms of wealth and reputation in the feudal society.
97 Extended families are those  families with ‘three generations’ and ‘four generations’ while 
nuclear families are the ‘married couples’ and “two generations’ families.
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after retirement in Guangdong.
The economic environment
From the economic perspective, Guangdong is a very resource rich region. As a coastal 
province Guangdong supplies the people living around the Pearl River Delta Region 
including Macau and Hong Kong with the daily necessities. Apart from that, this rich 
delta region is one of China’s best paddy fields that produces up to three yields a year. 
Planting and husbandry are also the chief primary economic activities in this province. 
Guangdong thus plays the double roles in national economy: the hinterland for the 
people at the estuary of the Pearl River and the port for the inland areas.
It is shown in Table 4-1 that the employment rate in primary industry in 
Guangdong Province was lower than that of the national by 13% in 1994. In that year 
54.3% of the labour force in China engaged in primary economic sector whilst for 
Guangdong it was only 41%. The lower commitment in primary industry implies higher 
rates of the labour force in the other two economic sectors in Guangdong and this is 
going to be explained in the following paragraph.
Modem economic development in Guangdong started from last century after the 
Opium War. Right after the Treaty of Nanking was signed between Britain and China in 
1842, the British established their businesses for trading with the Chinese." Many large- 
scale British companies which were set up in that period such as Jardine Matheson and 
Swire are still running today in Hong Kong. However, because of Guangdong’s strategic 
military position, the central government was long reluctant to develop it into an 
industrial city. (Huang, 1991, p. 238)
In 1994, the percentage of the labour force found in secondary industry in 
Guangdong (28.1%) was higher than the national rate (22.7%). A similar situation is also 
found in tertiary industry. (Table 4-1) The relative balance development among the three
98 ‘Elderly’ here m eans those who are at the age 65 or above.
99 According to Zhang, “Right after the Opium War, ... (the British) started to se t up banks and 
dockyards in Hong Kong and Guangzhou in 1845. In 1878, the British m erchants invested to 
start a sugar refinery in Shantou." (1992, p. 16-17, my translation)
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economic production levels in Guangdong in the 1990s is attributed to the historical 
legacy and regional particularities, especially after 1979. (Zhang, 1992, p. 19)
When discussing the economic development in Guangdong from 1949 to 1979,
Zhang marks out four distinct periods. (1992, p. 18-20) These four periods of economic
development align with the national features that are characterised by the changes in
political lines. A particular feature of the development of the Guangdong economy is her
out-dated technology. The reasons for such situation are various. First, as mentioned
before, the central government was for a long time reluctant to invest in this coastal city
for military reasons. Second, most of the machines for production in Guangdong have
not been replaced since the foreign investors brought them in before 1949. Huang
comments on the productivity of the enterprises in Guangdong that:
“At the end of 1978, ... the equipment and technology were backward, most of 
them were the products of the '50s and '60s and lots of small enterprises still 
producing manually. According to statistics, there were 1.44 million staff and 
workers in 1980. Among them only 2.2% or 31,5000 were skilled staff.” (1992, 
p. 238-239, my translation)
The limitation of economic development in Guangdong also comes from the long 
established central-local relationship, especially in the period of socialist transition. In 
the early 1950s, the communist government initiated a series of nationalisation 
programmes under which all means of production as privately owned capital were 
expropriated by the government. For example, in the movement of ‘The Confiscation of 
Bourgeois Capital’ in 1952 the government seized all capital property originally in the 
hands of capitalists.
Nationalisation was also enforced in Guangdong. According to Huang, state 
departments exercised direct control of the enterprises of various types of business in the 
province from 1956. (1992, p. 238) The consequence of the confiscation policy is the 
fragmented management of the enterprises. The Chinese describe this as the ‘vertical- 
horizontal relationship (tiao tiao kuai kuaiy. Under this inter-contradictory condition, 
most state-owned enterprises are tightly controlled, and severely hindered and over­
supervised by the bureaucratic central and local governments. In most cases these 
nationalised or state-owned enterprises have no clear missions in production, nor 
autonomy in decision making in the matters such as wage levels, recruiting staff and
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labour insurance. The tangled political, administrative and economic functions of these 
work units make up the bulk of the country’s social insurance and create a dilemma for 
its reform.
According to Yi (1991, p. 13), to establish a social security system in China is 
one of the principal objectives in the Eighth Five-Year Plan. He mentions that economic 
system reforms in the 1990s should be effective, manageable, and objective. In pursuing 
the aims of reforms, social security system has an important role in ‘providing a 
favourable economic environment’. Such roles can be fulfilled through providing 
income maintenance to the unemployed by involving the entrepreneurs and requiring 
employers to contribute. With this arrangement the state can withdraw from its direct 
role and sole agency responsibility in labour insurance system. It is thus learned from 
this perception that the reforms in social security, especially the social insurance 
programmes have functionally two objectives: achieving economic growth and 
satisfying the rising social needs of some groups such as the surplus labour which comes 
from state-owned units undergoing employment and enterprise reforms. In the following 
sections, the discussion will turn to outlining the socio-economic development and social 
insurance reforms in Guangzhou Shi, the provincial capital city of Guangdong that is 
selected as the case in this study.
Social and economic development in Guangzhou Shi after 1949
Guangzhou Shi is the provincial capital city {de j i  shi) of Guangdong.100 The jurisdiction 
of the city government is over eight regions or ‘qiC that are marked as urban areas, 
namely: Dongshan, Leiwen, Yueshao, Haizhu, Tianhe, Fengquan, Baiyuan, and 
Huangpu. There are also four county level cities (xian j i  shi) put under the city 
government: Panyu, Haudu, Zhencheng, and Zhonghua. All these four county level cities 
are the suburban or rural areas adjacent to Guangzhou City. In city administration, there
100 ‘De ji shF has th ree different m eanings. First it is the city that enjoys sam e authority in 
economic m anagem ent as  the provincial government. T hese cities are also called ‘designated 
cities’ (danli shi) since they are relatively independent from the provincial governm ent in social 
and econom ic planning. The second type is the bigger cities where the provincial governm ent is 
seated . It has discretion in formulating local policies and regulations but is not allowed to m ake 
the social and economic developm ent plans for itself. The third type are the deji shi which have 
no designated powers in planning but play the leading role in facilitating the developm ent of the 
surrounding counties. (Luo 1993, p. 117)
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are 101 street offices rule over 1,465 urban residents’ committees in Guangzhou Shi in
1994. On the other hand there are 75 towns altogether in its suburban area.101 (GSJ,
1995, Table 1-1)
Table 4-2 Main social and economic indices of Guangzhou Shi, 1952-1994
Units 1952 1978 1994
Population 10,000 271.92 482.90 637.02
Agricultural 10,000 137.02 250.76 249.78
Non-agricultural 10,000 134.90 232.14 387.24
Number of permanent 
household units
10,000 67.87 114.59 183.17
Gross production value (billion yuan '
Primary industry 1.08 5.03 60.62
Secondary industry 1.69 25.24 456.75
Tertiary industry 2.62 12.82 458.81
Average annual wage Yuan/head 714.00 8,623.00
Labour
Social labour force 10,000 111.87 266.9 383.17
Staff and workers 10,000 25.83 147.36 209.36
Education
Senior Secondary 10,000 1.00 2.17 8.90
Junior Secondary 10,000 4.47 40.59 43.84
Primary 10,000 23.45 56.92 67.45
Source: Extracted from GST 1995, Table 1-4, p. 3-14 and Table 2-4, p. 44.
In the year-end of 1994, the population of Guangzhou Shi was 6.37 million. 
(Table 4-2) From 1952 to 1994 the average annual growth rate of population in 
Guangzhou Shi was 2.05%. People registered as agricultural households grew 83% from 
1952 to 1978 but went down a very little, 0.4%, from 1979 to 1994. In contrast, the non- 
agricultural population rose steadily from 1952 to 1978 (72.1%) and from 1979 to 1994 
(66.8%).102 In terms of permanent households, the growth rate is 169.9% in the past 
forty years. Furthermore, the household size was around 3.5 persons in 1994 as 
compared to 4 in 1952 and 4.2 in 1978 in average. The population and household
101 In local administration in China there are two lower tiers in a locality. In urban areas, the 
street offices (jiedu banshiqu) are bigger conglom erations of the residents’ committee (jumin 
weiyuanhui). In rural a reas  there are towns (zhen) grouping the residents com m ittees (chuanmin 
weiyuanhui).
102 The growth in non-agricultural population is because  of the acquisition of agricultural land 
from the p easan ts  in the newly developed a reas  such a s  Tianhe Area and the upgrade of 
Huaxian into city. In this process the agricultural population is turned into non-agricultural status. 
(GST 1995, p. 41)
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situations in Guangzhou Shi from 1952 to 1994 indicate two social changes. First, the 
gradually decreasing agricultural population and the continually growing non- 
agricultural population imply the change towards urbanisation. The upgrading of the 
surrounding townships to city level and the acquisition of agricultural land are the 
indicators of urbanisation. Second, the family sizes are becoming smaller in the period. 
This agrees with Cai’s article (1990) regarding the general finding on families in 
Guangdong Province.
In the past forty and odd years, secondary economic production developed very 
fast in Guangzhou Shi, especially after 1978. From 1979 to 1994 the annual growth rate 
in secondary industry (in terms of gross production value) was 15.21%, whilst for 
primary industry was 6.45% and 15.02% for tertiary industry. This pattern of economic 
changes highlights industrialisation and the development of services industry in the city. 
It can be foreseen that in the coming decades tertiary industry will be more developed in 
Guangzhou Shi while manufacturing industries are transformed into more capital 
intensive and the primary production is shrinking.103 Rural industrialisation will continue 
with constant growth in production values created by township enterprises. This will 
speed up urbanisation in Guangzhou Shi.
In terms of the people’s education levels, education in Guangzhou Shi in the 
period from 1952 to 1994 placed primary emphasis on the junior secondary level. The 
average annual growth rate of the students enrolled at junior secondary level in this 
period was 5.59% compared with 2.55% for primary level and 5.34% for senior 
secondary level. Nevertheless the scenario now is a bit different since the growth rate in 
enrolment at senior secondary level (9.22%) was higher than primary level (1.07%) and 
junior secondary level (0.48%).
The continuous development in secondary industries and higher enrolment rates 
at junior secondary level in the past four decades have made possible a large group of 
employees with lower middle level skills in the region. People who completed secondary 
level education in the late 1970s reached their early or mid thirties in the mid 1990s. 
This implies that there is a big log of mid-age employees who may more or less
103 My interview of Mr. Dong Binguang of the Social Insurance Section of the G uangdong 
Province Economic System s Reforms Committee in Guangzhou Shi in May 1995.
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encounter the difficulties in the transition of economic production in the reforms. This is 
especially true for those who were allocated to work in state-owned enterprises in that 
period but who are now facing the changes and challenges in enterprise reforms. Thus 
the reforms in social insurance for the unemployed will be an important issue in the 
1990s and the next decade.
Social insurance in Guangdong Province and Guangzhou Shi
It has been said that the heavy social insurance expenses are encumbrances for 
economic transformation in China. And it has been proposed that to solve this problem 
social insurance should be ‘socialised’; i.e. the costs are shared between work units, 
employees and state. Reforms in social insurance in the 1980s and early 1990s in China, 
according to Long (1995), cover various aspects. The process, approaches and objectives 
of these changes reflect the features of the Chinese social insurance. This section is 
going to present the details of the changes in social insurance in Guangdong Province 
with the case of Guangzhou Shi. (Appendix, Map 2) The policies and services discussed 
below are implemented and provided in Guangzhou Shi because of its important socio­
economic position in the province.
For Guangzhou Shi, the general guidelines on social insurance reform in the 
1990s are set out in the “Regulations for Social Labour Insurance for Staff and Workers 
in Enterprises in Guangzhou Shi” promulgated in June 1993. (Lu 1994, p. 2) Early in 
1983 reforms in social insurance in Guangzhou Shi started with retirement pensions. 
Later the reforms were extended to medical insurance and the newly initiated 
unemployment benefits. The 1993 Regulations on the overall social insurance specified 
the following changes. In retirement pensions, a ‘tripartite system’ was founded that put 
together the ‘basic retirement pensions’, ‘additional retirement pensions’, and the 
‘personal factors’ which consists of one’s contribution, average social wages and the 
indices for growth in wages. The Regulations also allow work units to provide 
‘supplementary retirement pensions’ to their employees as the extra part of the 
mandatory retirement pensions. In summary, the retirement pension was revised more 
extensively than the other social insurance programmes such as OISH programmes and 
maternity benefits in Guangzhou Shi in the early 1990s.
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Table 4-3 Reforms in social insurance in Guangdong Province from the 1980s 
to the mid 1990s
Year Contents of reforms
1983 Start to implement ‘social retirement pensions’ for the newly employed contract 
system staff and workers. Work units contribute 15% of the total wage and 
individuals pay 2% of the total wage as their contributions.
1984 Start to realise the socialisation of retirement pensions for permanent staff and 
workers in state-owned and collective work units. Society (i.e. a designated 
social insurance organisation) collects contributions from work units and 
individuals and pays the benefits to the eligible from retirement.
1985 Develop social insurance management organisations (i.e. social insurance 
bureaux) at provincial, city and county levels.
1986 Set up waiting-for-job insurance system for staff and workers who lost jobs in 
state-owned work units.
1989 To establish a retirement pension scheme that is similar to that for the contract 
system employees for temporary workers.
1990 Start the ‘individual contributory retirement pensions system’ for permanent 
workers.
1992 Practise the work-related injury, sickness and handicapped scheme. Test some 
changes in maternity and medical insurance.
The provincial government promulgated the “Regulations on Work Related 
Injury Insurance for Staff and Workers in Enterprise in Guangdong Province ” 
on 17 January.
Social Insurance Bureau started services on 24 July and the Guangdong 
Province Committee for Social Insurance on 31 July.
1993 On 1 June the provincial government promulgated the “Provisional Regulations 
on Retirement Pensions for Staff and Workers in Guangdong Province ” which 
was effective from 1 August.
1994 The provincial government issued an internal notice to regulate the charges on 
medical services in Guangdong.
Long describes the reforms in social insurance in the 1980s in Guangzhou Shi, 
Guangdong Province as well as the whole country as a traditional model. The main 
feature of the model is that “it is a simple mutual help format at the beginning stage of 
the development of social insurance.” (1995, p. 199-200, my translation) He further 
comments that the model has some weaknesses. First, work units are still the main 
providers for social insurance expenses. Individuals are only required to pay nominal 
contributions and in fact this cannot reflect the real situations, e.g. their affordability and 
willingness. Second, since work units have limited ability to contribute the individual 
beneficiary cannot support his living to a reasonable level with the insurance benefits, 
especially in Guangzhou Shi where the inflation rates are rising rapidly and some of the 
work units are very weak competing with others in the market. Third, the strategy of 
‘accumulating from a balanced budget’ may not be realised since the ageing population
123
in the city has been rising sharply. The burden of supporting the elderly financially will 
be the heaviest in the coming 30 years. Finally, the people’s concepts and value of social 
insurance may be distorted by the ‘socialisation’. This is especially significant among 
young employees and newly established enterprises since it not persuasive to ask them to 
contribute to the social insurance system that seems remote from them. More 
importantly, most of the insurance benefits are determined by one’s standard wages and 
other factors rather than one’s contributions. This discourages the people’s incentive to 
contribute. It thus makes social insurance system look like the other type of collective 
benefits that everybody is eligible. (Long 1995, p. 200-201) In order to achieve the aims 
of social insurance reforms in this provincial city, there are a series of changes in 
different insurance programs since the early 1990s and these are going to be examined 
below.
Retirement pensions
In the pamphlet published and delivered by the Guangdong Province Social Insurance 
Service Bureau in May 1995, retirement pensions programme for all local administration 
regions in the province combines the principle o f ‘social funding’ (shehui tongchou) and 
‘personal account’ {geren zhuanhu) together. This method turns retirement pensions to a 
mixture with supplementary and mandatory components.104 (GSBX 1995b) In practice 
this approach involves the state, work units and individuals. The most significant feature 
of this system is, however, the strong linkage of one’s eligibility and level of benefits to 
one’s contributions and average wage level.105
104 T h e  work unit’s  supplem entary retirement pensions (qiye buchong yanglao baoxian) ’ is 
voluntary in nature. Work units are encouraged to contribute m ore to the funds apart from the 
stipulated contribution rates in order to strengthen the benefits for the retirees. In this case  
retirees of the profitable work units which is also generous in the insurance program m es may get 
higher benefits from the parts contributed by the employer. (Dong, April 1995, my interview 
records) Zhu et al. (1995, p. 128-129) argue that the work unit’s  supplem entary retirement 
pensions h as  the effect of ‘stopping the m isuse of capital or m ism anage the *welfare’ in 
en terprises’. Som e m easures can achieve the objective. For example, it should be approved by 
the staff and workers’ committee of the work unit and regulated by the state. In addition, Zhu et 
al. suggest limiting the amount of supplem ents contributed by work units at the rate of 10-20% of 
the basic retirement pensions funds. An exam ple cited by Zhu et al. is the Beijing Jeep , a Sino- 
American joint venture, which earm arked all em ployees with 6 yuan per m onths in their 
‘individual special account’. However, Zhu et al. also adm its that “to provide supplem entary 
retirement pensions is determ ined by the work unit’s  econom ic situation and it is not possible for 
others to follow.” (1995, p. 129, my translation)
105 P lease  refer to the “Provisional Regulations on Retirement Pensions for Staff and W orkers in
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The retirement pension plan in Guangzhou Shi, as stated in the pamphlet, 
requires all local employees to join. For the employees who come from outside mainland 
China the board of directors of the work units has discretion on whether those employees 
are covered. The term ‘local employees’ in this regulation includes permanent 
employees, contract system employees, temporary workers, peasants working in 
factories, local employees in foreign capital related ventures, exported Chinese labour 
working in foreign countries, self-employed people and participants in individual 
economy.
Based on the 1993 regulations, the pamphlet outlines the contribution levels of 
retirement pensions. Work units have to pay the standard rate that is proportional to the 
average total monthly wages of the precedent year. In 1994, the province-owned work 
units in Guangdong paid 17% of the average total monthly wages. The rates, however, 
have to be worked out and recommended by social insurance services bureaux and 
approved by the provincial government. Another source of retirement pensions is 
collected from staff and workers. It is stated in the pamphlet that employees have to 
contribute 2% of their average monthly wages of the precedent year. This is a ‘pay as 
you earn’ system. Work units have the responsibility to deduct this contribution directly 
from the payrolls, record the amount of contributions as well as the interest generated 
from the employee’s ‘personal account’ for retirement pensions. At the time when the 
employee retires, he can get the pension as a lump sum or in monthly payments, 
depending on the length of the contribution period.
The Regulations stipulate retirement age for men is 60 and for women workers is 
50 while for women cadres it is 55. Apart from the age requirement, the eligibility for 
retirement pensions also includes one’s contribution period. The Regulations states that 
only those who have contributed for 10 years can get the benefit in monthly payments.106 
Thus, those who are not qualified will be given a lump sum benefit called ‘elderly 
supplements’ (laoren jintie) in addition to the premium and interest of his personal
Guangdong Province " which w as issued in June 1993.
106 The contribution period can be accum ulated. The GSBX (1995b) s ta tes  that the “contribution 
period is an annual basis. The staff and workers can accum ulate their contribution years 
although they may have worked in several different work units before retirement. But it does not 
include the period in which he did not contribute.” (my translation)
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account.107 The Regulations also recognise the “continuous working period” {lianxu 
gongling) as the contribution period before the implementation of these regulations.108
The differentiation between the ‘general’ and ‘continuous’ natures of working 
period favours most of the permanent employees in state-owned units. This is one of the 
particular features of the Chinese social insurance. Permanent employees are usually 
recruited and allocated by the state and have worked for longer periods. In contrast, non­
state-owned sectors and non-permanent employees who have only emerged for about a 
decade with work units using such labour are out of the state network. Therefore, 
employees in non-state-owned sector are given an understanding that they are 
contributing to the retirement pension schemes only for those in the state-owned units. In 
addition, for most of the non-permanent employees, especially temporary workers and 
peasants workers who work in factories they are discriminated against being excluded 
from the eligibility for monthly paid retirement pensions.
Temporary workers, especially migrants, seldom work for a unit for a continuous 
long period. Non-permanent workers are employed because they are younger and 
cheaper. In most of the enterprises in the developed areas like Guangzhou Shi in China, 
temporary workers are usually young migrants who have been employed only a few 
years. Under the conditions of ample supply of young migrants and short-term 
employment, it may take a longer time for these workers to accumulate their 
contribution period of 10 years. It seems very likely that they can only get the lump sum 
benefits and their own part from the “personal account”, if these employees and their 
work units contributed to retirement pensions. The problem for these employees is that 
they have no alternative. In fact, ‘elderly supplements’ resembles a provident fund but it 
is not the retirement pensions for long term purposes. Thus their means of living beyond 
retirement is not guaranteed, especially when there is high inflation or if they are not
107 Elderly supplem ent Is a lump sum retirement benefit. The calculation is two m onths ‘indexed 
monthly average paying w ages’ for every one year of working service. The ‘indexed monthly 
average paying w ages’ equals the average index tim es the average monthly w ages in the city at
one’s  retirement.
108 “Working period" is generally defined a s  the length of service in a work unit and from which 
wage incom es are generated. According to Su et al. (1994, p. 460) working period can be 
differentiated into “general working period” (yiban gongling) and “continuous working period” 
(lianxu gongling). The difference betw een the two is that the latter only counts the length of 
services in one work unit. Thus “continuous working period" is also called ‘working period in the 
present work unit’. After 1978, the term “general working period” is not used anym ore.
126
good at managing money. In addition, these employees cannot enjoy the share
contributed by the work units (i.e. the basic retirement pensions, the additional
retirement pensions and the unit’s supplementary retirement pensions) and then their
amount of benefit is much less.109
Another factor that affects the enjoyment of retirement pensions for non­
permanent workers is the work units, especially the non-state-owned that do not join or 
contribute to the insurance. This phenomenon is not uncommon in Guangdong Province 
since the increase of non-state-owned enterprises was very rapid in the past decade. 
There are two main reasons for this situation. First, these work units are usually smaller 
in scale and the owners operate with a much shorter time frame.110 In the 1980s and 
early 1990s, most of the capitalists who were from Hong Kong invested in Guangdong 
Province because of its proximity to Hong Kong and the relative lower production costs. 
Furthermore, since the investment formats are various under some circumstances the 
owners of the units do not recognise the need for social insurance of the employees. The 
typical example is the “Three Processing and One Compensation” (sanlai yibu).in 
Unlike the large scale joint ventures (sanji qiye), sanlai yibu enterprises usually make 
use of the local cheap production factors, especially the labour force, to process the 
unsophisticated and lower level products for sale in the global market.112 The
109 Additional retirement pensions only apply to those who have worked for more than 10 years. 
The calculation method is that 1 % of one’s  ‘indexed average monthly paying w ages’ is put into 
the additional retirement pensions, and 1.2% for those who have worked for more than 15 years. 
For exam ple one can get 36% of the ‘indexed average monthly paying w ag es’ if one has worked 
for 30 years. (GSBX 1995b)
110 According to the GTN (1995, Table 10-10, p. 345) a total of 6,861 enterprises with 138 billion 
US dollars were invested in from outside China in Guangzhou Shi at the end of the year 1994. 
84.4% of th ese  enterprises brought in the capital of 115 billion US dollars from Hong Kong. On 
average, every one of th ese  units had an input of about 2 million US dollars. Relatively, every 
Jap an ese  associa ted  enterprise received capital of 4.4 million US dollars on average. For the 
enterprises with investm ent from Australian capitals it w as 3.1 million US dollars.
111 Sanlai yibu “is an abbreviated term for processing supplied m aterials, assem bling supplied 
parts, processing in accordance with supplied sam ples, and com pensatory trade. (In this 
cooperative business) the overseas businessm en supply all or part of the source materials, 
supplem entary materials or semi-finished products and packaging m aterials, and occasionally 
som e necessary  equipment; while the dom estic enterprises process them  according to the 
qualities, specifications and designs stipulated in the agreem ent, transport the finished products
to the suppliers and charge them  processing fees." (Li 1993, p. 281)
112 The GTN show s that the import value of sanlai yibu in the year-end of 1994 w as 3.4 billion 
US dollars while for sanji qiye it w as 17.5 billion US dollars. (1995, Table 10-3, p. 339) For the 
types of business, sanji qiye are usually capital intensive (e.g. the investm ents in building of 
infrastructures) and involve high technology (e.g. electronic products) (GTN 1995, Table 10-11, 
p. 346-350).
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manufacturing of toys, garments, artificial decorations, furniture making, food 
processing and the like are labour intensive modes of production among the examples of 
sanlai yibu industries. Since the provision and management of labour are the 
responsibilities of the local party to the venture agreement (usually the designated 
organisation or department of the local government) that foreign investors are not 
concerned about the management of social insurance or employees.
Second, because local government is incapable of implementing social insurance 
regulations effectively, that leaves a gap for capitalists to evade any moral responsibility. 
Li (1994, p. 5) mentions that “reforms in social insurance is usually restricted by socio­
economic development and the people’s knowledge in social insurance.” He further 
states that one of the weaknesses of social insurance reforms in Guangzhou Shi is “the 
inertia in legislation and the weak implementing forces.” Consequently, “there is a 
problem of a lack of legitimised forces to control, supervise and impose restrictions.” In 
responding to the problem Li maintains that it is necessary to accomplish the regulations 
in order to standardise the situation and guide the enterprises. (1994, p. 9) Du (1994) 
comments in another paper that “there are more and more enterprises which fall into 
arrears with the central funding of retirement pensions and this problem is very serious 
in Guangzhou Shi. It is found that the arrears of central funding were 50 million yuan in 
1994.” (Du 1994, p. 4, my translation) Du lists three main reasons of the problems. First, 
with regard to Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, there are more old state-owned units 
and greater numbers of permanent and retired staff and workers. Second, there is a lack 
of strong and powerful management organisation to centralise and coordinate social 
insurance. The Bureau of Labour in Guangzhou Shi is limited by its own legitimated 
power to supervise the whole mechanism. Third, the general practice and concepts in 
some trades and enterprises are conservative. The owners of these units are usually very 
calculating and mean in contributing to the central funding. They are also short-sighted 
and their knowledge of the nature and objectives of social insurance is limited and 
outdated. (Du 1994, p. 4)
In responding to the previously mentioned problems, the Guangdong Social 
Insurance Services Bureau instituted some measures to prevent arrears of contributions 
to the central retirement pension fund. These measures are implemented in all cities in 
the province. GSBX (1995b) First, an extra 0.5% of the total arrears may be imposed as
128
a penalty. Second, the local court can order the concerned work units to pay 1% of the 
arrears if it ignores the previous penalty. Finally, the Bureau of Industrial and 
Commercial Administration may revoke the business licence if the unit has not 
contributed for more than three months. It seems that the policies are effective, at least 
reflected by the official figures. According to the SSB (1996, table 8-14, p. 494), in the 
year-end of 1994, 65,462 work units of differing composition of ownership in 
Guangdong Province took part in retirement pensions. The total number of employees 
who joined the programme was 4.33 million. In this group of people 89% were staff and 
workers who were employed permanently or on contract, with the other 11% being 
temporary workers. The participation rate of non-permanent employees in Guangdong 
Province is higher than the 1.8% for the whole country. (SSB 1996, Table 8-14, p. 494) 
The real situation will be examined in the coming chapters with a field study in 
Guangzhou Shi.
Occupational injury, sickness and handicapped benefits
The provisions of OISH benefits in Guangdong Province are based on the “Regulations 
on Occupational Injury Insurance for Staff and Workers in Enterprises in Guangdong 
Province” promulgated in 1992. OISH programme as defined in the pamphlet issued by 
the Guangdong Province Social Insurance Services Bureau is “a mandatory social 
insurance of which the funding is managed by a social insurance department that gives 
financial compensation for securing the living of the injured or the survivors.” (GSBX 
1995a, my translation) The Regulation also states that all types of work units, including 
those owned by the military forces and foreign capital-related ones should join the 
schemes, regardless of whether they had industrial accidents or not before. The 
Regulations also specify that employees of all natures, irrespective of their household 
registrations, are covered.
There are twelve conditions in four groups under which the concerned employee 
can apply for OISH benefits, according to the Regulations. The first group includes five 
conditions under which accidents or sickness are regarded as being caused in the 
designated working hours and environment. The second group has two items which 
determine whether the occurrence is handled as a matter of travel related to work. The 
third group has four categories which relate to the judgements made by the referred
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organisation on severity. The fourth group listed is odd for it clearly states that it covers 
“those who participated in emergency relief or rescuing in dangerous or disastrous 
situations safeguarding the interests of the society and the people.” (my translation) This 
item does not relate to one’s working environment but the goodness of the whole society 
that reflects the collective spirit and objective of social insurance in China. An imaginary 
case is that one can register a claim to the work units for OISH benefits because of an 
injury sustained in putting out the fire in the work unit next door. Social insurance in 
China is thus a means to promote collectivism apart from confining the benefits to the 
specified group of contributors. In brief, this measure spells out the special characteristic 
of social insurance in the country with its strong communist morality.
In the 1992 regulations for OISH a ‘Work Injury Insurance Fund’ (Gongshang 
Baoxian Jijian) was established with the contributions made only by the work units. The 
management principle of OISH is similar to that of retirement pensions, i.e. ‘to keep 
some surplus after paying the benefits’. Work units have to pay two yuan for every 
single employee monthly to social insurance services bureaux. If there is any need 
arising from work related injury the work unit has to report to the social insurance 
services bureau and the work unit’s superior level of management. The bureau will pay 
the benefits only upon receiving the report within 15 days after the occurrence of the 
accident. Work units have to prepare all the necessary documents such as the receipts on 
medical expenses or death certificates when applying for the concerned employees to get 
the benefits. It is stated in the pamphlet that the social insurance services bureau will pay 
the stipulated benefits after the assessment is made within one month’s time after receipt 
of the documents. (GSBX 1995a)
The application procedures for OISH benefits are peculiar and rather different 
from other social insurance benefits in that the work units play an important role. The 
work unit can determine in the first instance whether the claim is valid or not. In other 
words, a buffer is set up before the case reaches the social insurance services bureau. 
This arrangement grants work units an immense power in quashing real claims, or even 
in manipulating its role by recommending false claims. To quote the example that has 
just been described above it is found that the employee who was hurt in fighting the fire 
may or may not be certified by his own work unit as occupational injury. In general this 
demonstrates that the work unit, as a collective, exerts a huge influence in the people’s
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daily life. In Chapter Eight this relationship is proved by the perception on the roles of 
work unit in income maintenance provisions among employees.
The 1992 Regulations also tries to classify the need of the claimants by different 
levels of injury or sickness.113 In the first group benefit payments are arranged within the 
medical treatment period. The work unit must pay 30% of all the medical expenses 
including registration fee, treatment fees, medicine, laboratory charges, operation and 
hospitalisation charges, and transportation expenses if the case is assessed as serious or 
causing handicap or death. The social insurance services bureau, on the other hand, pays 
the remaining 70%. The recipient employee is required to stay in an approved hospital if 
such treatment is needed. For non-serious cases the relevant work unit and OISH Fund 
will share at various rates the expenses up to a certain amount. (GSBX 1995a)
The second group covers benefits for those who are classified as handicapped 
after the treatment. There are four categories in this grouping. (Table 4-4) Category ‘A’ 
is for those identified as having “totally lost economic productivity.” The second 
category is for those who have “lost the great part of economic productivity”. Claimants 
in the third group are those who “partly lost economic productivity”. The last grouping is 
for those who have “some gashes left from the injury”. The classification and the 
benefits are revised after the annual medical check up of the recipient.
Table 4-4 The categorisation and grading of OISH benefits in Guangdong 
Province
Category A B C D
Grade 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Level of benefit 
(month)*
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
Source: GSBX 1995a.
* The benefit level is set at the local average monthly wage of staff and workers in the 
previous year.
The third group of benefits is granted to the survivors who live off the incomes of 
the employee who is dead because of occupational injury. There are three different kinds
113 The “Appraisal Standard For the Loss of Productivity in Work Injury or S ickness in 
Guangdong Province " w as announced on 31 D ecem ber 1981 by the Office of Public Health, 
Bureau of Labour, and Bureau of Personnel of Guangdong Province.
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of benefits in this group. First, a lump sum “funeral expenses” equals to the maximum of 
the employee’s four months average wages in province-owned enterprises. Second, a 
“compassionate grant” is allocated in a lump sum equal to the maximum of twenty-four 
months of the staff and workers’ average wages in province-owned enterprises. Finally, 
“living supplements” equal to 30% of the average monthly wages of the staff and 
workers in province-owned enterprises for those have one dependant and 50% for those 
have two or more dependants.
Zhang et a l (1994) reviewed the OISH programmes in the province for two 
years from 1992. They identify some strengths and problems with the service. They also 
remark that the current OISH programmes in Guangdong Province has wider coverage, 
more standardised assessment and effective management, and the risks are shared among 
work units that enterprises are more free to compete in the market economy. On the 
other side, they also find some of the problems of the OISH programmes such as the 
evasion of responsibilities by the work units. This problem is particularly serious among 
work units that tend to employ more temporary employees and are less profitable. In 
other words the coverage is affected. Zhang et a l points out that it is one of the results of 
the implementation of the ‘contract responsibility system’ that promotes narrow and 
‘short term behaviours’ among contractors. These work units are more likely to employ 
temporary workers to work in very unsafe working environments where the work 
accident rates are relatively high.
The problems of OISH programmes bring out another feature of the Chinese 
social insurance that non-state-owned work units and the newly rising capitalists hinder 
the development of a contributory social insurance system in the country. Unlike the 
spontaneous development of capitalism in Europe and America, private economic 
entities in China emerge passively from the transiting socialist economy. Irrespective of 
their vital economic functions in socialist transition, they do not play significant and 
active roles in the development of social insurance in China. These economic units are 
expected to support or supplement the malfunctioning state-owned work units in the 
socialist market economy. These capitalists affect the reforms in social insurance in 
China because of their narrower interests or negligent behaviour under the ineffectual 
management of social insurance regulations. It is found that 5.86% of the 34.34 million 
workers working in the non-state-owned sector might not have access to the services.
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(Zhang et a l 1994) The number of employees in “individual economic units and private 
economy” in the province increased from 0.11 million in 1980 to 1.43 million in 1993. 
The number of employees in foreign capital-related units grew from zero in 1980 to 1.14 
million in 1993.
Among the employees in non-state-owned sector who have only basic cover, 
Zhang et al. also shows that temporary employees are the most deprived in OISH 
programmes. Employers can manipulate these workers because of their temporary 
household status in Guangzhou Shi. Most of the migratory workers have to work under 
unfavourable working conditions since they are ignorant of local labour laws and their 
rights to social insurance. They seldom ask about or apply for insurance benefits because 
they believe that it might affect their job security where the job market is very 
competitive for migrants. The problem raised by Zhang et a l exposes the weakness of 
social insurance in China, that the implementation of other policies (e.g. household 
registration) is more important than social insurance services. Unusually these measures 
are set up for the ultimate political objectives that undermine the effectiveness of social 
insurance. Hence the main objective of social insurance in China is to enhance the 
national political development. This is also one of the specific features of the Chinese 
social insurance.
The responses of work units towards OISH programmes reflect the effectiveness 
of the regulations and service. The regulations cannot stop or change the short-term 
behaviours of employers who, as commented by Karl Marx, are preoccupied with the 
“extraction of surplus value”. This phenomenon is not rare in an emerging market 
economy although it is known that the effects will be very destructive to the whole social 
insurance system in China. (Zhang 1994) The ineffectiveness of the service is evidenced 
by those employees who are not protected in most of the social insurance services, 
including OISH which is directed to cover all employees. In brief, social insurance in 
this country has rather limited protection for employees in a transforming socialist 
economy. The coverage of the services is not determined by whether one is an active 
productive force but by the nature of the employment and the type of ownership of the 
work unit.
In Guangzhou Shi, reforms in OISH programmes started in 1993. (Chen 1994, p.
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4) Du (1994) states that OISH programmes in Guangzhou Shi protected 0.65 million 
staff and workers. According to the GST (1995, Table 12-1, p. 384) the total labour force 
in Guangzhou Shi in 1993 was 3.83 million and so on this basis only 17% of the 
employees were covered by OISH programmes. Reforms in OISH programmes aim at 
socialisation. Nevertheless, this insurance programme is still managed by the Bureau of 
Labour in Guangzhou Shi while the expenditures on benefits are shared between the 
insurance organisation and the concerned work unit.114 In general, work units have to 
contribute to OISH programmes at the rate of 1-2% of their payrolls. In aggregate terms, 
it is a rather heavy burden for work units since they have to pay for other insurance 
programmes as well. It is estimated that work units spend about 41% more of the total 
wage expenses on the six social insurance programmes including funding housing. (Li 
1994, p. 8)115
The heavy burden of social insurance on work units is one of the causes 
motivating them to avoid contributing. Furthermore, the nominal share of employees 
may cause difficulties in ‘socialising’ the social insurance towards a contributory mutual 
help system.116 If work units are still required to pay the major part of the expenses of 
social insurance then it makes no difference from the collectivism and the occupational 
nature labour insurance as in the past. This situation explains why work units are rather 
reluctant to contribute and migratory employees are the weaklings in the modified 
system. In sum, under the banner of ‘socialisation’, employers make the major 
contribution in the social insurance system in the 1990s in China. The newly rising 
capitalists in the socialist market economy shoulder the burdens that were taken up by
114 In C hen’s  paper, she  mentions that the m anagem ent system  for social security in Guangzhou 
is multi-headed. This is consistent with the province and the whole country. The centralised fund 
for retirem ent pensions is m anaged by the “Labour Social Insurance C om pany” under the aegis 
of the G uangzhou Shi Bureau Of Labour, except for the retirement pensions for em ployees in 
the governm ent’s  administrative departm ents is put under the Bureau Of Personnel of 
Guangzhou Shi. The “Labour Services Company” of the G uangzhou Shi Bureau Of Labour 
performs the centralised m anagem ent for unemployment insurance. Medical benefits for cadres 
are under the control of the Guangzhou Shi Bureau Of Health. The G uangzhou Shi Bureau Of 
[Labour controls the OISH program m es directly. In addition the Bureau of Civil Affairs is 
responsible for som e of the social insurance items such a s  retirem ent pensions. (Chen 1994, p.
2)
115 The six social insurance benefits and the percentages are: retirement pensions is 24.5%, 
unemployment fund is 1%, work injury fund is 1%, medical and sickness fund is 12%, maternity 
fund is 0.5% and provident fund for housing is 2%. (Li 1994, p. 8)
116 Li (1994, p. 8) estim ates that the contribution to social insurance by em ployees is about 5% of 
their personal w ages.
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state in the past. This particular feature reflects the Marxist socialist ideology and values 
on income protection for the working class that will be discussed in more detail in the 
concluding chapter.
Unemployment benefits
In Guangzhou Shi, the first policy paper on unemployment insurance was issued in 
November 1994. (GSR 1994) The second document paper was made public a month 
later by the Bureau of Labour of Guangzhou Shi. (GSLJ 1994) These two documents 
were based on the ‘Regulations on Unemployment Insurance for Staff and Workers in 
State-owned Enterprise’ promulgated by the State Council.
These two documents specifically point out the eligible groups of employees and 
the government departments that are assigned for the management of unemployment 
insurance benefits. The policy document issued by the People’s Government of 
Guangzhou Shi states that the regulations apply to contract system workers, temporary 
workers and the appointed cadres in government production and service units.117
An important issue in the November 1994 Document is the definition of ‘the 
unemployed’ laid down in Article Five. In general, ‘the unemployed’ denotes those staff 
and workers who are sacked because of streamlining, closing down, insolvency, 
restructuring, etc. of the work unit. It also includes the dismissed staff and workers with 
poor working performance and whose contracts are terminated. However, it is also stated 
in Article Six of the Document that certain types of employees are not covered: first, 
those resigning to take up studies in schools, second, those who have non-permanent 
household status in Guangzhou Shi, third, temporary employees who were not registered 
with local employment offices through their employers. Finally, those who have 
migrated to other countries without the state’s permission.
The definition on ‘unemployed’ seems very controversial. Some employees, for
117 Appointed cadres are different from the cadres who are allocated to a government 
departm ent through the centralised allocation policy. The appointed cadres are  employed in the 
‘state  civil servant system ’ which em phasises open exam inations for recruitment and promotion. 
For details please refer to the “Provisional Regulations on S tate Civil Servants” that w as put into 
practise from 1 O ctober 1993.
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example migratory workers, are not provided with unemployment benefits and medical 
and sickness supplements when they are unemployed if their employment status has not 
been registered. Thus two issues rise from such phenomenon. First, household status is 
important to one in getting social insurance benefits. Second, the maintenance of the 
relationship with a work unit provides the only access to social insurance or other relief. 
These issues demonstrate two features of the Chinese social insurance. First, social 
insurance policies in the country distinguish one’s eligibility for the services by his 
status such as household registration and employment conditions. The second is the 
consequence of the former issue, that income protection policies in China redistribute the 
resources and benefits horizontally from the least protected to the vested interest. All 
employees have to contribute through work units in the pay as you earn system but only 
some groups of them are covered for status reason. Such an approach apparently cannot 
cover the temporarily employed or migrants.
In responding to these weaknesses, the Economic System Reform Commission of
Guangdong Province proposed that:
“Regarding the situations in Guangdong Province and the fast growing numbers 
of foreign capital-related enterprises, township enterprises, and private 
enterprises in the province, there are more and more employees with non­
permanent urban household status. ... Based on the principle of protecting their 
rights and duties, these employees should be covered.” (GTGW 1995, p. 6, my 
translation)
Unemployment insurance benefit is supported by several financial sources. These 
include a centralised funding supported by employees and units, the bank interests 
generated from the fund, and the supplements provided by local government. In the 
management process, the amount of contributions and the list of contributors are 
reported and submitted by employers. In this case, employers can manipulate the system 
by keeping the number of the insured as low as possible to minimise their contribution. 
Although it is stated in the Regulations that employers have the ‘legal responsibilities’ to 
report precisely to labour bureaux, fraud, deception and like behaviours are frequently 
exposed.118 Referring to the situation in Guangzhou Shi, Li points out that “since there 
are many enterprises (especially private enterprises) which do not employ temporary
118 In C hapter Five of the Regulations, the penalty for late contribution or under-contribution is to 
pay two to three tim es the original amount. For those units or en terprises which behave 
dishonestly will be asked to pay an extra 15-30% of the se t am ount and a fine from 100 yuan to
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staff and workers using formal procedures it is very difficult to cover these workers with 
social insurance.” (1994, p. 10, my translation)
Unemployment insurance is set up for purposes other than maintaining the living 
standards of the targeted beneficiary. The Regulations emphasises that “unemployment 
insurance should persist with protecting the basic livings and promoting re-employment 
of the unemployed. It is closely related with job referral, re-training for employment and 
production for self-relief (shengchan zijiu) ... .”119 (GSR 1994, Article 4) Therefore 
unemployment insurance is a part of the self-help programmes. For example, the Bureau 
of Labour of Guangzhou Shi provides loans to women workers who are laid off from 
state-owned enterprises to start up individual household business (geti hu or geti jingji). 
It also allocates the sites for these unemployed to set up the business through the Bureau 
of Industrial and Commercial Administration.120
According to the Regulations, unemployment insurance benefit is determined by 
the length of the contribution and working periods. For those who lose their jobs because 
of insolvency of the work unit, etc. they may get unemployment as well as medical 
benefits in various terms.121 For the participants within the individual economy and 
private enterprises the condition is a full year’s contribution before claiming benefits. On 
the other hand, those who are unemployed because of the termination of contract or 
dismissal for misconduct at work, the minimum requirement for being eligible is two 
working years. The longest benefit period, however, is set at not exceeding six months 
for every two to five years of service and up to 13 months benefits for those had been 
working for more than five years. Finally, it is stated in the Regulations that the working 
period should only be counted for one application and the concerned employee cannot
500 yuans im posed on the responsible individual.
119 Shenchang Zijiu as  explained by Fu et al. Is a m eans for unemployment relief. “The related 
government departm ent organise the unemployed people to produce with the assistance 
allocated by the sta te  in order to solve the problem of lack of the source for livings.” (1994, p. 
525, my translation) According to Fu et al. There are four different approaches in shenchang jijiu: 
loans for expanding the production units for absorbing the unemployed; the setting up of 
production cooperatives among the unem ployed’ to organise the unem ployed in buying and
selling; to give out som e seed  capital to facilitate the unemployed to start individual business.
120 My interview of the Head of the Unemployment M anagem ent Section of the Bureau of Labour
of Guangzhou Shi on 29 August 1995.
121 The concerned can get the benefits for three m onths in every one year of service, and one 
extra m onth’s  benefits in every additional six m onths working period, up to the longest period for 
24 months.
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claim more than once.
As mentioned in the last paragraph unemployment insurance consists of 
unemployment benefit and medical benefits. Unemployment benefits are provided 
monthly at the levels set at the average monthly total wages in previous year. Table 4-5 
below shows the levels of unemployment benefits in relation with the different length of 
working service period. It shows that the longer the working period the higher the 
insurance benefit levels. But the benefit level is fixed at 35% of the monthly average 
total wages in the previous year from the thirteenth month and on, irrespective of the 
number of the working years.
Medical supplements for the unemployed are set at 10 yuan per month for those 
who have worked for less than 10 years, and one more yuan in proportion to every extra 
working year for those who worked for eleven or more years. A higher rate at twenty 
yuan per month is given to those who are sick or injured, and a lump sum supplement 
up to 50-70% of the total medical charges to those who stay in hospitals for medical 
treatment in unemployment.
Table 4-5 Unemployment benefit levels by different length of working periods 
in Guangzhou Shi
Duration of benefit 
(months)
Working period (years) Level of benefits (% of the monthly 
average total wages in previous year)
1-12 1-6 35
7-10 40
11 or over 45
13-24 — 35
Source: Extracted from GSR 1994, p. 9.
The previous discussion shows that unemployment benefit is not favourable to 
two types of staff and workers. First, older employees who worked for a rather long time 
in state-owned enterprises but were sacked because of enterprise reforms since the mid 
1980s. These are usually women workers in their middle age and have low likelihood of 
being re-employed. The needs of these people are relatively greater but the insurance 
benefits cannot help them out especially in the high inflation era. Second, migrant 
employees are only eligible for the lowest rate of unemployment benefits throughout the 
whole period of twenty-four months because their working records are short and
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discontinuous. These two results of unemployment benefits highlight first, the funding 
difficulties of social insurance in China. Second the ineffectiveness of the services in 
satisfying contingent income needs of the people. Third, the unrealistic policy 
regulations that do not take into account the employment conditions of different types of 
employees. In sum, unrealistic policy design is another feature of the social insurance in 
China.
Medical and sickness benefits
Unlike the new unemployment insurance in China, medical and sickness insurance is 
incrementally developed from the past system. The reasons of reforming this service are 
two: to unify the incompatible medical services and insurance systems for workers 
(ilaobao yiliao) and staff (gongfei yiliao), and to coordinate the different organisations 
that provide medical services and medical social insurance.122
Medical and sickness insurance has long been described as cumbersome. The 
coverage of this social insurance item is wide that “the employee and his family are 
covered once he has started the employment.” (Lu 1994, p. 2) Lu estimates that there 
were 0.23 million employees and their 0.57 million family dependants are covered by 
gongfei yiliao in Guangzhou Shi. On the other hand, 2.4 million workers (including the 
retired and their family dependants) are eligible for laobao yiliao. The problem is very 
clear. “The welfare approach of medical insurance services lacks effective supervisory 
and controlling mechanism that causes wastage in medical and health resources.” (Lu 
1994, p. 2, my translation)
Reforms in medical services in Guangzhou Shi were started from the
121 Medical services for workers or cadres usually involve the work unit that financially supports 
the expenses, the medical services unit which provide the services, and the related em ployee or 
his family dependants. The relationships between th ese  three parts have becom e more 
complicated after the introduction of the contract responsibility system  since the early 1980s. 
The medical services have been turned into a commodity that is sold for m eeting the production 
target. Clients are guided to use m any unnecessary  services or drugs in treatm ent. This cau ses  
the unbearable expenses that are borne solely by work units. The excessive dem ands affect 
most of the state-ow ned enterprises, which are less profitable but have to look after the large 
group of em ployees who are retired or still at their posts. (My interview of the Head of the Social 
Insurance Section of the Guangdong Province Economic System s Reform Commission on 29 
August 1994)
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management structure of gongfei yiliao. A decentralised two-layer structure is 
established to overlook the financial management at city and area levels for facilitating 
direct responses within the government administrative and business units on medical 
expenses. On the other hand, reforms in laobcio yiliao emphasise much more controlling 
the expenses. The measures such as “contracting out out-patient services” and 
“classifying the expenses on hospitalisation”, etc. aim at shifting the expenses to the 
eligible. (Lu 1994, p. 2) The main strategy employed in medical insurance reforms can 
be summarised as ‘controlling the rising expenses’.123 (GSYT 1994, p. 3)
The reform plans for gongfei yiliao in Guangdong Province and Guangzhou Shi 
is effective from July 1994. They suggest that there is “a mutual responsibility among 
hospitals, units and financial departments in managing the resources for gongfei yiliao.” 
(GSYT 1994, p. 4, my translation) In order to achieve the purposes of improving the 
management measures and establishing an effective control mechanism there are two 
main groups of recommendations. First it focuses on the central management of the 
financial inputs within a designated organisation. The second is to draw up the criteria 
for employees to get the benefits.
The 1994 reforms in gongfei yiliao have four main approaches to regulate 
financial resources. The first is to set up a centralised agency called ‘Management Office 
for Medical Benefits for Cadres and Staff {Gongfei Yiliao Bangongshi). This agency 
supports 80% of the medical expenses on hospitalisation for the staff and workers work 
in local government offices and departments {shengzhi jiguari) and the local 
government-owned units that registered with the Office {banzheng danwei). This source 
of financial support is checked once every three months and the Office clears the budget 
at the year-end. The Regulations stipulate that the hospitals can make use of the surplus 
to improve its medical facilities whilst the units are allowed to transfer its shares to other 
destinations. On the other hand if deficits rise then the state financial department, the 
hospital and the units share the amount at the ratio of 5:4:1. In brief, this is a multiparty 
budget control system in which the Office monitors the budgets. On the other hand, 
hospitals carefully control the provisions of medical services and work units check the 
applications for reimbursement. However, the negative effects are the very selective and
123 The growth in the medical expenses per head (gongfei yiliao) from 1992 to 1993 w as 39.9%
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limited medical services provided to the beneficiary.
The second approach is to practise the ‘contracting out system’ (baogang zhi) 
specially set up for meeting the medical expenses of the retired employees living locally 
or in other provinces. In the ‘contracting out system’ the local Bureau of Finance 
allocates a fixed amount of money to work units for medical services purposes. Thus 
there is no topping up when deficits appear, nor is the unit required to return the 
outstanding balance. The third method is to supplement 20% of the medical expenses 
consumed by the employees in shengzhi jiguan and banzheng danwei. In this case work 
units have the autonomy to make use and manage this financial resource. The last 
approach is to support up to 10% of the unmet part of the amount allocated by the Office 
that cannot be equally shared among the members of the banzheng danwei. This implies 
that the banzheng danwei and its members have to be responsible for at least 10% of the 
medical expenses. This discourages excessive or inappropriate use of medical services 
by promoting self-control responsibilities within work unit.
The second group of the recommendations concerns medical benefits for 
individual employees. There are two main items. First, it sets up the self-support rates 
and supplement methods that employees at their posts are required to pay up to 20% for 
outpatient services and 10% for hospitalisation. For retirees the self-supported rate is 
10% for outpatient services and 5% for hospitalisation. On the other hand, medical 
supplements are paid according to one’s age and rank, i.e. the higher the rank the higher 
the supplement. For example a cadre at provincial level can get 10 yuan while another 
cadre at sub-section level is eligible for 3 yuan ,124 For the age criteria, the older the staff 
the higher the benefits. A staff at the age of thirty or below can only get 3 yuan and the 
one at sixty-one or above is 10 yuan .
The second item is to set the ceiling for self-supported medical expenses. 
Employees at their posts are allowed to claim from work units if the total self-supported
in Guangzhou Shi, while for the whole province w as 50.61%. (GSYT 1994)
124 According to the “Provisional Regulations on S tate Civil Servants’ there are 15 ranks (ji) in 
the civil servant system . The highest rank is the state premier. The provincial level (sheng ji) is 
equivalent to the ministries and com m issioners levels (bu wei ji) which are at the third to fifth 
rank. Below that there are departm ent level (si ji), section level (chu ji), sub-section level (ke ji), 
and general level (banshi yuan).
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medical expenses are more than 500 yuan. For retirees the level is set at 400 yuan. 
Work units can reimburse the expenses from the fixed resources for medical expenses 
that are allocated from the Management Office for Medical Benefits for Cadres and 
Staff. In the cases of infectious diseases such as cholera, work injury or sickness and 
sterilisation for family planning the employee can claim full benefits from medical 
insurance. Family dependants of the employees can also get reimbursement of 80% of 
the expenses on out-patient services and 90% for hospitalisation if they have contributed 
10 yuan per month per head. All of the claims for reimbursement should be found on 
the approved list and prescribed by the contracting hospitals. Accordingly it discourages 
misuse, especially the unnecessary items for personal non-medical use purposes.
It is stated that the overall objective of the reforms in gongfei yiliao is to “build 
up a multi-layer medical protection system with medical insurance as the main body.” 
(GSYT 1994, p. 4) To achieve this objective the main task is to make the medical 
expenses “reasonably shared among state, work units and individuals.” In view of this it 
is necessary to establish a centralised body to manage the complicated medical services 
system.125 Lu in his paper (1994) brings out two main issues in medical insurance 
reforms in Guangzhou Shi. First, there are many difficulties for work units in sustaining 
the ‘welfare model’ of the medical insurance system. Second, medical expenses have 
been growing rapidly because of the lack of an effective controlling and supervisory 
mechanism.
The new medical insurance system seems very encouraging. The GTGW (1995, 
p. 8) reports that “after the implementation of the policy the misuse of the services has 
been decreasing and the sense of personal responsibility in the services is promoted. 
Wastage and induced demands by medical practitioners are under control.... The growth 
rate (of the expenses) is the lowest in the years.” The Report states that the growth rate 
in medical expenses went down to 2.13% in city-owned units and 13.8% among 
province-owned units in the second half of 1994 in Guangzhou Shi.
The focal point of the new laobao yiliao and gongfei yiliao is to reduce the work
125 It is com m ented in the GSYT (1995) that the reforms in medical service “h as m any difficulties 
and problem s in operation since it touches upon various asp ec ts  extensively." (p. 12, my 
translation)
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units’ role as financial supporter. However, the misplaced role of work units is not the
only problem of medical insurance. “Some enterprises just mixed the earmarked budget
for medical expenses with monthly wages. They didn’t bother whether the employee had
the need, nor considered the factors such as age and the length of service.” (Yang et al.
1994, p. 220, my translation) Yang et a l also state that some enterprises would like to
simplify the administrative process and choose to contract out medical expenses to
individual employees. Furthermore, reforms in laobao yiliao differ from gongfei yiliao
in that the benefits are different between the two systems. The main problem in medical
benefits is the lack of a management mechanism to regulate the three concerned parts,
i.e. hospitals, work units and employees. “The employee goes to see a doctor who
prescribes in the hospital while the work unit pays the bill. Every part has its own
financial account that is not related.” (Yang 1994, 221-222, my translation) In
concluding the problems, Yang et a l state that
“...laobao yiliao in enterprises is a multi-dimensional reform which, need 
coordination in society.... The reforms cannot be moved further if they are only 
carried out by labour services offices and social insurance department but are 
ineffective coordinating with health services and managing the medical and 
sickness insurance and the pharmaceutical business.” (1994, p. 222, my 
translation)
The previous paragraphs show that financing arrangement is the main concern in 
medical insurance reforms in Guangzhou Shi. Before the reforms there were different 
types of units including economic production units and social service organisations 
provided medical insurance. Since these units were not centrally coordinated the services 
were manipulated by service users and providers. Medical insurance in China is also an 
example that shows the strong influence of socialism over the country and the 
prevalence of occupational welfare.126 These two issues are closely related and make up 
the features of the Chinese social insurance. It is particularly found from this section that 
social insurance in China is coloured by socialist politics and it consequently models the 
occupational welfare insurance system.
Reforms in social insurance in Guangzhou Shi in the early 1990s exposes another 
feature that the country’s social insurance system lacks an effective centralised
126 Yang et al. com m ent that the s ta te ’s  responsibility in providing medical benefits for staff and 
workers is “a welfare of public ownership that has been recognised a s  the realisation of a 
strength of socialism .” (1994, p. 220, my translation)
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organisation to manage the services. The founding of social insurance services bureaux 
might be the starting point but there are many counter forces based in the established 
state ministries with their own vested interest. Without removing these bureaucratic 
influences and the political shackles the reforms in social insurance are only gestures at 
reform. In sum, with the case of medical insurance reforms in Guangzhou Shi, the 
founding, development and reforms of social insurance in China are politically directed 
and these constitute its specific features.
Maternity benefits
Maternity benefit is another social insurance funded and managed by social insurance 
services bureaux. The main aim of this insurance is to “provide assistance in kind for 
women workers when they lose their incomes during maternity leave, and to share the 
economic burdens with the enterprises which employ mostly women workers.” (GSBX 
1995c, my translation) It is found that where the more women workers are being hired 
the more unfavourable the situation the work units encounter in enterprise reforms. 
Because of the close work unit-employees relationships in China, maternity leave and 
benefits for women workers is recognised as the welfare provided solely by work units 
but not a social insurance service. This work unit-employees relationship, however, is 
complicated by the state-work unit (or state-enterprise) relationship as well. Thus the 
state-unit-employees relationships constitute a special feature of the Chinese social 
insurance and the particular social perception on and expectation from social insurance. 
It also causes unfair actions toward women workers in economic and enterprise reforms 
since the early 1980s. (GSBX 1995c)
Coverage of maternity benefits is rather wide. For example the Guangdong 
Province Social Insurance Services Bureau provide this benefit to retired women staff 
and workers who are on the “Staff and Workers Records” as well. Those eligible can 
enjoy one of the four different groups of benefits that are determined by the way of 
delivering the baby and expenses on postnatal care. The first group of benefits is paid in 
a lump sum for childbirth only. The highest benefit level is 2000 yuan for caesarean 
birth or multi-birth, 1800 yuan for forceps delivery or similar operation, and 1600 for 
natural delivery. The second group is the medical expenses on hospitalisation that is paid
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according to the levels set on medical insurance for cadres.127 The third group includes 
living supplements, wages and bonuses, etc. of the concerned employee in maternity 
leave that are given under the “Regulations on Birth Control in Guangdong Province ” 
and the “Measures on Labour Protections for Women Staff and Workers in Guangdong 
Province ”. The final group is the supplements for nutrition foods that are set from 50 
yuan to 100 yuan for natural birth, miscarriage and multi-birth, respectively.
Contribution to maternity benefit fund is set at one yuan per month per head, 
which is debited directly from the retirement pension fund that is contributed to by work 
units. In other words individual employees are not required to pay. Apart from 
contributing to the maternity fund, work units also take an active part in administering 
the applications. The work unit has to apply for the concerned woman worker by filling 
the “Application Form for Maternity Benefits”, and to check the following documents: 
the ‘Childbirth Permit’ issued by the Guangzhou Shi Birth Control Committee or the 
hometown government of the worker, her identity card, and the birth certificate of the 
new bom baby. The application for maternity benefit should reach the social insurance 
services bureau within three months after the birth of the baby and only married women 
workers can get the benefits.
The case of maternity benefit in Guangzhou Shi plays four main roles that have 
very latent but strong effects other than income maintenance. First, it is for the purpose 
of reproducing the socialist labour force. Women workers in China have a ‘dual role’ 
honour: productive and reproductive socialist labour force. The communist government 
recognises the important role played by women in expanding and nurturing the labour 
force for the development of socialism. The approbation used by the government on 
women’s participation in production is the ‘half of the sky’, which means the equal 
importance of men and women in socialist production. However, because of the 
biological differences only women can give birth to ‘the successors of socialism’. In this 
sense reproduction work is more significant than production for women. It is for this 
objective that maternity benefit in the country supplements the expenses on childbirth 
and some items are not included in maternity benefit seen in some capitalist developed 
Chinese societies like Hong Kong.
127 P lease  refer to T h e  Implementation Details for the M anagem ent on Medical E xpenses for
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Maternity benefit in China shown by the case of Guangzhou Shi is a mixture of 
occupation welfare and statutory social insurance. On the one hand work units actively 
manage and process the application for maternity benefits. On the other hand the 
objective of the services transcend the occupational welfare for enhancing the 
development of socialism. This feature is also found in other social insurance items in 
China so that social insurance is occupational welfare in nature and the objective is far 
from satisfying the income needs of the people. In the final chapter of this study this 
main feature of the Chinese social insurance will be discussed in more detail.
Second, reforms in maternity benefit are for releasing the economic burden of 
enterprises and promoting market economy. Such objectives are clearly stated in the 
Regulations. These enterprises, which employ a large number of women employees, are 
mostly state-owned manufacturing units. According to the SSB (1996, Table 1-20, p. 26) 
38.68 million or 68.5% of women staff and workers worked in state-owned units and 
14.2 million (25.2%) worked in urban collective-owned units in the year-end of 1994 in 
the whole country. In contrast there were only 6.34% or 3.58 million found in the units 
of “other ownership”. Furthermore, most women staff and workers were employed in a 
handful of business sectors. In Guangdong Province, 45.8% joined ‘manufacturing 
industries’, 15.7% were employed in ‘wholesale, retail trade and food services’, and 
8.8% were employed in ‘education, culture, art, radio, film and television’ sector in the 
year-end of 1994. (SSB 1996, Table 1-19, p. 24-25) In Guangzhou Shi 61% (0.52 
million) of women workers were employed in state-owned units whilst for work units of 
other ownership was 15.6% (0.14 million) in the year-end of 1994. (GST 1995, Table 
12-22, p. 410) Among these 0.66 million women staff and workers, 42.6% were engaged 
in manufacturing and another 17.6% were employed in wholesaling and retailing 
services. (GST 1995, Table 12-22, p. 410) In sum, the meaning of ‘releasing the 
economic burden of enterprises’ applies to most state-owned manufacturing units.
Third, maternity benefit has a main purpose to regulate women workers in the 
implementation of birth control policy. In other words, maternity benefit does not 
purposely act as the mechanism for income maintenance for the family in need. Rather,
Staff in Province-owned Units" issued by the provincial Office of Health and Office of Finance.
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it is a facilitator for other state policies such as population control. Maternity benefit is 
therefore a reward system for the women workers who observe the birth control policies 
such as ‘single child policy’ and take the relevant actions such as sterilisation. Women 
workers are eligible for the benefit neither because of their physical needs after delivery, 
nor the living needs but because of losing productivity temporarily. It is because of their 
fulfilment in playing the role of reproduction and satisfying the requirements in 
population control.
The last but not least is the strong traditional social ethic imposed as the values of 
judgement. Apart from the objectives of population control, women’s social behaviours 
are regulated by this insurance benefit. Unmarried mothers and those who deliver babies 
in extra-marital relationships are socially unacceptable and their children are usually 
deprived of social services.128 This reflects the paternalistic value of the state by using 
social insurance to guide the people to adapt to Chinese socialism. In other words, social 
insurance is a tool of the state to educate the people to align with the communist 
government and the prevailing social values.
In sum, maternity benefits in Guangzhou Shi reveals the features of the Chinese 
social insurance that it is an occupational welfare designed for achieving political 
objectives. Maternity benefit in China is not a need-based social insurance. Functionally, 
it is a set of income supplements earmarked for assisting women workers to reproduce 
socialist labour force. Practically, this benefit maintains Confucian and socialist 
ideologies and values of the communist government in China. Thus it significantly 
reflects social insurance with Chinese socialist characteristics.
Summary and conclusion: Features of social insurance in Guangzhou Shi in mid 
1990s
In a conference on social security reforms in Guangzhou Shi in 1994, Li Chunrong, 
Deputy Head of the Guangzhou Shi Labour Bureau, remarked that the main features of 
social insurance reforms in Guangzhou Shi are three. First, it emphasises the
128 For example, in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, if there is any private school which offers 
schooling services to the children who have no right to live in Shenzhen  or were born out of the 
city governm ent’s  permission, the school will be fined for 500 yuan per head. (Mingpao Daily
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responsibilities of state, work units and individual employees, especially the sense of 
social insurance within work units and among employees. Second, the reforms are 
moving from establishing a mutual assistance system to building up an operational 
mechanism of the whole social insurance system. Third, the coverage of the social 
insurance system in Guangzhou Shi is expanding from staff and workers in state-owned 
units to the labour force of all natures.
The first two issues raised by Li mainly are about how social insurance in 
Guangzhou Shi can be more efficiently reformed whilst the last one reflects the 
weakness of the existing social insurance services. Socialisation of social insurance 
points out the weakness of its occupational welfare nature. The process, however, needs 
a strong and centralised professional organisation to replace the multi-functional work 
units. To achieve these objectives the government has to use some administrative means 
to transfer the existing management of the social insurance scheme to social insurance 
services bureaux. To solve the problems of uneven coverage in social insurance, 
however, involves the lifting of the restrictions in other national policies, e.g. household 
registration and single child policy. However, such activities will unavoidably change 
the controlling mechanisms of the regime and social stability. Thus it can hardly be 
envisaged that the coverage of social insurance will be changed drastically in a short 
time although it is acknowledged that the situation is poor.129
With the case of Guangzhou Shi, Li (1994) reports that there are two main 
groups which fall outside social insurance protection: participants in individual economy 
and migratory temporary workers. He estimates that about 45% of the labour force in the 
city are rural labourers who are employed in the private sector. This point is not 
groundless. The GST (1995) states that in the year-end of 1994, 0.267 million were 
participants in individual or private economy. This constituted 7% of the total labour 
force in the period in the city. The average increasing rate for this specific group of 
employees was 66.5% per year in 1980-1994. In comparison, the average annual growth
News, 10/2/1997)
129 Li s ta tes  that “The coverage rate of labour insurance in the whole city is 55% on all the social 
labour force. But it has to be pointed out that not all of them  are provided with com prehensive 
social insurance services. In fact lots of work units have not joined the socialised retirement 
pensions, and there are more who do not provide unem ploym ent and occupational injury 
insurance program m es. In addition, the benefit levels in som e of the work units are very various
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rate for staff and workers was 2.24% in the same period. On the other hand, the number 
of employees in this group dropped about 15,000 between the years 1993 and 1994.
The other neglected group of employees in the reforms of social insurance 
mentioned by Li is the migratory temporary worker. As mentioned previously most of 
the migrants come to Guangzhou Shi for economic purposes. Because of the household 
registration policy, these migrants are seldom offered permanent employment. At the 
end of 1994, 5.6% or 10.58 million staff and workers were employed on temporary 
terms in the country. Among them 85.8% worked in manufacturing industries, including 
manufacturing (36.9%), construction (24.6%), and wholesale, retail trade and food 
services (9.5%). In sum, this group of employees are less educated and usually engaged 
in secondary economic production such as manufacturing and construction, and are less 
significant in financial and service industries, e.g. banking and insurance (0.7%), or 
professional jobs such as ‘geological prospecting and water conservancy’ (0.5%). (SSB 
1996, Table 1-25, p. 31)
The data shows that in the year-end of 1994 there were 5.36 million staff and 
workers engaged in the above-mentioned economic production in Guangdong Province. 
Hence it can be assessed that about 3.8 millions of the labour force in Guangdong were 
deprived of social insurance protections. In relative terms 42.1% of the urban employees 
were hardly covered by social insurance in the province.
In addition to the above two issues, Li also found other two features of social 
insurance in Guangzhou Shi: occupational nature and unequal treatment between work 
units of different ownership systems. He argues that irrespective of the effort put in 
socialising social insurance, state and work units are still the main contributors of social 
insurance services. (Li 1994, p. 5) Second, insurance benefit levels are higher in state- 
owned units as in the past. Li states that employees in state-owned units can get benefits 
two times higher than those in non-state-owned sector. Furthermore, Li finds that the 
burden of social insurance expenses on the retired and resigned staff and workers of 
collective enterprises is heavier than that of other types of work units. Li did not explain 
the scenario but it may be attributed to their relatively remote relationship with the state,
and do not m eet the regulated standard." (1994, p. 4, my translation)
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long established years, and the limited financial resources allocated by the government.
Finally, Li raises three points to elaborate the occupational nature of social 
insurance in China that is constituted by the state-unit-individual relationships. First, 
there are various state departments, including work units that provide social insurance 
services. This leads to overlapping management and difficulties in coordinating the 
services. Second, because of the overemphasis on the relationships between state and 
work units in socialist economy, some of the social insurance programmes malfunction. 
For example, unemployment benefits and OISH benefits hardly cover the employees in 
township enterprises and private enterprises. In addition, medical and sickness benefit is 
still very unpopular in the non-state-owned sector. Thirdly, work units cannot effectively 
manage social insurance services, although the relationship between employees and 
work units is strong. In some cases work units mix the running of business with the 
administration of social insurance and distort the roles and objective of social insurance. 
(Li 1994, p. 5-8)
In sum, the case of Guangzhou Shi brings about two main features of social 
insurance in China. First, it is a dual system that employees of different natures are being 
treated dissimilarly. Employees in state-owned work units and permanently employed 
are better and more widely covered than the others. Second, social insurance services in 
China are politically and economically oriented. The rationale behind the provision of 
the services is not mainly for income protection but for facilitating socialist transition 
and economic transformation. Before going to conceptualise the specific features of 
social insurance in the particular social system and economic production mode in China, 
the following four chapters will demonstrate the situations in work units in Guangzhou 
Shi with a quantitative study with structured questionnaires.
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Chapter Five
Funding and provisions of social insurance in work units in China:
The case of Guangzhou Shi
Introduction
The previous three chapters explored the features of social insurance in China and 
Guangzhou Shi with qualitative research techniques of reviewing the policy documents 
and interviewing the experts. It was also highlighted at the ending of the last chapter 
that, with the example of Guangzhou Shi, the maintaining of traditional Chinese values 
and socialist economic system constitute features of the social insurance in China. 
Because of these two important forces the Chinese government has a rather dissimilar 
view on the objectives, policy planning, and provision pattern of social insurance. 
Nevertheless, the features of the Chinese social insurance have not been examined in 
depth, especially an analysis with the data collected from field study.
In order to explore into the aforementioned issue, quantitative research 
techniques with questionnaires administered by trained interviewers was carried out in 
Guangzhou Shi, China in 1995. This capital of Guangdong Province is situated at the 
southern end of the province, close to Hong Kong and has a record of the fastest 
economic growth and rapid reforms in the country. The results of the field research are 
presented and discussed in this and the following three chapters in two main parts. The 
first part consists of this and the following chapter focus on the management pattern of 
social insurance in work units. Chapters Seven and Eight is the second part that will 
concentrate on the experiences and views of employees. The materials collected from the 
quantitative and qualitative study will be summed up in the final chapter for 
understanding the features of the Chinese social insurance.
This chapter has five parts that focus on the administration of social insurance in 
work units in Guangzhou Shi. These include: the nature of ownership, the nature of 
business, the provisions of different types of social insurance, the administration and 
financing of social insurance, and the provisions of supplementary income protections. 
Before that the following section is going to present the field study method in detail.
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The field study with quantitative method
The field study with structured questionnaires is the method used to examine the ‘true or 
false’ (or how true and how false) of the real world. This method of study applies 
‘systematic observation of the world as it appears to the senses.’ (LessnofF 1979, p. 12) 
The field study in the format of structured interviews for this project was carried out in 
Guangzhou Shi, Guangdong Province in China from January to March 1995 and is an 
empirical work for testing the findings obtained from literature review and unstructured 
interviews. It also provides a material basis which gives insights into the features of the 
Chinese social insurance and reasoning the relationships between social insurance and 
the social circumstances in China.
This evaluation on the practices of and experiences on social insurance in a 
relative developed city in China dealt with both of the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ sides.130 
Merriam (1975) suggests focusing on evaluating the social insurance beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries in this method. In this study, however, the approach was modified to 
investigating the employees of different tenures and in state and non-state owned sectors 
in order to find out the operation and effects of social insurance. The quantitative 
research involves first the employees as the ‘client groups’. A certain number of 
employees in the sampled state and non-state owned units reported their living 
conditions, experiences in getting the benefits, and views and expectations on social 
insurance in structured questionnaires administered by trained interviewers. The purpose 
of this examination is to find out how far the social insurance services cover the 
employees of different backgrounds, and their responses and expectations towards these 
income maintenance measures.
In order to achieve the pre-set objectives of this study, the questionnaire for 
employees comprises the following areas. The first is the demographic background of 
different groups of employees like gender, age, household status, employment nature 
(i.e. permanent, contract, etc.). The second area is the set of criteria for employees to be 
eligible for social insurance benefits. The third area is the adequacy of social insurance
130 Merriam (1975) suggests focusing on evaluating the social insurance beneficiaries and non­
beneficiaries in this method. In this study, however, the approach w as modified to investigating 
the em ployees of different tenures and in s ta te  and non-state owned secto rs in order to find out
152
benefits in maintaining the living. The fourth concerns how they deal with the general 
living arrangements, health problems, consumption and other types of incomes, etc. The 
fifth is their knowledge and usage of other social security programmes. The sixth is the 
use of insured and non-insured services, e.g. medical services. The final aspect is their 
experiences and opinions on the services, e.g. time gap between application, benefit 
payment, and services provided. The questionnaires drawn for the above-mentioned 
examination were administered within a fixed number of the sampled work units.131 
These included state enterprises (guoying qiye), public service departments (guojia 
jiguan), private economies (siyou), individual household economies (geti) and 
enterprises with foreign capitals (scmji).
Apart from researching into the ‘users’ of social insurance in Guangzhou Shi, the 
study also examines the providers of social insurance. Research on work units was 
designated to provide evidence in answering the first and second research questions 
stated in Chapter One. Firstly it featured social insurance in Guangzhou Shi by probing 
the relationships between the ownership backgrounds, funding resources and the 
provisions of social insurance services. Second it explored the conditions for eligibility 
and categorisation of beneficiaries. Thirdly it examined the formats of provisions in 
social insurance.
Concerning the sampling survey in developing countries as China, Bulmer (1993, 
p. 91) states that “...in many third world countries, sampling according to standard 
principles poses formidable problems.... There are usually no sampling frames, no 
central registry of all citizens, no census tracts with home addresses, and no 
comprehensive directories of who’s where. If any of these do exist, they are likely to be 
unreliable except possibly in some rural areas.” In brief Bulmer emphasises the 
difficulties that sampling frames are not accessible if they exist, statistical research is 
nigh impossible, in developing countries and such adversity may lead to great error in 
surveys conducted in developing countries.
In order to avoid the weakness of ‘misleading information’ in conducting the 
survey, non-probability sampling is used for this study because of the “ ...indefinite
the operation and effects of social insurance.
131 The sampling method will be shown in later parts in this chapter.
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populations, unavailable sampling frames, small budgets, lack of time, inexperienced 
personnel, pressure for results and the like.” (Roy et al. in Bulmer 1993, p. 97-98) Yet, 
this survey applied the multistage method to eschew serious errors in the process.
In referring to non-probability sampling Nachmias (1981, p. 298-300) list three 
different methods. For this study, however, quota-sampling method was used. The 
reasons of picking quota-sampling method were two. First, the objective of this 
quantitative study is to explore the features of social insurance in China with the 
information collected by field study. In practice a particular group of people (i.e. the 
beneficiaries) in one main aspect of social security (i.e. social insurance) were
examined. ^ 2  Second, two contrasting categories of people were identified (i.e. the state 
and non-state sectors) in this exploratory study.133 The following discussions will present 
the sampling method of this study.
The multistage quota sampling for this study started from the provider side, i.e. 
work units of both ownership natures. The first step was to identify the ‘primary 
sampling units’ (PSU) that largely reflect the population. (Nachmias 1981, p. 299) Table
4-1 in Chapter 4 shows that Guangdong Province was chosen because, unlike the other 
prosperous provinces and metropolitan cities (e.g. Beijing, Shanghai) or some of the 
poor remote mountainous areas (e.g. Guizhou and Gansu) where extreme cases were 
found, it imaged China’s socio-economic circumstances. Table 4-1 demonstrates that in 
comparison with the whole country Guangdong Province was ahead slightly in the 
secondary and tertiary production sectors. The urbanising economic structure was one of 
the reasons for choosing Guangdong Province as the PSU. The socio-economic structure 
of Guangdong Province was explained by j Vogel (1989) and in the previous chapter. The 
other noteworthy issue rises from Table 4-1 is the higher percentages of non-state owned 
sector. This highlights the significant changes in the employment system and 
consequently reforms in social insurance services. In sum, Guangdong Province is the 
place selected for demonstrating the provisions of social insurance in China because it 
epitomises the socio-economic conditions of the country and is often taken as a national
132 C.f. Martin Bulmer (1993:98) and Catherine Marsh (1981:275-276).
133 In order to contrast the differences, the equal num bers of questionnaires were distributed to 
the participants in both of the econom ic ownership system  and thus grasped the balance view on 
the provision of social insurance. For detail description of the method please refer to the 
subsequent parts.
154
model by central planners and commentators.134
The second step was to find out the sizes of the social labour forces in 
Guangdong Province. According to the Guangdong Yearbook 1994 the total labour force 
(urban and rural) in Guangdong Province in 1993 was 34.34 millions. This included 5.64 
million staff and workers (zhigong) in state-owned units, 2 million zhigong in collective 
units, 23.26 million rural labours, 1.43 million owners and employees in individual 
economy and private economy, 1.13 million zhigong in other units, and 0.88 millions in 
other economic units. As mentioned earlier, this study only concerned social insurance 
in urban areas and so the rural labour force was not counted. Table 5-1 below shows the 
features of labour forces in urban Guangdong Province. The table also reveals virtual 
parity between the number of employees in state-owned units and other units.
Table 5-1 Distribution of employees in urban Guangdong Province in 1993
Economic ownership type Number (10,000) %
State owned 563.63 50.87
Collective 199.99 18.05
Other natures of ownership 87.58 7.90
Private economy and Individual household economy 143.24 12.93
Other work units 113.54 10.25
Total 1,107.98 100.00
Source: Guangdong Yearbook 1994, p. 633.
It is learned from Table 5-1 that in 1993 the urban labour force in Guangdong 
Province was more than 11 million. Accordingly, the PSU was refined so the sampled 
area was Guangzhou Shi, the capital city of the province.135 The GTJ 1994 (p. 371, 
Table 12-7) states that in 1993 Guangzhou Shi recorded a total 1.97 million labour force. 
The cohort included 1.24 millions employed in state owned units, 0.47 million in 
collective units and another 0.39 million in work units of other ownership such as private 
economy, individual household economy and foreign capitals related units. Table 5-2 
below shows that as an old city Guangzhou Shi was weighted with a greater proportion 
of its labour force in state owned work units than the others.
134 For example, the Financial Times of 13 January 2000 describes Guangdong Province a s  the 
pow erhouse of China’s  econom ic development.
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Table 5-2 Urban labour force in different economic ownership sectors in 
Guangzhou Shi in 1993
Types of units Number (10,000 people) %
State-owned 124.40 63.13
Collective 39.03 19.81
All other types 33.62 17.06
Total 197.05 100
The above table shows that the labour force in state-owned units was biggest. For 
achieving the purpose of examining the features of social insurance, this study contrasted 
social insurance services for the labour force in state owned and non-state owned 
sectors. Hence the questionnaires were distributed in like manner among the employees 
and work units. A quota of 500 questionnaires were set for employees and 25 for the 
managers or owners of the work units after consulting the local government offices, e.g. 
Economic Systems Reforms Committee, Social Insurance Services Bureau and Civil 
Affairs Bureau, and the academic institute, i.e. the Sociology Department of Zhongshan 
University in Guangzhou Shi.
The subsequent steps of sampling were to make out the significant chunks and 
then pick out the segments. The chunks for this study were, first, state owned sector and, 
second, the grouping of the collective, individual household economy, private economy 
and other units as ‘non state-owned sector’. On the other hand, the segments were the 
different types of business in that particular ownership system. It was mentioned above 
that there were 16 different businesses listed in the statistical yearbook and in view of 
the limitations of this study it was necessary to narrow down the focus. The method was 
to determine the average number of employees in the listed businesses. Finally, certain 
businesses were identified because they employed a distinguishable number of people.
In addition, for the purpose of finding out the features of social insurance by 
contrasting the different variables, only those businesses found in both of the ownership 
sectors and employing the largest group of the labour force were selected as the chunks. 
Based on the GTJ 1994 three main businesses were identified under the aforementioned 
criteria: manufacturing, catering, wholesaling and retailing, and social services.136 Table
135 For the boundary of G uangzhou Shi please refer to C hapter 4 of this study.
136 The definition of social service industry refers to the labour and services for facilitating 
people’s  daily living such a s  hotels, barber shops, public baths, photo shops, clothes cleaning
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5-3 below shows the selected chunks for this survey.
Table 5-3 Number of employees in selected businesses by different ownership 
system in Guangzhou Shi in 1993 (figures in 10,000 people)
State owned Collective Other units Private & 
Individual
Manufacturing 33.785 18.844 13.707 2.014
Catering, wholesaling 
and retailing
16.067 9.640 1.737 8.755
Social services 7.333 2.924 3.194 1.891
Source: GTJ, 1994, Tabl e 12-6, p. 370.
Table 5-4 Selection of work units by chunks and segments
State owned Non state-owned
Number of
employees
(10,000)
% Work
Units
Number of
employees
(10,000)
% Work
Units
Manufacturing 33.785 59.08 7 34.565 55.12 7
Catering, 
Wholesaling & 
Retailing
16.067 28.10 3 20.132 12.17 2
Social Services 7.333 12.82 2 8.009 32.11 4
Total 57.185 100 12 62.706 100 13
The final stage of sampling was to find out the individual units from the 
segments to be interviewed. Nachmias (1981, p. 310) suggests that if there are more 
units in the segment then the study should include a specified fraction of the units. It was 
obvious that the selected segments had more than one unit from which the fractions were 
made. Table 5-4 above shows how the 25 work units were allotted from the chunks and 
segments. The distribution of questionnaires to these 25 units between the segments was 
based on their percentages within the particular chunks. Because of the different 
numbers of employees in the two chunks, this study interviewed 12 state-owned units 
and 13 non state-owned units. Based on this sampling method the researcher solicited a 
list of work units supplied by the interviewers who carried out the pilot test on the 
questionnaires. The researcher then selected and invited 25 work units to be interviewed 
by the interviewers. (See Appendix)
and dyeing, renting, and repairing, etc.
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The interviewers, who were recruited from the Sociology Department of 
Zhongshan University in Guangzhou Shi, had strong linkages with state organisations 
and enterprises because they always conduct academic studies in the locality. With this 
‘relationship’ (guanxi) the officials and managers in work units were more willing to 
participate and felt comfortable providing assistance. In addition, with the assistance 
from some of these students in carrying out the pilot test in December 1994, the wording 
in the questionnaires was rephrased to be more colloquial to facilitate the structured 
interviews. In a nutshell, this sampling employed an especially favourable and unique 
method which was an ideal match for the special social conditions in China.
Table 5-5 Social insurance research in work units in Guangzhou Shi
Ownership Business
category
Quota Completed % by 
ownership
% by business
State
Enterprises 7 8
48
32
Business 3 2 8
Services 2 2 8
Collective
Industries 5 4
32
16
Business 2 2 8
Services 2 2 8
Private/
Individual
Business 2 2
12
8
Industries 1 1 4
Others Industries 2 2 8 8
Total 26 25 100 100
The field study was conducted from January to April in 1995 and was 
accomplished by 12 third-year undergraduate students from the Department of 
Sociology of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou Shi. These students were recruited 
and trained to assist in administrating the questionnaires and data input. On average each 
interviewer completed about 45 questionnaires in four months.137 The completed 
questionnaires were counter-checked before the data were codified and analysed by the 
SPSS statistical program. In general, the field study met the set targets, i.e. 25 work units 
of various ownership systems and types of business, and 524 employees of different 
demographic and employment status. (Tables 5-5 & 5-6) Except for the smaller scale 
work units, which employ fewer people in private (siyou) and individual (geti) economy,
137 The interviewers visited the work units and interviewed the persons-in-charge on 
social/labour insurance first. After that they went to the workshops or offices of the work unit to 
interview the em ployees. O ther than the specific situations in individual econom ic units, about 25 
em ployees were interviewed with questionnaires in m ost work units.
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this survey achieved the assigned quota in every single state-owned (guoying), collective 
(ziti), and foreign capital related (waiji) work unit. After presenting the sampling method 
the following section analyses the results.
Table 5-6 Social insurance research on employees in Guangzhou Shi
Ownership Business
category
Quota Completed % by 
ownership
% by 
business
State
Enterprises 160 155
45.2
29.6
Business 40 38 7.2
Services 40 44 8.4
Collective
Industries 100 98
34.7
18.7
Business 40 44 8.4
Services 40 40 7.6
Private/
Individual
Business 40 46
12.8
8.8
Industries 20 21 4.0
Others Industries 40 38 7.3 7.3
Total 520 524 100.0 100.0
The nature of ownership and types of business
There are four main business types of work units examined in this study: services, 
business, industries, and state organisations. Among them 60% were industrial units, 
40% were services, business and state organs. In sum, most of the work units being 
interviewed participated in secondary economic production activities whilst the others 
were tertiary or services units. This situation resembles the different production 
economic sectors in major cities like Guangzhou Shi in China.
The results show that the distribution of the sampled work units in different 
businesses and ownership natures is in accord with the pre-set quota. In this study 66.7% 
industrial units were state-owned and 33.3% were non state-owned. On the other hand 
the number of non state-owned service units outnumbered their counterpart. One 
additional point requiring mention is that, according to this study no local individual was 
the owner of a sanji unit. On the other hand, no capitalist from Hong Kong or Macau 
claimed he owned or had shares of a joint stock work unit. This verifies the argument 
made previously that local entrepreneurs are usually involved in units of a smaller scale, 
and the investors from outside China favour the joint venture format of business.
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Among the 25 work units interviewed in this study, 48% (12) were state-owned 
enterprises, business units, and party and government organisations. Within the 13 non 
state-owned work units 61.5% or 8 were collective enterprises and business units, 23.1% 
or 5 were units privately owned by local people and the Chinese from Hong Kong or 
Macau. Finally, the study also interviewed 2 units of other ownership types in non state- 
owned sector.
Table 5-7 Established years of work units by different nature of ownership (%) 
n=25
Years State-owned Collective Private
Below 10 8.3 28.6 100.0
Below 15 8.3 28.6 0.0
Below 30 25.0 28.6 0.0
Below 40 25.0 0.0 0.0
41 years or more 33.3 14.3 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
The data reveal that the weaker the relationship of the unit with the state, the 
shorter the establishment period. (p<005) It was found that one-third of the state-owned 
units were established more than 40 years, in contrast with only 7.7% in non state-owned 
sector or 14.3% for the collective units. On the other hand, all of the privately owned 
work units in this study were established in the past 10 years, whilst only 8.3% of the 
state-owned sector and 28.6% of the collective units fell into this category. (Table 5-7) 
This proves non state-owned work units were younger in comparison with most state- 
owned units that were founded in the 1950s and 1960s.
The other issue about the work unit’s business type and the establishment years is 
that most business and service units (70%) started in the past 15 years, with 50% of them 
younger than 6 years. In contrast, most industrial units had been set up for longer 
periods, with 26.7% older than 40 years. This phenomenon reflects that there were 
stronger needs in long-term social insurance such as retirement pensions in industrial 
sector, especially for the blue collars in state-owned units. Most importantly, this issue 
reveals two specific characteristics of social insurance in Guangzhou Shi. First, demands 
on social insurance from the employees in state-owned work units are higher because of 
ageing problems, ‘customised’ wide coverage and generous benefits to protect the social
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labour force under socialism. Second, in order to satisfy the growing demands on income 
maintenance in the reforms, the contributory mechanism set up for accomplishing the 
goal of socialisation of social insurance will result in a horizontal redistribution system 
between the employees in different economic ownership sectors. However, the most 
significant characteristic of this is the strong political and economic will that direct the 
whole income maintenance system.
Social insurance in work units
It was found in the previous chapters that there were six main social insurance 
programmes in China: retirement pensions, unemployment benefits, OISH benefits, 
maternity benefits, medical and sickness benefits and survivor’s benefits and funeral 
supplements. The following presentation will focus on the management of these social 
insurance programmes in Guangzhou Shi, as well as their relations with the specific 
nature of work unit and employment conditions.
Table 5-8 Provisions of social insurance programmes to employees of different 
employment natures by work units. (%) N=25
Permanent Contract
system
Temporary Others All
Unemployment 48 40 4 4 23
Retirement
pensions
76 68 20 12 44
Death 80 68 56 16 55
Maternity 84 76 32 16 52
Sickness/
medical
88 76 64 20 52
OISH 88 76 84 20 67
All 77.3 67.3 43.3 14.7
Table 5-8 above features what and how social insurance services were provided 
in work units to employees of different employment natures. Among the six social 
insurance programmes ‘OISH benefits’ was the most active service among all work 
units. The table shows that as many as 67% of the work units provided OISH benefits to 
their staff and workers. In contrast, ‘unemployment benefits’ was the least active. The 
result shows that less than one quarter (23%) of the work units interviewed provided 
unemployment benefits.
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In relation to OISH, the provisions of other social insurance services were also 
less significant. For example, 44% of the work units offered ‘retirement pensions’ and 
55% set up ‘survivor’s benefits’. Such phenomenon has two implications. First, it echoes 
the argument made before that social insurance in China is occupational welfare related. 
The high provision rate of OISH and low percentage for unemployment reflects a long­
standing situation. OISH is the income maintenance service directly or indirectly related 
to needs created at work whilst unemployment is perceived as the malfunction of the 
social or economic mechanisms. Furthermore, the relatively high supply rate of OISH 
can also be interpreted as the outcome of the state’s remarkable employer role. The 
employer-employee relationship is enhanced through the state-unit-employees fabric, 
which, to a large extent, work units execute the national social insurance policies with 
the funds obtained from the concerned ministry at the central level.
Second, in social insurance provisions work units were inclined to favour 
permanent employees. In general, 77.3% of the work units accommodated permanent 
staff and workers with all of the six social insurance benefits while on the other extreme 
only 14.7% of the work units offered the same to the employees who were categorised as 
‘the others’. From a more refined view the discrepancies between permanent and non- 
permanent employees are shown by the declining percentages between the two main 
groups of employees in every single social insurance programme.
Clearly the greatest discrepancy exists in the area of retirement pensions. In 
examining 76% of the work units providing this insurance to permanent employees, only 
20% of them offered it to temporary employees. This phenomenon also arose in respect 
of the OISH, 4% more of the work units offered OISH cover to permanent employees. 
What is more, despite mandatory social insurance regulations, fewer work units were 
offering social insurance cover to contract system workers than to permanent workers.
Table 5-9 outlines that employment nature (i.e. being a permanent or contract 
system employee) rather than the classification of ownership system of the work unit 
affects one’s eligibility to social insurance. The table shows in detail that a very high 
percentage of state-owned work units provided permanent workers with social insurance. 
Except for unemployment benefits, 100% of the state-owned work units provided all
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other types of social insurance benefits to permanent employees. On the other hand, 
contract system workers in state-owned units were also widely covered with social 
insurance when they lost income for the reasons of sickness, maternity, the decease of a 
family member, and injury or death at work. Relatively, fewer work units provided 
social insurance to non-permanent employees such as temporary workers. The table 
shows that while 58.3% of the work units in the state-owned sector provided 
unemployment benefits to permanent workers, the temporarily employed and workers of 
other employment natures were totally denied benefits in these work units. In addition, 
these groups of employees in state-owned units were virtually denied income protection 
in old age. The result shows that only 16.6% of the state-owned work units provided 
retirement pensions to this category of workers in contrast with 100% for permanent 
workers.
Table 5-9 Provisions of different social insurance programmes in work units of 
different ownership system. (%) N=25
Employment
nature
Permanent Contract
system
Temporary Others All
Sectors State Non­
state
State Non­
state
State Non­
state
State Non­
state
State Non-:
state
Sickness 100 77 100 53.9 83.3 46.2 25 15.4 77.1 52.1
Maternity 100 69.2 100 53.8 33.3 30.8 25 7.7 64.6 43.8
Retirement
pensions
100 53.8 91.6 46.2 16.6 23.1 16.7 7.7 56.3 37.5
Unemployment 58.3 38.5 50 30.8 0 7.7 0 7.7 ;;27;T:;i; 22.9
Survivors’ 100 61.5 100 38.5 58.3 53.8 25 7.7 70:8 43.8
OISH 100 76.9 100 53.8 91.6 76.9 33.3 7.7 58.3
When comparing the relationships between the work unit’s ownership nature and 
the provisions of social insurance, Table 5-9 shows that, in general, fewer non state- 
owned units provided social insurance to all types of employees than the state-owned. 
For example only 58.3% of the non state-owned units provided OISH benefits to all 
types of workers whilst 81.3% of the units in state-owned sector did. However, the 
correlation between ownership systems and the provisions of social insurance are 
different from programme to programme. The strong correlation (i.e. p<0.05) between 
these two variables can be found in sickness benefits for contract system workers, 
maternity benefit for contract system workers, retirement pensions for permanent 
workers and contract system workers, OISH for contract system workers, and death
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benefits for permanent workers and contract system workers. The only insurance benefit 
that has no significant correlation is unemployment benefit.
Another specific observation made from the above discussion is that non state- 
owned units provide less social insurance to contract system workers. This situation, 
however, is not significant for the employees in permanent, temporary, and other 
employment terms. The result reveals that survivors’ benefit was the most typical 
example which is reflected by a very high correlation (p=0.00098), i.e. fewer contract 
systems workers may receive survivors’ benefits. The provision of survivors’ benefits to 
the families of permanent workers was also related to the ownership system of the work 
units. A similar situation was found in retirement pensions.
The findings in previous paragraphs raise an important issue: work unit’s 
ownership nature does not affect the eligibility of permanent workers to social insurance. 
It is found that both state-owned and non state-owned work units widely covered this 
type of employee with social insurance. On the other hand, economic ownership of work 
unit is an insignificant factor in providing social insurance for those who were employed 
on a non-permanent basis. The data show that the opportunities for temporary workers to 
get income protection through social insurance were limited in both the state-owned and 
the non state-owned work units.
Last but not least, generally less non state-owned work units provided social 
insurance. For example, the median percentage of work units in non state-owned sector 
providing retirement pensions is 30.8% whilst for state-owned work units this is 58.3%. 
This difference is the greatest (27.5%) among all of the social insurance services offered 
in both economic ownership sectors. Conversely, the difference in the provision of 
unemployment benefit is little (5.9%).
The implications of this comparison are that: first, social insurance provisions are 
varied between work units of different economic ownership systems. The results show 
that fewer non state-owned work units than state-owned units provide social insurance to 
their employees. In addition to the consequence of more employees being neglected in 
non state-owned work unit, it also raises the issues of ineffective social insurance 
legislation and implementation. Second, there were very low percentages of work units
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in both sectors covering their staff and workers with unemployment insurance. This 
implies ‘out of work’ was still interpreted differently and not commonly recognised as a 
problem in a socialist country. Such ideology is particularly related to the political belief 
which creates the pattern and guides the development of social insurance in China. 
Third, in contrast with unemployment benefits, more work units consider OISH benefits 
as a more important social insurance item. The high provision rate of work units in both 
sectors with OISH benefits reflects the production-oriented characteristics of social 
insurance programmes in this socialist country. After having presented the different 
social insurance programmes in work units, the next section will present the 
administration and financing of the benefits.
The funding pattern of social insurance
It was stated in Chapter One that one of the research questions in this study is to explore 
the features of social insurance programmes in China from its managing and financing 
methods. The focus of this section is designated for such objective by comparing the 
funding patterns of social insurance in state-owned and non state-owned work units. This 
issue is important since it tells us to what extent and in what areas the social insurance 
services are financially supported in the different economic ownership sectors in 
Guangzhou Shi. Furthermore, such empirical study also enhances the knowledge of the 
peculiarities of social insurance in the country.
There were various financing channels for social insurance in work units in 
Guangzhou Shi. These channels can generally be grouped into first, direct funding from 
the state, and second, funding through contributions from the work unit or individual 
employee, or both. The first group refers to direct state allocation (zhongyang fenpei) in 
which the state’s money goes to the specific financial accounts managed by the work 
unit for social insurance programmes (zhuankuan zhuanxiang). The second funding 
source includes self-funding by the work unit (danwei zichou) and contributions to 
insurance companies from the work unit and its employees (danwei yu zhigong 
gongkuan). Usually work units appropriate from their own budget to finance social 
insurance services or contribute to insurance companies rather than fundraise from the 
public. On the other hand, employees’ contributions in the dual-party system do not 
affect their benefit from other specifically designed social insurance socialisation
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programmes.
In brief, the above two are not the exclusive funding methods but were widely 
used in the sample work units. It is therefore apparent that work units might have more 
than one financial source to support the social insurance programmes. In Table 5-10 
below the single- and multiple-sources for social insurance programmes used by work 
units in Guangzhou Shi are listed. The table features show that, in contrast with 
survivors’ benefits and sickness and medical benefits, more work units sought funding 
from various sources for retirement pensions and OISH. However, because of the special 
characteristic of the planned economy, state-allocated funds go only to state-owned work 
units. In other words, economic ownership of work unit conditions the pattern of funding 
for social insurance and that work unit cannot determine a preferred way.
Table 5-10 Funding channels for social insurance services in work units (%) 
N=25
Sickness OISH Retirement Maternity Unemployment Death
Single­
source
92 80 71.4 87.5 85.7 95.5
Multiple-
sources
8 20 28.6 12.5 14.3 4.5
The results demonstrate that the most usual way to finance social insurance 
programmes was through self-financing, i.e. the work unit exercised its discretion in 
budgeting for social insurance expenses. This was quite common for the work units that 
have only limited funding sources, e.g. the state-owned units that are heavily backed by 
the state. It is learned from the study that 66.7% of the work units used their own 
resources to finance social insurance services whilst another 23.7% of the work units 
supported the social insurance by contributing to insurance agencies together with their 
employees. Relatively, 6.4% and 3.2% of the interviewed work units sought funding 
from the state or other unexplained methods. However, the later three funding ways 
played an unimportant role in financing social insurance programmes. In short, ‘self­
generated funds’ was the primary source of funding for social insurance benefits, whilst 
‘multiple party contribution to an insurance company’ was the secondary way, and the 
‘allocation from the state’ was the third listed solution. However, for state-owned work 
units the first and third approaches might have no difference since their operation funds
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are determined by state.
In the reform era, both of the first and third funding sources may not be effective 
for work units in both sectors. The non state-owned units, for example, are unwilling to 
appropriate for social insurance funding from their profits. In contrast, faced with the 
competitive and open market economy and the minimised state’s role in social insurance 
provisions, the financial resources allocated to state-owned work units from the centre 
will be very strictly controlled. Consequently all work units will change to contributing 
to insurance agencies with their staff and workers in the socialisation of social insurance 
services. Nevertheless, the funding pattern of social insurance is rather peculiar and will 
therefore be elaborated on below.
Table 5-11 below shows that state-owned work units got more resources for 
social insurance than their counterparts. For example, among state-owned units up to 
25% had access to state funding of maternity benefits, 16.7% were allocated with state 
funds for other insurance programs like sickness and medical, retirement pensions, 
death, and OISH, respectively. This contrasts starkly with the non state-owned work 
units, none of them received any resources from the state.
Table 5-11 Sources of funding for social insurance programmes in work units of 
different ownership sectors (%) n=25
Methods of 
funding
State
allocation
Financed by 
work unit 
only
Multiple
party
contribution
Contribution 
by employee 
only
Others
Ownership
Sectors
State Non­
state
State Non­
state
State Non­
state
State Non­
state
State Non­
state
Sickness 16.7 0 91.7 84.6 16.7 7.7 8.3 0 0 7.7
Maternity 25 0 91.7 76.9 16.7 7.7 0 0 0 0
Retirement
pensions
16.7 0 66.7 38.5 58.3 46.2 0 0 0 0
Unemployment 8.3 0 41.7 30.8 33.3 7.7 0 7.7 0 0
Death 16.7 0 91.7 69.2 16.7 7.7 0 0 0 0
OISH 16.7 0 91.7 61.5 33.3 46.2 0 0 0 0
Table 5-11 features the relationship between work unit ownership background 
and funding sources for social insurance. Generally, state-owned work units had greater 
accesses to resources and were willing to appropriate their resources to finance social 
insurance. This inclination was proved by a relatively high percentage of the state-owned
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units that provide unemployment benefits more than the non state-owned units. It was 
found that 41.7% of the state-owned units indicated self-funding for unemployment 
benefits in contrast with 30.8% in the non state-owned sector. In fact, the willingness of 
the state-owned units is generated from the close state-enterprise relationships. These 
work units used state funding but not the unit’s resources in supporting social insurance 
programmes. In this sense, for state-owned units state allocations and self-financing 
mean the same thing. It is thus clear at this point that the reformed socialist economic 
system creates two main types of production units and an unequal financing structure. 
Some of these work units have advantages in using public money to finance social 
insurance whilst the others have to seek for support on their own. The accessibility to 
public money for social insurance in state-owned units makes the services akin to 
occupational welfare. It also creates an unequal income maintenance system for work 
units and employees.
Self-funded social insurance has the advantage of efficiency. Benefit payments 
within the control of the units needed shorter time because of the direct management and 
accessible records. However, the dark side of this approach might be that the service is 
unstable because the employer or manager of the unit controls both production and the 
provisions and management of social insurance services. In the 1990s in Guangzhou Shi 
there were some cases where state-owned units could not give retirement pensions to the 
retired because of deficits in the units. This phenomenon relates to the uniqueness of 
centralised economic planning and an underdeveloped economy. In the concluding 
chapter this particular issue will be elaborated on.
Within the non state-owned sector, it is found that more work units (46.2%) 
contributed to insurance companies for retirement pensions and OISH. On the other 
hand, a relatively low percentage of these units would prefer to pay from their own 
accounts the retirement pensions (38.5%) and unemployment benefits (30.5%). In 
general, contributing to insurance companies for funding social insurance was not so 
popular among non state-owned units, although the reality is that these cannot get any 
allocation from the state.
The preference to self-funding for certain social insurance programmes also 
reflects the opportunistic and passive attitude of non state-owned units. Their
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opportunistic view was demonstrated by the higher percentages of these units in self- 
financing the sporadic needs on social insurance such as sickness, maternity, death and 
occupational benefits. On the other hand, the higher percentage of the non state-owned 
work units in contributing to insurance companies for the long-term insurance benefits 
such as retirement benefits can be explained as the effects of mandatory insurance 
policies and their limited sources to support these insurance programmes.
In concluding the discussion on the funding pattern of social insurance in 
Guangzhou Shi, China, it is found that because the state-enterprises relationship was still 
tangled, the state’s funding for social insurance was lopsided to these units. 
Discriminative funding practices are one of the particularities of social insurance in 
China. This discrimination, however, varies as the state-enterprise relationship changes. 
Individual household units, for example, get nothing from state in comparison with 
large-scale enterprises owned by a ministry, or even the collective units owned by local 
government.
The results show that even though self-financing was still the most popular way 
to support the insurance services, both the state- and the non state-owned units had just 
started to approach insurance companies to provide social insurance services. The more 
resourceful state-owned units, under this situation, get an additional channel to finance 
the social insurance services. In a nutshell, the financing pattern of social insurance in 
China with the case of Guangzhou Shi is unique in its multifarious types. Nevertheless, 
the provisions of funding are different and uneven between state-owned and non state- 
owned work units. The inequality in funding may consequently cause ineffective 
services, put the related employees into unfavourable living conditions, and arouses 
social dissatisfaction.
The management and provisions of social insurance benefit
One of the features of social insurance reforms in China after mid 1980s is the 
diversification of the monotonous work unit-supported benefit paying methods. 
Although some work units still continue to shoulder the responsibilities of social 
insurance management designated in the past, other work units had started to link up 
with insurance companies or state departments for joining the contributory social
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insurance system. These insurance companies are usually state-owned (e.g. the People’s 
Insurance Company of China) and the administrative departments (e.g. Social Insurance 
Services Bureau and the Bureau of Labour) are directly controlled by the central 
government.
In comparing the attitude of the holistic management approach on social 
insurance, with the stance that contributing to insurance companies is voluntary, this is 
rather innovative for this socialist developing country. However, this is the objective of 
socialisation emphasised by the Chinese government. But since the insurance market in 
China is still under very strict control the commercial insurance market is 
insignificant.138 In addition, the services of these state-owned units are limited and 
insensitive to the new social needs so that they cannot respond to the income 
maintenance problems in the 1990s.
Table 5-12 Provisions of social insurance in work units of different economic 
ownership (%)
Formats State-
owned
(n=12)
Non state-
owned
(n=13)
i. Sickness and medical benefits
Free medical consultation and medicine. 16.7 15.4
To reimburse a certain part of the expenses from the work unit. 83.3 69.2
Fixed amount of benefits for a certain period (month/year), the 
concerned employee pays all the rest.
16.7 0.0
Fixed amount of benefits for a certain period (month/year), the 
concerned employee pays part of the rest.
25.0 23.1
The unit contributes to insurance companies that are responsible 
for the expenses.
16.7 7.7
Others. 0.0 15.4
ii. Retirement pensions
The unit and employees contribute to insurance companies from 
which retired employees will get their retirement pensions.
66.7 61.5
Only the unit contributes to insurance companies from which 
the retired employees can get their retirement pensions.
8.3 15.4
The unit gives the retired employees regularly (e.g. monthly) 
the retirement pensions.
83.3 23.1
138 The foreign-funded insurance com panies have started the business on an “experimental 
basis” since 1992. “At present, only Shanghai and Guangzhou are involved in the trial.” (Beijing 
Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, 8-14January 1996) The Beijing Review also s ta te s  that “som e 77 
foreign-funded insurance com panies had established 119 representative offices in China by 
O ctober 1995.”
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The unit gives a lump sum retirement pensions to the retired 
employees.
0.0 0.0
The unit regularly (e.g. monthly) pays the current employees 
the retirement pensions only.
8.3 0.0
Others. 0.0 0.0
iii. OISH
The unit and employees contribute to insurance companies from 
which the qualified employees can get their OISH benefits.
33.3 38.5
Only the unit contributes to insurance companies from which 
the qualified employees can get their OISH benefits.
33.3 7.7
The unit gives a lump sum of OISH benefits to the qualified 
employees.
25.0 15.4
The unit pays the qualified employees the OISH benefits on 
multiple occasions (e.g. monthly).
25.0 38.5
The unit regularly (e.g. monthly) pays the current employees 
the OISH benefits that the employees cannot get the benefits 
when they have such needs.
25.0 0.0
Others. 8.3 7.7
iv. Maternity
Full-paid (wages only) maternity leave. 25.0 0.0
Child allowances.* 91.7 76.9
Special allowance related to maternity issues. 16.7 7.7
The unit regularly (e.g. monthly) pays the current women 
employees the maternity benefits that they cannot get the when 
they have such needs.
0.0 0.0
Others 0.0 0.0
v. Unemployment benefits
The unit and employees contribute to insurance companies from 
which qualified employees will get their unemployment 
benefits.
41.7 15.4
Only the unit contributes to insurance companies from which 
qualified employees will get their unemployment benefits.
16.7 7.7
The unit gives the unemployed employees regular (e.g. 
monthly) unemployment payments.
16.7 0.0
The unit gives lump sum unemployment benefits to the 
unemployed employees.
8.3 15.4
The unit regularly (e.g. monthly) pays the employees 
unemployment benefits that they cannot get when they have 
such needs.
8.3 7.7
Others. 0.0 7.7
vi. Death benefits/funeral supplements
The unit and employees contribute to insurance companies from 
which the family dependants of the qualified employees will get 
death benefits/funeral supplements.
16.7 7.7
Only the unit contributes to insurance companies from which 
the family dependants of qualified employees will get the death 
benefits/funeral supplements.
8.3 7.7
The unit gives the family dependants of qualified employees 25.0 7.7
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regularly (e.g. monthly) the death benefits/funeral supplements.
The unit gives lump sum death benefits/funeral supplements to 
the family dependants of the qualified employees.
75.0 61.5
The unit regularly (e.g. monthly) pays the employees the death 
benefits that their family dependants cannot get when they have 
such needs.
0.0 0.0
Others. 50.0 23.1
*Child allowance is also called ‘Health Care Allowance for Single Child’ which is given 
to the single child of married women employees as though being rewarded as “those 
who respond to the State’s call on birth control.” (Su 1994, p. 387). According to Su, the 
couples can get 5 yuan per month when they produce the ‘Single Child Certificate’.
Table 5-12 above listed the different provision formats of the six social insurance 
programmes in Guangzhou Shi. It shows that for some specific provision formats there 
is a consistent pattern. For examples 83.3% of the state-owned and 69.2% of the non 
state-owned units provided sickness and medical benefits by reimbursing a certain part 
of the expenses from work units. Furthermore, whilst 66.7% of the state-owned units 
provided for retirement pensions by contributing to insurance companies, there were 
61.5% units in the non state-owned units which also did so.
The social insurance provision formats as outlined in the case of Guangzhou Shi 
offer an insight that the involvement of third parties such as insurance companies was 
rather low. Except for retirement pensions, all of the other five social insurance 
programmes were mainly managed and financed by work units, no matter whether the 
benefits were paid in advance or only when the immediate needs were manifest. Such 
phenomenon can be found in work units of both of the ownership sectors and thus a 
specific feature is found: for work units in both of the ownership sectors, social 
insurance plans in China are mainly managed within work units and supported by their 
own resources.
Another characteristics of social insurance provisions in China learned from this 
study is that state-owned work units have more diversified provision formats than non 
state-owned units. Table 5-12 shows that state-owned units provided a wider spectrum of 
services. The implication of this particular finding is that employees in work units of 
both economic ownership systems were offered the services with different opportunities 
to get income protection through social insurance. Employees in state-owned work units
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were offered relatively more benefit formats. This relates to the equality issue in the 
provisions of social issuance.
All in all, three significant features can be found from the study on the provision 
formats of social insurance in Guangzhou Shi. First, social insurance provision formats 
are affected by the work unit’s ownership background. This issue is particular to social 
insurance in China since work units play significant roles in all aspects of the people’s 
living. Furthermore, the provision pattern of social insurance is related to other issues 
like coverage and effectiveness of the services, the subsequent parts of this chapter will 
probe these matters to see uniqueness of social insurance in the Guangzhou Shi.
Second, the social insurance provision pattern is affected very much by funding 
sources. Since insurance companies are not active in social insurance services and the 
insurance business is state-controlled which deals with mainly government-related 
organisations only a limited number of work units contribute to insurance organisations 
for just a few social insurance programmes. In other words, irrespective of the setting up 
of the government controlled social insurance services bureaux, social insurance services 
are still not ‘socialised’ in China.
Finally, the social insurance provision formats in state-owned work units are 
more diversified because of the specific state-enterprise relationships. In contrast, work 
units and their employees in non state-owned sector are put in an adverse situation 
because their resources for social insurance are less flexible. In brief, insignificant and 
insufficient services of the insurance companies and selective state funding for work 
units of different ownership background are the factors and the characteristics of social 
insurance in China.
Table 5-12 shows the different funding methods in social insurance in China. The 
paragraphs below demonstrate how the different social insurance services were provided 
in work units. The findings show that, for sickness and medical insurance about 15% of 
the work units in both sectors provided free medical consultation and medicine to their 
employees, whilst around 70-84% chose to reimburse the staff and workers a certain part 
of the expenses from their own budgets. Work units in the non state-owned sector, ‘fix 
the amount of the expenses for employees within a definite period’ which was not as
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popular as in the state-owned sector. 16.7% of the state-owned work units used this 
method and another 25% were more generous in paying part of the employee’s share. 
Furthermore, more state-owned units (16.7%) contributed to insurance agencies than 
those units in non-state sector (7.7%). However, some of the non state-owned units 
(15.4%) found other alternatives to provide the service.
The findings also show that the most popular way of offering medical and 
sickness insurance was for the unit to reimburse part of the employee’s medical 
expenses. 76% of all work units used this approach to pay for their employees’ medical 
expenses. However, most of these work units (60%) offered the service with only one 
single method whilst 32% employed two and another 8% had up to three ways. In sum, 
regardless of the kind of ownership of the work unit, paying sickness and medical 
benefits directly by the work units is the most commonly used method of delivery.
Referring to retirement pensions, 64% of the work units provided the benefits in 
connection with insurance companies while 52% chose the way of giving out the 
benefits regularly to the retirees directly from their budgets. Contributing to social 
insurance on work unit’s own was not typical (12%). Only 4% of the work units chose to 
vary the benefits according to the employee’s age. From the study it is also learned that 
48% of the interviewed work units offered this social insurance service in one single 
way, 28% employed two different approaches and 8% effected it with more than 3 
different methods. Interestingly, 16% of the work units had not provided retirement 
benefits and these were all non state-owned units. Last but not least, none of the work 
units offered the retirement pensions in a lump sum payment.
In sum, more units would prefer to involve insurance companies to provide long 
term insurance services such as retirement pensions. However, there were still a higher 
percentage of the units, especially those in the state-owned sector, which paid retirement 
pensions directly by themselves. This particular format of providing retirement pensions 
is highly correlated with ownership system. (p<005) This phenomenon indicates that, in 
relation to non state-owned units, state-owned work units are more flexible and diverse 
in the provision of some kinds of social insurance.
When comparing the provision methods for OISH in work units, 68% applied
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only one method whilst another 24% used two. Only 4% of the work units employed 
three different formats to provide the benefits and another 4% did not have any 
experience in offering this type of insurance service. The provision patterns of OISH 
benefits seem dissimilar to the two insurance programmes previously discussed - for 
OISH there were no dominant provision types. 36% of all the work units contributed 
jointly with the employees for the OISH and another 32% paid the benefits in multiple 
formats from their budgets. Some other work units (20%) provided the benefits in a 
lump sum whilst another 20% contributed to insurance companies on their own. OISH 
benefit payment in advance to employees at their posts was not common. Only 12% of 
the work units did so and these were all state-owned work units. This reflects the fact 
that social insurance benefits are treated the same as job-related occupational welfare in 
state-owned units.
For non state-owned work units, more units (38.5%) chose to pay the qualified 
employees regularly by themselves and another 38.5% associated with insurance 
companies. There was no work unit of this economic ownership sector which paid the 
OISH to employees in advance as the state-owned units did. This provision format is 
very dependent on the ownership system of the unit (p<005). The implication is that the 
funding for social insurance in non state-owned units comes from either their own 
budgets or contributions from employee as stipulated in the regulations. These work 
units scrutinise the need of applicants in a more careful manner. This also indicates that 
social policy in China needs clearer guidelines for units to follow in the process of 
socialisation.
In referring to the provisions of maternity benefits the study yields with the 
results that 84% of the units offered mandatory child benefits to the applicants who 
called on the state’s birth control policy. On the other hand only 12% of the work units 
offered paid maternity leave and these were all state-owned. There were also 12% of the 
work units providing maternity related allowances to qualified employees whilst none of 
the units paid the insurance benefits in advance as part of the employees’ incomes. 
Generally speaking, 80% of the work units employed only one way of providing the 
benefit, 8% provided it in two different ways and 4% in three ways. Also exposed is 8% 
of the work units had never offered these insurance benefits. And they were all non 
state-owned.
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The study reveals an important issue that more state-owned units observed the 
state’s policies than non-state-owned units. (p< 005) This is proved by the higher 
percentages (25%) of state-owned units allowing their women employees to take paid 
maternity leave. In the study no non state-owned work unit made such an offer. This 
state of affairs suggests two implications. First, state-owned units were more resourceful 
so that they could support this format of provision. Second, non state-owned units were 
less concerned with the physical and financial situations of the employees and showed 
less respect for social insurance regulations. The first implication is already clear from 
previous discussions but the latter requires more examination.
The penultimate social insurance programme is unemployment benefit. The work 
units used six different approaches in providing benefits. Among them most of the 
interviewed work units (28%) chose to contribute together with their employees to 
insurance companies. On the other hand, 12% of the work units contributed on their own 
and another 12% offered lump sum benefits to the unemployed. Furthermore, 8% of the 
units opted for regular payments by work units and another 8% paid in advance to the 
employees’ incomes to minimise the administrative work.
On the whole, 12 (48%) work units that had never paid unemployment benefits 
to their employees. Among them the ratio between state-owned and non state-owned 
work units was half-and-half. Apart from this, 40% of the work units provided the 
benefit by one single arrangement, 8% gave the benefits via two different channels and 
4% offered benefit in a multiple manner. The lesson learned from this insurance 
programme is that state-owned units have more varieties in providing unemployment 
benefits. In comparison with non state-owned work units, state-owned work units 
inclined to provide the service through insurance companies.
The final social insurance programme on the agenda is survivors’ benefits and 
funeral supplements. The study shows that lump sum payment to the survivors was the 
predominate mode (68%). The second favoured format (35%) varied from unit to unit, 
special arrangements between the survivors and the work units were not unusual. In 
addition, one can hardly find a work unit which paid this benefit in advance to their 
employees. It should be noted that circumstances under which an advance payment for
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this benefit would seem weird in any country. Likewise, there were fewer work units 
(12%) contributing to insurance companies on their own or together with their 
employees (8%). Finally some work units (16%) expressed the wish to be able to give 
lump sum benefits to the survivors. Among these work units 75% were state-owned.
The provision format of survivor benefits and funeral supplements was found to 
be rather diversified. Fewer work units (44%) offered this benefit in one major format. 
Conversely, 44% of the work units accommodated the needs with more than two 
designs. It is also interesting to find that 12% of the work units had never provided this 
benefit and all of these were non state-owned. This reflects the fact that younger 
employees are more concentrated in non state-owned units.
In conclusion, some features can be drawn from the case of Guangzhou Shi. 
First, for the majority of non state-owned work units the methods of providing social 
insurance are limited. Although choices may vary from item to item, in general state- 
owned work units have more methods than their counterparts. This may correlate with 
other factors such as the financial resources, the values and good will of the employers 
and employees, etc. It is learned that the availability of the services is a significant factor 
affecting the satisfaction of social insurance. Therefore the correlation between the 
sources of funding and the formats of provision should be evaluated.
Another significant feature revealed from the previous discussion is that the role 
of ‘the third party’ such as insurance company had not been recognised. Insurance 
companies are involved only in the long-term nature of insurance programmes. For 
example with retirement pensions vital numbers of work units contributed with their 
employees to insurance companies for retirement pensions. Furthermore, the active 
involvement of insurance companies in some of the insurance programmes also reflected 
the legislation effects on the provisions of social insurance. The government of 
Guangzhou Shi had started to enforce the mandatory retirement pensions schemes, OISH 
programmes and unemployment insurance. It seems that more work units insured against 
these risks for the employees under the Labour Law (Laodong Fa) 1994 that went into 
effect from early 1995.139
139 The Labour Law of the People’s  Republic of China w as prom ulgated in July 1994 and has 
been effective from 1 January  1995. In Article 73, C hapter 9 on Social Insurance and W elfare it
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Finally, the study results show that social practices and traditions act upon the 
provisions of social insurance. For example, fewer work units provided unemployment 
benefits by contributing to the insurance agency. This displays the lower acceptance of 
this need of the concerned individual and the society in a socialist system. On the other 
hand, a large number of work units chose to offer survivors’ benefits and fimeral 
supplements in a lump sum only as the needs arose. There are not too many work units 
arranging this through insurance companies or pay in advance to the employees at their 
posts. An implication is therefore developed from here that, apart from the funding issue, 
social traditions and values play an active role in the development of social insurance in 
the country.
The adjustment of benefit levels and the provisions of other assistance
In this study the work units were asked whether they had ever adjusted the insurance 
benefit levels. The data shows 20 out of 25 units; i.e. 80% did so. Among these work 
units 8 were non state-owned and 12 were state-owned. The remaining 5, which had 
never adjusted the benefit, were all non state-owned. The correlation between ownership 
system and the adjustment of benefit levels is high (p<005). In other words, state-owned 
units were more apt to adjust the benefits than non state-owned units.
The reasons to adjust the benefits were various and the work unit might revise 
them for more than one reason. Table 5-13 below shows that among the four mentioned 
reasons, the units, especially the state-owned, usually observe the regulations stipulated 
in state or regional social insurance policies. It implies that the socialist economic and 
political system creates a specific environment in which not only are the work units 
differentiated by their ownership backgrounds but also makes them respond dissimilarly 
to the regulations and policies on social insurance. 52.6% of the state-owned units 
always observed the policies and regulations to adjust their social insurance benefit as 
compared with 40% in the non state-owned sector.
sta tes that “workers are eligible to enjoy social insurance under any of the  following conditions: 
retirement, sickness or injury, occupational related sickness, d isease  or handicapped, 
unemployment, maternity.” (Tang, 1994, p. 7)
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Table 5-13 Reasons of increasing social insurance benefits in work units of 
different ownership sectors (%)
Ownership
natures
Reasons for increasing benefits
Inflation More resources 
available
National or 
regional policies
Feed back 
from recipients
State-owned (n=12) 21.1 21.1 52.6 5.2
Non state-owned 
(n=13)
20 30 40 10
The reasons to adjust social insurance benefit levels included consideration of 
inflation, the availability of more resources in the work unit, and feed back from benefit 
recipients. It is shown in Table 5-13 that, for both sectors, few work units responded to 
the views of the benefit recipients but more work units would like to adjust the benefits 
when they have more resources. On the other hand, fewer units in the non state-owned 
sector considered inflation as a reason to adjust the benefits. To a certain extent, this 
reflects the strong socialist belief in the effective economic management under the 
centralised government. However, from another perspective, this ideology demonstrates 
the low sensitivity of the employers in this socialist developing society to the radical 
changes in the national economy and the impacts on the people’s living.
In brief, the adjustment of social insurance benefits is highly correlated with the 
ownership nature of the unit. The results show that more state-owned units would like to 
adjust social insurance benefits than the non state-owned. State-owned work units seems 
to be much more compliant to the policies when contrasted with non state-owned units. 
This phenomenon underscores the strong state-enterprise relationship created within the 
socialist centralised economic system and which is active in the provision of social 
insurance.
On the other hand, benefit recipients’ responses were relatively less concerned. 
This situation is especially significant among non state-owned units. Except where 
stipulated in policy documents, in most cases the benefit levels were not adjusted even 
though the needs for income maintenance were acute because of inflation. Conversely, 
the availability of resources in work units was determinant, i.e. the provision of social 
insurance depends very much on how much resources the work units can and wish to 
appropriate. This issue is particularly related to the socialist developing economy of
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China. As exhibited by the case of China, social resources are unequally distributed after 
the economic ownership system is diversified. It is apparent that non state-owned work 
units have diminished access to social and economic resources because they have a 
weaker relationship with the state and party.
In general, social insurance in this country was provided at the minimal benefit 
levels set in the regulations. Higher level benefits arise only as a blessing from the work 
unit, rather than addressing the real needs stemming from the changing economic system 
or expressed by the service recipients. This fact brings out the need to understand the 
provisions and formats of the additional assistance offered by work units.
This study also explored the availability of an additional safety net to safeguard 
the people from sudden loss of incomes. It shows that state-owned units were more 
prepared, considerate and generous than non state-owned units in providing 
supplementary benefits to employees who claimed social insurance benefits were 
insufficient for their living. All the 12 state-owned work units in this study replied that 
they provided supplementary benefits when such needs arose. On the non state-owned 
side, 9 out of 13 work units made such provisions and another 4 did not provide. In 
short, the provision of supplementary benefit to meet the additional financial needs of 
employees is related to the ownership nature of the unit. In other words, more state- 
owned units provide extra financial assistance to the labour force when their social 
insurance benefits are not enough. (p<005) The provisions of supplementary benefits, 
nevertheless, were mostly conditional and reviewed case by case, with only a very 
limited number of the units making the offer unconditionally.
Furthermore, it is also necessary to report that the ratio of work units providing 
emergency assistance to those who had not joined any social insurance schemes was 
higher in the non state-owned sector. 9 out of 13 (69.2%) of the non state-owned units 
compared with 7 in 12 (58.3%) in the state-owned sector offered such kind of emergency 
assistance. The higher rate among non state-owned work units offering such assistance 
shows that the concept of social insurance is not well developed in the country. It 
especially demonstrates that in China the newly emerging capitalists only prefer ad hoc 
emergency relief to contributory long-term social insurance schemes for income 
protection.
180
The formats of assistance offered to employees with emergency needs included 
lump sum cash supplements, loans with or without interest, advance salaries, referral 
services and others. These devices can also be grouped into cash supplements, loans 
(including advance salaries), and referral services. In general, cash supplements are the 
most generous which need not be repaid. However, it is found that the 8 out of 14 units 
offering this type of assistance were state-owned units whilst most of the non-state 
owned units offered the benefits but with conditions attached. Non state-owned units 
usually allowed these employees in need advances on their salaries instead of giving 
loans. On the other hand, none of the non state-owned units referred these employees to 
other service agencies such as trade unions, Civil Affairs Bureaux and street committees 
whilst 2 among the 12 state-owned units did so.
In summarising the discussions it has to be pointed out that state-owned units 
were more willing to offer assistance to those in need, no matter whether the individual 
was covered by social insurance or not. Nevertheless, this assistance was short term in 
nature. In addition, for non state-owned units the assistance was mainly conditional, such 
as advance salaries or loans. The role of work units in this sense was as a creditor rather 
than a service provider for those in need. Furthermore, non state-owned units were less 
supportive of contributory social insurance services and weak in networking with outside 
organisations that can offer help to the employees.
In responding to another question on the conditions to give non-contributory 
assistance to employees with contingent financial needs, there were relatively more 
(69.2%) non state-owned units setting hurdles than the state-owned units (41.7%). In all 
14 units the criteria of getting non-contributory living supplements included: work 
performance, assessment made by the work units, the stipulated conditions set in the 
policies, political performance, employment conditions, rank or post, recommendations 
made by other companies such as trade unions.
Interestingly, the data show that state-owned units prefer the recommendations 
from other organisations to political performance when setting up the criteria. The 
involvement of external organisations can be found only in the state-owned sector. This 
outstanding approach reflects the strong correlation between the ownership nature of the
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unit and the conditions to get the help. (p< 005) For non state-owned units, there is quite 
a contrast in that work performance was put as the paramount important factor. 6 out of 
9 non state-owned units considered that this was the condition for the employees to get 
non-contributory living supplements. For state-owned units on this particular issue the 
ratio was only 1 in 5. In short, the stipulation of non-contributory living supplements in 
non state-owned units was determined by one’s productivity. The more productive the 
labour the higher the chances of getting the living supplements without making extra 
contributions. This implies first, non-contributory living supplements in non state-owned 
units are analogous with occupational benefit. Second, as developed from the former 
point, older and weaker labour forces are usually discriminated against regarding income 
protections if they have never joined and contributed to social insurance schemes.
Thus the scenario is that, for state-owned units, both contributory social 
insurance programs and emergency relief for employees are hardly distinguishable in 
that both benefits come from the state when the need is there. The assessment on the 
needs and provisions of income maintenance services in state-owned units, however, are 
also linked with other state-related organisations although they are not specifically 
responsible for social insurance services. On the other hand, non state-owned work units 
would only provide statutory social insurance services because they are not allocated 
with the resources from the state. These work units, on the other hand, have weaker ties 
with state organisations and place great weight on the employee’s productivity when 
making the assessment. These contrasts between work units of different ownership 
background highlight the special characteristics of social insurance in Guangzhou Shi.
Summary and Conclusions
It was discussed in Chapter One that one of the ways to find out the features of social 
insurance services in China is to examine how the services are managed and the benefits 
provided. In order to achieve such a purpose, a field study with questionnaires 
administered by trained interviewers was carried out in Guangzhou Shi, Guangdong 
Province. The study covered various aspects related to social insurance services but the 
discussions of this chapter focuses on the financing and benefit provision patterns of 
social insurance, as well as the supplementary benefits offered in the work units.
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The beginning of this chapter highlighted the nature of ownership of work units 
as a specific and main issue in the study of the features of social insurance in China. The 
dual ownership system, as discovered in this chapter, causes problems to the funding and 
provisions of social insurance services. In addition, it also affects the availability of 
supplementary benefits for employees. Such phenomena are clearly proved throughout 
the chapter by the high correlation rates between the independent variable, i.e. the work 
unit’s ownership background, and dependent variables such as funding sources, benefit 
provision methods and the formats of supplementary benefits.
The message of the discussions of this chapter is that the nature of economic 
ownership is an important issue in exploring the features of social insurance services in 
China. Economic ownership of the work unit is the basic criteria that determines how 
and to what extent the production force can benefit from social insurance. The economic 
ownership issue relates particularly with the socialist ideology and political system that 
governs the establishment and management of social insurance. Before the inception of 
the ‘Four Modernisations’ in the late 1970s the ownership issue was not so prominent 
because public ownership was the main economic mode of production, the country’s 
economy was nationalised and centralised. The emerging of the needs for social 
insurance, however, is a product of diversifying the economic system.
The growth of the non state-owned sector since the early 1980s creates some 
forces pushing for reforms in social insurance. On the one hand these forces challenge 
the obsolete labour insurance which was merely occupational welfare designed for 
alleviating the living problems of the employees within work units. On the other hand 
the reforms in social insurance policies were insensitive to the needs of the rapidly rising 
number of non state-owned work units and their employees. Social insurance services in 
China are reformed for sustaining the socialist economic system and then realising the 
political ideals. It is a new bottle with the old wine. The data collected from the field 
research shows the state-owned sector has advantages over its counterpart in funding 
resources and supporting network. In comparing the work units in state-owned sector 
with non-state owned work units it is also demonstrated that supports from the state are 
weaker for providing social insurance services. Furthermore, non state-owned work units 
do not observe the stipulations of social insurance policies in the country. Consequently, 
non state-owned work units provide only minimal insurance benefits to eligible
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employees or try to avoid fulfilling their responsibilities by whatever means possible.
The study on social insurance in Guangzhou Shi reveals its limited coverage and 
unstable state support. Its peculiarity, in addition, highlights the strong political will and 
economic growth strategies. These are the significant features of the social insurance 
services in Guangzhou Shi. Socialist ideology dominates the provision pattern whilst the 
economic growth development approach creates two consequences. First, the national 
economy is transformed and second, the state faces great limitations on regulating and 
supporting a ‘socialised’ social insurance system. The uniqueness of social insurance 
in China, as depicted in this chapter, is the overtly politically directed development and 
provision of benefits approaches. The case study on Guangzhou Shi shows that the 
features of social insurance in China are different from what pass as the conventional 
pattern found in capitalist developed countries
The study of the features of social insurance in China is an underdeveloped area 
of social policy. However, such study should have a wider perspective far beyond the 
analyses on the financial resources and provision patterns. The following chapters will 
explore this particular topic by examining the extent and reasons for discrepancies in the 
coverage of social insurance services in Guangzhou Shi.
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Chapter Six
Coverage of social insurance in China: The case of Guangzhou Shi 
Introduction
In the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) in November 1993, the CPC said that the roles of social security 
reforms were for “deepening the reforms”. The aims of the reforms, as stated in the 
congress, were to stabilise the society and develop a socialist market economy. In 
practice, the state’s role as sole provider and manager of social security becomes the 
regulator to overseeing the running and provisions of the services. In other words, whilst 
the state-enterprise relationships is being dissolved, the occupational welfare-nature 
social insurance will be ‘socialised’ by shifting the responsibility to be shared by 
employees and employers.
It has been found in previous chapters that, as other social institutions in the 
country, the social insurance system in China is conditioned by the socialist political and 
economic systems. It was shown that, because of the social environment, social 
insurance is not primarily aimed at satisfying the people’s contingent income needs. The 
features of social insurance in China with the case of Guangzhou Shi is made clear 
further by the re-emergence of private ownership and a non-permanent labour force in its 
modernisation process. The last chapter showed that the social insurance programmes in 
China have many unique features.
As a continuation of last chapter, this chapter reports and analyses the specific 
findings arising from the structured interviews in Guangzhou Shi in responding to the 
research question set in Chapter One on the coverage issues of social insurance services. 
In order to elicit the features of social insurance in China this chapter focuses on the 
criteria set by work units on one’s eligibility to social insurance like individual needs, 
personal commitment, personal status, etc. In addition, it is also necessary to make 
reference to the characteristics of the outstanding groups of employees in the existing 
social insurance system. In concluding the chapter it is found that as a social institution 
social insurance in China is directed by a particular pattern of values and accordingly its 
coverage is partial.
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Employment, wages and living supplements in work units
Before discussing the conditions of being covered by social insurance in China, a glance 
at the working conditions of employees in work units of different natures is necessary. 
The first of the three parts in this section will elaborate the different employment types 
in work units. The second part is about the formats of paying wages. Finally, it will 
demonstrate how living supplements are offered in work units.
Table 6-1 Ratio of employees of all employment natures in work units (Number 
of state-owned units=12, number of non state-owned units=13)
Employment
Natures
Ownership
Sectors
1-40% 41-80% 81% or 
over
Not
offered
Permanent State 4 4 3 1
Non state 3 3 4 3
Contract
System
State 7 1 1 3
Non state 3 1 3 6
Temporary State 8 3 1 0
Non state 6 2 2 3
Others State 2 0 0 10
Non state 2 0 0 11
There are three main employment types in China in the early 1990s: permanent, 
contract system, and temporary.140 The results show that the sampled work units tended 
to employ people with longer terms. There were 41-80% of the employees in 7 or 28% 
of the 25 work units working on permanent terms, another 7 work units offered 81% or 
more of their employees the same terms. On the other hand, 14 out of the total 25 work 
units offered 1-40% of their jobs on temporary employment conditions, whilst there was 
only a small proportion of the units (12% in total) filling the posts with a large ratio (i.e. 
81% or over) of temporary employees. For contract system employees, it is found that 
more work units (40%) offered lower percentages (i.e. 1-40%) of the posts to this type of 
employees and another 9 (36%) did not make such offers at all. In addition, there were 
only 6 or 24% of all of the work units employed contract system workers to fill their 41- 
80% posts. (See Table 6-1)
140 In this study, workers who are contracted to work on projects in work units or those with less 
secure em ploym ent term s are categorised a s  th e  o thers’. The exam ple is nongmin lunhuan
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Generally speaking, employment patterns in work units of both sectors were 
similar. The distributions of permanent, contract system, and temporary workers and 
workers of other employment types were alike in state-owned and non state-owned work 
units. This implies ownership systems have weak correlation with employment natures. 
In referring to this point the follow-up question is: How different are the employees 
treated within the units? In the previous chapter (Table 5-8 & Table 5-9) it was shown 
that the less permanent the employment conditions the more limited the chances to get 
social insurance. It is necessary here to see whether and to what extent the different 
types of employees were treated differently in their work units.
The second point for discussion is the format of wages, i.e. regular or irregular. It 
was found in this study that non state-owned work units were likely to pay the wages 
irregularly (i.e. non-monthly paid) in contrast with state-owned units (50%) which did so 
less. (p<005) As high as 84.6% of the interviewed non state-owned work units paid 
wages by piece rate, hourly, daily and weekly. In general, more work units (68%) paid 
temporary workers irregularly.
This study also reveals that among the four different types of employees, contract 
system workers were the highest paid. About one quarter of the work units paid contract 
system workers at the lowest monthly wage level (500 yuan or less) in contrast with 
21% which paid them at the highest (1,000 yuan or more). Relative to each other, only 
4.5% of the units paid temporary workers at the highest wage level but more (31.85%) 
paid them the lowest. As few as 9.1% of the work units paid permanent workers at the 
lowest wage level. On the other hand, 72.7% paid permanent workers the middle level 
wage and 18.2% gave the highest wage. (See Table 6-2)
Table 6-2 Monthly wage levels by employees of different employment natures. 
(%)
Lower income 
group (<500 yuan )
Mid income group 
(500-1,000 yuan )
Higher income group 
(1,000 yuan or above)
%
Contract
system
26.3 52.6 21.1 100
Permanent 9.1 72.7 18.2 100
Temporary 31.8 63.6 4.5 100
gong.
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The final issue is about the provisions of living supplements {shenghuo jintie or 
shenghuo xin fuli) in work units. In China living supplements are also part of the income 
of staff and workers. Living supplements are cash incomes given by work units to 
employees for the expenses of accommodation, canteen, nursery, non-staple foods, etc. 
(Zhu 1991, p. 450) In the study it was found that most work units (89.5%) provided the 
lowest level of living supplements to temporary workers whilst only 5.3% of the work 
units provided at the highest level. For contract system workers, more work units 
provided them lower living supplements but a few more work units provided the highest 
level of supplements to permanent workers. (See Table 6-3)
Table 6-3 Different types of employees in units by the provision of living 
supplements per month at different levels. (%)
Employment
conditions
Low benefit group 
(50 yuan or 
below)
Mid benefit group 
(51-100 yuan )
High benefit 
group (101 yuan 
or above)
%
Contract
system
43.5 26.1 30.4 100
Permanent 31.6 31.6 36.8 100
Temporary 89.5 5.3 5.3 100
In concluding this part it is found that in general, work units of both ownership 
sectors employed similar approaches in managing the pay rolls. The results show that 
employment patterns were alike in these work units. Among the 25 units 76.7% offered 
over 40% of their employees permanent terms, 62.3% and 63.6% of the units offered 
‘contract system’ and ‘temporary’ terms to the employees, respectively.
The case of Guangzhou Shi demonstrates that the employment nature or status 
relates with the sources and levels of incomes (wages and living supplements). The more 
secure the employment the higher the income (or the broader the income base). 
Temporary workers were mostly treated less well in the provision of living supplements 
than contract workers and permanent workers. In contrast, the wage levels of contract 
system workers were the highest among the three, although they could not get other 
supplements. But overall, the incomes of permanent employees were highest because 
they have various supplements.
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From the previous discussion it can be inferred that since temporary workers 
were usually non-permanent residents in Guangzhou Shi that household status determine 
one’s income levels. Migrants are therefore the deprived group of people who are the 
least covered by income maintenance services and have limited access to raise their 
incomes in formal employment. Migratory workers are usually found in economic 
transformation (industrialisation) and social development (urbanisation). However, 
because of the specific national population policy and economic ownership systems in 
China, migrants in the country face more difficult situations and live in more deprived 
conditions. In brief, political transition and economic transformation despoil migratory 
workers of social insurance protection. The deprivation of migratory workers in social 
insurance services is one of the features of social insurance in China that needs further 
investigation later.
Criteria for being covered by social insurance
In order to understand the criteria for being covered by social insurance, the work units 
were asked whether income levels were set as the threshold. It was found that only 2 out 
of the 12 work units in the state-owned sector set income ceilings or baselines for 
employees to join social insurance programmes. This phenomenon is similar to that in 
non state-owned work units, except for OISH where more non state-owned units set an 
income ceiling as the limit.
Within a specific ownership group, however, there are some interesting findings. 
Among all of the social insurance programmes, more (12) non state-owned units offered 
maternity benefits without income limitations. This approach responds to the argument 
made in the last chapter that maternity insurance as a mandatory insurance programme 
attracted the most attention of the units, irrespective of their ownership natures. An 
examination of the data showed 9 of these work units offered other social insurance 
programmes without setting income limitations. On the other hand, 10 of the 12 state- 
owned units did not set limits and this pattern was quite consistent for all social 
assistance programmes.
In concluding this part, it is found that income thresholds were not frequently set 
for joining social insurance programmes in work units of both ownership natures. To a
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certain extent this shows the universality and availability of the services. One may also 
conclude that the coverage of social insurance in China was wide enough. Nevertheless, 
income is not a significant condition for one to join social insurance schemes. In China 
one’s eligibility to social services like education and social relief is determined by one’s 
household background and employment status. Although the ownership background of 
work unit and employee’s income factors are not important, one may still be rejected or 
only partly provided with the social services because of household and other status 
considerations. The effects of household and employment status on social insurance 
coverage in China had not been thoroughly examined in the past. Furthermore, these two 
issues that shape the Chinese social insurance have been changing following the onset of 
the modernisation programme of the country. The study on household and employment 
natures, therefore, highlights the features of social insurance in China.
Provisions of social insurance to different types of employees
In this section, the focal point is turned to the various social insurance programmes 
provided by work units which engaged workers under different conditions. There are 
four tables (Tables 6-4 to 6-7) in total and each of them specifically describes the 
situations of the respective grouping. Table 6-4 shows the provisions of social insurance 
to permanent employees in state-owned and non state-owned work units. There are two 
main points. First, more state-owned units offered retirement pensions to permanent 
employees. In the 12 state-owned units, 11 provided full retirement pensions whilst 1 did 
so partially. In contrast, 6 of the 13 non state-owned units did not make any offer 
although the other 7 provided all services. Second, similar patterns occurred with 
survivors’ benefits and funeral supplements. All state-owned units rendered this 
insurance service comprehensively whilst only 8 of 13 non state-owned work units did 
the same. For the other social insurance programmes the differences between the units of 
the two ownership sectors were insignificant. Overall, most of the work units in both of 
the ownership sectors provided the six social insurance services to permanent employees 
in full scale, except for retirement pensions and survivors’ benefits while more of the 
non state-owned units did not offer the service. In brief, compared with other types of 
employees, permanent employees were treated generously.
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Table 6-4 Provisions of social insurance to permanent employees in work units 
of different ownership systems. (Total number of units=25)
Social insurance Not provided Partly provided Fully provided
State Non state State Non state State Non state
Medical 0 3 3 4 9 6
Retirement 0 6 1 0 U 7
OISH 0 3 1 1 11 9
Maternity 0 4 1 0 11 9
Unemployment 5 8 1 0 6 5
Death 0 5 0 0 12 S
* Shaded items are social insurance services with high correlation (i.e. p<005) between 
the provision of services and the work unit’s ownership type.
In comparing the generosity of the units to permanent employees, treatments to 
contract system employees are generally different in the two different ownership sectors. 
(Table 6-5) The only exceptional case is unemployment benefits practice in work units 
of both sectors. With this exception, the ownership background of work units affected 
the provisions of all five other social insurance programmes.
For example, medical and sickness benefits are provided dissimilarly among the 
units. In state-owned units 9 of 12 (75%) provided full terms whilst 6 in the 13 (46.2%) 
non state-owned units did the same. In contrast, 6 non state-owned units did not offer 
this insurance service but no state-owned unit was found to behave in the same manner. 
For retirement pensions there were also more non state-owned units not making any 
offer whilst only 1 state-owned work unit did so. Conversely, more state-owned units 
offered this insurance in full to contract system employees but few non state-owned units 
acted the same way. A similar pattern is found in OISH benefits, maternity benefits, and 
survivors’ benefits. In brief, except for unemployment benefits, fewer non state-owned 
units provided social insurance service to contract system workers. This also implies the 
relationships between the provision of social insurance to contract system employees and 
ownership system of work unit is strong.
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Table 6-5 Provisions of social insurance to contract system employees in work 
units of different ownership systems. (Total number of units-25)
Social insurance Not provided Partly provided Fully provided
State Non state State Non state State Non state
Medical 0 6 118111 1 9 6
Retirement 1 ill! iiiiii IIIIII 0 10
OISH 0 iiiiiiiliiil 1 I 11mmmrnimm 0 6 1 0 11
Unemployment 6 9 0 1 6 3
Death 0 8 a 0 12 5
* Shaded items are social insurance services with high correlation (i.e. p< 005) between
the provision of the services and the work unit’s ownership type.
Returning again to temporary employees, however, the scenario is rather 
different. Work units of different ownership natures provide social insurance to 
temporary employees in similar fashion. In other words, there is no strong evidence that 
proves a direct correlation to the ownership systems and the provision of social 
insurance to temporary employees.
An important point learned from Table 6-6 is that fewer work units offered social 
insurance to employees with temporary working status. An extraordinary case is OISH 
benefits that 10 of 12 state-owned work units and 10 of 13 of non state-owned units 
offered this benefit to this group of employees. Table 6-6 shows further that most work 
units in both ownership sectors did not offer retirement pensions, unemployment 
benefits and maternity benefits to temporary workers. In addition, a moderate number of 
work units protected temporary workers with limited medical and sickness insurance 
protections.
Table 6-6 Provisions of social insurance to temporary employees in work units 
of different ownership systems. (Total number of units=25)
Social
insurance
Not provided Partly provided Fully provided
State Non state State Non state State Non state
Medical 2 7 7 4 3 2
Retirement 10 10 1 3 1 0
OISH 1 3 1 0 10 10
Maternity 8 9 1 2 3 2
Unemployment 12 12 0 0 0 1
Death 5 6 3 1 4 6
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When comparing the three types of employees, ‘employees of other working 
conditions’ are the most miserable. Table 6-7 reveals that this group of employees was 
the most neglected. In general, 20 out of the all 25 work units interviewed did not give 
any social insurance service to this group of employees. 24 out of 25 work units rejected 
providing unemployment benefits. The prejudice is also found in mandatory social 
insurance programmes in Guangzhou Shi. The study finds that only 4 state-owned units 
and 1 non state-owned unit provided OISH to this group of employees.
Table 6-7 Provisions of social insurance to employees of other employment 
conditions in work units of different ownership system. (Total 
number of units=25)
Social insurance Not provided Partly provided Fully provided
State Non state State Non state State Non state
Medical 9 11 2 1 1 1
Retirement 10 12 0 0 2 1
OISH 8 12 0 0 4 1
Maternity 9 12 0 0 3 1
Unemployment 12 12 0 0 0 1
Death 9 12 0 0 3 1
In sum, Table 6-8 below summarised the provisions of social insurance in work 
units in Guangzhou Shi. It shows that the less secured the employment status the more 
the likelihood of not being covered by social insurance. Regardless of the ownership 
category, most work units provided social insurance to permanent employees. In 
contrast, a very low percentage of the work units protected temporary or employees of 
other working conditions. Nevertheless, more work units provide social insurance to 
temporary employees than to employees of other working conditions.
Table 6-8 Different types of employees with fully provided social insurance 
benefits. (%) N=25
Permanent Contract Temporary Others
Medical 60 60 20 8
Retirement 72 64 4 12
OISH 80 80 80 20
Maternity 80 80 72 16
Unemployment 44 36 4 4
Death 80 68 40 16
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When looking into the attentiveness of work units on social insurance services 
for all employees, it is found that more work units offered OISH and maternity benefits 
than other social insurance items. This reflects some of the shortfalls of the social 
insurance policies and regulations. First, work units would like to offer OISH and 
maternity benefits because contributions to these two services are lower relative to other 
social insurance items. In addition, the paying of these two benefits is subject to many 
bureaucratic rules (especially for OISH) and criteria that discourage the applicants. Thus 
the generosity of work units may only demonstrate opportunism or the seizing of every 
chance to gain advantage. The lower percentages of the work units in offering retirement 
pensions to temporary employees reflect this situation.
The insight gained from the previous discussions is that employment condition 
and ownership nature of work units affect one’s eligibility as well as one’s social 
insurance benefits. There are four significant issues found. First, as high as 100% of 
state-owned units, partly or fully, offer medical and sickness benefits, maternity benefits, 
retirement pensions, and survivors’ benefits to permanent and contract system 
employees. Second, for contract system workers some social insurance programmes are 
provided differently between work units of different ownership. Third, the less secure 
the job the lower the possibility of getting social insurance. This point is evidenced by 
the lower percentages of temporary employees and ‘employees of other working 
conditions’ being covered by social insurance. Finally, more units are providing OISH 
and maternity benefits than retirement pensions. Work units are interested only in 
offering social insurance services that require less commitment from the units. In sum, 
state-owned work units provided more social insurance services than non state-owned 
ones; and the coverage of social insurance services does not extend far beyond 
permanent employees.
The overall implication of the above discussion is that employment and social 
insurance are the institutions attached to and owned within the work unit - the multi­
purpose centralised social institution looks after people’s living, manages the country’s 
economic production, and facilitates political advancement. For a long time after 1949 
employment was centralised and politicised as the duties for building up a socialist state. 
Before 1980 the number of non state-owned units was insignificant compared with the
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overwhelming number of state-owned units in which the members of the labour force 
were protected by the state through labour insurance in work units with strong 
occupational nature. The re-emergence of non state-owned units in the mid 1980s, 
however, cannot change the long established labour insurance and the affiliated 
occupational welfare institutions because of the extensive interested parties.
Provisions of social insurance to employees with different household status
It was discussed in the previous chapters and in last section that different employment 
natures emerge after the economic reforms in the 1980s in China. Employment natures 
or status in all work units are diversified into permanent, contract system, temporary and 
the others. On the other hand, the conditions for one to get a job may include the 
household background, apart from training, age, gender, experience, the available 
vacancies, and even the national job placement policy.
For a long time, the household system has strictly controlled one’s access to state 
services including education, medical services, and even social relief in China. A 
migrant may not be eligible to social relief if he is not granted the ‘permanent 
household’ status in the locality. Likewise a child who was bom without the state’s 
permission is denied access to medical care and schooling services because he is an 
‘illegal young resident’ (hei haizi) who has not registered with the local bureau of public 
security. In the reform era, however, some local governments tried to lift the restrictions 
in order to facilitate the growth of productivity in view of the fast industrialisation. For 
example in Shanghai there is a ‘blue passbook’ system that allows migrants to stay, work 
and enjoy similar social protections as permanent residents. (Mingpao Daily News, 
20/10/1996)
The participation of the people with non-permanent household status in 
economic production has become a need and trend. In Guangdong Province a relative 
high percentage of migrants come from all over the country for economic purposes.141 
The flooding of migrants into big cities like Guangzhou Shi supplies the labour forces 
needed for economic growth. Nevertheless household registration policy is a hindrance
141 S ee  C hapter Four of this study.
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to being covered by social insurance for these people with non-permanent household 
status. It is found that most of the migrants were employed as temporary employees in 
Guangzhou Shi. These migrant workers were deprived of protection from income risks.
Table 6-9 below shows that, 7.1% of the work units offered permanent jobs to 
those who had temporary household status, 75% of the work units allocated temporary 
jobs to this specific group of the labour force. In contrast, nearly 50% of the work units 
provided permanent jobs to those with permanent household status and 37.8% allocated 
those with permanent household status contract system employment. In brief, 
employment status strongly relates to one’s household background. Thus, there is 
significant evidence which proves that household background rather than income levels 
and ownership systems of the work unit affect one’s eligibility to social insurance.
Table 6-9 Distribution of employees with different household background 
employed with various employment statuses. (%) N=25
Employment status Permanent households Temporary households
Permanent 48.9 7.1
Contract system 37.8 17.9
Temporary 8.9 75.0
Other types 4.4 0.0
An additional point should be mentioned here is that work units might recruit 
from informal channels such as the illegal labour market to satisfy their labour demands. 
In this case, illegal labourers would surrender to work units and were totally 
discriminated against in being excluded from any protection in the event of sudden loss 
of income. Thus most migratory workers had to work under unfavourable terms offered 
by work units in the extreme competitive labour supply market. It is difficult to estimate 
to what extent such problem existed. In fact this is one of the important topics about the 
social effects of economic reforms that should be explored. However, a glance at the 
relationship between the employee recruitment approaches and the provisions of social 
insurance in the next section will facilitate conceptualising the situation.
To go back to the discussion on the relationships between household background 
and the provisions of social insurance, Chart 6-1 below generally outlines the picture. 
The chart shows the frequencies of the provision of different social insurance services in
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the 25 work units. The data show that in these units there were 168 alternatives for 
temporary household employees (i.e. “partly provided” and “fully provided”) whilst for 
employees with permanent household status there were 258.142
Chart 6-1 shows that 76.8% of the work units provided the group of employees 
with permanent household status full social insurance services. The other 8.5% of the 
units offered partly and 14.7% refrained from providing any social insurance services to 
these employees. In contrast, 45 .8% of the work units did not offer any social insurance 
services to the employees with temporary household background, whilst 16.7% of these 
25 work units only partly provided the social insurance services and another 37.5% 
made full provisions. In brief, most employees with permanent household status were 
covered with full social insurance services in work units. The percentage of the 
temporary household employees who were not covered with social insurance was three 
times higher than that of the employees with permanent household background. On the 
other hand, the percentages of the migratory employees with fully covered social 
insurance services were two times less than that of the permanent household employees.
Chart 6-1 Provisions of social insurance by household status
Fully provided
Partly provided
Not provided
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The above chart reveals a significant feature of social insurance that is dissimilar 
to other countries. In most countries social insurance services favour salaried employees 
for two reasons. First, this group of labour force is more stable and has higher capacities
142 The frequencies for em ployees with temporary household status were lower than their 
counterparts because, according to the study, fewer work units employed people with temporary 
household status. Therefore the summations of the choices of providing social insurance for 
em ployees with permanent and temporary status is different.
□  Temporary household
□  Permanent household
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to contribute to insurance programmes. Second, it is easier to manage social insurance 
for these employees because of the availability of records. Sometimes insurance 
organisations need only to collect the contributions by deducting from the payrolls.
The discrepancy in the coverage between employees with different household 
status in China has a similar direction. The management of records on the employees 
with permanent household is much easier than that of the migratory employees. 
Permanent residents have very strong relationships in the community and register with 
the local public security office. At grass root level, one has to submit personal as well as 
family members’ details to the public security office and street committee. These 
administrative measures have the advantage of controlling the mobility of the labour 
force but causes discrimination against the employees with temporary household status. 
This approach also discourages mutual help and social solidarity that social insurance 
may bring forth. More importantly, it creates income protection problems for migratory 
workers when they are old, sick, unemployed, or handicapped. Kinds of dissimilar 
treatment to employees with different household status are listed in detail in Table 6-10 
below.
Table 6-10 Provisions of social insurance to employees with different household 
status in work units (Perm.: permanent household, Temp.:
temporary household, n = number of work units)
Social
insurance
Provision
Formats
Permanent
workers
Contract system 
workers
Temporary
workers
Perm.
n=22
Temp
n=2
Perm.
n=17
Temp.
n=5
Perm.
n=4
Temp
n=21
Medical None 0 0 0 0 0 6
Partly 7 1 2 3 3 10
Full 15 1 15 2 1 5
Maternity None 1 0 0 0 3 14
Partly 1 0 0 1 0 2
Full 20 2 17 4 1 5
Retirement None 3 1 1 2 3 17
Partly 1 0 0 1 1 3
Full 18 1 16 2 0 1
Unemployment None 10 1 8 5 4 20
Partly 1 0 0 0 0 0
Full 11 1 9 0 0 1
OISH None 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Partly 2 1 1 2 1 1
Full 20 1 16 3 3 19
Death & 
funeral
None 2 1 2 1 1 8
Partly 0 0 0 0 2 3
Full 20 1 15 4 1 10
The above table shows the number of work units that provided social insurance 
services in different manners to employees with different household background. The 
provision pattern for permanent employees is that more work units offered social 
insurance to employees with local household status. This can be found in medical and 
sickness insurance, maternity benefits, retirement pensions, OISH, and death and funeral 
supplements.
For contract system workers, the situation is not quite the same. Disparities in 
provisions of social insurance between employees with different household status are 
significant. Especially, it is found that employees with permanent household status are 
better served. For example, 15 out of 17 work units fully provided medical and sickness 
benefits to permanent residents in Guangzhou Shi but only 2 in 5 make the same offer to 
migratory workers. Furthermore, whilst 5 out of 15 work units did not offer 
unemployment benefits to non-permanent residents, 8 out of 17 work units did the same 
way and the other 9 work units fully provided this benefit to employees with permanent 
household status. Similar patterns are also found in death and funeral supplements, 
OISH, retirement pensions and maternity benefits.
The situations of temporary employees of the two household registration systems 
are similar to permanent workers. There is no obvious contrariety in the provision of 
social insurance. The denial to provide social insurance services in work units was found 
in many items. For example, 81% of the work units did not offer retirement pensions to 
the workers of temporary household status whilst 75% of the work units practised the 
same to those with permanent household status. Similarly 67% of the work units did not 
offer maternity benefits to migratory workers whilst 75% of the work units provided for 
permanent residents. Although it is found that the ratio of the work units which did not 
offer unemployment benefits to workers with permanent and temporary household status 
workers was 1 to 9.5, this difference is in fact very minimal. In brief, the coverage of
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social insurance between employees of different household status varies.
In sum, the coverage of social insurance in terms of household status is specific 
to China. In political and economic terms household registration system is an effective 
mechanism that controls internal migration and prevents political instability. Details of 
the residents are recorded in local public security office and moves from one place to 
another should be reported or, on some occasion, approved in advance. Apart from this, 
the household registration system also plays a significant role in an underdeveloped 
economy. The needs of people are quantified and then satisfied by a ration system with 
coupons. Furthermore, the household system works beyond the controlling tool on 
materials supply but the means for achieving the socialist ends of “To each according to 
his work.”
Three points arise from the discussion on the relationships between the 
household registration system and social insurance in China. First, social insurance is 
regarded as scarce resources that only certain groups of people can enjoy. Similar to 
other social services like education in China, social insurance is an institutional service 
reward to those dedicated to the country. Migratory workers, especially those who have 
left their hometowns without permission, are not being protected by social insurance 
because they move around the country without respecting the national population policy. 
In other words social insurance in China is an institution to penalise those who do not 
observe the rules and regulations. A detailed discussion on the eligibility to get maternity 
benefits in the coming chapters supports this point.
Second, coverage of social insurance is conditioned largely by political and 
economic factors but is not based directly on the needs of the service recipient. The 
relationship between political ideals and the economy is openly regarded in China as 
being very dynamic. On the one hand the socialist economic system governs the national 
politics whilst on the other the country’s economy is underdeveloped so that it is 
difficult to realise the socialist objectives. Thus the national economic conditions and 
political orientation are the two main factors affecting the development and policy of 
social insurance.
Finally, the household registration system categorises service recipients of social
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insurance in China. It is sometimes held that since the Communist Party of China 
eliminated capitalist classes that an egalitarian society has been built in the country. 
However, there are still residual forms of social classes existing in socialist society like 
within the urban household. Urban household status allows one to access social 
insurance and other institutional services. Hence the household registration system 
affects the coverage of social insurance because it differentiates the people with need by 
their social groupings.
The above three points are not exhaustive but highlight the significant effects of 
the household registration system on social insurance coverage. On the surface the 
household registration system is an administrative approach to control the people’s 
mobility, as well as the supply of materials. The deep-rooted effect of household 
registration system on social insurance, however, is the sustaining of inequality in 
society in which the waged labour force of different household status are not offered the 
income protection in the same way. In addition, it also provides employers a way of not 
providing income protection to employees with needs.
Disparity in social insurance coverage caused by one’s household status is an 
outcome of the administrative measures. It is also one of the features of social insurance 
in China. In view of the fast growing number of migratory workers flowing from other 
regions into Guangzhou City, these measures may militate against the aims of income 
protection for all the urban labour force. The household registration system is thus a very 
significant element in social insurance service in China. The following section reviews 
how the recruitment methods affect one’s eligibility to social insurance in order to see 
better the features of social insurance in China.
The provisions of social insurance to employees recruited through different 
channels
In China, a centralised job placement policy supplanted individual job hunting after 
1949. Through centralised job placement services the Chinese communist government 
controls the supply and demand of labour. This administrative approach to labour 
management aims at realising total control of the national economy in the name of 
eliminating capitalist exploitation of the working class.
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In some circumstances centralised job placement alleviates unemployment. 
Nevertheless, it disregards individual needs and interests, violates the law of supply and 
demand, and demands a large-scale effort in administration. The ineffectiveness of the 
centralised supply of labour led to restructuring the labour market in modernisation. 
Under this apprehension since the mid 1980s the labour recruitment process has been 
diversified. In the 1990s there are at least six different ways of labour recruitment in 
Guangzhou Shi. These six ways are: arrangement by labour bureaux (laodong bu), 
arrangement by labour service companies (laowu gongshi), arrangement by the Bureau 
of Personnel {rensi ju), recruitment by the work unit with approval from the Bureau of 
Personnel, recruitment by the work unit with approval from the Labour Bureau, work 
unit recruitment with full autonomy and, other approaches. In fact these six different 
methods can even be grouped into four according to their main features: direct state 
arrangement, state approval, work unit’s full discretion, and other approaches.
Chart 6-2 Different ways of recruiting employees by employment natures
Others 
Temporary 
Contract system 
Permanent
□  Others
■  Work unit's discretion
■  State's approval
□  State's allocation
100%
Chart 6-2 above shows the four main groups of methods used in recruiting and 
employing workers with the different engagement conditions. It is generally found that 
the more alienated from the state’s control in the recruitment process the less secure is 
the employment tenure. For example, among the work units that recruited and employed 
temporary employees, 52% made their own arrangements without seeking approval from 
any government department. In relation to the higher percentage of the work units 
enrolling temporary employees at their own discretion, 36% of the units had the same 
experience in hiring contract system workers and 24% in picking permanent employees.
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On the other hand, in recruiting employees of other types, most work units (88%) 
applied other ways and another 12% claimed it was the work unit’s discretion to do so. 
In brief, work units were rather free to engage the ‘employees of other types’.
State intervention by requiring approval prior to offering jobs was not unusual, 
especially for permanent posts. 32% of the work units obtained state approval prior to 
effecting their own decisions. In contrast, 24% of the work units needed to do so when 
the job was of a temporary nature. For permanent employees, 60% of the work units 
referred to the related government departments. Among them, 7 engaged these 
employees directly allocated by the state and 9 got the state’s approval. 6 work units out 
of the 25 work units recruited permanent workers independently without direct state 
involvement. In sum, work units have more autonomy in recruiting and employing 
people with less permanent employment conditions. On the other hand, where the state is 
involved, the offers are always more permanent in nature. This finding echoes the 
proposition made in the previous paragraph that some employees were excluded from 
social insurance protection because they were not formally employed and registered with 
labour administration departments. In order to substantiate this argument the following 
part will present the relationship between the provisions of social insurance and the ways 
of recruiting the employees.
The first issue to be discussed is the relation between the provision of social 
insurance and the recruitment of permanent employees. Table 6-11 shows that except for 
unemployment insurance, all of the findings reflected high correlation between the two 
issues. In other words, the stronger the state’s interventions in the recruitment process 
the more likely the work units offer social insurance. Take the medical and sickness 
insurance as the first example. 15 (i.e. 60%) of the units that provided medical and 
sickness insurance benefit had permanent employees engaged under state action such as 
direct allocation and state approval. This contrasts with those 24% of units recruiting 
permanent employees under their own discretion, and only 1 (i.e. 4%) of the units 
provided to the employed who were recruited by other arrangements.
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Table 6-11 Provisions of social insurance to permanent employees recruited in
different ways. (Number of untis=25)
Insurance
programme
Provision Direct
allocation
State’s
approval
Work unit’s 
discretion
Others
Medical No 0 0 0 3
Partly 4 2 1 0
Yes 3 6 5 1
Retirement No 0 1 2 3
Partly 1 0 0 0
Yes 6 7 4 1
Maternity No 0 0 1 3
Partly 1 0 0 0
ATCII
Yes 6
n
8
A
5 1
nO lb r i NO
Partly
U
i
U
1
U
0
3
0
Yes 6 7 6 1
Unemployment No 4 3 3 3
Partly 1 0 0 0
Yes 2 5 3 1
Survivors’ No
Partly
O 
G 1
0
1
0
3
0
Yes 7 7 5 1
Note: The shaded parts means high correlation (i.e. p<005) between the provision of 
social insurance and the format of recruitment.
The other example is OISH benefit. It is found that 8 work units among the 25 
provided the benefit to their employees recruited with state involvement. In contrast, 6 
other work units made this offer to permanent employees recruited on their own, and 
only 1 work unit provided permanent employees with this service who were employed in 
other ways. Similar patterns are found in retirement pensions, maternity benefits and 
death benefits.
The exceptional case is unemployment benefits. The provisions of 
unemployment benefits had no significant difference between the ways that the units 
used in engaging people. For example, 2 work units did not provide this insurance 
benefit although they employed permanent employees through the state allocation 
policy, in contrast with 3 work units that were free from state administration in employee 
recruitment. However, more (5) units provided the benefit although they were required 
to seek approval from related government departments.
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Similar features can also be found among contract system employees. (Table 6- 
12) There is a high correlation between social insurance programmes and the different 
way of employee recruitment. For example, 6 of the work units did not provide 
retirement pensions to contract system workers who were employed in other ways, in 
contrast to only 1 work unit that was subject to state involvement in its recruitment 
process. Similarly, the 6 work units that did not offer OISH were units employing 
contract system workers recruited by other ways whilst none of these units was subject 
to state involvement in the labour recruitment process.
Table 6-12 Provisions of social insurance to contract system employees recruited 
in different ways. (Number of units=25)
Insurance
programme
Provision Direct
allocation
State’s
approval
Work unit’s 
discretion
Others
Medical No
Partly
Yes
0
I
0
0
1
0
0
0
Retirement No
Partly
Yes 0
0
8
0
0
Maternity No
Yes
0 0
0
OISH No
Partly
Yes
0
0 0
0
Unemployment No
Partly
Yes
Survivors’ No
Partly 0
1
0
0 0
0
Note: The shaded parts means high correlation 
and the formats of recruitment.
:>etween the provision of social insurance
Table 6-13 below describes the relationship between the provision of social 
insurance and the approaches of recruiting temporary employees. The only outstanding 
feature is the high correlation in OISH. For all other social insurance benefits the 
relationship between recruitment process and provision o f social insurance is not clear. 
The experience from the provision of OISH and its linkage with recruitment process is 
that OISH is a very common social insurance that was well known by work units
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regardless of the recruitment methods they used. This situation clearly reflects that 
occupational injury is a common concern among the managers of the work units. It also 
indicates that the ideology of social insurance in China has strong occupational nature
Table 6-13 Provisions of social insurance to temporary employees recruited in 
different ways. (Number of units)
Insurance
programme
Provision Direct
allocation
State’s
approval
Work unit’s 
discretion
Others
Medical No 0 2 4 3
Partly 2 2 6 1
Yes 0 2 3 0
Retirement No 1 6 9 4
Partly 1 0 3 0
Yes 0 0 1 0
Maternity No 0 5 8 4
Partly 1 0 2 0
Yes 1 1 3 0
OISH No 0 0 1 3
Partly 0 0 i 0
Yes 2 6 11 1
Unemployment No 2 6 12 4
Partly 0 0 0 0
Yes 2 0 1 0
Survivors’ No 0 3 5 3
Partly 1 1 2 0
Yes 1 2 6 1
Note: The shaded parts means the high correlation between the provision of socia 
insurance and the format of recruitment.
The last issue in this section is about the provisions of social insurance to 
employees of other types who are recruited by different methods (Table 6-14). As 
previously pointed out, this group of employees is the most neglected. The table shows 
that there is no strong relation between eligibility to social insurance and the terms under 
which they are engaged. In general, most of the work units do not make any offer to this 
group of employees. For long-term social insurance programmes such as retirement 
pensions, 22 out of all 25 sampled work units did not provide the service. For short-term 
insurance benefits such as survivors’ benefits, 21 out of the 25 work units do not make 
such offers. In short, this group of employees is the least protected, regardless of 
employment format.
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Table 6-14. Provisions of social insurance to employees of other types recruited in
different ways. (Number of units=25)
Insurance
programme
Provision Direct
allocation
State’s
approval
Work unit’s 
discretion
Others
Medical No 1 6 8 5
Partly 0 2 0 1
Yes 0 1 1 0
Retirement No 1 8 8 5
Partly 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 1 1 1
Maternity No 1 7 8 5
Partly 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 2 1 1
OISH No 1 6 8 5
Partly 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 0 0 1
Unemployment No 1 9 9 5
Partly 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 0 0 1
Survivors’ No 1 7 8 5
Partly 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 2 1 1
The above tables and charts clearly show that the term of employee engagement 
significantly determine eligibility to social insurance in China. The various recruitment 
ways, especially central job placement policy, are part of socialist social administration. 
Job placement policy is politically guided. The evidence is the volatile objectives 
between ‘red’ and ‘expert’ sides of the policies. In turbulent periods such as the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution ‘being loyal to communism’ {hong or red) is the basic 
consideration to be used in filling a designated position. On the other hand, in the 
modernisation period the policy pays greater attention to qualified candidates (zhuan or 
expert) who can accomplish the job for socialist construction. The labour market is thus 
politicised, as well as the work units, the affiliated welfare services and social insurance.
It is obvious that the central job placement services and occupational nature of 
social insurance are the main parts of labour force management bound by the close state- 
enterprise relationships in China. These management approaches are supported and 
facilitated by the household registration system that consequently discriminate against 
non-permanent residents and employees in non-state work units in terms of being
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covered by social insurance. The categorisation of the labour force covered by social 
insurance in such a way clearly shows the particular features of social insurance in 
China.
In concluding this part, one significant feature of social insurance programmes in 
China is that employment and household status rather than income level or ranking 
determines the coverage of social insurance in China. Status criteria in social insurance 
provisions in China are political and economic. For example, the household registration 
policy is basically designed for economic resource allocation that affects one’s chances 
of accessing social insurance services. On the other hand, employment in a state-owned 
unit enhances one’s opportunities to obtain social insurance because the politicised state- 
unit-individual relationship is determinant. The way of providing social insurance in 
China is thus unique to its economic and political environment. In the light of the new 
findings on social insurance coverage in China, the following sections will study the 
determining factors in the provisions of social insurance in Guangzhou Shi.
An examination on the four groups of factors in social insurance provisions
An important point learned from the discussion on the coverage issue is that social 
insurance in Guangzhou Shi resembles occupational welfare. It is found that 
employment status or natures rather than needs determine one’s eligibility to the service. 
(Chart 6-3) This particular feature highlights the uniqueness of social insurance in China.
In the study the work units enumerated 10 important factors in providing social 
insurance benefits.143 These ten factors are, namely: family burden of the claimant, the 
severity of the problem such as in the OISH, the length of the social insurance 
contribution period, the total premium, the current wage level, household status, 
employment nature, the length of service period in the work unit, the claimant’s rank or 
post, and Chinese citizenship. In order to facilitate the discussion and get a clearer 
concept, the ten factors are re-grouped into three main categories according to their
143 The work units expressed  on a scale  of five their views on how important of a particular factor 
for offering the social insurance service. The five d eg rees ranged from “the least important’ to 
Very important’. For easy  understanding, those answ ers in the questionnaires titled a s  th e  least’ 
are transform ed into ‘can be disregarded’, whilst the answ ers in the list from ‘less or m odest’ to 
‘more or very important’ are  changed to ‘important’.
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similar natures. (Chart 6-3) The first group are the ‘need’ factors that include family size 
of the claimant and severity of the problem. The reason of grouping these two together is 
because it concerns the immediate needs of the claimant and his dependants. The second 
group focuses on the actions of the claimant, by his efforts (i.e. amount and time-length 
of contribution) made towards the insurance programmes. The third one comprises six 
factors ranging from the claimant’s current wage level to citizenship. Finally, a group of 
‘other factors’ reflects the special expectations of the work units.
Chart 6-3 The pattern of the factor groups in determining the provision of 
social insurance in work units
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Social insurance programmes
Chart 6-3 above shows the patterns of the determining factor group demonstrated 
by the mean scorings o f their percentages. The chart presents three main groups of 
factors and their relations with social insurance programmes. Relatively, the attention on 
‘status factors’ on all social insurance programmes is the most consistent whilst the 
‘needs factors’ is the ‘less or modest’ and the ‘commitment factor’ is the least This 
implies the significance of the status factors in getting social insurance benefits. In 
contrast, the judging of the needs and commitment vary between different insurance 
programmes.
In the ‘needs factors’ group, all of the work units agree that the family burden of 
the claimant is important in getting the six social insurance services, especially those 
seeking maternity benefits. Nevertheless, work units also express rather divergent views
Needs
C om m itm ent
S tatus
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when weighing the ‘magnitude of the problem’. None of the work units consider this 
factor should be taken into account, except for medical and sickness benefits and the 
OISH benefits that called 88.9% and 100% of the work units’ attention.
The ‘magnitude of the problem’ in the ‘needs factor group’ is less significant for 
retirement pensions, maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, and survivors’ benefits. 
The reasons for this situation may be various. Maternity benefits, for example, are 
determined by the state and affected by the implementation of the birth control policies. 
The conditions for getting maternity benefits are set and based on the consideration other 
than the claimant’s need for income maintenance in the special period. Another example 
is retirement pensions where the criteria are standardised and the needs institutionalised. 
A similar ideology is also found in the provision of unemployment benefits. In sum, the 
magnitude of the problem or the assessment on the needs is affected more by other 
national policies, e.g. national single child policy, than the expressed or real needs of the 
claimant. This particular issue is echoed by the views expressed by the employees in the 
field study that will be reported in the coming two chapters.
The second point is an elaboration on the argument made in the previous 
paragraph. It is found that because of economic restructuring in China that social 
upheavals like early retirement and unemployment emerge. The large group of people 
who retreat from production is a heavy burden for work units to deal with. For 
accomplishing the economic and political tasks, social insurance in China plays the role 
of social institution to facilitate the implementation of other national policies such as 
birth control, employment reforms, and enterprise reforms. Thus social insurance 
services in China become the core of socialist transition. The roles of social insurance in 
China are the facilitator as well as stabiliser for political and economic transformation.
The study shows that work units moderately rate commitment factors as the 
criteria of providing social insurance. Commitment to social insurance is especially 
important to getting three social insurance programmes: unemployment benefits, death 
benefits and retirement pensions. Take unemployment benefits as the example. All of the 
work units request employees to contribute for a longer period. For retirement pensions, 
90% of the work units claimed that the length of the contribution period was important 
whilst 80% of the work units emphasise the total money contributed. In brief, work units
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recognised the significant and positive effects of participation through contribution by 
the employee for long-term social insurance programmes.
The third issue revealed in Chart 6-3 emphasises status factors are very 
consistent. There are two patterns of status factors demonstrated in the chart. First, some 
work units fluctuate more when considering the factors like ‘household status’, ‘rank and 
post’, and ‘citizenship’. For example, more work units weight the household factor 
heavier for maternity benefits than retirement pensions. In general, household status is 
determinant for one to get maternity benefit whilst only 50% of the work units agree it is 
important in providing retirement pensions. On the other hand, 100% of the work units 
said claimant’s rank and post are significant in getting medical and sickness benefits 
when contrasting 62.5% of the units recognising this is as influential in getting 
retirement pensions. Finally, Chinese citizenship is also considered as an important 
factor. 75% of the work units agree this is an important factor in obtaining maternity 
benefits but only 33.3% see it important for getting unemployment benefits.
Another specific pattern of the status factors is the rather conforming trend in 
weighing one’s wage level, employment nature, and years of service in the unit. As high 
as 100% of the work units said that ‘wage level’ is important in determining 
unemployment benefits, maternity benefits, retirement pensions and survivor’s benefits. 
However, 78.6% and 83.3% of the work units recognised this as significant in working 
out OISH and medical and sickness benefits. For ‘employment nature’ factor, 92.3% of 
the work units agree that this is important in getting retirement pensions, 90.9% said this 
affects the provision of medical and sickness benefits whilst 83.3% said it is weighty in 
getting maternity benefits. Finally ‘service years’ in work units also affects one’s 
eligibility to social insurance. This factor particularly affects work unit’s decision in 
giving out retirement pensions, maternity benefits and unemployment benefits. 
‘Servicing years’ also plays an important role when work unit examines the applications 
for OISH, survivor’s benefits and medical and sickness benefits, albeit these items are 
obviously more usually happening and on an occasional basis.
Apart from the above-mentioned three main factor groups, work units also count 
on other special factors although these relate to particular social insurance programmes 
only. For example, 95.7% of the work units regard the ‘cause of happenings’ as a factor
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in giving out OISH. This concern is very straightforward and instrumental since this is 
laid down in policy documents. Similar procedures applied to survivors’ benefits that 
90.9% of the work units weigh the cause of death important in getting the benefit, 
irrespective of whether the incident was job related. The other case is that 100% of the 
work units justified the giving of maternity benefits by the number of children the 
claimant had. Finally, 50% of the work units take into account the frequency of being 
unemployed in offering unemployment benefits.
In sum, the importance of the factor groups fluctuates from one social insurance 
program to another. For example, commitment factors are very insignificant for OISH 
benefits and medical and sickness benefits but important for unemployment benefits, 
survivors’ benefits, and retirement pensions. On the other hand, needs factors are 
relatively highly praised for OISH and maternity benefits but not for the others. These 
phenomena reflect most work units understand the needs for social insurance created by 
physical inferiority should be observed but not for those arising from social dysfunction, 
e.g. unemployment. This implies the Chinese government has a particular ideology on 
social insurance and constitutes its specific features.
In conclusion, the study finds that the provision of social insurance in China is 
influenced by certain ideologies. First, an individual’s status plays a significant role in 
establishing eligibility. The status is not only determined by income level but also by 
connection with the unit in terms of the length of the servicing period, employment 
terms and nature, etc. Among these considerations employment nature is crucial 
because, as discussed above, it depends very much on one’s household status and thus 
affects eligibility to social insurance. Status factors spell out the strong identification of 
socialist values in managing social service in China. This status is centred on one’s 
household being described as ‘peasants in rural areas’ or ‘ workers in urban areas’. A 
permanent urban resident has more chances to get permanent jobs, being promoted to 
higher rank, enjoying stable and regular incomes, and then enjoys a secure living from 
social insurance if the income is disrupted. It is found in this chapter that household 
status is highly related to one’s eligibility to social insurance benefits. Socialist values 
and administration is therefore significant and has particular impacts on social insurance 
programmes in China.
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In relation to status factors, work units value ‘need factors’ and ‘commitment 
factors’ in diversified ways. Work units cannot come to the point of regarding both of 
them as important. The divergent views mark the starting of the restructuring of social 
insurance system from the roads of universality in the past and selectivity for the future. 
It also shows the socialist government has been wondering about how to reinterpret the 
meanings of need and the extent of commitment. Need for social insurance was 
unimaginable before the modernisation drive since the country provided an all- 
embracing social protection system supported and guided by egalitarian socialist 
ideology.
The alternating high-low places of need and commitment factor groups turns 
speak to the inconsistent views on the right and duties of the people in need. It also 
reflects the efforts and expectations of the government in putting social insurance on the 
right track by using professional services such as the medical profession and insurance 
companies. The confusing views really affect the implementation of some of the social 
insurance programmes. Retirement pensions, for example, have encountered many 
problems in determining contribution levels, methods of setting and the levels of 
benefits. It was found that the better off coastal regions set higher contribution and 
benefit rates that created many difficulties in establishing a nationwide retirement 
pension system. (Mingpao Daily News, 15 November 1996)
In a nutshell, a strong socialist value is the main characteristic of social insurance 
in China that affects work units of both ownership types in providing the services. There 
is hardly any difference in the relationships between work units of specific ownership 
nature and particular factor groups in this study. As the momentum of and guidelines for 
social insurance in the country, socialist values rule over the definition of the needs for 
social insurance, as well as the founding, development and reforms of the whole social 
insurance system. Apart from the evaluation on the service providers, the coming two 
chapters will examine the features of social insurance in China from the perspective of 
the service recipients.
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Summary and conclusions
Throughout the discussions in this chapter certain features of social insurance in China 
are found. The main point of the chapter, however, is that social insurance in China has a 
strong socialist accent that consequently affects the coverage. It is found that migrants 
are put in the most unfavourable positions in social insurance services because of their 
non-permanent household and employment status. Such a phenomenon is created by 
other social and economic policies. This situation reveals social insurance in China as a 
sub system affiliated to and works for other social institutions. The strong evidence is the 
very limited coverage of employees with non-permanent household status and those 
women employees who violate the national birth control regulations. These 
particularities of social insurance in China are highly related to socialist values and the 
national economic development strategies.
This chapter considered the relationships between employment, wages and living 
supplements provided by work units. The data show that the less permanent the job the 
lower the wages and supplements. It is also found that permanent employment is still 
prevalent in work units although non-permanent employment condition is emerging 
quickly in the reforms. The chapter also showed that lower wage levels and the fewer 
chances to access social insurance of the temporary employees are correlated with 
household status. Although it is shown that work units of both ownership sectors 
deployed similar practises in employing the workers of all natures, household status is 
determinant to one’s eligibility to social insurance. Basically, the household registration 
is an administrative approach to control people’s internal migration and the supply of 
daily necessities in an underdeveloped economy. However, the system degenerates into a 
hindrance for some people to earn their livings and obtain eligibility to income 
protection by social insurance in the 1990s.
The study results show that income thresholds were not set as the criteria for 
getting social insurance benefits. But the study further exposes that other conditions such 
as household status and employment nature are determinant. These two factors 
consequently block the access to social insurance for certain groups of employees, albeit 
it is stated in the policy documents that employees of all kinds should be covered by 
social insurance. Furthermore, household status and employment natures are the two
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closely related influential factors for eligibility to social insurance. The classification of 
people within a social insurance system creates social alienation that has evidently been 
found in other social institutions in China.
In is also argued in this study that social insurance in China is designed for 
facilitating the transition of economic structures and the transformation of political 
stages rather than satisfying the people’s contingent income needs. The case of 
Guangzhou Shi demonstrates that social insurance in China is charged with the role of 
facilitating socialist economic system transformation, stabilising society and establishing 
a favourable environment for realising political ideals. For the Chinese communist 
government these issues are strongly intertwined since the success of the transition to 
market socialism is based on a politics-commanded economic system. Such an economic 
system, however, can only be realised by reforming some of the social institutions like 
the recruiting system, state-owned work units, and social insurance services. In short, the 
government envisages social insurance as the means for the ends of economic system 
transformation in the country. Politically the Chinese government has never capitulated 
from intervening in the social insurance system in which socialist elements are still 
found. These elements, in fact, make social insurance services in the country different 
from those in the North American and Western European countries. In brief, the Chinese 
experience in social insurance the strong politics and economic transformation ties. The 
examination of the three factor groups in this chapter on the effects on social insurance 
in China will be discussed in more detail in the coming two chapters.
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Chapter Seven
Social insurance in China: Diversified services under one system 
Introduction
More than two thousand years ago Confucius remarked in The Book of Commentaries 
(Lun Yu) that “ ...there are some countries that do not worry about insufficiency but 
inequality; are concerned about social unrest rather than impoverished living. If there is 
equality then poverty does not exist because the people share the resources equally. In 
such harmonious conditions the society is safe and the people live together amicably.” 
(Liu 1990, p. 112-113, my translation)
The note made by Confucius is an apt comment on the social conditions in China 
since 1980. The findings in last chapter revealed that resources for social insurance in 
China are not distributed according to the people’s needs but allocated for maintaining 
and managing a loyal and reliable production force. Such an approach evidences the 
institutional roles and features of social insurance in the country. To turn from the 
providers’ views, this chapter focuses on the responses of employees. The six parts of 
this chapter mainly examine how different groups of employees were covered in social 
insurance and what their experiences were.
The first part will present the background of the sampled employees with 
demographic variables such as gender and age groupings. It also analyses in more detail 
according to two independent variables, namely, household registration and employment 
natures to explore the varieties of the employees. The second section highlights the 
relationship between the provisions of and eligibility for social insurance. The following 
part will dig deep to determine the deprived groups in the provisions of social insurance 
and argues that household status is the main determinant. This feature of social insurance 
has hardly been disclosed and examined in detail in the study on the Chinese social 
insurance in China, nor in other countries.
The fourth part of the chapter presents the views of the employees. These views 
match the observation made previously, i.e. household status and employment nature
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determine one’s access to social insurance. In the fifth part, the two most popularly 
demanded social insurance services are selected for discussion. Finally this chapter will 
elaborate the needs of migratory temporary employees - the group that suffers the most 
with insecure living in this underdeveloped socialist economy.
An examination on the gender groups, educational level, household status, and 
employment nature of the employees
The structured interview with employees of this project was carried out in 25 work units 
in early 1995. In this section, the discussion focus is on the four independent variables: 
gender groups, educational levels, household status, and employment natures. The main 
objective is to inquire into these four aspects in order to understand the situations of the 
labour force in Guangzhou Shi.
The study shows that the distribution between the genders is rather even (52.3% 
were female and 47.7% were male) among the 524 interviewees. Concerning age 
distribution, there are five main age groupings. (Chart 7-1) The first is the youngest 
group of employees from 16 to 25. They were bom in the 1970s and joined the labour 
force in the late 1980s. The second group are the respondents of the age 26 to 35 who 
were bom in the 1960s and grew up in the turbulent years of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. The third group of respondents was aged 36 to 45. They were bom 
in the 1950s and had been working for 20 or more years. Fourth, the cohort of people 
aged 46 to 55 was bom in the 1940s, witnessed the success of the Communist Party of 
China in taking over the country, and grew up through the First Five Year Plan, the 
Great Leap Forward Movement, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and then the 
Four Modernisations. In other words, they experienced most of the changes after the 
communist government came to power in 1949.
Chart 7-1 below demonstrates the distribution of gender and age groupings of the 
interviewees. Although the distribution between male and female in this study was rather 
even as mentioned, the gender distribution by age is by no means the same. Female 
employees were mostly found in the age group of 26-45 whilst for males the peak was in 
the groups from age 16 to 45. There were higher percentages of male workers at the age 
of 26-35 (26.4%) and 56 and over (6.4%) compared with females at 23.8% and 1.1%,
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respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of female workers at the age of 36-45 
(38%) far exceeded that of the males (26.4%). The distribution patterns of age and 
gender groupings in work units offer an insight that women employees quit earlier from 
jobs at a younger age (e.g. around 40) than men employees. The reasons may be various 
and need further examination. One of the hypotheses is that most middle-aged women 
are asked to retreat from their posts in the economic and enterprise reforms era. The data 
show that 23% of women started to join the labour force at age 16 to 35, drops a little bit 
at the child-bearing age and intensifies at the age of 36-45 but drops sharply after 45. In 
brief, double-worker families (shuangjigong jiating) in urban China are popular and the 
career life of female employees is shorter than their counterpart in general.144
Chart 7-1 Distribution of gender and age groups of employees
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Chart 7-2 Distribution of married employees by age and 
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Chart 7-2 above shows the distribution patterns of different married gender and
144 The meaning of double-worker families is that both parents work outside the family to earn 
money incom es. Usually these parents stay with the family rather than migrate to other places 
for work.
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age groups. It shows that for both genders the biggest married age group is 26 to 55 . For 
women and men employees the highest percentage is the age group 36-45. However, the 
percentage for women was 51% contrasted with 40.5% for men. This reflects that most 
women do not leave production after getting married and having children. The married 
age group of 46 and over, on the other hand, features another picture that women usually 
retire or quit production earlier than men. There were 10.1% of the male employees at 
age 56 or over found in work units whilst there only 1% females. In brief, the association 
between age and married employees is weak (Cramer’s V= 0.21). It verifies that both 
men and women participate actively in the labour force after getting married, despite 
there being more men staying in formal employment than women after age 46. This 
implies social insurance is important for both men and women to maintain their living 
standards since double-worker families are quite popular in urban China. The loss of 
income for either man or woman may drastically affect the living standard of the whole 
family. In addition, with the rising divorce rates and increasing numbers of women being 
laid off in China today, special supplementary benefits should be provided to the 
breadwinners of broken families to meet their contingent income needs.145
In relation to female employees, male employees enjoy more permanent and 
longer career lives. Chart 7-1 shows that employment opportunities for women go up 
very sharply at age 26, reach the peak at age 36, but go steeply downward after age 45. 
In general the curve for male is rather smooth and steady in all age groupings that 
indicates a longer career life for male employees.
The prevalence of double-worker families in urban China brings out two 
important issues. First, women are encouraged by the Chinese communist government, 
for political and economic reasons, to engage in work. Politically the communist 
government treasures women’s participation in production as a sign of social equality. 
Economically, the bigger the production force in society the smaller the dependent 
groups that consume social resources. This is particularly important at the 
underdeveloped economic stage. Thus encouraging women to join the production force 
is a stone of the communist government to kill two birds at one time. The values of
145 In the China Population Statistics Yearbook 1995 it is stated that the divorce rate rose from 
5.9X* in 1990 to 7.1X» in 1994. The CSPH also points out that the mid age group (30-39) with 
higher educational levels (i.e. college or above) recorded faster growth rate in divorce in 1994.
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women in the labour force, however, changed after modernisation, especially when the 
government is trying to streamline the production teams in work units. In sum, the price 
of realising political ideals and satisfying economic needs is the changed pattern of the 
labour force.
Apart from the above two variables, education level, household status, and 
employment natures are also concerns. The study shows that 58.5% of the 524 
interviewees were permanent employees, 20.6% were contract system workers and 
19.1% were temporary workers. Referring to the relations between employment natures 
and ownership natures of the work units, it is found that 77.2% of the interviewees were 
permanent employees in state-owned units in contrast with only 42.6% in the non state- 
owned units. For the employees in non state-owned units, 29.1% were temporary 
employees and another 24.9% worked as contract system employees. These contrast 
with 6.8% and 15.2% in state-owned units, respectively. In short, non state-owned work 
units tended to offer more non-permanent jobs and this finding counter-argues with the 
claims in last chapter made by these work units that they like to employ permanent staff 
and workers.
When scrutinising in detail the relationships between different gender groups and 
employment natures, it is found that, among the interviewees, 58.8% permanently 
employed were women, whilst 57% of the as temporary workers were male and for 
contract system workers 55.6% were men. The correlation between gender groups and 
less permanent employment is high (p<005). For example, 70% of those employed in 
the "other employment" group and 57% of the temporary workers were male. 
Concerning household status and employment natures, the result shows that migratory 
workers were younger than employees with permanent household (p<005). 66.7% of the 
migratory employees at age 16-25, in contrast with 15.8% of the employees who are 
permanent residents and in the same age group. On the other hand, only 6.8% of the 
migratory employees were older than 46 but those with permanent household status 
19.6% were.
The previous paragraph demonstrates a very important finding on the correlation
'(CSPH 1996, p. 338, my translation)
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between employment nature and household registration. The association between these 
two variables is very strong (Cramer’s V=0.70). The study result shows that fewer 
employees with temporary household status were offered permanent employment 
Among the 87 (16.6%) interviewees claiming they resided temporarily in Guangzhou 
Shi, 80.5% were employed as temporary staff and workers. This percentage contrasted 
greatly with only 6.9% for those who were permanent residents in Guangzhou Shi. On 
the other hand, 69.3% of the permanent residents got permanent employment but only 
3 .4% were found among those who were migrants. Thus in Chart 7-3 below one can find 
that permanent residents were mostly provided with permanent jobs but for temporary 
residents they were not treated in the same way.
Chart 7-3 Employment natures by household status
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After discussing the strong relationships between household status and 
employment nature, the following parts will go into detail about the characteristics of the 
employees of different household status. The field study data show that the ratio between 
male and female migratory employees is close. Among the migratory workers 55.2% 
were men and 44.8% were women. For those employees with permanent household 
status the male group was smaller (46.2%) than the female’s (53.8%). This situation was 
rather different from other newly developed areas like Shenzhen - a Special Economic 
Zone south of Guangzhou Shi that was filled largely by female migratory workers in 
light industries. However, one similar issue for the migratory workers in Guangzhou Shi 
and Shenzhen is that most of them were not married. For the case of Guangzhou Shi 
74.7% of the migratory workers were single whilst for permanent residents the figure
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was 24.9%.
For the educational levels of the employees, it is found that, migratory workers 
were less educated than those with permanent household status (p<005). 85.1% of the 
migratory workers received education at junior secondary level or below but for 
permanent residents the percentage was 37.3%. Furthermore, 46.2% of the employees 
with permanent household status in this interview received senior secondary education 
but for migratory employees the percentage was only 10.3.
The scenario is thus clear. The previous paragraphs describe the general situation 
of employees of different household status that in Guangzhou Shi most migratory 
employees are younger, not married, less educated, and in temporary employment. These 
findings also raise an issue that people with different household status under different 
employment natures might be treated differently in the social insurance system in China. 
This is a very important part in exploring the features of social insurance in China 
because social institutions in the country like education and social insurance are set up 
for political and economic purposes. Accordingly, different groups of people are 
categorised by the politically, economically or socially determined status to access the 
services. This perspective on social institution in China facilitates the understanding on 
the features of country’s social insurance.
It was discussed above that employment nature is highly correlated with 
household status. It is also found that, on the other hand, some other factors like 
educational level (Cramer’s V=0.40) and age (Cramer’s V=0.36) are moderately related 
to employment natures. Concerning educational level there are two different patterns. 
The first is that people with lower education level (e.g. junior secondary education level 
or below) were usually employed as temporary workers or join the labour force labelled 
as ‘other employment nature’. 81% of the temporary workers and 50% of the employees 
of other types had received education at or below primary level.
Another contrasting pattern is that for permanent and contract system workers the 
educational achievements were generally higher. For contract system workers 98.1% 
received junior secondary education or higher, whilst for permanent employees the 
percentage was 90.8%. This signifies that there are more higher-educated people filling
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permanent and contract system posts. Another interpretation of this phenomenon is that 
migratory workers were usually less educated and less skilful. In fact most of them came 
from remote areas of the country and look forward to higher income jobs. Their 
ignorance of the city and rights to social insurance, and the hunger to find a job created 
the chances for work units to hire them with lower costs and exploit them. This makes 
very clear the reason why most of the work units employ migrants in temporary jobs 
with irregular incomes.
It was also discovered from the study that employment nature has fair 
relationships with the distribution of age groups (Cramer’s V=0.40). Chart 7-4 below 
demonstrates that temporary employees were the youngest. 66% of the temporary 
employee fall into the age group 16-25 and another 24% in the age group 26-35. 
Temporary employees were rarely found in older age groups. For permanent employees 
the situation was that the majority (45%) was at age 36-45. The age group of 46-55 was 
the second biggest group for permanent employees. Among the four different 
employment nature groups, contract system workers were largely (80.5%) found in the 
age groups below 35. Finally the chart shows that 50% of the employees in the group of 
'other types’ were younger than 35 and another half of this group was at age 36-45.
Chart 7-4 Distributions of employment natures and age groups
The implication from Chart 7-4 is that social insurance services in China are 
immediate responses to the political and economic needs of the regime. The 
concentration of some age groupings in particular employment natures shows that the 
existing social insurance services can hardly satisfy the future needs of the employees.
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For examples, temporary and contract system employees have higher needs for OISH 
and unemployment insurance because of their unfavourable working conditions. These 
two groups of employees are relatively more vulnerable in job security and more 
exposed to occupational accidents that they have greater needs to maintain their living. 
On the other hand, medical benefits and retirement pensions are the greatest concerns 
among the ageing permanent employees. Their needs on these two benefits will be 
growing in the next five to ten years in view of the fact that 26.5% of the permanent 
employees reached the age of 46 or over in 1995.146
In concluding this section four issues have to be mentioned. First, migrants are 
usually employed in temporary jobs and this implies they are mostly alienated from 
social insurance because, as found in the last chapter, coverage of social insurance is 
highly related to employment natures. Second, in short terms the needs for OISH, 
maternity benefits and unemployment insurance are greater for the employees with less 
secure tenure and working in worse conditions. This issue is found among the young and 
less permanent employees. The third point is that in midterms, i.e. 5 to 10 years, needs 
for retirement pensions and medical benefits will rise sharply among permanent 
employees. Fourth, as an income maintenance measure, social insurance services are 
important to all labour force without disregarding for some small and definite groups. In 
sum, this section demonstrates the features of social insurance in China from exploring 
the characteristics of the diversified groups of employees. It evidences that social 
insurance services in China can only provide short to midterm income maintenance that 
is framed by political and economic ideals. Consequently, social insurance services in 
China selectively cover the working forces that are recognised as productive and 
favourable to political transition and economic system transformation. In order to dig 
deep into this issue the following sections will inquire into the experiences and opinions 
expressed by employees on eligibility for social insurance in Guangzhou Shi.
The provisions of and eligibility for social insurance services in units
In the questionnaires the interviewees were asked whether they knew the provisions of 
social insurance in their work units and, if so, what social insurance programmes were
146 The percentage of the age group over 46 in this study is 16.6%. Thus it is clear that 26.5% 
within the perm anent em ployees is rather high.
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provided. Furthermore, these employees were also asked whether they were eligible for 
the social insurance services. Chart 7-5 and Chart 7-6 below demonstrates their 
situations. First, Chart 7-5 shows that a rather high percentages of the employees are 
provided with social insurance except for unemployment benefits. For example, 80% of 
the employees said that their work units provided medical and sickness benefits. Apart 
from that very close percentages of the interviewees claimed that their work units 
provided retirement pensions, maternity benefits, and survivors’ benefits and funeral 
supplements. In comparison, medical and sickness benefits were the most popularly 
known item among employees whilst for unemployment benefits only 21% of the 
employees felt certain about the provisions.
Chart 7-5 Provisions of social insurance services
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The provisions of social insurance
Chart 7-5 also shows the percentages of the employees who did not think about, 
nor know the provisions of social insurance in their units. Take unemployment benefits 
as an example. As high as 46.2% of the employees did not know the provisions and 
32.7% said their units did not provide the benefit. The other unpopular insurance service 
found from the study was survivors’ benefits and funeral supplements (27%) and OISH 
(23.8%). Some of the social insurance programmes like survivor’s benefits and funeral 
supplements are unfamiliar to employees and this might be attributed to the rare needs as 
well as the inactive and bureaucratic work unit. The case of OISH demonstrates this 
situation in that the receiving rates were relative low although the insurance was 
provided to all labour force irrespective of their backgrounds. Because of the important 
and conflicting roles as employer and social insurance manager played by work units in 
China the use of social insurance services is filtered and the needs of employees on
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income maintenance through social insurance are undermined. In the following parts the 
focus of discussion turns to the relationships between the provisions of and eligibility for 
social insurance.
Chart 7-6 Eligibility for social insurance services
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The factors affecting the provision of social insurance may be various but in 
general the two important ones are the objectives of social insurance system and the 
availability o f resources. For some countries like China some other factors like the 
effects of other social institutions are also significant. Eligibility for social insurance 
services in China, for example, is fixed by factors such as household status, employment 
nature, the length of working period, the income format, etc. These prerequisites to 
eligible for social insurance in China are also its features. Accordingly, the case of 
Guangzhou Shi demonstrates that the provision and eligibility issues of the social 
insurance system are politically, economically and socially determined. Although 
interested groups, namely, the state, employers, and employees always have conflicts 
and incompatible values and interests on social insurance in other countries, in a 
centralised country with a strong government as China these conflicts are seldom found
The social insurance eligibility pattern in Guangzhou Shi as shown in Charts 7-5 
and 7-6 above are very similar. The charts present the rather high associations between 
provisions and eligibility in social insurance services. (Cramer’s V are from 0.68 to 
0.71) The strong relationship between these two has two implications. First, employees 
in state-owned work units have relatively more accesses to social insurance since state-
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owned units have more state supports in providing the services. Second, employees in 
the state-owned sector constitute the largest consumer group in social insurance services. 
According to the study on eligibility and provision pattern in Guangzhou Shi, this group 
of employees are eligible for most of the social insurance services. This eligibility and 
provision pattern reflects the feature of social insurance in China that employees in state- 
owned sector are relatively extensively better covered than their counterparts. Since 
working in state-owned units is a social status in this socialist country that requires 
further exploration.
Eligibility for social insurance provisions by status factors
Chapter Six shows that work units usually provide social insurance on four main factor 
groups: the need factors, the commitment factors, the status factor and the other factors. 
For status factors there are two subgroups: ascribed status such as gender and age and 
achieved status such as wage level, work nature, employment nature, the rank or post, 
working years in the work unit, household status and modes of income of the employee. 
In order to get social insurance one has to satisfy the status requirements before other 
factors are taken into account. In the following paragraphs the discussion is around these 
matters.
On ascribed status it is found in this study that gender and age do not impact 
strongly one’s eligibility for the six social insurance items. The findings show that 
except for maternity benefits gender factor is weakly related with the other five social 
insurance items. This implies gender discrimination in social insurance in China is rather 
insignificant. It is not the point to examine in detail the underlying reasons but one 
noteworthy issue is that the communist government in China changed the inferior 
women status in the long Chinese history. From the political point of view socialist 
egalitarianism spread over the country since early 1910 under the ‘Fourth of May 
Movement’ and the efforts made by the Communist Party of China. Functionally the 
communist government envisaged women’s important roles in economic production and 
reproduction of the labour force. Thus social insurance services in China are provided to 
both genders on a rather equal basis.
The history of women’s participation in production in China is not long. It was in
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the 1910s that the foreigners invested on a large scale in light industries such as spinning 
and weaving in China and women were recruited to work outside the family. The 
successful organisation of women to provide logistical supports in the ‘liberation 
movements’ in the struggles between the Communist Party of China and the Nationalist 
government in the 1930s and 1940s escalated women’s social and economic status in 
China. After 1949 the communist government opened more accesses for women to join 
economic production through legislation and facilitating their participation by providing 
institutional services at neighbourhood and work unit levels. Women were praised as 
‘half of the sky’ {ban bian tiari) signifying that they have the same share as men in 
society.147 Thus gender equality in China had been strengthening in the four decades 
since the 1940s. Gender equality in the country is evidenced by the weak correlation 
between gender and education attainment (Cramer’s V=0.15) found in this study. In fact, 
when contrasting with 52.4% of the male employees who received education at senior 
secondary or above, the percentage for female employees was found even slightly higher 
for 4.5%. A similar phenomenon was also found in other employment-related issues 
such as job natures (i.e. production and non-production) and skill levels of jobs. The 
percentages of these two issues are very close that the Cramer’s V are only 0.11 and 
0.19, respectively.
These conditions, however, have been changing in the 1990s in enterprise 
reforms. It is found that more women workers are under-employed or have to step down 
from their posts because of streamlining of work units. As having been stated in previous 
sections the retreat of women from the labour force may cause a sudden drop of family 
incomes because of the prevalence of double-worker families in China. This transition 
creates the need for more income protection, especially for the families that have the 
breadwinners being dismissed or requested to take early retirement from paid jobs at the 
same time.148 In brief, social insurance in China is featured by its functional purposes
147 Article 48 of the Constitution of The People’s  Republic of China states: “W omen in the 
People’s  Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all sp h eres  of life: political, economic, 
cultural, social and family life. The state  protects the rights and interests of women, applies the 
principle of equal pay for equal work for men and wom en alike and trains and selec ts  cadres 
from am ong women." (Constitution of the People’s  Republic of China 1982)
148 The need  on income protections has becom e a serious social problem. There are m ore and 
more c a se s  in China where the early retired workers and the unem ployed cannot find sufficient 
m eans of living. Reports on suicide for this reason are not uncommon in today’s  China. S ee, for 
example, Ming Pao Daily News 13 & 14 February 1999 about two different c a ses  in northeastern 
China. The central governm ent w as so alerted to the serious social consequence that it required
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for labour management rather than income protection. This particular feature is reflected 
by the recruiting of women into the production force, equal treatment with social 
insurance benefits for both genders, and sending women home to facilitate economic 
system transformation.
Concerning the relationship between eligibility for social insurance and age 
groupings, the association significance is low in different social insurance services. For 
example, the Cramer’s V for the association between eligibility for unemployment 
benefits and age groupings was 0.12. This shows the fact that age is not an important 
element in getting unemployment benefits. However, there are still some insights. 
Among those not eligible for unemployment benefits includes 40.8% of the younger 
group (age 16-35), 25.6% of the middle age group and 21.1% of the oldest group (age 
over 55). On the other hand, the study shows that the younger the groups the more the 
employees know about unemployment benefits. The percentage of the youngest group 
that did not know the benefit was 41.6% as compared with 55.5% of the middle age 
group, and 57.9% of the oldest group. However, the study also reveals that the 
percentages of the three age groups eligible for unemployment benefits are very close. 
For the younger group it was 17.5% and for the middle age was 18.5%, whilst for the 
older it was 21.1%.
A rather different picture is the association between eligibility for retirement 
pensions and age. The Cramer’s V for this significance test is 0.27. The results show that 
more of the older employees were eligible for this benefit than the younger. The 
percentages for the three age groups were 42.7 for the younger, 75.2 for the middle age, 
and 94.7 for the oldest. On the other hand, it also reveals that the younger the employee 
the more likely he is not eligible for the benefits. 31.8% of the younger group compared 
with 6.7% in the middle age and 5.3% of the oldest group were not eligible for 
retirement benefits.
The above two cases mark the particular effects of age factor on the changing 
social insurance services in China. First, age is a factor that relates to the established 
social insurance services like retirement benefits. The weaker association of age with
local governm ents and work units to 'avoid discharging working couples from the sam e family at 
the sam e time'. (Ming Pao Daily, 4 April 1999)
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unemployment benefits than retirement pensions evidences this argument. Similar 
situation can also be found in medical and sickness benefits and OISH. The study shows 
that the correlation is weaker (Cramer’s V=0.16) for OISH than for medical and sickness 
benefits (Cramer’s V=0.23). For OISH benefits it is found that 22.1% of the younger age 
group did not know whether they were eligible for the benefits or not. The percentage 
for the middle age group was 29.8 and for the oldest group was 36.8. In other words, the 
knowledge about OISH was weaker in older age groups. This situation is also found in 
other social insurance items like medical and sickness benefits where the older the age 
the higher the eligibility rates.
In concluding the discussion it is discovered that ascribed status is not an 
important factor in eligible for social insurance in China. It shows that, among the 
different ascribed status factors, age is relatively more significant and has various 
impacts. For example, the younger groups are more familiar with new social insurance 
services such as unemployment benefits. The older groups, on the other hand, have 
higher percentages who are eligible for the established social insurance items such as 
retirement pensions and medical and sickness benefits. Finally, the gender factor does 
not constitute a problem for one to be eligible for social insurance. Nevertheless, more 
women employees in middle age will be laid off or under-employed in economic 
reforms that pushes them to seek for assistance from social insurance. In a nutshell, 
because of the purposes of meeting the needs of political transition and economic system 
transformation, there are new initiatives in social insurance in China that affects different 
gender and age groupings. Such a happening reflects the fact that development of social 
insurance in China is led by the governing political party in pursuit for political ideals in 
the name of economic development. Thus the momentum of social insurance 
development in China mainly comes from the state but not the capitalists or labour force. 
In the following paragraphs the focal points of discussion will turn to the relationships 
between achieved status and eligibility for social insurance.
The first achieved status factor to be discussed is job nature, that is, whether one 
works as a production worker or non-production staff.149 The definition of production
149 Zhu etal. (1991) use the term s ‘production labour’ (shengchan laodong) and ‘non production 
labour’ (fei shengchan laodong) to explain the meaning of production and non-production work 
natures. Production labour, according to Zhu et a!., m eans “those labour activities which can
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workers refers to those who participate directly in production or services, e.g. assembly 
worker and salesperson. On the other hand, non-production means the management and 
clerical staff, designers, accounting staff, etc. In general these two main job natures 
means waged or salaried work that may affect one’s eligibility for social insurance. The 
data show that job nature does not matter in being eligible for social insurance in 
Guangzhou Shi, China.
The study reveals that the association between job nature and the six social 
insurance items are various but in general they are rather low. Chart 7-7 below 
demonstrates that the patterns of eligibility for social insurance between production and 
non-production employees are very similar and the association between the two 
variables is not strong. In general the percentages of eligible for social insurance services 
are higher for non-production staff than production workers. For instances, the gaps in 
retirement pensions (23.8%) and death benefits (23.7%) are the biggest, and the smallest 
is on unemployment benefit (10.7%). This high-low pattern also tells the variations 
between the established and newly implemented social insurance items that new services 
are generally less known and the eligibility rates are also different according to the work 
natures.
The study shows that nominal disparities exist between employees of different 
job natures for eligibility for social insurance although the variance is insignificant. The 
reason for the similar social insurance benefits for employees of different employment 
natures can be attributed to the equalisation policies implemented by the communist 
government since 1949. These policies include ‘centralised job allocation policy’ and the
create m aterials and wealth, including work in direct production and throughout its process, and 
the service nature production. This is the basis of the existence and developm ent of mankind.” 
(Zhu et al. 1991, p. 22) Zhu et al. also supplem ent the term saying that the aim s of production 
labour in capitalist society is only for producing the surplus values. On the  other hand, ‘non 
production labour’ refers to “...the symmetry of production labour that, in general, does not 
include the labour that cannot creates m aterials and w ealth.... It breaks up in the developm ent of 
productivity and specialisation.” (Zhu et al. 1991, p. 56) In brief production labour has a main 
concern on the ‘production or reproduction m aterials’ whilst the non-production labour consum es 
th ese  production m aterials. Mao’s  writing on The Ten Major Relationships (Shida Guanxi) 
evidences the inclination to production labour of the communist governm ent in China. In the 
article on T h e  Relationships Between Heavy and Light Industries on the O ne Hand and Light 
Industry and Agriculture on the O ther’ in April 1956, Mao stated: “The em phasis in our country’s  
construction is on heavy industry. The production of the m eans of production m ust be given 
priority.” (Mao, Selected Works Volume V, p. 285)
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policies on developing heavy industries.150 The centralised job allocation policy is also 
matched by the standard wages system that the nature of and incomes from the job are 
scaled and fixed. Consequently the differences between production and non-production 
jobs are minimised. The relative equal treatment in social insurance between production 
(blue collar) and non-production (white-collar) employees is one of the features of 
Chinese social insurance.
Chart 7-7 Employees eligible for social insurance by work natures
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Apart from the job nature issue, another achieved status is household registration 
Household registration is an administrative measure that was originally designed for 
controlling the supply of scarce resources in the liberated areas. Household registration 
has some features of ascribed status. For example it can be passed from one generation 
to another within the family. However, household registration is basically a social 
system that one’s household status can be changed from one to another by administrative 
means. For example, the transmigration policy in the Great Leap Forward Movement in 
the late 1950s changed the household status of tens of thousands of urban youth.151 
Furthermore, in the 1990s, some big cities like Shenzhen and Shanghai practise ‘Blue 
Stamp Household System’ which offers long-term residency to migratory workers who
150 P lease refer to footnote 149. op cit.
151 In order to achieve the targets set for the Great Leap Froward Movement, the Chinese 
government encouraged people to move around the country to join industrial production in cities 
and agricultural production in rural areas. Most of these migrants were ‘educated urban youth’ 
who went and worked in the countryside and mountain areas in responding to the CPC’s  call.
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come from other cities.152 Thus household status should be treated as ‘achieved’ rather 
than ‘ascribed’.
Household status in China can generally be categorised into urban household 
(chengzhen hukou) and rural household (rongcun hukou). If one migrates or moves to 
live in places other than one’s (native place) original towns or ‘street’ (jiedu) then one 
can apply at that place’s public security office for a temporary household (linshi hukou) 
for a definite period. In China those who are living temporarily in a place for any reason 
the term ‘floating population (liudong renkou)’ is used. Floating population in developed 
areas in China has long been the social and economic problems. It has been discussed in 
previous chapters that most of the floating population in Guangzhou Shi consists of 
economic migrants who come to make money. Income protection for this floating 
population is far from enough because of the special conditions set in the policies, the 
interests of the capitalists, and the desire of the floating population to earn money. 
Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that people with temporary household status are 
usually linked with less permanent jobs and are barely provided with social insurance in 
work units. The following part has a special aim to solicit the views of the employees on 
social insurance services in relation with household status.
Chart 7-8 below shows the views of employees on eligibility for social insurance 
in relation to their household status. In comparing the weaker association between 
eligibility for social insurance and job natures, the chart shows the high correlation 
between household status and eligibility for various social insurance programmes. The 
Cramer’s V for these two variables are around 0.30 for unemployment benefits to 0.56 
for retirement pensions. For the other social insurance benefits, the Cramer’s V are also 
modest. The examples are 0.49 for medical and sickness benefits, 0.47 for survivors’ 
benefits, 0.43 for maternity benefits and 0.34 for OISH.
In statistical terms, the higher the value of Cramer’s V the more active the effects 
of one variable to another. Thus it shows that household background is vital for one to be
152 Ji et at quoted from the Population Growth and Migration Study Group for Hangzhou Urban 
Area that in the household system  reforms there should be a two-level system . The first level is 
for the perm anent resident that includes ‘red stam p’, ‘blue stam p’ and ‘green card’ holders. The 
second level is for those with ‘no card’ and th ese  are the tem porary residents. (Ji etal. 1995, p. 
297-298, my translation)
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eligible for social insurance. Employees with permanent household status have relatively 
greater chances to be eligible for different social insurance programmes in China, 
according to this study. 89.7% of the employees with permanent household status were 
eligible for get medical benefits, 70.9% to join and get the retirement pensions, around 
60% to be eligible for OISH, maternity and survivors’ benefits. For this group of 
employees 21.7% were eligible for unemployment benefits.
Chart 7-7 Employees eligible for social insurance by household
In relation to those with permanent household status, migratory employees were 
not so lucky. For this group of employees medical and sickness benefits (39.1%) was the 
most commonly enjoyed social insurance service whilst OISH was the second (36.8%). 
On the other hand, eligibility for retirement pensions of migratory employees was 1.1%, 
maternity benefit was 3.4%, and survivors’ benefit was 4.6%. The most striking finding 
is that no migratory employee thought that they were eligible for unemployment 
benefits. In sum, employees with temporary household status were more likely to be 
eligible for social insurance related to physical inability such as medical and sickness 
and occupational injuries. However, when compared with permanent residents migratory 
employees were still neglected. The study shows that in every two employees with 
permanent household status one migratory employee is eligible for medical and sickness 
benefits
An insight from this study is that the interviewees were rather certain about the 
eligibility for social insurance. The percentages of the employees who chose the definite
status
100.00% T 
90.00%
Permanent household 
Temporary household
Social insurance
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answers such as ‘not eligible’ and ‘don’t know’ are very close. Thus it can be summed 
up that, employees of different household status hold certain perceptions on their access 
to social insurance. These perceptions, to a large extent, are related to their own 
cognition of household status and the information on related policies collected from 
work, peers, mass media, etc. In the coming chapter this issue will be examined in more 
detail.
In relation to employees with permanent household status, more migratory 
employees said they were not eligible for social benefits. For migratory employees 
60.9% said that they were not eligible for retirement pensions, 46% not qualified to get 
OISH and 44.8% not eligible for medical and sickness benefits. This shows social 
insurance benefits in China were provided to migratory employees in a rather limited 
way. On the whole, there were far fewer permanent residents not eligible for social 
insurance than the migrants. Household registration in China is thus a significant status 
factor for one to be employed permanently or temporarily and eligible for social 
insurance. Thus household registration is of vital importance in the study of social 
insurance in China because it reflects the related features of social insurance like the 
strong administrative functions and uneven coverage between different categories of 
employees. In the following part the attention will turn to the relationship between 
employment nature and eligibility for social insurance.
For the gender variable, it has been shown in previous parts that more women 
than men were employed under permanent terms. This situation is unique to China - a 
developing country that has successfully overcome the difficulties in employment 
equality. An important issue, however, is the relationship between employment nature 
and one’s skill level, i.e. does one’s skills determine his employment nature? This 
question is meaningful because, as having been discussed before, employment natures 
have moderate relationship with one’s eligibility for social insurance. In other words, 
one’s eligibility for social insurance will also be affected if skill is correlated with 
employment nature.
The finding result shows that the association between employment nature and 
skill levels is rather weak (Cramer’s V=0.19). Among the 224 non-skilled labours (e.g. 
salespersons, manual production workers, etc.) 52.7% worked as permanent workers in
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contrast with 17% as contract system workers and another 27.7% as temporary workers. 
For the 127 skilled labours (i.e. chef, accounting clerks, printers, etc.) 70.9% were 
permanently employed and 17.3% were contract system workers and another 11.8% 
were temporary workers. Among the 80 professional or managerial employees, 73.8% 
worked as permanent staff, with 21.5% contract system employees and 5% temporarily 
employed. In brief, there is a tendency that the higher the skill levels the more the 
chances of being permanently employed. However, it is necessary to mention here that 
one’s skill level is conditioned by many factors such as working experiences, training, 
age, education, etc. Thus in general the older the age and the higher the education level 
may increase one’s chance to skilled labour work. The weak correlation between age, 
education levels and employment natures found above also explains why skill levels do 
not affect employment natures directly.
In concluding consideration of the relationships between employment nature and 
the variables discussed above, it is learned that in relative terms household status affects 
employment nature the most. Based on this observation an argument comes out that if 
employment nature does affect one’s eligibility for social insurance then such effects are 
strongly related to household status. This finding is unique to China since household 
registration is one of the effective social systems of the communist government for 
managing the economy and the people.
The results found in previous parts show that most of the permanent employees 
were eligible for social insurance. On average, above 70% of these employees were 
eligible for social insurance services, except for unemployment benefits. This percentage 
contrasts greatly with that of employees of other natures. For example, around 50% of 
the contract system employees, 15% of the temporary employees and around 35% of the 
employees of the ‘others’ group were eligible.
The analysis shows that the association between eligibility for social insurance 
and employment natures varies but in general they are not notably linked. The three 
social insurance items which have a modest relationship with employment natures are 
retirement pensions (Cramer’s V=0.47), medical benefits (Cramer’s V=0.43), and 
survivors’ benefits (Cramer’s V=0.41). Eligibility of permanent employees to medical 
benefit (97.1%) and retirement pensions (80.1) is exceptionally high. For this group of
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employees, the rate of eligibility for survivors’ benefits is a bit lower but it also reached 
63 .4%. The percentages for contract system and temporary employees were rather low.
The other three social insurance items in which the employees of different 
employment natures have relative weak associations are unemployment benefits 
(Cramer’s V=0.19), OISH (Cramer’s V= 0.27) and maternity benefit (Cramer’s V=0.36). 
For unemployment benefits the eligibility rates for permanent and contract system 
employees were the same (22.2%) whilst for the group of ‘others’ was 10%. The 
differences between permanent and contract system employees in OISH is 9.6% and in 
maternity benefits the percentage for permanent employees is 63.4% whilst for contract 
system employees was 57.4%.
The stronger correlation between employment natures and eligibility for the three 
social insurance services, i.e. medical and sickness benefits, retirement pensions and 
survivors’ benefits goes with the pattern found earlier on the relationships between these 
items and household registration. This states clearly that, among all status factors, 
household registration is the most influential in determining one’s employment nature as 
well as eligibility for social insurance. On the other hand, the weaker association of the 
other three items (unemployment, OISH, and maternity) and eligibility for social 
insurance reflects the less divergent treatments among all types of employees.
In concluding this section, an important point that should be pointed out is that 
household registration is significant to one’s eligibility for social insurance in China and 
this is also its significant feature. The case of social insurance in Guangzhou Shi 
demonstrates that to be eligible for social insurance one’s gender and age are 
unimportant. The data also exhibit that neither job natures such as production or non­
production nor education level or skill levels are influential to one’s eligibility for social 
insurance. Rather, it is one’s household status, i.e. being a permanent resident or a 
migrant, that affects one’s employment natures and then one’s access to social insurance. 
It can be envisaged that, by having understood household registration as the means used 
by the government to control the movement of population, one’s eligibility for social 
insurance is predetermined and discriminatory. The primary aims of the administrative 
approach of controlling the mechanics of population growth is to create a favourable 
economic production environment in urban areas, and for the better use of the limited
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resources in the modernisation process that will ultimately facilitate economic growth. 
Household system, therefore, makes up the special characteristics of social insurance in 
China under the socialist modernisation development approach.
Eligibility for and needs of social insurance as viewed by employees
This section is going to demonstrate the feelings and understandings on eligibility issue 
among employees. There are two main concerns: first, the reasons stated by the 
employees for being not eligible for social insurance (Table 7-1) and second, their 
experiences in getting social insurance benefits (Table 7-2). This section ends with the 
analysis of the relations between eligibility for social insurance and the reasons and 
experiences as perceived by employees. On the whole, this part presents the effects of 
social insurance as a social institution on people in China with the case of Guangzhou 
Shi. These findings are also important to the exploratory study on the features of social 
insurance in China.
Table 7-1 below lists the five main reasons perceived by employees for being not 
eligible for social insurance benefits. It shows that among the 165 employees who 
responded to the question, more employees (41.8%) thought employment status or 
nature was the reason for not being eligible. Interestingly, household status was second 
place. 28.5% of these interviewees answered that temporary household was the reason 
for being rejected from social insurance provisions. For the other three reasons the 
significance was not so strong although 1.2 out of ten of the employees thought that the 
length of working periods was also determinant.
Table 7-1 Reasons for being not eligible for social insurance as viewed by 
employees
Reasons Number %
Household status (e.g. temporary household) 47 28.5
Employment status (e.g. temporary employee) 69 41.8
Irregular incomes (e.g. on piece basis) 13 7.9
Lower ranks 16 9.7
Short working period 20 12.1
Total 165 100.0
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The views of employees on eligibility for social insurance coincide with the 
findings in earlier sections of this chapter, i.e. household status and employment status 
are the two main criteria for one to be eligible for social insurance. Such findings make 
clear that status factors control over one’s eligibility for social insurance in China.
Table 7-2 Use of social insurance services among employees (%)
Social insurance Yes Never
Medical and sickness benefits 79.8 20.2
Maternity benefits 34.2 65.8
OISH 16.2 83.8
Unemployment benefits 1.9 98.1
Retirement pensions 6.8 93.2
Survivors’ benefits & funeral expenses 3.2 96.8
Table 7-2 above shows the percentages of the employees who used the social 
insurance services. It is found that medical and sickness benefit is the most frequently 
used item among the employees (79.8%). The percentage for maternity benefits (34.2%) 
is lower whilst the percentage is even lower still for OISH. The low utilisation rates of 
employees in social insurance other than medical and sickness benefits may be 
understood as the infrequent needs or fewer chances of happening rather than a sign of 
lack of success. However, the figures also reflect that some of insurance items are 
particularly important and more popularly known or used by employees and thus the 
usage rates are higher.
From testing the association between eligibility and usage of social insurance 
service it is found that the Cramer’s V for medical benefits (0.86) is the highest whilst 
for maternity benefits (0.60) is the second and the others were from 0.12 to 0.31, 
respectively (Table 7-3). These indicate medical and sickness insurance is the biggest 
concern among employees. On the other hand, this study also shows the needs for 
particular social insurance items by cross tabulating the eligibility (i.e. who is covered) 
and usage of services. The needs for a specific social insurance are high if the two 
variables are strongly related. This facilitates the understanding of how often people 
have to resort to the insurance benefits when such need arises. Most importantly, the 
study on the needs of employees enhances the understanding of the uniqueness of social 
insurance in China.
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Table 7-3 Eligibility for and usage of social insurance services viewed from 
employees (%) (number=524)
Social insurance Eligibility % Usage Cramer’s V=
Never Yes
Medical & sickness Not eligible 12.5 92.4 7.6 0.86
Eligible 81.0 3.5 96.5
Don’t know 6.5 88.2 11.8
Maternity benefits Not eligible 24.5 94.6 5.4 0.60
Eligible 49.8 37.0 63.0
Don’t know 25.7 94.1 5.9
OISH Not eligible 17.1 96.7 3.3 0.31
Eligible 56.7 73.8 26.2
Don’t know 26.2 97.1 2.9
Retirement pensions Not eligible 19.8 99.0 1.0 0.18
Eligible 59.1 89.4 10.6
Don’t know 21.1 98.2 1.8
Survivors’ benefits Not eligible 19.2 100.0 0.0 0.15
Eligible 46.8 93.9 6.1
Don’t know 34.0 98.9 1.1
Unemployment
benefits
Not eligible 33.5 98.9 1.1 0.12
Eligible 18.1 94.7 5.3
Don’t know 48.5 98.8 1.2
Table 7-3 above shows the relationships between the eligibility for and usage of 
social insurance. The table clearly shows that, according to the Cramer’s V, the 
relationships between eligibility for and usage of social insurance exist to various 
extents. The two most outstanding items are medical and sickness benefits (Cramer’s 
V=0.86) and maternity benefits (Cramer’s V=0.60). The scorings of these two social 
insurance benefits, as mentioned, speak to two important matters. First, from the 
employees’ perspective medical and sickness insurance and maternity benefits are the 
most frequently needed items. Second, the usage of insurance services depends very 
much on the eligibility status, i.e. only if one is eligible for the benefit can then one 
access and experience from it.
Among the 524 sampled employees 81% said they were eligible for medical and 
sickness benefits and only 12.5% were not eligible. The high eligibility rate of the 
employees for medical and sickness benefits contrasts greatly with that for 
unemployment insurance. For unemployment insurance, the uncertainty rate, i.e. those
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who didn’t know whether they were eligible or not (48.5%), and the rate for those who 
were not eligible (33.5%) far exceeded the percentage of those who were eligible (18.1).
In returning to the discussions on the relationship between eligibility and usage 
of social insurance, Table 7-3 shows that 96.5% of those who were eligible for medical 
and sickness benefits used this benefit. In contrast, 92.4% of those who were not eligible 
for this insurance had never used this benefit. This shows the strong relationship 
between one’s eligibility for and usage of the social insurance. Accordingly, the more 
the people who use particular insurance item they are eligible for, the more frequent the 
need of these people on such service. Thus the 94.7% of those eligible for 
unemployment benefits but had not used the service reflects the low immediate needs for 
the insurance.
Generally one’s knowledge of a service or commodity affects usage of it. In a 
society with free information exchanges everyone is supposed to own equally and have 
adequate accesses to knowledge of what one can get. However, such accesses are also 
conditioned by the ability of the concerned, i.e. to what extent one can get the 
information and one’s purchasing power. This is a very basic issue in the study of social 
services. Therefore, an assumption is that a high utilisation rate of a service also implies 
that the users are widely informed and they can afford the charges.
The above simple and straightforward marketing rules, nevertheless, is difficult 
to be applied in understanding the relationship between knowledge, usage of and 
eligibility for social insurance in China. This difficulty comes from the country’s 
enclosed and strongly linked political, economic and social systems. Social insurance in 
China exceeds the functions of a social institution that it is also a political and economic 
institution. The dissimilar eligibility rates between migratory workers and workers with 
permanent household status, and between permanent and non-permanent employees 
spell out the effects of the multifunctional social insurance services in China. Eligibility 
for social insurance in China is to a large extent status-determined whilst knowledge 
about the services is controlled by central or local government or its agents. Accordingly 
usage of a particular social insurance item depends on the attitude and openness of the 
state. The relatively high eligibility and usage rates but low ‘don’t know’ percentages of 
medical and sickness and maternity benefits show that social insurance services in China
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are basically concerned with the needs for income protection caused by short term 
physical disabilities.
In the following part, the discussion centres on who were not eligible for social 
insurance service from analysing the demographic variables such as gender groups, age 
groups, household registration, work natures and employment natures to study. Table 7- 
4 below compares the employees of different backgrounds who were not eligible for the 
two most popularly needed social insurance benefits.
Table 7-4 Employees who were not eligible for medical and sickness insurance 
and maternity benefits
Variables Category Number Medical & 
sickness (%)
Maternity
(%)
Gender Male 250 18.4 32.4
Female 274 15.3 16.8
Job nature Production 307 20.2 29.0
Non production 217 12.0 17.5
Household
Registration
Local 437 11.0 17.8
Migrant 87 46.0 56.3
Employment
Nature
Permanent 306 7.2 14.4
Contract system 108 11.1 16.7
Temporary 100 51.0 60.0
Others 10 30.0 50.0
Age 16-35 267 24.7 33.7
36-55 238 8.4 13.9
Over 55 19 10.5 3.1
The first finding is that, except for maternity benefits, the contrasts between the 
unprotected rates for men and women are small. Apart from gender variable, all of the 
others have significant disproportion. The two notable variables are household status and 
employment natures. On household status there were higher percentages of temporarily 
employed migrants not eligible for the two insurance items. For example, 56.3% of the 
87 migratory employees were not eligible for maternity benefits in contrast with 17.8% 
of the 437 local employees. For medical and sickness benefit, the difference is also 
remarkable. Only 11% of the local employees were not protected whilst for migratory 
workers the percentage was 46. In terms of employment natures fewer permanent 
employees could not get the two insurance items. But the percentages of non-permanent 
employees were higher. The percentage of temporary employees in the ‘not eligible’
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group was exceptionally high. Finally, in comparing different age groupings, it is found 
that the youngest group (age 16-35) was mostly neglected and the oldest most protected.
In brief, the case of medical and sickness benefits shows migratory workers aged 
16 to 35 and employed temporarily in production work comprise the least covered group 
in social insurance services in China. Accordingly, it is obvious that this group of 
employees is even more neglected in other social insurance benefits. The least covered 
young migratory employees reflects social insurance services in China are largely 
provided to local older permanent employees who are mostly employed by state-owned 
work units. This phenomenon evidences unequal resource distribution especially in a 
horizontal way between migrants and local people, between sate and non-state owned 
work units, and between non-permanent and permanent employees. These inequalities in 
social insurance relate to the particular environment in China.
The need for social insurance: A comparison between different groups of employees
The previous part reviewed the employees’ experiences of, and views on the different 
social insurance benefits in Guangzhou Shi. It is found that in terms of eligibility for 
social insurance young migratory temporary workers were the most neglected. This 
section is going to compare the magnitude of disparities between migratory temporary 
employees, local permanent employees and the overall sampled population. The first 
task in this section is to present the general features of their backgrounds such as family 
income levels and modes of income, etc. (Table 7-5). Second, it will explore their living 
standards that include housing types, household equipment and household facilities 
(Table 7-6). Finally the discussion will touch on the family expenditure patterns of these 
three groups of employees (Table 7-7).
Table 7-5 below shows that migratory temporary employees have some 
particular features when compared with local permanent employees as well as the 
overall sampled population. First, more than half (53.6%) of the group of migratory 
temporary employees got household incomes below 900 yuan per month. This 
percentage far exceeds that of the local permanent employees (15.2%) and the whole 
sampled population (21.7%). Second, there are fewer migratory temporary employees 
(58.3%) procuring their incomes from work units monthly than local permanent
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employees (85.5%) and the whole sampled population (81.9%). Third, 52.4% of the 
migratory temporary employees were breadwinners in their families (provided 80% or 
more of the family incomes) whilst 49.5% were local permanent employees and 48.4% 
were in the whole sampled population. Fourth, more migratory temporary employees 
have big family sizes than the other categories. 26.2% of the migratory temporary 
employees have 2 or more family dependants but for local permanent employees the 
percentage was 20.5% and the whole sampled population was 19.6%. Finally, slightly 
more of the migratory temporary employees group (20.2%) experienced sudden loss of 
family income in the previous three years, compared with 18.5% of local permanent 
employees and 20% of the whole sampled population.
Table 7-5 Income and household patterns of migratory temporary and local 
permanent employees (%)
Variables Categories
Migratory
temporary*
(n=84)
Local Permanent
employees**
(n=303)
All
respondents
(n=524)
Earner of the family 52.4 49.5 48.4
Monthly income mode 58.3 85.5 81.9
Experience of sudden loss of 
income
20.2 18.5 20.0
Family incomes less than 900 
yuan per month
53.6 15.2 21.7
Family dependants
1 only 7.1 54.1 40.5
2 or more 26.2 20.5 19.6
Married 25.0 84.2 64.9
Note: * ‘Migratory temporary employees’ means those who registered as temporary 
households in Guangzhou Shi and were employed under temporary terms.
** ‘Local permanent employees’ means those who were permanent residents in 
Guangzhou Shi and employed as permanent employees.
Migratory temporary employees as contrasted with their counterparts tended to 
earn incomes irregularly (i.e. non-monthly such as piece rate or weekly basis) from work 
units. Furthermore, their household incomes were lower than that of the local permanent 
employees and the whole sampled population. These special features of migratory and 
temporary employees arouse attention to their higher needs for social insurance to 
protect them and their families from living difficulties. These weakness or features of 
social insurance in China as demonstrated by the neglected migratory employees are
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two. First, social insurance services in China are insensitive to and ineffective in 
managing the rising social needs in the country. Second, these services screen out the 
most needy by administrative means, e.g. household and employment natures in the 
transition to a socialist market economy
Apart from irregular income pattern, Table 7-6 below shows the living standards 
of migratory temporary employees by three variables: housing types, household 
equipment and household facilities. In general the table discloses that the living 
standards of migratory temporary employees are lower than that of the overall 
population, particularly of the local permanent employees.
Table 7-6 Living standards of different categories of employees (%)
Variables Categories
Migratory
temporary
(n=84)
Local
permanent
employees
(n=303)
All respondents 
(n=524)
Housing types
Self-owned/built 47.6 18.8 27.0
Privately rent 7.1 8.9 10.6
Work unit’s 41.6 64.4 55.7
Household equipment
Television set 70.2 98.0 93.3
Radio set 79.8 87.1 86.5
Refrigerator 20.2 90.8 80.0
Visual system 11.9 59.7 51.7
Audio system 26.2 61.7 53.8
Telephone set 17.9 71.0 62.0
Air conditioner 10.7 49.2 43.2
Electric fan 90.5 95.7 94.1
Microwave oven 7.1 15.2 15.6
Rice cooker 76.2 97.7 93.7
Household facilities
Running water 85.7 99.3 96.8
Electricity 83.3 92.1 90.3
Gas 36.9 92.4 82.9
Sewage 1 46.4 73.9 67.3
Private use toilet 48.8 86.1 81.4
Private use kitchen 54.8 93.4 87.1
245
On the housing types it is learned from Table 7-6 that more migratory employees 
own houses (47.6%) than local permanent employees (18.8%). At the same time, fewer 
migratory employees (41.6%) live in accommodations provided by work units than local 
permanent employees (64.4%). It seems that by viewing from the higher house 
ownership rate, migratory temporary employees are better off than local permanent 
employees. However, this is not the case in China since most housing units in the mid 
1990s were still owned by central or local government, or their work units and were not 
marketable. Thus for the majority of the dwelling-houses in the country owned or built 
by individuals, especially those by migratory employees, are of a very low standard and 
non-marketable (e.g. temporary accommodations built with waste materials along 
railroad tracks or on construction sites). In contrast, the lower living standard of 
migratory temporary employees is reflected by their low percentage of ownership of 
household equipment and household facilities (Table 7-6). In sum, this issue reveals that 
most work units did not provide migratory temporary employees with various kinds of 
housing services as are provided the local permanent employees.
The table above shows that migratory temporary employees were more deprived 
of household equipment and household facilities than their counterpart. The variations 
can be found from the very basic and necessary equipment to luxury items in urban 
living in China. For example, 46.4% of migratory temporary employees owned drainage 
system in their accommodation whilst for the whole sample population was 67.3% and 
for local permanent employees was 73.9%. The lack of drainage system of the migratory 
temporary employees also reflects the non-permanent structure of their accommodation 
units. The example of luxury item is audio system (i.e. personal stereo sound system 
including amplifier, speakers, turntables or compact disc players, tape recorders, etc.) 
26.2% of migratory temporary employees claimed they owned such commodities as 
contrasted with 61.7% of local permanent employees and 53.8% of all the sampled 
population.
The findings show that local permanent employees had more household facilities 
and better equipment for daily living needs than migratory temporary employees. These 
two sets of variable show that the living quality of local permanent employees is the best 
irrespective of the fact that one-third of them are not house owners. In sum, Table 7-6 
shows the general living situations of employees in Guangzhou Shi. The main finding is
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that social institutions in China are linked and have strong effects on people’s daily lives. 
Household system, employment system, and social insurance determine the standards 
and patterns of the people’s living. Furthermore, an important insight is that the roles 
and functions of social insurance are highly dependent on the other two in this socialist 
developing country.
Table 7-7 Family expenditure patterns of different categories of employees (%)
Items that consumed 1- 
20% of the family incomes
Migratory
temporary
(n=84)
Local permanent 
employees (n=303)
All respondents 
(n=524)
Housing 66.7 70.6 69.9
Foodstuff 33.3 7.9 15.6
Transportation 78.6 77.2 77.4
Clothing 84.5 80.5 80.4
Children’s education 53.6 62.8 57.8
Medical 86.9 82.1 82.3
Fuel/electricity 81.0 87.2 84.6
Entertainment 76.2 72.0 71.7
Others 31.0 28.7 30.7
The above table lists the proportion of family expenditures of the employees in 
this study. The table shows that migratory temporary employees spent less on 
transportation, clothing, foodstuff, medical, entertainment and other items but spent 
much more on housing, children’s education and fuel and electricity than the whole 
sampled population as well as local permanent employees. For foodstuff items one-third 
of migratory temporary employees spent only 1-20% of their family income whilst for 
local permanent employees outgoings were 7.9%. On medical expenses, 86.9% of the 
migratory employees spent 1-20% of the family incomes but the percentage for local 
permanent employees the percentage was 82.1%. Different household expenditure 
patterns reflect the coverage of social insurance as well as the affordability of employee 
contributions to social insurance services. Thus the finding outlines that migratory 
temporary employee can hardly contribute to social insurance on the one hand, and 
suffer from paying higher service charges on the other.
Table 7-8 below presents that basic wages are the main sources of incomes for 
the majority (97.6%) of migratory temporary employees. Some of them might also 
generate additional incomes from production such as job supplements (26.2%) and
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bonuses (27.4%). However, only 2.4% of migratory employees said non-production 
related welfare supplements were their main income source. This percentage was far 
lower than that of the local permanent employees (30%) and all of the sampled 
population (25.5%).
Table 7-8 Main incomes from work units between different categories of 
employees (%)
Source of incomes Migratory 
temporary 
employees (n=84)
Local permanent
employees
(n=303)
All
respondents
(n=524)
Job supplements 26.2 41.3 35.9
Basic wages 97.6 97.0 95.1
Welfare supplements 2.4 30.0 25.5
Bonus (monthly, annual, 
interests, etc.)
27.4 62.0 54.2
Others 0.0 2.0 2.5
In a nutshell, the extent of risk, the severity of income loss and contributions to 
social insurance are not enough for one to get social insurance in China. Rather, 
eligibility for social insurance is conditioned by one’s household and employment 
natures. By using different variables like housing tenure, household equipment and 
facilities, family sizes and the family expenditure patterns, this part depicted the living 
standards and needs for social insurance by migratory temporary employees. Although it 
is found that migratory temporary employees have greater needs for social insurance 
than the others, their accesses to social insurance are always blocked because of the 
administrative barriers like household system and the newly changed employment 
system. Both of these two social institutions are strongly related to socialist political and 
economic systems that create the particular features of social insurance in China.
Summary and conclusions:
This chapter discussed the features of social insurance in China from the recipients’ 
views of service surveyed in Guangzhou Shi. The study finds three distinguishing 
features of social insurance in China and these features have great impacts on the 
services. First, this study discovered that coverage of social insurance in China is to a 
large extent determined by non-social insurance related factors such as one’s household
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status. Although the relationship between household status and eligibility for social 
insurance is indirect it is because of the strong linkage between household status and 
employment nature that it strongly affects one’s social insurance coverage.
The particular relationships between household status and social insurance also 
reflect another feature of the country’s social insurance that the services are functionally 
geared for national economic transformation and political transition. For the former 
function social insurance is assigned to cater for the needs of the employees arising from 
early retirement and unemployment in building up the market economy. In realising the 
political functions social insurance services are set up and reformed for facilitating the 
transformation to market socialism. In pursuing these ideals some groups of employees 
are neglected whilst others are well protected. It is found from the study in Guangzhou 
Shi that migratory young employees are mostly employed with non-permanent terms and 
are the least covered. The study shows that even though these employees are covered, 
most of them can only get medical and sickness benefits that provide shorter-term 
income protection.
The second feature of the Chinese social insurance is its administrative and 
management structure. The study demonstrates that work units play multiple roles in the 
social insurance system in China. Work Units in China are economic production units as 
well as social services providers. In China> conflicts between employees, employer and 
state on social insurance are rare because work units carry out the development and 
provisions of the services. The mingled roles of work units in social insurance 
management facilitate horizontal redistribution of economic and social resources within 
the social insurance system. The evidence is the large group of extensively covered 
permanent employees in state-owned work units. State capitalism in China is realised by 
the politically controlled work units on economic and social issues. Social insurance 
services in China are driven by the states that the people’s needs on particular insurance 
items are created or satisfied.
Finally, this chapter proposed that social insurance, as a social institution, is 
highly vulnerable to political and economic institutions in China. This feature of the 
Chinese social insurance explicitly demonstrates the impacts of socialist politics and 
economy of the country on the objectives and effectiveness of social insurance services.
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The example is newly developed unemployment insurance benefits for those who have 
to quit the jobs under enterprise reforms. The implication of redefining unemployment in 
the 1980s is to justify the foreseeable needs of the state-owned work units in the short 
term, and the need for building up a socialist market economy in the long run. Another 
example is the criteria of being eligible for maternity benefits. The conditions of being 
covered and eligible for maternity benefits include observing the national birth control 
policies. In brief, the social functions of social insurance in China are directed by the 
country’s political and economic ideals.
The particularity of social insurance in China is its ultimate objective. 
Throughout the chapter it is found that social insurance services in China do not fall in 
line with the social insurance services in most capitalist developed countries. The case of 
social insurance in Guangzhou Shi reflects social insurance in China is built up on her 
own economic mode and fulfils mostly the socialist political and economic functions. 
This explains the phenomenon that migratory workers who have higher needs for social 
insurance because of their insecure jobs and unfavourable working conditions are barely 
protected by social insurance.
The discussion of this chapter highlights that, with the case of Guangzhou Shi, 
social insurance in China can hardly fulfil the role of ‘protecting the members against 
economic and social distress.’ Rather, it is a social institution in which the satisfaction of 
contingent income needs is based on one’s conformity or nonconformity to the norms of 
society. The implication, therefore, is the significant control function rather than the 
promotion of mutual assistance among the contributors. After presenting the features of 
social insurance in China from the employees’ experiences, the coming chapter will 
present their aspirations on the social insurance services.
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Chapter Eight
Features of social insurance in China: The views of the employees 
Introduction
The expectations and views of users on social insurance come from their cognition of the 
services (i.e. knowledge and experiences) that relies upon many variables. On the 
employees’ side these variables include their accessibility to information, ability to 
understand the information, relationships and familiarity with the social insurance 
organisations, the needs of the services and the frequencies of using the services. On the 
other hand, the service system, openness of the services and institution, education on and 
promotion of the services, administrative approaches, etc. determine the provisions of 
the services and affect the user’s perception of the whole system. The relationships 
between these two groups of variables are dynamic that make up the particular user’s 
perspective and highlights the features of the country’s social insurance. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine what these specific views on social insurance in China are and 
what features of the Chinese social insurance can be found from the views of the 
employees.
In June 1988 Deng Xiaoping commented on the reforms in China that there were 
numerous hardships and difficulties but also hopes for the success. (Deng 1993, p. 268) 
The risks of reforming are various but the primary concern of the Chinese government 
was political stability.153 In the 1980s there were ups and downs in Chinese politics. 
These include the rise and fall of Premier Zhao Ziyang and the loss of Hu Yaobang, 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the one-time closest comrade- 
in-arms of Deng Xiaoping. These events exposed power conflicts between different lines 
within the Party that consequently led to stronger political controls over national 
development. Although it was witnessed in the demonstrations in spring and summer of 
1989 that the people were dissatisfied with the political development and social 
conditions in the country, the Communist Party of China still insisted political stability
153 In the conversation with U.S. President G eorge Bush on 26 February 1989, Deng said that 
“China should persist in reforming and opening and th ese  are  the hopes for solving the problems 
in China. But reforms m ust have a stable political environment." (Deng 1993, p. 284, my 
translation)
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took precedence over everything in the country.154 The Tiananmen Square Incident in 
June 1989 was therefore labelled an “anti-revolutionary riot” and, according to 
denunciations by party leaders, the crowds in the Square had two main purposes: to 
overthrow the communist party and overturn the socialist system.155
The word ‘crisis’ in Chinese connotes the meanings both of ‘risk’ and ‘hopes’. 
Risks in national development are sparked by modifying the established systems and 
institutions at certain points of time in responding to the new measures and needs in the 
process. Hopes, on the other hand, proliferate from fear when there are uncertainties. 
Social insurance system reform in China brings new hopes to the people, especially the 
newly rising social groups. However, it is also full of risks since the new initiatives tend 
to be politically and economically commanded but | they do not aim primarily at easing 
the people’s income maintenance problems. The driving force of re-establishing a new 
social insurance system in China comes from the determination of “deepening the 
reforms in enterprise and business units, stabilising the society, and then building up a 
socialist market economic system without a hitch.”156 These political and economic 
forces constitute a specific environment which moulds the people’s perception of social 
insurance and the uniqueness of social insurance in China. The main objective of this 
chapter is to examine the features of social insurance in China given prominence by the 
field study on employee views in Guangzhou Shi in 1995.
Social insurance in Guangzhou Shi: The experiences of the employees
Social insurance is a social institution set up for assisting the eligible to meet their 
contingent income needs through a multiparty contributory system. In most capitalist 
developed countries like France, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom 
social insurance services are well developed as an important part of the income 
protection mechanism. As a social institution, economic maturity and political stability 
of society largely determine the development and operation of a social insurance system.
154 op cit.
155 T hese can be found in the speech  m ade by Deng Xiaoping on 9 Ju n e  1989 in a m eeting with 
the cadres of army level and above during the time martial law w as in force in Beijing. (Deng 
1993, pp. 302-308)
156 P lease  refer to paragraph 26, Section 5 of “The Decisions of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on the Several Questions about the Building Up of Socialist Market 
Economic System" on 14 November 1993.
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For a socialist developing country as China, however, these two important conditions are 
hardly discernible. Nevertheless social insurance in China was established in the period 
of chaotic civil wars and anti-foreignism, developed in the 1950s and 1960s in the midst 
of political upheavals, and reformed in the economic transformation from collectivism 
and centralisation to ‘market socialism’.
This section attempts to provide an understanding of the general background 
and conditions that cultivate the views of employees towards social insurance in China. 
This is an innovative approach to understand the features of social insurance system in 
China since the path of social insurance development in the country nurtures particular 
perceptions and values among the people that to a large extent reflect the features of the 
whole system. An example is the different values on roles and functions of labour and 
social insurance among local permanent employees in state-owned units and that of the 
migrant temporary employees in non state-owned sector.
This first part of the section demonstrates the characteristics of the employees 
and their families who used social insurance. The result shows that among the 524 
sampled employees 33.5% answered that their families received maternity benefits, 
19.4% got retirement pensions, 5.5% got OISH, 1.7% received unemployment benefits, 
and another 1.7% got survivors’ benefits and funeral supplements, respectively. In short, 
except for medical and sickness benefits, maternity benefits ranked as the second 
popular social insurance item, whilst unemployment and survivors’ benefits and funeral 
supplements ranked the least. The explanation is that unemployment insurance is a new 
social insurance item in China whilst the low recipient rates of survivors’ benefits and 
funeral supplements relate to the typical introvert character of Chinese on matters 
relating to death and dying. The reasons for such happenings, however, have to be 
examined in detail in another study. Chart 8-1 below demonstrates the benefit levels of 
different social insurance services received by these families.
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Chart 8-1 Recipent families and the amount of social insurance
benefit
Death
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The chart above shows the amount of monthly benefits received by the families 
from different social insurance services in the three years from 1992 to 1995. The 
benefits are grouped into three different levels from less than 100 yuan to 301 yuan or 
more per month. The bar graph shows that most of the families (80%) could only get less 
than 100 yuan from maternity benefits in contrast with 0.7% who received more than 
300 yuan per month. For retirement pensions 52% of the families got 301 yuan or 
more per month, with as little as 3.9% o f the group receiving less than 100 yuan a 
month.
In general, the amount of the benefits that a family can get depends on various 
variables but the most important one is the number of its members who are eligible to 
social insurance. It was shown in the last chapter that one’s eligibility to social insurance 
relates to work nature and household registration status. The others are attributed to the 
capability of the work unit in which the benefits are offered. Take the example of 
retirement pension for discussion. The study found that the association between the 
number of family members who are eligible to retirement pensions and the amount of 
the benefit is moderate. (Cramer’s V=0.31) Among the 37 sampled employees who 
replied that they had one pensioner in the family, 64.9% received from 101 to 300 yuan 
from retirement pensions and 35.1% got 301 yuan or higher. The percentage for the 
families with two pensioners (a total of 37) who receive the same amount of retirement 
pension was 32.4%, while 62.6% got 301 yuan or more. The same pattern is found 
among the families that have 3 or more pensioners. Accordingly, the case of retirement 
pensions shows that the more the family members are eligible to social insurance the 
more benefits the family can get.
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The previous proposition, however, cannot be generally applied to all social 
insurance items in China. For example, maternity benefits will not be increased by 
additional new-born to a family. Under the strict population control policy in China, the 
second child is not allowed in cities like Guangzhou Shi except for some very special 
reasons and being approved in advance.157
The variant relationships between social insurance benefits and eligibility to 
benefits prove further that social insurance services are conditioned by many other 
measures in China. It is obvious that ‘need’ is not determinant for one to get social 
insurance benefits but the national policies are. The typical example is maternity 
benefits. It was found in the previous chapter that work units scrutinise the applications 
for maternity benefits in supporting the national ‘single child policy’. Such approaches 
show that social insurance services in China are not needs oriented. The subsequent parts 
will investigate this issue by examining the administrative pattern of Chinese social 
insurance.
The administrative matters to be discussed in this part include the adjustment of 
social insurance benefit levels, the waiting period for social insurance benefits, and the 
formats of providing social insurance. All three of these issues can reflect the 
effectiveness of social insurance system as well as its features. For example, to review 
the formats of providing social insurance benefits (e.g. lump sum or multiple payments) 
are important since it determines how the needs of the beneficiaries are met. (Midgley, 
1984) Furthermore, an evaluation on this issue can also reflect the service values and 
ideologies. In a nutshell these practices constitute a specific view among employers and 
give prominence to most of the characteristics of the social insurance system in the 
country.
157 In m ost c a ses  married couples are only allowed to give birth to one child in the period 
approved by the related unit. However, if the first child is proved handicapped by a medical 
doctor that the couple might apply to have another. The strict population control policy also 
applies to the re-married couples that they cannot have any new bom child if either of them  had 
a child in a preceding marriage.
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Table 8-1 Review on social insurance administrative issues in Guangzhou Shi
(%)
I. Waiting time ; • / . . . .  •.
Social insurance Less than one More than one Don’t know/
month month Depends
Maternity (N=178) 41.6 25.8 32.6
OISH (N=32) 46.9 6.2 46.9
Unemployment (N=10) 70 10.0 20.0
Retirement (N=84) 78.6 19.0 2.4
Survivors’ (N = ll) 91.0 9.0 0.0
2. Benefit payment formats
Social insurance Multiple Lump sum Depends
Maternity (N=178) 73.8 20.9 5.3
OISH (N=32) 46.4 14.3 39.3
Unemployment (N=10) 60.0 20.0 20.0
Retirement (N=84) 90.1 8.7 1.2
Survivors’ (N = ll) 10 80.8 10.0
3. Adjustment of benefit levels
Social Insurance Never Yes Don’t know
Maternity (N =l78) 71.9 14.6 13.5
OISH (N=32) 25.0 46.9 28.1
Unemployment (N=10) 30.0 20.0 50.0
Retirement (N=84) 12.6 82.5 4.9
Survivors’ (N=l 1) N.A. N.A. N.A.
Table 8-1 above summarises how social insurance services were provided to the 
sampled employees and their families. First, it is evident that the issuing of social 
insurance benefits is rather efficient. This can be found especially from the short waiting 
time for survivors’ benefits and funeral supplements. The majority o f the beneficiaries 
(91.0%) got this item of benefit in less than one month from the day of filing their 
applications. On the other hand, the two most inefficient services were maternity benefit 
and OISH. Less than half of the sampled population said that they received these two 
items of benefits in less than one month’s time. Furthermore, about half of the 
employees claimed that they could not be sure of the length of the waiting time for OISH 
although they received the benefits. This reflects the complicated assessment process 
and the involvement of other non-social insurance related organisations such as labour 
bureaux. Similarly, the 32.6% of those who could not give definite answers on the length 
of the waiting time for maternity benefits reflect their uncertainties on eligibility to the 
benefits. In sum, the waiting time for specific social insurance benefits depends on first,
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whether the social insurance organisation is capable of completing the whole assessment 
process, e.g. OISH. On the other hand, it also depends on the relationships between that 
particular social insurance item and national policy on other matters, e.g. maternity 
benefits and single child policy. However, the main factors are the political orientation 
and economic drive of the government regarding social insurance services. These two 
factors determine the objectives, managing mechanism, roles and functions of social 
insurance in China.
The other aspect to be discussed is the different formats of paying the insurance 
benefits. There are two main payment formats, namely, multiple and lump sum. It is 
found that multiple payments were the generally used format but for some insurance 
items such as OISH and unemployment benefits there were no definite formats. For 
OISH, 46.4% of the responding employees and their families received the benefit in 
multiple type, 14.3% in lump sum and another 39.3% said it was not fixed. For 
unemployment benefits the rate for lump sum payment was even higher (20%) although 
for multiple payments it was as high as 60%. For retirement pensions and maternity 
benefits multiple payment was the main format, especially for the former the rate was as 
high as 90.1%. In contrast, lump sum payment was very significant (80%) in survivors’ 
benefits and funeral supplements.
The findings in previous paragraph raise three issues. First, to retire doesn’t mean 
the termination of the working relationship with the work unit. This is shown by the 
regular retirement pension payments through work units. Second, for the employees who 
have to discontinue the relationship with the work unit lump sum payment is the usual 
format. The examples are survivors’ benefit and unemployment benefit. Third, the high 
rates (39.3%) for the unfixed formats in OISH reflect the flexibility of the services. 
Work injury in fact involves rather convoluted appraisals to determine the severity of the 
problem and the needs for assistance.
The previous paragraph demonstrates the exceptional social insurance 
administration and management approaches in China. These approaches also feature the 
particular relationships between the state, work units and employees in the entire social 
insurance system. Social insurance in China is one of the many non-production services 
still controlled through work units in the 1990s. It is mainly through work units that the
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eligible employees collect their benefits. In the ‘socialisation of social insurance’ since 
the late 1980s, the roles of work units are still significant although some specialised 
organisations like the social insurance services bureaux were set up for managing the 
system. The long and close relationships between social insurance and work units built 
up in the 1930s make the people comfortable in seeking assistance from work units on 
income maintenance that fosters a particular view on social insurance.
Table 8-1 above also summarised the comments from the interviewed employees 
on social insurance benefits adjustments. The table does not contain information on 
survivors’ benefits and funeral supplements since they are mainly lump sum in nature 
and set for relieving the immediate needs of the families. It is reported by most of the 
respondents (71.9%) that maternity benefits had not been adjusted at all in three years 
before 1995. Likewise, 82.5% of the families that received retirement pensions replied 
that the benefit levels only changed occasionally or sometimes. For OISH recipients, 
46.9% agreed that the benefit levels changed occasionally or sometimes, 25% replied 
that it had never been revised and another 28.1% said they didn’t know whether or not it 
had changed. The uncertain group was the biggest (50%) in unemployment benefit and 
30% of these families also said the levels of this benefit had never been modified.
The findings above indicate the peculiarities of social insurance in China with the 
case of Guangzhou Shi. First, adjustment of social insurance benefit levels (e.g. 
maternity benefit) is paltry since the whole social insurance system is set up for assisting 
the realisation of political and economic ideals it does not override other national 
policies. Second, the beneficiaries may not be aware of the adjustment of the benefit 
levels since some insurance programmes (e.g. unemployment insurance) are rather new 
in the country whilst some others (e.g. OISH and unemployment) are unusual because 
they happen sporadically. Finally, benefit adjustments cannot catch up with the needs of 
the beneficiaries in an expanding and decentralising economy. On the one hand, the 
benefits are limited by the capabilities of work units and on the other hand the living 
costs are pushed up by the inflation in the developing market economy. This explains 
why a higher percentage of the long term insurance benefit recipients (e.g. retirement 
pensioners) said the benefit levels were only revised sometimes. In sum, social insurance 
benefit levels in China have hardly been adjusted and when it is the adjusted benefit 
levels cannot match the needs of the eligible in a changing economic system.
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To round up this section three points are made in relation to the study on the 
uniqueness of social insurance in China. First, the work unit is significant in social 
insurance management. The work unit is important in economic production, social 
services and political stability that its roles and functions are still significant in a 
dominant public ownership economic system. Since work units still actively control 
social insurance services the unit-employee relationships are maintained and the 
efficiency of the whole social insurance system is governed. Second, work units 
especially control long term income maintenance programs that makes social insurance 
services in China occupational welfare. For example retirement pensions are managed 
and supported by work units that make its nature non-contributory and weak in mutual 
help. Last but not least the social insurance benefit is not adjusted according to the needs 
of the beneficiaries but for the satisfaction of other policies. This strengthens the 
occupational welfare nature of social insurance in the country and also highlights the 
limitations of social insurance in China such as backward economy and unstable 
resources. In a nutshell, the three issues discussed in this section clearly demonstrate the 
particularities of social insurance services in China - a socialist developing country.
Social insurance in China: The views of the employees in Guangzhou Shi
In the questionnaires the respondents were asked to rate to what extent the existing 
social insurance benefits can support a reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi. The findings 
show that in general the respondents were rather dissatisfied. Their ratings were grouped 
into five different levels from ‘totally impossible’ to ‘absolutely possible’. An additional 
answer (‘don’t know’) was included for those who had no such experience. The result is 
that 80.5% of the interviewees expressed clear feelings and 19.5% were uncertain.
Among the 524 interviewees it is found that most of them were rather 
disappointed with the existing social insurance benefit levels in maintaining a reasonable 
living. The following discussions are made with the cross tabulation between the 
question “Do you think the existing social insurance benefits can maintain one’s 
reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi?” and the ownership background of their work units, 
the respondents’ household registration and their employment terms of employment. 
From the five-grade responses made by the respondents, three of the levels (i.e. ‘partly 
possible’, ‘slightly possible’, and ‘totally impossible’) are regrouped as the ‘negative
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feelings’. It shows that 73.3% of them were unsatisfied, 19.5% were not so sure and only 
7.2% satisfied (i.e. ‘greatly possible’ and ‘absolutely possible’).
The results got from cross tabulating the different variables show that there is no 
strong association between the satisfaction levels and household status (Cramer’s 
V=0.06), employment natures (Cramer’s V=0.13) and the ownership background of the 
employee’s work units (Cramer’s V=0.22). The weak correlation was also found 
between the views on the benefit levels and other variables: the role as breadwinner of 
the family (Cramer’s V=0.15) and the family income groups (Cramer’s V=0.15). Similar 
cases were also found when cross checking with education levels variable (Cramer’s 
V=0.11), gender variable (Cramer’s V=0.16), age variable (Cramer’s V=0.17) and the 
number of family dependants variable (Cramer’s V=0.12). These imply dissatisfaction 
with social insurance benefit is very common among the employees of all backgrounds 
in Guangzhou Shi. Nevertheless, the following discussions with charts are assigned to 
elaborate these situations in detail to get a more comprehensive picture.
Chart 8-2 Views of employees from work untis of different ownership 
systems on social insurance benefits in maintaining reasonable living
in Guangzhou Shi
Chart 8-2 above presents the views o f the employees from work units of different 
ownership natures on the efficacy of social insurance benefits. Although it was found in 
general that the majority was not satisfied with the benefit levels there are some 
differences between employees in state and non-state owned work units. Take the case 
of those who answered “totally impossible” as the example. 28.3% of the respondents
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from state-owned work units chose this answer as contrasted to 43.2% in the non state- 
owned sector.
Another notable point is the same percentage (19%) of the employees of work 
units in two different ownership sectors said they did not know whether the social 
insurance services could help them. The findings show that these respondents had never 
received social insurance benefits. The recipient status variable is not associated with the 
age, employment natures, and household status variables. However, this phenomenon 
reflects in general the public doubt about the social insurance system in their country. In 
addition, it also illustrates these people’s expectations are for job-related living 
supplements (shenghuo full) offered by work unit but not the contributory social 
insurance services. In short, social insurance is not valued or accepted by all employees 
in China as an important income maintenance device. In the 1990s non-contributory 
income maintenance benefits are still in high demand among the employees as in the 
past.
Concerning the relationship between age groupings and satisfaction with social 
insurance benefits, it is found that older employees are relatively more positive than the 
younger. (Chart 8-3) 45.7% of those aged 16-35 replied that social insurance benefits 
was ‘totally impossible’ to support one’s reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi. On the 
other hand, 26.5% of those aged 36-55 and 31.6% of those over 55 gave the same 
answer. The older employees (i.e. over 55) tended to be more positive as evidenced by 
10.5% of them agreeing that social insurance benefits are sufficient to support one’s 
reasonable livings in Guangzhou Shi greatly.
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Chart 8-3 Views of employees of different age groups on social 
insurance benefits in maintaining reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi
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The situation described above may be attributed to the values and belief of the 
people on social insurance services and the reforms. The younger groups (35 or below) 
were bom in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of these employees joined the labour force at 
the beginning of the modernisation in the late 1970s. Throughout the economic and 
enterprises reforms in the 1980s the labour insurance system was modified that 
ultimately affected their eligibility and benefit levels. These employees were also 
excluded from some of the long term insurance benefits such as the benefits for ex- 
servicemen and for those who joined the revolutionary movements in the 1940s. In 
addition, they are not the members of the production force in building up a socialist 
society in the political and social movements for socialist transition in the 1950s and 
1960s. In sum, younger employees have less confidence in the social insurance service 
because it can only give them limited income protection in facing the changes in 
production, ownership, and employment systems in the 1990s.
It was shown in previous chapters that younger employees were more 
concentrated in non state-owned sector. 64.4% of the employees aged 16 to 35 worked 
in the non state-owned sector whilst 34.1 % are in the age group 36-55. The satisfaction 
pattern of the younger groups (i.e. age 16-35 and 36-55) (Chart 8-3) is similar to that of 
the employees working in work units of different ownership system (Chart 8-2). This 
implies that although the employees in non state-owned sector earn higher pay than their
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counterparts in the state-owned sector, this younger generation has to face all the daily 
living crises by themselves and their living standards my drop rapidly if there is a sudden 
loss of income.158 In brief, the different income modes nurtured different views on social 
insurance between employees in state-owned and non-state owned work units. 
Employees in state-owned sector, especially the older groups, are used to getting social 
insurance from work units where there is no specific provision for them to contribute. 
On the other hand, younger employees prefer higher incomes to contributing to social 
insurance for safeguarding any future contingent income needs. These reflect that 
development of social insurance in China is unique since it is driven by the changes from 
socialist to capitalist economy. For capitalist developed countries contributory social 
insurance systems are driven by the socialisation of production and the rise of waged 
employees within the capitalist economy and the belief and values of social insurance 
between employees of different age are less diversified.
The other perspective to explain the phenomenon is the internalised political 
ideology among the older group. As explained in the previous paragraph, the older 
groups were bom in the 1930s and 1940s. It is learned that these people were well 
schooled in socialist values and ideologies during the founding stage of the communist 
country and experienced many different types of socialist movements. For example, in 
the Great Leap Forward Movement in the early 1960s they were starved after the 
disastrous failure of the economic growth programmes. In the nearly thirty years they 
lived and grew up in communes the thrift and sharing with others (yida ergong) 
contributed to their frugal and stem characters. Consequently, these employees are less 
demanding of the government and accept what it is doing in the reforms. In other words, 
social insurance in China receives less challenge from the working class since they are 
educated to support and align with the policies of the government. This explains why the 
reforms of social insurance in China have not aroused strong counter forces from 
employees disregarding the fact that they could be regarded as the interested party.
Regarding the relationships between employment nature and the satisfaction with 
social insurance benefits, Chart 8-4 below shows that there were slightly more of the
158 The GST 1995 noted that in 1994 the highest annual income for those who worked in state- 
owned sec to r in Guangzhou Shi w as 9,540 yuans, in collective units w as 11,255 yuans, and for 
the em ployees in work units of ‘other economic types’ w as 11,112 yuans. (GST 1995, various
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contract system employees satisfied with benefit treatments. The chart displays that 
about one third (32.7%) of the permanent employees commented that the insurance 
benefits are ‘totally impossible’ in supporting a reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi. For 
contract system employees the percentage was 38.9 and for the temporary and other 
types of employees it was 44.5%. On the other hand, permanent employees were slightly 
more confident with social insurance benefits than those in the non-permanent groups 
For example, 2.6% of permanent employees believed social insurance benefits is 
absolutely possible to maintain one’s reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi but only 0.9% 
among the contract system, temporary and other types employees, respectively.
Chart 8-4 Views of employees of different employment natures on social 
insurance benefits in maintaining reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi
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The analysis above reflects the state of affairs that permanent employees have 
stronger confidence in social insurance in the country. In China permanent employee 
{gliding gong) is an ascribed status that is the legacy of the centralised job allocation 
system. Work units, especially the state-owned, have limited power over how many and 
what types of employees they want from the state. It was discussed in previous chapters 
that the ‘iron rice bowl’ policy provided permanent employees and their family 
dependants with very comprehensive benefits from birth to death. Relatively, non­
permanent employees are disadvantaged in job security as well as the job-related
tables)
■ Permanent 
■Contract system  
■Temporary & others
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benefits. This situation becomes more manifest in enterprise reforms since the mid 1980s 
under which more and more newly recruited staff and workers are employed with 
‘contract system’ (hetong zhi) or temporary conditions. Nevertheless, in relation to 
temporary employees, contract system staff and workers have more positive attitudes 
towards social insurance system and that is different from other non-permanent 
employees. Contract system employees exist in the grey area between permanent and 
temporary employees. They perceive that, unlike the temporary employee, they are 
covered by social insurance albeit they are not permanently employed.
Chart 8-5 Views of employees of different household status on social 
insurance benefits in maintaining reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi
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The views on social insurance among the groups of employees of different 
household status are not quite different, irrespective of a handful of employees with 
permanent household status who were a bit more satisfied with the insurance benefits. 
(Chart 8-5) Overall, the positive or negative views among these respondents concur 
closely with the pattern of the sampled population. This occurrence can be explained by 
the greater needs for jobs among migrants, in relation to getting income protections from 
social insurance. However, it is also due to their adverse household and employment 
conditions that they have no dreams of income protection. In other words, because of 
policy discrimination these workers had a shorter range view and immediate economic 
returns were more important. In brief, the expectations on social insurance vary between 
employees of different employment conditions, and the non-permanently employed 
prefer to get incomes from a job. This reflects the long-established central allocation and
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job placement systems in this socialist developing country constitute the hindrance to the 
development of a multiparty contributory social insurance system.
Chart 8-6 Views of man and woman employees on social insurance 
benefits in maintaining reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi
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Chart 8-6 above demonstrates to what extent the two gender groups of employees 
are satisfied with social insurance in Guangzhou Shi. The chart shows that in relative 
terms women were more satisfied than men with social insurance benefits Fewer 
women (32.1%) than men (41.2%) showed extreme dissatisfaction, although the 
percentage for women (44.1%) who were satisfied with social insurance benefits (from 
slightly to absolutely possible) were almost equal to that of the men’s (44%). However, 
more women (23.7%) than men (14.8%) were uncertain about this social institution. The 
study shows that men are relatively negative to social insurance benefit. This reflects 
men in China today still actively play the role of breadwinner. In addition, men being 
more outgoing than women is a Chinese tradition that explains partly the situation and 
contrasts with Chinese women’s passivity and pessimism in general when facing 
financial difficulties. Thus the ‘half of the sky’ built up by the communist government in 
China after 1949 has only changed the de juries status of women but de facto  women in 
China are still introvert and passive. Social insurance services in China are planned with 
a traditional view that presupposes men are the breadwinners. This approach acts against 
gender equality brought about by the communist party and the fact that women 
employees compose almost half of the labour force. In a nutshell, social insurance in 
China is conservative and insensitive to the changed social trends and needs.
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Chart 8-7 Views of employees at different education levels on social 
insurance benefits in maintaining reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi
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Chart 8-7 above shows the views on social insurance benefits of the employees in 
relation to their education patterns. The significance found is that the more educated the 
group the more dissatisfied with the benefit offered. The employees who attained college 
or university education levels (47.4%) did not think social insurance benefits could 
maintain a reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi. However, 28.8% of the group that 
received primary education and 29.7% of the employees completed junior secondary 
level shared the same view. On the other hand, the more educated group (i.e. college or 
university levels) was more certain or clear about the effectiveness of social insurance 
benefits in keeping one’s reasonable living. The discussion in this paragraph elaborates 
that social insurance in China cannot satisfy the needs of professional employees.
It has been stated earlier in this section that among the 524 sampled population, 
36.5% did not believe social insurance benefits function well in sustaining a fair living 
standard of the needy and another 36.8% expressed that social insurance can only 
slightly or partly maintain such living standard. Nevertheless, 26.7% of the employees 
did not show confidence with the income maintenance effects of the social insurance in 
the country. To get a more detailed evaluation, the following part is assigned to contrast 
the views given by the employees who received insurance benefits and those who did 
not.
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Table 8-2 A comparison between the views on social insurance benefits in 
maintaining reasonable living in Guangzhou Shi between benefit 
recipients and non recipients (%)
Totally
impossible
Slightly
possible
Partly
possible
Greatly
possible
Absolutely
possible
Don’t
know
Medical & 
Sickness
312 25.2 13.8 6.0 1.9 17.9
41.3 14.4 13.5 2.9 1.9 26.0
Maternity 3 LI 27.2 1:3.3 6.1 2.8 19.4
39.2 20.9 14.0 4.9 1.5 19.5
Retirement
Pensions
2 1 0 36.1 16.7 5.6 0.0 167
37.3 22.1 13.5 5.3 2.0 19.7
OISH 37.6 31.8 10.6 4.7 4.7 10.6
36.2 21.4 14.4 5.5 1.4 21.2
Unemployment 30.0 10.0 tm 0.0 0.0 50.0
36.6 23.3 13.8 5.4 1.9 18.9
Death 29.4 41.2 5.9 5 9 0.0 17.6
36.7 22.5 14.0 5.3 2.0 19.5
Note: The shaded figures are for benefit recipients.
Table 8-2 above demonstrates that, compared with non-recipients, benefit 
recipients are more positive. Furthermore, fewer benefit recipients said they did not 
know the social insurance services, except for unemployment insurance. The particular 
case of unemployment insurance for the benefit recipients reflects their ignorance and 
uncertainty on this rather new insurance item relative to other social insurance benefits. 
The views of these different groups of sampled employees are shown in Table 8-3 
below.
Table 8-3 A comparison of the views of all sampled employees, benefit 
recipients and non-benefit recipients on social insurance (%)
Negative Moderate Positive Uncertain
All sampled employees 36.5 36.8 7.2 19.5
Beneficiaries 33.8 40.4 8.0 17.8
Non beneficiaries 37.7 35.0 7.1 20.2
Table 8-3 presents the views of the employees on the efficacy o f social insurance 
benefits. The three groupings of employees are ‘all sampled population’, ‘benefit 
recipients’ and ‘non benefit recipients’. On the other hand, their views are categorised 
into ‘negative’ (i.e. totally impossible), ‘moderate’ (i.e. slightly possible and partly 
possible), ‘positive’ (i.e. greatly possible and absolutely possible), and ‘uncertain’ (i.e.
268
don’t know). The rates for benefit recipients and non-benefit recipients are worked out 
from the average percentages of the respondents in the respective categories.
The data in Table 8-3 shows benefit recipients held relative moderate and 
positive attitude towards the efficacy of social insurance. However, the differences 
between the employees are not very significant. Table 8-3 delineates the general 
perceptions of employees on social insurance in China that more than one-third of the 
employees was not satisfied with the social insurance benefits. The pessimistic or 
cynical attitudes among the employees will be discussed later. In addition, another one- 
third or more of the employees felt that social insurance benefits could only maintain a 
living below the reasonable standard in big cities in China like Guangzhou Shi. Finally, 
around one in five of those who were uncertain about social insurance benefit levels 
reflects the lack of knowledge or information on social insurance including the 
provisions, eligibility, application procedures, amount of the insurance benefits, etc.
The study shows that people who were sceptical towards social insurance 
benefits had some common features. The majority of this group of employees was 
younger, educated at senior secondary education level or above, and employed in non 
state-owned work units. It was found that household registration is not a pivotal factor 
on this issue since migrants were usually ignorant or excluded from applying for the 
insurance services. This highlights a special feature of social insurance in China that its 
development towards the building of a contributory risk sharing mechanism will be 
rather difficult since a larger group of the employees are apathetic, ignorant, and 
doubtful of the system.
In sum, people’s attitudes and the particularities of a social institution are 
reciprocal. Inmates, students and hospitalised patients have particular responses towards 
the systems and institutions with which they are in contact. One’s attitude and views 
towards a social institution are affected by various factors, e.g. education, culture and 
tradition, experiences and reference made by others, etc. This study has found that 
individual experiences and reference made by others are more significant than other 
factors in social insurance in China. Such experiences of collectivism are accumulated 
and shared among employees. It also explains why the people’s views towards social 
insurance tend to be negative and non-supportive. Collectivism exists in all social
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institutions in the country from communes to the labour insurance system so the 
individuals are not used to paying contributions for protecting their incomes in 
contingency. Because of these social circumstances four features of social insurance in 
China are found. First, traditionally a self-reliant value is built up among the people that 
institutional care is treated as the last resort. Second, the long-period collectivism in 
China after 1949 cultured the habit of depending on the collectives like work units that 
all services should be provided by the state. Third, the driving forces of social insurance 
development and reforms in China come from the socialist economic structure but not 
the employee who needs income protection. Fourth, as the consequence of the previous 
point, social insurance services in China are established for non-social insurance ends. 
The examples are maternity benefits and unemployment benefits. Briefly speaking these 
four features can be summarised as ‘a social insurance system with Chinese 
characteristics’. In the coming section the focus will turn to examine the deprived groups 
formed under these particular social insurance policies.
Migratory employees and women: The deprived groups in social insurance in 
China
It was shown in the previous chapter that eligibility to social insurance and employment 
natures (i.e. permanent or temporary) are strongly related to one’s household status in 
China. Furthermore, in this study the majority of migrants found in non-permanent 
employment are deprived of social insurance protection. This section will examine the 
migrants’ situations in order to understand their needs and the relation to the specialities 
of social insurance in China.
The result reveals that 16.6% of the employees in Guangzhou Shi were migrants. 
Internal migration (city-city and rural-city) has become a social issue since the start of 
economic reform in the mid 1980s. (Shao, 1995) Since the beginning of the 
modernisation people in China have had more accesses (or freedom) to move from one 
place to another, as well as from one work unit to the other. Among the migrants there 
are more males (55.2%) than females.159 Within this group of employees, 51.7% claimed 
they were the main income sources for their families (i.e. provided more than 80% of the
159 This finding coincides with the C ensus in 1990 in China that the  percentage of m ale migrants 
(55%) w as higher than the fem ale (45%). (Zhang, 1995, p. 58)
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household incomes). A moderate association is also found between age distribution and 
household status, migratory workers are younger. (Cramer’s V=0.38) For these 
migratory employees 93.1% were aged between 16-35 whilst it was only 42.6% for local 
workers. On marital status 74.7% of the migratory workers were single, in contrast with 
24.9% of local workers. (Cramer’s V=0.40) When comparing the education levels 
between these two groups, it is found that local workers are more educated than 
migrants. (Cramer’s v=0.36) 85.3% of the migratory workers reached junior secondary 
level or below and another 10.3% attained senior secondary level. For local employees 
the percentages are 33.3% and 46.2%, respectively, and another 16.5% completed 
college or university education. In sum, most of the migratory workers in Guangzhou 
Shi are young, less educated, and still single but are relied upon to support their families 
financially.
Because of their temporary household status, only a relatively small group of the 
migratory employees (40.2%) could get accommodations of any type from work unit. It 
is therefore not surprising to see that nearly half of these workers (49.4%) live in the 
houses bought or built by themselves, in contrast only 22.7% local employees are housed 
similarly. Accordingly it is found that the living conditions (i.e. facilities and equipment 
in the living premises) of migratory employees are poorer than their counterparts.160
The lower job and income levels of migratory employees explain their poor 
living conditions in Guangzhou Shi. First, compared with local workers, most of the 
migratory workers are offered the jobs requiring lower level of skills. (p<005) 86.2% of 
the migratory workers found non-skilled jobs and another 11.5% semiskilled, with 2.3% 
working professionally. For local employees, the percentages were 50.6, 26.8, and 22.6, 
respectively. In addition, when compared with local workers, migratory workers are 
trapped in very insecure and irregularly paid jobs. (p<005) The percentages for 
migratory employees in wages on piecework rates (28.7%) and hourly basis (27.6%) 
were higher than that of the local employee (7.3% and 5.7% respectively); but lower in 
wages on a monthly basis (57.5% Vs 87.2%). Most strikingly, most migratory workers 
(80.5%) were provided with temporary work whilst another 13.8% were employed as
160 P lease  also se e  the detailed discussion on the living conditions of migratory em ployees in 
C hapter 7.
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contract system workers.161
The study also finds that migratory workers got less state protection from sudden 
loss of incomes. However, their resilient and unyielding characters save them from these 
problems. For example when they are in trouble because of a sudden drop of incomes, 
they will find a second job, go to borrow, or try hard to balance their expenses (42.1%). 
It is also found that, compared with 24.1% of the local workers, only 15.8% of the 
migratory workers ignore the problems and do nothing.
The account for the previous phenomena is the relatively low education 
attainment and non-permanent household status of migrants that leads to lower living 
standards. Another reason is that they have to save up and send the money to their 
families far away in their hometowns. In sum, since migration in China is strictly 
controlled for economic and political purposes the unauthorised migrants from other 
regions are seldom provided with permanent jobs and covered with income protection. 
This is one of the main factors constituting the features of social insurance in China. In 
the following paragraphs the centre of discussion will turn to the situations of the women 
household heads.
This study interviewed 274 women workers (52.1% of the total sampled 
population). In order to delineate the needs of this group the presentation below 
concentrates on the comparisons between the households headed by different genders. 
‘Household head’ in this study is defined as a respondent who contributes 80% or more 
of his or her income to maintain the living of the family members. Thus a woman­
headed household in this study means the women employee who give 80% of their 
income for expenses to their family.162 Among the 185 household heads in this study
161 It refers to the employment relationships contractual basis. The contract is usually for two 
years and the work units have the right to renew or revise the conditions when the current 
contract term inates.
162 For Moser, the m eaning of ‘w om an-headed household’ (or fem ale-headed) m eans the 
household “in which the male partner is absent, either temporarily (for instance because of 
migration or refugee status) or permanently (because of separation or death)." (Moser, 1987, p. 
14) This definition of w om an-headed household may not fully describe the significant economic 
role of wom en even when the m ales are not away from family. In societies that provide more 
employment opportunities and are moving tow ards equal pay for m en and women, w om en’s 
financial contributions to families should not be neglected. This is especially significant in 
developing countries where women play a production role in supporting their families and even 
the national economy. A typical exam ple is the  millions of the  Filipina w om en who work abroad
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45.9% were women.
The result demonstrates that 89.7% of the household heads are permanent 
residents in Guangzhou Shi. This implies that they are living with their families in the 
city. Furthermore, it is discovered that within this grouping 90.6% of the women 
household heads are married. The married women, according to the data, had more 
family dependants than the male-headed households. The data show that 55.3% of the 
married women household heads had one family dependant and 34.1% had two, whilst 
for men the percentages were 71% and 18%. It indicates that women as breadwinner are 
especially important in bigger families and this is reflected by their economic 
contributions towards families. In brief, women household heads in Guangzhou Shi are 
mainly married, with more family dependants and they support their families financially 
as men do.
It was also found that the living standards in terms of household facilities among 
the two groups of household heads are very similar. For example, both groups have very 
close percentages in respect of ownership of several kinds of basic household facilities 
such as running water and electricity supply. This reflects the high ratios (63.5% for the 
women’s group and 57% for the men’s group) of these interviewees who live in 
accommodations provided by the work units with such basic living facilities.
The study shows that the association between household heads of different 
genders and incomes is weak. (Cramer’s V=0.18) That means the income gaps between 
male and female household heads were small. However, in relation to 21% for the male­
headed households, 24.1% of the female household heads fell in the income group of 
less than RMB 900 (or £68.8) a month.163 On the other side, 56% of the male household 
heads earned monthly income above RMB 1,300, whilst for the female group it was 
41.1%.
Armour & Coughlin (1985) find that one’s education, skill levels, and income in
as  dom estic helpers serving as  a source of strength to their families in the Philippines. In China, 
many wom en leave their hometowns for m ore developed cities (e.g. Shenzhen) to work in 
material processing industries such a s  toy making and electronic products to maintain their 
families.
163 For the exchange rates p lease refer to the Technical Notes of this study.
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socialist society are related. Accordingly, the differences in incomes between men and 
women are insignificant because, as revealed in this study, the gender factor has only a 
weak association with education level and the skill levels.164 In a socialist developing 
country as China, high education level or skill level does not necessarily result in high 
incomes. For example in the Cultural Revolution period the ‘red {hong) rather than 
expert {zhuny criteria was promoted so that a ‘socialist’ worker was hailed highly but 
not one who was highly educated. From January 1967 to September 1969 the Red 
Guards took control of all economic units in the “Seizing of powers” movement while 
the educated were sent to rural areas and the higher level management and production 
posts were occupied by the less educated workers and peasants. (Zhu 1989, p. 452-454) 
In the period of economic reforms after 1979 one’s income is determined by the skills 
needed in the market as well as productivity and one’s social relationships (guanxi). It is 
not surprising to find that the less educated group (e.g. practitioners of individual 
economy) can earn much more than intellectuals, e.g. teachers. (Ho, 1996)
The lower incomes of women household heads may therefore be explained by 
their ability to generate incomes or the marketability of their productivity. It is found that 
women are less competitive in the job market, especially the older and less skilled. In 
numeric terms, 75.3% of the women household heads were aged from 36 to 55, and 
50.6% were non-skilled. The lower living standard of the households headed by women 
is also explained by larger family sizes. 34.1% of the women headed households had two 
family dependants and another 10.6% had 3. For the man-headed households the figures 
are 18% and 11%, respectively. In a nutshell, women household heads are less skilled 
and older so that they and their families live on lower incomes.
Women household heads, as a result, have more frequent and more severe 
experiences in losing family income. The study shows that 26.3% of the women group 
and 36.4% of the men group said contingent income needs ‘seldom’ arise. On the other 
hand 31.6% of the women household heads and 22.7% of male household heads replied 
such problems come ‘occasionally’. However, when contrasting the 31.8% of the man 
group said they encountered such problem sometimes, 10.5% of the women group
164 The C ram er’s  V for the relationship between gender and education levels w as 0.23 and for 
gender and skill level w as 0.28. Moreover, the correlation between education and skill levels w as 
also low (Cram er’s  V=0.36).
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responded likewise. The most striking finding is that, when contrasting only 4.5% of the 
men claimed the problem happened quite frequently, 26.3% of the women responded the 
same way. In brief fewer men household heads than the women experienced sudden loss 
of incomes. (Cramer’s V=0.44)
When the financial problem arises, the reactions and solutions are different in the 
two groups. The majority (55%) of the women household heads would like to seek state 
assistance (i.e. to apply for labour insurance), and then passively leave it unsolved 
(25%). Another 15% said they had no definite answers. Relatively, men were more 
active and dynamic in dealing with the problem. For the man household heads, 36.4% 
would go directly to ask for state assistance, and another 36.3% would try to solve it by 
other means such as finding a second job, borrowing, and using the money thriftily. On 
the other hand, another 22.7% from the men’s group would passively just wait and see, 
and 4.5% said they had no clear resolution. The association between the choosing of a 
solution for the family’s contingent income problem and the gender of household heads 
is moderate. (Cramer’s V=0.45) The implication is that women household heads are 
relatively more passive and have greater needs for social insurance benefits.
In conclusion, women in today’s China are still living dependently. However, 
this dependency is not related to men as in tradition. Women household heads in terms 
of their role in financing their families is very significant. In such cases the living of 
women household heads and their dependants is mostly provided through the women’s 
working relationships with the work unit. The implications of this relationship are two. 
First, the living standard of the women household head and her dependants is determined 
by her eligibility to social insurance provided by the work units.165 Second, state 
assistance is an important and even the only source of income when the woman is out of 
work for whatever reason (e.g. “xiagang nuzhigong” or women workers who are asked 
to take leave with part of their wages in enterprise reform). This relates particularly to 
women because more and more women employees are requested to retreat from their 
posts in the economic and enterprise reforms in Guangzhou Shi.166 (Mingpao Daily
165 For example, the take-hom e incomes, living supplem ents and daily necessities such a s  the 
welfare service in cash and in kind (e.g. housing).
166 According to the 1995 Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook (Table 12-22), 40.96%  of the labour 
force w as women. Among the 0.858 million women staff and workers 61% w ere em ployed in 
state-ow ned work units.
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News, 24/12/1996)
It seems that women in China have weaker social relationships and lower income 
generating skills so they are more vulnerable when facing financial crisis. It is 
foreseeable that the closer the involvement with the market economy the closer the 
women-headed households live to poverty in China because of less security in housing 
tenure, lower income generating ability, weaker social networks and older age. This 
problem affects not only women workers but also their family members who are living 
on the incomes generated mainly by them. In sum, in the reforms in China women 
household heads and migratory employees are in an adverse situation because of the 
politically oriented economic growth strategies. The features of social insurance in the 
country emerging from such conditions are that the society as a whole sacrifices some 
socially deprived groups such as migrants and women as part of the costs of the reforms 
rather than enabling them to enjoy the services. Social insurance in China has 
discriminatory effects that repress social needs under the national development strategy. 
In the following section the discussion looks at the views and expectations of employees 
in Guangzhou Shi regarding social insurance reforms.
Views on the solutions to the income problems in Guangzhou Shi
In order to explore the uniqueness of social insurance in China, this study also touched 
on the people’s general views on social insurance. The respondents were asked what 
methods they used in solving their financial problems and their awareness on the state 
and work units’ assistance. It was discovered that in general about one-fifth of the 524 
respondents experienced income crisis. Among these 108 employees, 37% said state 
assistance was their primary resource. However, this experience was different for men 
and women, young and old, local residents and migrants, and among employees in work 
units of different ownership systems.
The general finding on the question of “What will you do when your family is 
faced with income difficulties?” is that more people (40.7%) were inclined to apply for 
assistance from the state (i.e. labour insurance and state relief). For the others some 
chose self-initiative methods such as finding a second job (0.9%), to keep the budget in
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balance (18.5%), and borrowing from others (2.8%).167 The result also shows another 
22.2% of the respondents were rather passive (i.e. just did nothing to solve the problems) 
whilst 13% said they were uncertain about what they could do. Furthermore, the study 
shows that among the 108 respondents who had such experience, 54.6% were women 
and 45.4% were men. It also discloses that more women (52.6%) applied for state 
assistance than men (26.5%) did. Nevertheless, 32.7% of the male respondents adjusted 
family expenditure to pass through the hard time whilst in contrast only 6.8% in the 
women group did this. It seems that state assistance is valued as the main resource, 
especially for women. On the other hand men are more optimistic that such problems 
can be solved by their own efforts. Although these percentages are lower than those in 
the previous section on men and women household heads, in general the lower rates for 
all respondents could be explained by the more aggressive non-household heads.168 
Nevertheless, among the non-household heads men were also less dependent on state 
assistance than women when they came across family financial difficulties. (Cramer’s 
V=0.57) Accordingly, it is concluded that women have higher expectations of social 
insurance in China.
Another point worthy of mention is the relationship between age and the solution 
of income problems. The finding shows that all age groups tend to be “passive” (i.e. just 
left the problem aside or adjusted the family budget) when encountering income needs. 
For the age group 16-35 the percentage was 41.8 whilst for those aged over 55 it was 50. 
Thus in the survey the 37.2% for the age group of 36-55 was the smallest. On the other 
hand, the dependency on state financial assistance including relief and social insurance 
was high for the oldest group. 50% of this group sought state assistance to solve their 
financial difficulties in contrast with 48.8% for the middle age group. The youngest 
group can be described as more independent since only 32.7% used this access. 
Nevertheless, since 21.8% of the 16-35 age group were not certain about what they 
could do, this could reflect the helpless situation of this youngest group of employees 
when faced with such problems. Generally speaking, age is not a significant factor in 
determining people’s solutions to contingent income needs (Cramer’s V=0.18) although 
the younger groups were less clear on their options and the oldest group tends to rely on
167 S ta te  assistance  includes sta te  relief and social insurance. The percentage for s ta te  relief 
only is 3.7 and for social insurance 37.
168 ‘Non household head ’ is defined a s  those who do not provide more than 80% of their incom es
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state assistance.
The discussion on the association between age groupings and attitudes towards 
financial difficulties reveals another feature of social insurance in China that the services 
get more support from the older group of employees. Because of the de-emphasis in 
collectivism (e.g. the breaking down of the commune system and the ending of the 
Cultural Revolution) in the 1980s that those aged 35 or below bom in the 1960s and who 
grew up in the 1970s and 1980s have a weaker collective sense than older generations. 
In contrast, for the older groups of employees, social insurance services in the 1990s in 
China are much more like the labour insurance before the 1970s, except for some new 
initiatives. Moreover, the younger group of employees experienced and is more adapted 
to the highly praised values of individual efforts, market, and the sense o f ‘its glorious to 
become rich (zhifu guangrongy in the reforms to market system. Therefore in contrast 
with older generations, the young have weaker expectations from state assistance and 
have more self-motivation when facing problems.
The third issue is the relationship between employees in the units of different 
ownership systems and state assistance. It is found that employees from state-owned 
work units have a stronger tendency to ask for state assistance. The results show that 
54.8% of these employees applied for state assistance (labour insurance and state relief) 
to overcome their income crises. In contrast, only nearly one-third (31.8%) of the 
employees in non state-owned units used these resources. In relation to the 31% with a 
passive attitude and 9.5% who were uncertain in the state-owned sector, employees in 
non state-owned units were even more passive (47%) and uncertain (18.2%) in actively 
solving their families’ income problem. This reflects social insurance in China is 
perceived as an established occupational welfare provided according to one’s 
relationships with socialist production. The previous finding proves that employees in 
China make equal the roles and functions of social insurance in the country to other 
welfare supplements provided by work units.
Another issue is that educational level is not a significant factor in determining 
the solution for income crisis. (Cramer’s V=0.17) The results show that the employees 
who attained middle education level were more likely to get state assistance. 43.3% of
to the family and have no family dependants.
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those who completed junior secondary education and 42.2% of the senior secondary 
graduates asked for state assistance. In relation, only 35.3% in the group who finished 
primary six or below, and 37.5% of those in the batch of college graduates chose the 
same way. In comparison, the least educated were more passive in solving their families’ 
income problems whilst the most educated group were more doubtful on what they had 
to do. In short, although the difference is not very significant, social insurance services 
in China covers more the educated who have a better understanding of the services and 
the modes of access.
Last but not least is the difference in views between local and migratory 
employees. The finding demonstrates low association between one’s household status 
and attitude towards income crisis. (Cramer’s V=0.2) However, local employees are 
likely to be less passive (39.3%) and there was a higher percentage of this group seeking 
state assistance (43.8%). In contrast, although migratory employees were more passive 
(47.4%) they were more alienated from state assistance (26.3%). In addition, more 
migratory employees (10.5%) found their own solutions than local employees (2.2%). 
As discussed before, household registration is crucial for eligibility to social insurance in 
China. The different rates of usage between local and migratory employees reflect that 
social insurance in China is discriminatorily provided to specific groups of employees 
through administrative measures. The provision of social insurance in China is 
determined by the needs of other national policies. Consequently it is not highly valued 
by the needy.
In sum, the responses of people towards needs for income maintenance were 
various. The study shows that the association between the choices of the solutions and 
personal backgrounds such as education level, employment nature, household status, 
gender and even ownership background of the work unit is not strong. Notwithstanding, 
we see that some groups of employees have greater needs for state assistance to satisfy 
their contingent income needs. For example, women were identified in the study that 
they are more likely to rely on the state’s income protection schemes whilst migratory 
employees were more pessimistic because of the hindrances created by household and 
employment systems. People’s choices in the ways of satisfying contingent financial 
needs relate to their cognition, access and availability of the services. The case of 
neglected migratory employees shows there is no direct causal-result relationship
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between awareness and eligibility in social insurance in China. More importantly, the 
weak association between the independent variable ‘solutions for income difficulties’ 
and the personal background variables demonstrates that social insurance services in 
China play a significant role in supplementing employees living that it is generally 
acknowledged and accepted as job-related welfare or benefits offered by work units. 
Apart from this particular feature of social insurance in China, the following section will 
explore other features of social insurance in China by probing employee awareness and 
expectations of social insurance.
The awareness of income maintenance services and the expectations on the reforms 
of social insurance
There are two main issues in this section. The first is the awareness of the respondents of 
the income maintenance programmes provided by work units and state. The second is 
about the respondents’ knowledge and expectations of the reforms in social insurance. 
The study shows that about one third (36.5%) of the 524 respondents answered 
positively to the question on the awareness of relief provided by work unit. On the other 
hand, the percentage (24.9) of those with affirmative answers to the question on the 
awareness of the relief provided by the state is lower. This simply shows that, in general, 
work units play an important role in providing income maintenance programs including 
social insurance in China.
As discussed in the previous chapters, the work unit {danwei) is not only an 
economic unit but also a social unit that operates horizontally and vertically in China. 
Danwei is a collective unit which represents its groups of individuals in getting state 
resources. It also acts on behalf of the government to implement the state’s policies 
among its subsidiary groupings. Thus the close relationships between individuals and 
danwei constitute the occupational welfare nature of social insurance in China.
In cross tabulating the two variables of awareness of the state’s and the work 
units’ income maintenance programs a strong correlation is found. (p<005) This implies 
the awareness of one of the institutional income maintenance services is related to the 
cognition of the other. Yet, more employees are familiar with the income maintenance 
programmes arranged by work units (36.5%) than the state (25%). It is also found that
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less than a half (48.2%) of those (191 in number) who were aware of the provisions of 
work unit’s assistance were also interested in the state’s services. On the other hand, 
88.3% of the 333 respondents who did not express concern about the income 
maintenance programmes provided by work units were also ignorant about the relief 
services offered by the state. The data prove the knowledge of income maintenance 
programmes among employees in China largely comes from the long and established 
relationship built between individuals and work units (beta = 0.43 52).169 Accordingly, 
the awareness, knowledge, expectations, and acceptability of the pubic on social 
insurance services initiated by state are particularly related to work units rather than the 
specially assigned social insurance organisation, e.g. social insurance services bureau.
The foregoing paragraphs touched upon as well as highlighted the imperceptible 
role of state in social insurance in China, albeit the major part of the resources is 
provided by the state. However, one has also to note the significant roles and functions 
of work units in social insurance management granted by the state, and the consequence 
of a strong parochial view among the employees. All of these have been mentioned in 
previous chapters but the findings in the awareness of social insurance services among 
employees in this chapter make clearer the uniqueness of social insurance in China.
It is found in this study that in general the respondents lacked confidence in 
social insurance services. Table 8-4 below shows that about 60% of the 524 sampled 
employees did not think the benefits of social insurance could maintain a reasonable 
living in Guangzhou Shi (i.e. totally impossible and slightly possible). Another 13.7% of 
the respondents commented that the benefits could only partly meet their income needs. 
On the other hand, the groups of employees that satisfied the provisions were relatively 
small. Only 5.3% said the insurance benefits were “greatly possible” and another 1.9% 
described the benefits got from social insurance were “absolutely possible” to solve their 
income maintenance problem.
169 The beta value Is calculated from the regression te s t between the dependent variable 
"aw areness of s ta te  income m aintenance services" and the independent variable "aw areness of 
the incom e m aintenance services provided by work units". Detailed explanation of the
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Table 8-4 Views on social insurance benefits in income maintenance (%) 
(n=524)
Current social 
insurance
Social insurance after the reforms
Maintain 
reasonable 
living standard
Provide more
income
protections
Provide short 
term income 
protections
Provide long 
term income 
protections
Totally impossible 36.5 12.8 12.2 18.5
Slightly possible 23.1 29.6 28.4 19.8
Partly possible 13.7 17.0 14.5 14.4
Greatly possible 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.7
Absolutely possible 1.9 3.2 3.1 3.6
Don’t know/ no idea 19.5 32.2 36.5 38.0
Total 100 0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 8-4 above demonstrates how the respondents appraise the current social 
insurance services and what they expect of the services after the reforms. In general 
12.8% of the respondents showed pessimistic views on the reforming of social insurance 
services. They did not agree that the reformed social insurance system would provide 
more income protection. On the other hand, nearly one-third (32.2%) were uncertain 
about the effects of the reforms and the remaining maintained a positive outlook.
In comparing the employees’ views on the long and short-term effects of the 
reformed social insurance system, the outcomes are rather similar to that of the 
examination on the effects in general. On the whole the employees were dissatisfied 
with the existing social insurance benefits. They were not very enthusiastic nor excited 
about the reforms in social insurance, although they also looked forward to a better 
social insurance system after the reforms.170 (Tables 8-5 & 8-6)
The two tables below illustrate the perceptions of the 524 respondents on the 
coverage of the social insurance system in China in the 1990s. The tables show that most 
of the employees (82.7%) held that permanent employees were the most favoured. On 
the other hand income protections were weaker for those with less permanent 
employment. Furthermore, the respondents also pointed out that state-owned work units 
had a vested interest in the existing social insurance system. As high as 84% of the 524
measurem ent of regression values can be found in Healey (1993) Chapter 18.
170 The study result show that about one-third of them indicated that they had no knowledge
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respondents thought employees in these work units were covered by social insurance 
whilst fewer respondents agreed the non state-owned units were put under the aegis of 
the country’s social insurance system. From the analysis it is found that these views were 
correlated weakly with the respondents’ employment natures (Cramer’s V=0.26 to 0.03) 
and the ownership background of their work units (p=0.78 to 0.03). In other words, the 
case study on Guangzhou Shi reveals the existence of discrepancies in the country’s 
social insurance system. The discrepancies of social insurance in China, as generally 
perceived, are generated first by the ownership background of the work units and 
second, by one’s employment nature.
Table 8-5 Coverage of social insurance on employees in work units of different 
ownership natures perceived by respondents (n=524)
Ownership natures %
State-owned 84.0
Collective 54.2
Foreign capital related 17.3
Private economy 4.8
Individual economy 5.7
Others 8.2
Table 8-6 Coverage of social insurance on employees of different employment 
natures perceived by respondents (n=524)
Employment natures %
Permanent 82.7
Contract system 62.5
Contract 8.4
Temporary 3.4
Others 5.5
The last issue in this section is about the people’s choices in social insurance 
reforms. Chart 8-8 below presents the priorities listed by the respondents among the 
social insurance items in the reforms. According to the answers given by the sampled 
employees, medical and sickness benefits was the most concerned item among the six 
social insurance programs. 50.7% of the 524 respondents put this insurance service as 
the first priority in the reforms. On the other hand, 30.8% of the respondents also named 
old age pensions as the first item to be reformed. Nevertheless, the percentage of the
about the reforms in social insurance.
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respondents in naming the retirement pensions as the second choice (29.9%) was very 
close to that being put as the first. In contrast, only 13.1% of the respondents said 
unemployment insurance should be placed first, whilst 12.7% put this as the second item 
and another 29% listed it as the third. For OISH, 26.4% put it the third, while 15% said it 
should be the second and only 4% placed it first. Finally the least percentage of 
respondents (1.4% and 0.2%) listed maternity and survivors’ benefits as the items most 
desperately in need of reform. However, more respondents (17.2%) put maternity 
benefits as the third insurance service to be reformed, in contrast with 2.7% naming 
survivors’ benefits. Accordingly, the choices of the sampled population in this study, in 
descending order, is: medical and sickness insurance, old age pensions, unemployment 
insurance, OISH, maternity, and survivors’ benefits. The desires of the people, however, 
do not line up with the reforms in social insurance initiated by the state and there is 
dissatisfaction. In the concluding chapter this situation will be discussed in more detail.
Chart 8-8 Priorities in social insurance services reforms
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Summary and Conclusions
This chapter presented the views and attitudes of employees on social insurance in 
China. These views and attitudes, however, reflect some of the features of the social 
insurance system in the country. In the main this chapter discussed some of the result 
findings echo conclusions stated in previous chapters. These findings might be grouped 
into three different aspects: the determinants that make social insurance in China unique, 
the specific features of social insurance in China, and the effects of these social
B  Death
■  Old age
■  Unemployment
□  OISH
□  Maternity
□  Medical & sickness
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insurance services.
Concerning the determinant factors that nurture the uniqueness of social 
insurance in China these are various. First it is pointed out in this chapter that eligibility 
to social insurance in China is based upon the employment nature and economic 
ownership of the work unit. One of the findings in this study is that the number of family 
members who are employed permanently in state-owned work units is crucial to 
accessing and receiving social insurance benefits. Accordingly ‘need’ of employees is 
not an important factor since other factors are weightier. For examples, the achievement 
of economic reforms and the success of the birth control policies.
Political transition and economic system transformation drive the government to 
assign social insurance services with the non-social insurance goals. These make up the 
fabric and the dynamism of the institutions in the country. Because of these intricate 
relationships social insurance in China turns out occupational welfare in nature attached 
to the work units. In brief, political fervour and belief in economic growth mould the 
features of social insurance in China in the 1990s.
The finding in this chapter also demonstrates an important issue that the 
development of social insurance in China passes through many different social, political 
and economic changes that mould a particular set of values, experiences and views 
among the employees. The historical legacy can be found in the 1990s that permanent 
employees in state-owned work units are better off and widely covered. Furthermore, the 
non-contributory and occupational welfare nature of social insurance cultured among 
employees in China is also discovered in this study. In looking at retirement pensions in 
China we see that social insurance in China is weak in mutual help but strong in 
occupational welfare.
Because of the unique social institutions and systems created and maintained 
upon the economic base, the roles and functions of social insurance in China are not 
unequivocally defined. This can particularly be found in the non-needs based maternity 
benefits and in OISH benefits. Nevertheless, it is surprising to discover that the working 
class and capitalists do not oppose strongly the approaches and arrangements of the 
social insurance services. The results show that employees are apathetic and
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unresponsive towards these reforms. They believe that the reforms will favour only those 
with stable working relationships in state-owned work units as in the past.
In view of the politically guided social insurance for achieving economic 
structure transformation objectives, this chapter also presented some of the effects of the 
current social insurance services in China detected from the interviewing. It is clearly 
found that employees, especially migratory temporary employees and women 
employees, are not satisfied with the adequacy of social insurance benefits. The 
respondents maintained that the benefits could not perform the income maintenance 
function well. The results show that some groups of employees, e.g. professional 
employees and migrants, who emerged in the modernisation since 1979, cannot have 
their needs arising from the diversified income and employment patterns met by the 
provisions for social insurance.
Except for the newly initiated unemployment benefits, social insurance in China 
in the 1990s has no differences distinguishing it from labour insurance that was 
specifically designed for maintaining the incentive of the socialist labour force. As a part 
of the job-related welfare services, social insurance in China fulfils the task of rewarding 
and penalising functions guided by the Chinese socialist welfare philosophy. The ‘social 
insurance with the characteristics of Chinese socialism’ can mainly be found in the 
important role played by work units in all income maintenance programs including 
social insurance, and its unquestionable influences on the public’s awareness, 
knowledge, expectations, and acceptability of these services. At the micro level, the 
‘social insurance with the characteristics of Chinese socialism’ is characterised by the 
state’s oblique roles and the prominent activity of employers (work units) in social 
insurance service provisions. In addition, the policy discrepancies generated by the 
socialist economic ownership and employment systems in China nurture strong 
parochial views within the particular work unit, employment system, household status 
group, economic ownership sector, etc. Consequently employees in general are 
apathetic, ignorant and sceptical of social insurance in the country that turns out to be a 
hindrance to the reforms to institute a contributory social insurance system for risk 
pooling and mutual help. The features of ‘social insurance with the characteristics of 
Chinese socialism’ will be discussed in detail as the conclusions of this study in the 
following chapter.
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Chapter 9
Social insurance with the characteristics of Chinese socialism 
Introduction
The previous chapters examined social insurance in China for finding out its particular 
features from the Marxist structuralist perspective. This study method suggests that all 
state institutions stem from and are determined by the economic base or structure of the 
country. Accordingly, social insurance is the institution created and maintained by the 
economic base of the country that its features vary. It is therefore necessary to probe into 
the particular features of social insurance in China because it is a socialist developing 
country. The study on social insurance in China is important because its social insurance 
services are coloured most with the internal factors especially the long lasting Confucian 
values and socialism with Chinese characteristics.
This exercise went through a thorough literature review on the values and 
features of social insurance in capitalist developed countries. It also reviewed the 
policies and regulations on labour and social insurance in China in the past 50 years. 
Most importantly, this project employed both quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies to collect the data on social insurance in China in the 1990s. The results of the 
research demonstrate that, with the case of Guangzhou Shi, social insurance in China is 
largely tinted with the Confucian self-reliant values and determined by the socialist 
economic production relationship.
The first four parts of this conclusion and summary chapter will respond to the 
four sub-questions set in Chapter One. The first part is about the development of social 
insurance from the feudal stage to the mid 1990s. This part will specially spell out how 
the Confucian values affect and the socialist economic structure determines the 
development of social insurance in China. The second part summarises the views and 
information gathered from unstructured interview and document reviews on six major 
social insurance benefits in Guangzhou Shi. It is pointed out in this section that social 
insurance in the country is developed on the public ownership economic system and 
provided by work units which manage the social labour force and social insurance.
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The third part summarises the findings of the structured interview with the 
management of 25 work units in Guangzhou Shi. The data collected from the 
interviewing with questionnaires demonstrate that because of the close state-work unit- 
individual relationship in the public ownership economic structure that only those with 
local household status and permanently employed in state-owned work units are widely 
covered. The subsequent part of this chapter shows that, appreciation of the provision of 
income maintenance services provided by work units is stronger than that by the state 
among the 524 employees in the 25 work units. This reflects the obscure roles and 
functions of first, social insurance and second, work units in offering social insurance 
and other income maintenance services in the socialist economic structure.
In concluding this study, the final part of this chapter states that social insurance 
in China have many features different from those found in capitalist developed countries. 
These identifiable features relate strongly with the specific economic structure of the 
country and unique to the Chinese society. Finally, it is highlighted at the end that the 
knowledge on social insurance in socialist developing countries is meagre and that more 
exploratory study is needed for building up a comprehensive view in social policy 
studies.
The development of social insurance in China in relation with the Confucian self- 
reliant and socialist collectives values
The features of social insurance services in China change in different periods. First, in 
the period before 1949 contributory social insurance did not exist in the country because 
of the very low level of industrialisation, and an insignificant domestic capitalist class 
and salaried labour force. Second, in the period from 1949 to the mid 1990s the 
economic base of the country guided social insurance services to facilitate the realisation 
of political objectives that consequently forms many distinguished features of the social 
insurance services. However, the effects of the socialist economic mode of production 
on social insurance are dissimilar in two periods. First, the public ownership system 
limited the coverage of the labour insurance system and directed the services to become 
a part of the occupational welfare provided by work units from 1949 to late 1970s. 
Second, from 1980 and on, social insurance has been adapting for establishing a socialist 
market economy in the country. This section is going to summarise in general how the
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features of social insurance in China relate with the particular social values system and 
economic structure in China before 1980. After this the subsequent parts will give the 
main points of the study results and the features of social insurance in socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.
The absence of contributory social insurance in China before 1980 can be 
explained by the predominance of Confucian and socialist values. Confucian teaching 
appeals for self-reliant, cohesive family relationships, and looks askance at non­
scholastic activities. These consequently disregard residual welfare system in the 
country. Equally significant is the emphasis and belief in the effectiveness and functions 
of the socialist collective system. The occupational income maintenance services offered 
by work units are assigned for maintaining the productivity of the socialist labour force 
but not for satisfying the contingent needs of all. The development of the Chinese social 
insurance manifests four main factors: the extent of self-help or self-reliance ideology, 
the degree of economic specialisation, the stability of political system, and finally, the 
strength of collectivism. These four factors are also the particular features of Chinese 
social insurance.
Self-help ideology is the basic requirement in Confucian teaching. The centre 
point of self-independence, as stated in “Sishu: Daxue (The Four Books: The Great 
Learning)”, is xiushen or cultivates one’s moral character for realising a consolidated 
society. The meaning of ‘cultivating one’s moral character’ refers to introspection or 
self-examination of one’s innermost being for attaining a perfect personality. As the 
basic step to get to a peaceful time, self-examination requires one to modify oneself to 
adapt to society. For example, self-introspection in Lun Yu, the record of Confucian 
teaching, means “to see whether I am dishonest to others, to check whether I am 
unfaithful to my friends, and to review whether or not I practise what I am taught.”
The requirement of oneself to be honest and faithful to the others accords with 
Confucian teaching and has great social impacts in Chinese society. This ideological 
training raises inferior and weak self-image of an individual in a group of people and 
induces him to be submissive. A submissive self does not involve others in solving his 
difficulties. Thus self-reliance ideology does not equate with individualism in that the 
former is less aggressive and more retiring. Self-reliance ideology also stimulates one’s
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concern for face-saving. A Chinese proverb says that you ‘don’t spread your family’s 
scandal’ and that others should be excluded from such family matters. It brings shame on 
oneself or one’s family if one has to involve others in securing one’s or one’s family’s 
own living. Therefore, Chinese would prefer seeking help from one close such as 
siblings, in-laws, friends and colleagues, rather than referring to a publicly run 
organisation. This is supported by the findings in the field study that when income 
problems rise only about 40% of the sampled employees of all types tend to seek 
assistance from state.171
Confucian teaching has been so dominating in China for more than two thousand 
years that it goes beyond the syllabus of public examination for selecting government 
officials. It becomes the social rules and norms for identifying one’s roles and duties in 
society. In many Confucian teachings these roles and duties are clearly defined. For 
example, Mengzi, the foremost student of Confucius, mentioned ‘five human 
relationships (renlun or wuluriy in society and everyone has his or her expected roles 
and duties. In relation to the concept of state, ‘Five human relationships’ conveys ideas 
of ‘community’ or ‘society’ by means of images, which are spiritual, spontaneous, non­
contractual and non-institutional.172
In relation to income maintenance, self-reliance but not state provision is praised 
so that one has to find the solution, or through the expected human relationships to 
obtain the assistance. The ‘five human relationships’, for example, states that the more 
capable is responsible to look after the less able. A son, for instance, is charged with the 
responsibility to support his parents when they are weak and unproductive. In Lun Yu 
parent-child relationship is emphasised in the roles of younger family members in 
supporting their seniors. According to Lun Yu “the meaning of filial piety (xiao) is 
support (yang)”. This implies the Confucian values on meeting individual contingent 
income needs focus on the family or social relationships between oneself and others.173
171 P lease  refer to C hapter Eight of this study.
172 The interpretation of ‘s ta te ’ in feudal China related with spiritual im ages. For example, the 
Chinese word 'shejF is a worship place for th e  god of the land and the god of grain’ that 
sym bolises the being of ‘s ta te ’. In addition, it w as believed that the head of state , i.e. the 
em peror, is sen t from heaven to rule over the land. Thus the concept of s ta te  is very am biguous 
am ong Chinese. (Liang, 1987) This specific point will be d iscussed  in detail in later part.
173 This refers to the teaching in The Great Learning that Ih e  people learnt filial piety from the 
em peror if he supports the elderly’. In addition, the value of family across the land’ also stresses  
on supporting the elderly in the community a s  that at home.
290
Such relationships extend from a ‘self to his family and then the ‘land under heaven 
(tiamciay 114 It requires one to work for supplying oneself with daily necessities and 
when this fails the family members have to play their roles. For those who are weak or 
old and have no family ties then community collective relief work should come in to 
help.
In Chinese society families perform the role of supplier in various aspects. The 
Chinese word for ‘family’ (Jia) means the physical setting for its members living 
together. Furthermore, in Chinese writing the ideogram of ‘family’ includes a roof at the 
top and a pig under it. Symbolically the roof is the protection and the pig is the 
comfortably off living for those under the roof. The implication is that supports between 
family members are very strong but concerns for outsiders are relatively weak. In 
addition, “family (for Chinese) is the centre of social life.” (Zhong in Liang 1987 P. 12, 
my translation) In the five human relationships three (husband-wife, father-son, sibling) 
are found inside family whilst one relates to community (friends) and the other in work 
environment (emperor-offrcials). Furthermore, “for a long time social organisations in 
China disparage individuals but place stress on family and put family and clan before the 
state.” (Chen in Liang 1987, p. 12) Thus in Chinese culture family is an enclosed setting 
that rejects non-members. This Confucian individual-based and family-bound ideology 
greatly affects the development of mutual contributory social insurance in China.
Before 1949 the family in China performed two functions under the inward 
support forces: consolidating the relationships between its members and satisfying their 
various needs on the one hand, and excluding outsiders on the other. For example, 
family clan (jiazu) for Chinese is a collective for realising the supportive functions. In 
the old days members of a clan used to live together in order to maintain a mutual 
support and security system. This system is realised by physically built structures like 
walled community or, if not living in their hometown, grouping together those with the 
same last name to form mutual help associations. Such kinds of civil societies offered 
various kinds of social services including shelter, medical care, education, and even
174 Tianxia in C hinese is a supranational concept. In ancient China ‘s ta te ’ is at the intermediate 
level betw een family and ‘land under heaven’. S ta te  refers to the grouping of families whilst 'land 
under heaven’ is the conglomeration of states. In this sen se  sta te  is not the ideal stage of human 
society in which the people’s  living is protected or satisfied.
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assistance in cash.175 On the other side the most destitute had to live upon the relief 
provided by philanthropic organisations, which ‘represent the spirits of benevolence and 
universal fraternity.’ (Chow 1990 p. 4) Consequently, charitable welfare rather than 
mutual contributory income maintenance system prevails in Chinese society.
In sum, before 1949 the family in China played two important roles that affect 
the development of social insurance. First it built up a very intimate relationship 
amongst its members. Second, individuals preferred the family to the state because it 
was believed that the ‘peace across the land (ping tianxia)’ or a pacific society could 
only be achieved and sustained by the family system. (Liang 1987, p. 18) This explains 
why ‘society’ rather than ‘state’ was emphasised among Chinese. ‘Society’ is the 
aggregate term for all families but ‘state’ means institution or bureaucracy for ruling 
over the public. Therefore, the patriarchal system is maintained from the ruler to general 
public in order to minimise the role of the state but strengthen the role of the family 
across the land.176 Liang states that “China ... belongs to the supranational type of 
country” which means it passes through the ‘state’ stage. Thus the insignificant ‘state’, 
dominant patriarchal system, and strong individual responsibility held up the 
development of contributory social insurance in China before 1949.
The other impact of Confucian values on the development of contributory social 
insurance is the discrimination against non-scholastic activities like trading and 
manufacturing. This strongly discouraged economic specialisation, especially the rise of 
capitalists and hired labourers in the country. Confucianism places high value on 
scholars but looks down upon businessmen and artisans. ‘A good scholar will make an 
official’ and ‘no prospect for an artisan’ is Confucian doctrines that is etched on the 
peoples’ mind for a long period. In the old days the title of ‘literati and officialdom 
(shidafuy but not wealth aggrandised one’s own as well as one’s family’s social status.
The higher place of scholars and lower place of workers and merchants can be
175 S ee, for example, Chow com m ents on the early welfare system  in Hong Kong that “(in the 
period before 1960), assistance from family w as the most reliable. If som eone has no relatives to 
rely on then he had to turn to the associations of fellow provincials or tow nsm en which se t up for 
uniting the clansm en." (Chow 1990 p. 4, my translation)
176 The concept of ruling the country by an em peror in China is family across the land (jia 
tianxia)'. This implies the whole country belongs to the em peror and the ruling is his family’s 
business.
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found in the book Xiaokang (Comfortably Off) by Guanzi, a student of Confucius. 
Guanzi says “Scholars, farmers, workers and merchants are the four pillars of the state.” 
It is thus obvious that the literati was highly praised whilst those who made use of their 
labour or capital to make a living were despised. Such a social ideology lasted for more 
than two thousand years and the consequences are contributory towards the 
underdeveloped manufacturing industries and capitalist system in China before 1949. 
Fairbank in his comprehensive book on the history of China also mentioned the 
underdevelopment of the proletariat and the capitalist classes and insists that revolution 
in the 1940s in China is not proletarian or bourgeois revolution but a peasant 
revolution.177
The inferior social status of manual labour force and trading people affected the 
development of large-scale production in China and consequently deterred the growth of 
the numbers of salaried workers and capitalists. Large-scale industries were not found 
until the turn of the 19th century in some designated areas. In the mid 1800s the Qing 
court was forced to open the country’s eastern and southern coast as the result of being 
defeated by European and American colonial conquerors. These started the 
establishment of contemporary mass production economy in China. On the other hand, 
the Qing government also recognised the importance of national industries in national 
security. Hence in the second half of the 19th century China founded several military 
industries such as shipbuilding, casting, machinery, etc. in Shanghai and Tianjin. All of 
these were initiated by the state for the aim of industrialisation for self-strengthening 
(Yangwu Yundong). Nevertheless, industrialisation failed. The capitalists and labour 
were stopped from growing numerically because of the World Wars and civil war in 
China from the 1910s to the 1940s.
The bourgeoisie and waged labour in China emerge very late in the long Chinese 
history. Furthermore, these social classes were not developed alongside industrialisation 
but ‘created’ by state in the wake of the national crisis, e.g. the establishment of state-
177 However the Chinese Marxists like Mao Zedong accepted the basic analysis of Lenin and 
recognised that capitalism had developed beyond national borders into the advanced stage  and 
the struggle w as not simply between capitalist and labourer in each  national setting. Capitalism 
had developed into imperialism and this is what defined the cam ps of the contenders and which 
put the Chinese proletariat at the forefront of the global struggle. The C hinese Marxists always 
stressed  that theory is tested  by practice and by this criteria it is clear that Mao Zedong and his 
com rades had a different view on the nature of revolution.
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managed enterprises after the invasion of foreigners. This pattern is different from 
Western industrialised societies in that, according to Karl Marx, the capitalists and 
working class appear spontaneously in each historical stage. The linear perspective of 
Marx on the development of human history also demonstrates the substantial needs for 
establishing a multi-party income maintenance system. In other words, the non-existence 
or weak development of any of these parts may lead to difficulties in realising this.
The previous paragraphs demonstrate why the development of social insurance in 
China before 1949 was slow and insignificant. The insight got from the discussion at 
above is that strong self-reliance values, a weak state, undeveloped capitalist economy, 
late development of salaried workers and strong family system are the counter-forces 
militating against the development of a contributory social insurance system. All of these 
are the actualities in the country. It has been elaborated above that ‘land under heaven’ 
rather than ‘state’ is the utopia for Chinese. Before the revolutions in the early 20th 
century, people in China persevered at the two-level roles and functions of family: 
provider of daily necessities and the necessary step to achieve ‘peace across the land’. 
Thus the state is minimised for its unspecific duties whilst the people’s living 
contingency is served within the family. The weak state is less capable or unwilling to 
plan and manage a contributory social insurance system whilst the strong family system 
diverted the people with needs away from state assistance.
The undeveloped capitalist economy affects the building up of contributory 
social insurance in three ways. First, since production cannot be socialised then the 
waged labour force is very small. The basic approach of contemporary social insurance 
system is a vast base of the production force so that the risks can be shared. Second, the 
labour force is difficult to organise under the petty commodity economic system. The 
characteristic of most petty commodity production is an unorganised labour force and 
the use of informal means of production like family members and with no formal 
accounting system.178 Therefore it is difficult to set up formal contributory system for 
this group of labour force. Third, since capitalists are paltry in a non-capitalist mode of 
production that their roles and duties in social insurance is unrecognised. This raises an 
issue that in non-capitalist economic system capitalists are insignificant, neglected or
178 See, for example, the study by M oser (1986) on 'Informal econom y’.
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discriminated against that a part of the tripartite system cannot be identified. This is 
particularly true for the case of China before 1979.
In the period from the 1910s to 1970s, contributory social insurance was hardly 
found in China. This can be attributed to political factors in addition to the dominant 
Confucian values. Because of the civil wars and the Second World War, social insurance 
could not be developed since the social environment was unfavourable. In this period 
social production was disturbed and the people’s living was very insecure. Although it 
was mentioned in Chapter 2 that the communist and the Nationalist governments 
developed labour insurance in their own spheres of influence, contributory social 
insurance system was very minimal and unstable.
In the thirty years after 1949 state-owned labour insurance but not contributory 
social insurance was implemented in China. Chinese labour insurance was in fact a part 
of the collective occupational welfare system provided in state-owned work units and 
built upon the socialist public ownership system. On the one hand labour insurance had a 
strong political element for promoting the incentive of the socialist production force. On 
the other hand state collectivism emphasises strong state intervention and collective 
actions. In addition, since it is socialist in nature capitalist economic production was 
suppressed. In sum, the unfavourable factors to establish and develop contributory social 
insurance in China after 1949 are economic and political: precarious political lines and 
extreme strong collectivism. These are distinct from the prominence of self-reliance and 
retarded economic specialisation in the feudal stage.
In contrast with the family ties, a weak state and an undeveloped capitalist 
economy in the past, China after 1949 can be described as a strong state; collectivism 
oriented and suppressed capitalist economy. Between these, the strong state is the most 
influential factor. Through political activities and state institutions the Chinese 
government intervenes in every sphere of people’s lives. These include comprehensive 
services through its organs like work units (danwei), trade unions and street committees 
(jiedao weiyuanhui), and mass (or political) movements such as the Great Leap Forward 
Movement and the Cultural Revolution. These approaches mobilise the public to 
sacrifice oneself to the collective for realising the political ideals. In the process the 
family bound ideology is changed to state bound. Public services substitute the
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traditional roles and functions of families; one’s activity boundary is extended which 
ultimately leads one to live off the state. The typical example is the commune system in 
the Great Leap Forward Movement whereby the services like canteens, nurseries and 
retirement homes replaced the services provided by the family.
Since 1949 state mechanisms in China have been extensively intervening into the 
people’s living. The strong socialist government centralises the supply of materials and 
services in society. Production materials and services are allocated through 
collectivisation and centralisation with the aim that the people’s living is guaranteed. 
This approach, therefore, built up an involuntary comprehensive state supportive 
mechanism in which the conventional tripartite contributory social insurance system is 
discarded. The almost all-embracing non-contributory labour insurance system, 
however, did satisfy most of the socialist labour force in the urban areas of the country. 
Furthermore, irrespective of the turbulent decade of Cultural Revolution, the successful 
centralised policies, booming population and young labour force in the 1950s to 1970s 
depicted a picture of ‘peace across the land’ which is always longed for by the Chinese.
i
In a nutshell, contributory social insurance seems odd to the Chinese government 
and her people before 1979. It is because of the strong Confucian values in the society 
and the impacts of the socialist economic structure that determines the features of social 
insurance in China in the period. These two main forces cultivate a unique perception on 
oneself, one’s relationship with society, and the expected roles and functions played by 
state. Consequently, individualism, socialisation of production, and contractual social 
relationships emerge very late in China. Most importantly, the development of 
individualism, social contract system and socialisation of production is also under the 
influences of the forces of the social values and economic structure in the country. 
Because of these socio-economic factors the development and features of social 
insurance in China are different from those found in capitalist developed countries. The 
following section will summarise in more detail the particular features of social 
insurance in China in the 1980s and beyond.
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The provision and management of social insurance in China with the case of 
Guangzhou Shi in the 1990s
It is detected from the interview with social insurance experts in China and review of the 
policy documents and statistical yearbooks that in the 1980s to the mid 1990s the 
provisions and management of social insurance in China has three main characteristics. 
These three main characteristics were described in Chapter 3 and will be summarised in 
the following paragraphs. In addition, Chapter 4 presented the case of Guangzhou Shi in 
Guangdong Province in China. The findings in the chapter echo with those three 
characteristics discovered in Chapter 3.
The first characteristic of social insurance in China in this period is the 
persistence of the ‘dual service system’. ‘Dual Service System’ refers to the 
phenomenon whereby two relatively different sets of criteria and benefit levels were 
designed for those eligible for social insurance services with dissimilar backgrounds. 
The ‘dual service system’ approach can be found in various aspects. For examples: state- 
owned and non state-owned work units, cadres and workers, migratory employees and 
local employees, permanent workers and contract system workers, and even between the 
employees who are law-abiding or not.
The ‘dual service system’ emerged during the economic and enterprise reforms 
in the country in the early 1980s. It becomes more and more apparent with the deepening 
of the reforms especially in social insurance services. In' social insurance system 
contrasts between two parties are easily found. For example, in relation to state-owned 
work units, non state-owned units are smaller in size, younger and more flexible. Social 
insurance services in non state-owned units have weaker ties with the state and therefore 
it is easier to promote ‘socialisation of social insurance’. Nevertheless, because of the 
weaker relationships with the state, employees in non state-owned units are not always 
covered by social insurance.
Discrepancies in social insurance provisions between cadre (white collar) and 
worker (blue collar) as well as ‘revolutionary’ or not are also vital. The examples can 
especially be found in retirement pensions and medical insurance. In general, cadres are
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eligible for higher and more benefits than their counterparts. This situation is quite 
common in capitalist developed countries since management of social insurance systems 
is relatively easier for salaried white-collar staff. It seems that there are no differences in 
China, a socialist developing country, which has higher avowed values of the manual 
labour force. Nevertheless, the documents on social insurance reveal that, disregarding 
one’s job nature; people who are seen to have contributed to ‘socialist construction’ are 
better treated. Such appreciation criteria are more disguised in capitalist countries.
In the 1990s migrant and local workers are treated differently in the Chinese 
social insurance system. The emergence of migratory workers is stimulated by 
urbanisation in modernisation. The ‘Smaller Urban Places Policy’ designed for retaining 
rural surplus labour is not efficient because of the vast population base. On the other 
hand, the pulling forces of cities attract the people who migrate from the less developed 
rural areas. However, the different treatment of local and migrant workers is caused by 
the rigid ‘household system’ in the country. Eligibility to social insurance in China is 
determined not only by one’s economic production, but also by one’s personal 
background including political participation and social belonging. This is one of the 
main characteristics of social insurance in China that can hardly be found in capitalist 
developed countries.
Household status of a worker also affects one’s employment conditions, i.e. 
whether one can be employed permanently or not. In general, migratory workers from 
rural areas usually take up the jobs left over by local workers. In China nongmin gong 
(peasant staff) are ‘temporary, seasonal or rotational’ employees who work in enterprises 
such as mines, transportation bureaux, railway bureaux, building companies, etc. (Lee 
1993, 236). Furthermore, Lee (1993, p. 237) describes the employees recruited under the 
nongmin lunhuan gong zhidu (system of labourers working in factories and in the fields) 
as being conditioned by the registration of residence of the labourers. These labourers 
are always deployed in “ ...industries which provide unattractive and hazardous work or 
demand the employment of physical work.” Except for OISH, most of the social 
insurance services in China favour cadres who are permanently employed in state organs 
or party offices so they hardly cover the non-permanently employed blue-collar workers.
The last but not least feature is the different treatment for employees who respect
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the state laws or do not. Maternity benefit, for example, shows that only the law-abiding 
employees are eligible for the insurance benefits disregarding proof of the need. In this 
dual service provision system, women employees are categorised into two groups: those 
who deserve to enjoy the benefits and those who do not deserve. However, the 
determination on who should get the benefit is totally beyond the consideration of 
income maintenance. This non-social insurance criterion of granting the benefit is not 
common in the social insurance services in capitalist developed countries.
Apart from the dual system approach, another characteristic of social insurance 
in China is its unclear objectives and indeterminate role. Unlike other social insurance 
systems, social insurance services in China always play the supplementary role in 
economic and political development. In addition, because of the strong political 
command over all systems in the country, social insurance services are designed for 
facilitating the realisation of political ideals. For examples, the OISH and maternity 
benefits are obviously tools for such purposes. The provisions of OISH is as wide as to 
cover those people who were injured in the revolutionary movements and war whilst 
maternity benefits are designed as the means to control the birth rate of the country. Both 
of these approaches are overtly politically oriented in a manner that is not so familiar in 
capitalist developed countries.
In fact, social insurance in China is unique especially in her management system. 
One of the examples is the state-owned work unit, which is subordinate to the state, is 
the manager of social insurance. Structurally most of the social insurance services in 
China are controlled by the respective state ministry at the centre that provides the 
services based on the regulations set by the Ministry of Labour and The All China Trade 
Unions. On the other hand, financially the Ministry of Finance supports social insurance 
services through the work unit’s accounting system but not an independent social 
insurance organisation or funding. The occupational nature of social insurance in China 
is nourished in the inseparable state-enterprise relationships created under the socialist 
ideology o f ‘all people’s ownership’.
The final feature of the Chinese social insurance services is its social control 
functions. Maternity benefits, for example, penalise those women employees who do not 
comply with the birth control regulations. This social insurance service, at the same
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time, penalises those employees who violate the rules by stopping their payment of their 
scheduled benefits. Another example is that, in order to reduce the labour force in state- 
owned units, retirement pensions are revised to induce people to take early retirement. 
Nevertheless, the most significant regulating function of social insurance in China is the 
unlike services and benefit levels between different sectors in the dual service system.
All in all, social insurance services in the 1990s in China are being reformed in 
many ways. These reforms aim at sharing the state’s heavy burdens with enterprises and 
employees and to weaken the occupational welfare nature of social insurance by 
building up a multi-party contributory system. In these on-going reforms some specific 
characteristics arise that are dissimilar from those before the 1980s. For example, in 
foreseeing the growing numbers of idled in society as the result of enterprise reforms 
and the re-emergence of private ownership system unemployment insurance is 
redesigned. The implications of redefining unemployment benefits shows the new 
planning and provision initiatives in social insurance in a socialist developing economy 
but at the same time, it exposes the double standard of the service system.
The features of social insurance in China as demonstrated by its provisions and 
management approaches clearly reflect the strong impacts of the country’s social system 
and economic structure. The ‘dual service system’ and the unclear roles and functions of 
social insurance services in the country reflect the close party-state-enterprises 
relationships. These relationships develop from the public ownership system of the 
Communist Party of China, and strengthened by the Party which dominates all state 
institutions, as well as the centralisation and collectivisation policies in all sectors in the 
country.
Social insurance in China is built up on the public ownership system as the 
institution to provide necessary benefits to the socialist labour force. However, in the 
provision and managing process work unit as the production and occupation welfare 
manger has to observe the related regulations and other stipulations of the state in 
fulfilling the control functions. Therefore the labour force is categorised and treated 
dissimilarly according to the non social insurance based criteria like household status 
and employment natures. The case of Guangzhou Shi illustrates that the party-state-work 
unit relationships also extend to individual employees that turns social insurance in the
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country to be one’s occupational welfare. This brings out an issue that employees in non­
state-owned work units are more deprived of social insurance services because the 
financing of social insurance largely counts on the ownership nature of the work unit. In 
brief, the unique social insurance provision and management pattern in China is strongly 
related with its economic structure as in other countries.
The unique coverage pattern and types of benefits
This study delved into the social insurance coverage and benefit in Guangzhou Shi with 
quantitative study technique. It is found from the study that in the economic system 
transformation period the issue of narrow coverage of social insurance is the focus of 
attention in the country. Coverage of social insurance is caused by the dual service 
system of social insurance as discussed above. In general, disparities in coverage are 
found between employees of contrasting backgrounds like household status, 
employment natures, and submissiveness to authority.
The most outstanding feature found in Chapter 6 on the coverage of social 
insurance is that migratory employees are the least covered. These employees are usually 
less permanently employed and paid on an irregular basis. Another noteworthy feature of 
the social insurance in China relates to the women employees who violated the national 
birth control policies. Women employees who gave birth to babies without prior 
approval are deprived of all maternity benefits, as well as other penalties imposed on the 
mothers and children. In strong contrast, employees who are injured outside of the 
working environment might also be covered by occupational injury, sickness and be 
eligible for handicapped benefits if the cause and action was judged to be for social 
good.
Disparities in social insurance coverage in China have weak correlation with the 
ownership background of work units but the employment nature or status assumes great 
importance. This implies in both the state-owned and non-state owned work units 
temporary employees are the most neglected. It is thus clear that social insurance in 
China is in a dependent position, interacts with and is heavily affected by other policies 
and institutions. The crux of this issue is the functioning of centralisation and 
collectivisation of the public ownership system that migrants, especially those moving
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without official permissions are not allocated with jobs by the state. This group of people 
has to face many adversities in finding a job and because of these reasons they surrender 
their rights to social insurance on the one hand, and the employers manipulate them on 
the other.
For the group of women employees the unequal treatments for the law-abiding 
and non law-abiding employees reflect the country’s social insurance polices play the 
facilitator role in maintaining the socialist economic system rather than income 
maintenance. Similar ideology is also found in the OISH that one who sacrifices to 
socialism does a social good that should result in being eligible for social insurance. The 
examples of covering those reproduced socialist productive forces and dedication to the 
socialist state are strong evidence for arguing the socialist values and orientation of 
social insurance in China. The implication of the reward-penalty functions of social 
insurance in the country is that social insurance is an institution built upon and serves the 
country’s economic base.
In comparing with the neglected groups of employees listed above, permanent 
employees in state-owned work units are the most favoured. These employees are mostly 
the residents with permanent household status, allocated to the work units through the 
centralised job placement process. The study results show that in most cases they are 
eligible for the six social insurance items in Guangzhou Shi. Furthermore, the ownership 
background of the work unit does not affect one’s access to social insurance. These 
imply first, the effects of collectivism and centralisation on one’s eligibility to social 
insurance are clear. Second, eligibility to social insurance in China relates to the 
stipulations in other policies and institutions.
Household status and employment status does not only determine one’s 
eligibility to social insurance but also the types of insurance. Table 6-4 in Chapter 6 
demonstrates that a higher percentage of state-owned work units fully provided the six 
social insurance items to permanent employees. This contrasts greatly with the 
percentages of the work units that provided partly or did not provide social insurance 
services at all to temporary employees and the employees of other employment 
conditions.
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The discussion in the chapters on the coverage and types of benefit for 
employees discloses that eligibility to social insurance in China is a matter controlled by 
administrative measures.179 It can be found from the types of benefits and one’s 
eligibility to social insurance that the services are kind of occupational welfare set up for 
guaranteeing the socialist production. Work units are seen as the operational teams to 
fulfil the production targets set by the headquarters (i.e. the state). On the other hand, in 
pursuing its missions (i.e. develop socialism) the headquarters has to guide and control 
its operations within the proclaimed values and ideologies (i.e. public ownership). Thus 
the work unit is only the medium for carrying out the instructions given from the 
headquarters and accordingly production and services within work units are framed. This 
party-state-work unit relationship creates and shapes the unique features of social 
insurance in China and explains why the employees are treated differently.
Social attitudes and expectations on social insurance in China
Attitudes and expectations towards particular issue are nurtured through one’s 
socialisation. This includes the social institutions like family, schools, work units in 
which one is brought up. In these social institutions where the peers and other members 
live are influential. This explains the importance of the Confucian self-reliant values that 
pass from one generation to another and the socialist collective system have strong 
impacts on one’s attitudes and expectations towards the state’s roles in income 
maintenance services.
There are two main forces in China that culture the people’s attitude and 
expectations towards social insurance in China. First, there is a set of profound and 
lasting Confucian values that indoctrinate the people with a unique perspective on one’s 
relationship with and responsibility for others. This affects the development of income 
maintenance in the country. Second, the collective measures established and 
implemented within the public ownership system after 1949 have instilled another set of 
attitudes and behaviours towards a contributory income protection system. These two 
sets of ideologies seem contrary. One of them stresses self-reliance on one’s family 
network with minimal state assistance whilst the other emphasizes sacrificing oneself to
179 For this issue p lease  refer to C hapter 7.
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the collective with strong state intervention. Nevertheless, the study results demonstrate 
that both of these two forces affect the people’s attitude and expectations toward social 
insurance in the 1990s.
The study results in Chapter 8 demonstrate that, employees in work units of both 
ownership nature do not expect too much direct income assistance from the state, 
irrespective of the fact that the state finances most income maintenance services through 
work units in the country. The sampled employees perceive work units as the provider of 
all living supplements including social insurance that they are eligible. However, 
because of this occupational welfare nature of social insurance provided at the same time 
by the production unit they work for, the positive views among employees towards their 
work units do not necessarily mean they support the social insurance services 
wholeheartedly.
The finding results also reveal that after the 50 years of time employees had in 
most work units in China they established various degree of relationships with work 
units, and also cultured particular attitudes and expectations towards the all-embracing 
social and economic units in this socialist developing country. It is found that the older 
employees who had been working in state-owned work units are more adapted to the 
values of socialism, more supportive to social insurance and have greater confidence in 
the state’s income protection. These particular values among the older employees on 
social insurance reflect the effects of occupational welfare nature social insurance rooted 
in the public ownership economic system.
The reactions among younger and less permanent employees found in this study 
are rather contrasting with those of the older and permanently employed. The younger 
non-permanent labour force, e.g. temporary young employees, is more pessimistic, 
shortsighted and has less confidence in the state’s income protection services. A larger 
group of these employees were found living in more destitute conditions with their 
unstable and lower incomes. Also, because of their household status they are more 
alienated from social insurance coverage. These employees are indifferent to social 
insurance because they experienced and perceived that social insurance is another job- 
related income supplement provided for the permanently employed in state-owned units.
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It is also found in Chapter 8 that about 40% of the employees would ask for 
labour insurance and state relief when contingent income needs arise. Also, there are 
more women than men in this group of employees. This indicates that in the past 50 
years socialism in China has only augmented the chances for women to participate in 
economic production but has not modified the dependent status of women in the 
patriarchal socialist system. Rather, socialism in China treats female labour as the 
reserve production army that, in the economic transition stage, has to retreat from 
production and ask for state’s income maintenance services. With the example of 
maternity benefits in this study, it is found that women employees are expected to carry 
out their roles in reproduction of the production force as planned. This reward-penalty 
social insurance item makes women employees not only helpless but submissive to the 
collective in which they are living. In brief, the work unit is viewed as an enlarged 
family in which traditional gender roles are maintained and the provision of social 
insurance in work unit is valued by its members as a matter of course.
Although employees of different backgrounds preserve dissimilar attitudes and 
expectations, the Confucian values still sway their views on contributory social 
insurance. The ‘self and ‘social’ ideologies of Confucianism that emphasize 
‘spontaneous and family-based supports’ are transplanted to the ‘collective’ and ‘state’ 
socialist value system that stresses the ‘mechanical institutional intervention’ by the 
means of centralisation.180 This transformed Confiician social system is evidenced by the 
roles and functions of work unit in social insurance provisions. In providing financial 
supports by means of social insurance to its members the only difference between a 
work unit and a natural family is the bureaucratic process set up for discriminating the 
needs of the socialist state from others. Furthermore, in the transition to socialist market 
economy in the 1990s, the Communist Party of China emphasizes the duties of 
individuals and family under the banner o f ‘socialisation of social insurance’ in order to 
develop a ‘social insurance with the characteristics of Chinese socialism’. It is thus clear 
that both Confucian and socialist values are significant and compatible in the country in 
formulating its social insurance policies.
180 The exam ples of ‘mechanical institutional intervention’ are household registration, job 
placem ent policy, com m unes, ration system , birth control policy, etc.
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Social insurance with the characteristics of Chinese socialism: an explanation
From the Marxist structuralist perspective, this study brought to light the significant 
features of social insurance in China. All these features, as stressed in the discussions, 
are unique to the country’s social values and economic base. As a part of the 
conclusions, this section will elaborate further the thesis of ‘social insurance with 
Chinese socialist characteristics’.
The starting point to delineate the issue of ‘social insurance with Chinese 
socialist characteristics’ is the concept of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ 
initiated by Deng Xiaoping. In April, 1983 Deng explained to the representatives of the 
Indian Communist Party that the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949 was because 
the CPC “combines the general theories of Marxism and the real situations of China, 
finds the most suitable ways, types and roads for revolution in China.”181 (Deng 1993, p. 
27, my translation) Furthermore, he said that since the CPC did not take all of the advice 
from Stalin that the revolution in China was successful. (Deng 1993, p. 27)
The two points above indicate that the idea of ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ means first, Marxism is the body of basic guidelines and the reference 
framework for all institutions including social insurance. Second, it should take into 
consideration the deep-rooted Confucian moral and value system and its interactions 
with Marxism in China. Basically Marxism has long been regarded as the guiding 
principle and terms of reference of the CPC. Until today the Chinese communist 
government still maintains that “to sustain and follow Marxism and Leninism” is one of 
the ‘Four Cardinal Principles’ (Sige Jianchi) in the modernisation and reform era.182
For Deng Xiaoping and the CPC socialism with the Chinese characteristics
181 S ee  T o  Build Up Socialist Material Civilisation and Spiritual Civilisation’ in the interview with 
the representatives of the Indian Communist Party on 29 April 1983 in Deng (1993, p. 27-28).
182 The ‘Four Cardinal Principles’ w as proposed by Deng Xiaoping at the meeting of the 
Communist Party of China in March, 1979. The four cardinal principles are socialism; 
dictatorship of the proletariat; the Communist Party’s leadership; and Marxism-Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought. (Li 1993, p. 334) In the meeting with the Prem ier of Zimbabwe in 
January, 1987 Deng also em phases on Ih e  strengthening of the education of the four cardinal 
principles and the persistence of the reform and open policies’. (Deng 1993, p. 201-202)
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means the ‘constructions of material civilisation and socialist ethics’ in the country with 
reference to Marxism.183 In this sense, economic development for the betterment of the 
people’s living and the preservation of the social culture should start from Marxism. For 
the realisation of material civilisation the CPC reinterprets historical materialism of Karl 
Marx on the upper and lower stages of socialism and initiate ‘socialist market 
economy’.184*185 The socialist market economy includes enterprise system, market 
mechanism, foreign trade, rural economy, macro economic adjustment and control 
system, social security system, and the legal system.186 (Ma 1993) In general, the 
strategies used by the CPC and the Chinese government in building up a socialist market 
economy involve the revitalisation of private ownership system and relaxation of 
centralisation and collectivisation in the country. These actions induce the rise of non- 
state-owned work units and reforms in state-owned work units, wage system, 
employment system and then affect the services provided by work units such as housing 
and labour insurance. Moreover, the development of the large-scale joint ventures with 
foreign capitalists and the small-scale local people owned economic units have 
momentous social and economic impacts in the country.
The above discussion shows that the main approach of the Chinese government 
used in liberalising the productivity for building up a socialist market economy is to 
reform its economic systems. These reforms, however, are “based on persisting in 
maintaining public ownership and the principle of ‘to each according to his work’ as the 
main body, with other economic ownership systems and allocation formats as the
183 In 1992 Deng said “Guangdong has to catch up with the  ‘Four Little Dragons’ in Asia in two 
aspects. It is not only in the economic area  but also the social order and the common mood of 
society. Both of th ese  two types of civilisations have to be ahead  of them  and this is socialism 
with C hinese characteristics." (1993, p. 378)
184 Karl Marx analyses from the perspective of historical materialism that, according to the m ode 
of production, developm ent of hum an society is linear from feudalist to the ideal of communist. 
Marx also distinguishes socialism is the lower phase of communism in which “there are still 
classes, occupational division of labour, elem ents of a market econom y and of bourgeois 
right....” (Bottomore 1983, p. 486) The developm ent from capitalism to communism needs a 
“series of s tep s  which eventually revolutionise the entire m ode of production." (Bottomore 1983, 
p. 486) T hese step s  include the seizing of political power in order to build up a dictatorship of the 
proletariat and centralising all production instrum ents in the hand of the state. The Communist 
Party of China in the 1950s and 1960s had successfully gone through th ese  s tep s  in the social 
and political m ovem ents like Land Reform Movement, Three-antis and Five-antis Movement, 
and Cultural Revolution. The Party held that the country had followed through the Marxist- 
Leninist line and reached the communist stage.
185 ‘Socialist m arket econom y’ w as formally adopted in the Third Plenary Session of the 
Fourteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 14 Novem ber 1993.
186 ‘Socialist m arket m echanism ’ m eans the market of consum er goods and production 
materials, financial market, labour market, technology market, information market, real estate
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complements.” (Meng et al 1994, p. 2) The same ideology is also found in the 
constructions of socialist ethics. It is stated that the objective of constructing socialist 
ethics is to develop the socialist ‘ideal, morality, culture and discipline’ to ‘suit the 
economic and political reforms and development’. (Meng et a l 1994, p. 2) This 
evidences socialist values and principles are used as the reference framework in all 
aspects of social tradition and culture.
It is explicit that the modernisation in China in the late 20th century went back to 
the debate on the relationship between ‘system (tf)’ and ‘tool (yongy,187 The Chinese 
communist government has been striving in similar ways to look for the tool by 
launching institutional reforms for building up a socialist market economy in the 
country. Thus the centre point of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is the revival 
of the socialist economic base in China with capitalist market elements and approaches. 
Accordingly, the state institutions on this transformed socialist economic structure are 
adapted and in this process develop their unique patterns.
From the ‘system-tool (ti-yong)’ perspective it is found that the relationship 
between socialism and Confucian moral and value system in China is very strong. In the 
article by Yang (1996, p. 232) on the social morality in China in 1995, it is recorded that 
in November, 1994, the Postgraduate Students Society of the Beijing University initiated 
a movement on ‘Cultivating one’s moral character (xiushen)’ -  a very typical Confucian 
value on the relationship between one and the others in family, society, and the ‘land 
under heaven’. (1996, p. 232) The movement was developed later into a “Project on 
cultivating one’s moral character’ in the campus for ‘developing the general mood of 
socialist ethics’. Other important evidence on the using of Confucians value system in 
enhancing the development of socialism is the revision of some popular literature 
originally with strong Confucian values for primary and secondary students from the 
socialist values.188
market, etc. (Li 1993, p. 313)
187 At the turn of the 19th century the Qing governm ent tried to initiate the technologies 
developed in W estern countries for strengthening her military power but insisting on preserving
the country’s  social, econom ic and political system s at the sam e time.
188 For exam ples, the T h e  New Three-W ords C lassics (Xin San Zi Jing)’ and T h e  New Good
Writing For Enhancing The Knowledge (Xin Zeng Guang Yan Wen)'.
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The ‘system-tooF relationship explains clearly the features of social insurance in 
China and the thesis o f ‘social insurance with the characteristics of Chinese socialism’ in 
this study. It is found from the ‘system-tooF perspective that Confucian values and 
moral system is treated as the tool being used in the socialist system. Confucian moral 
and value systems suit the needs of social insurance reforms especially in the 
‘socialisation of social insurance’. Two significant examples are the re-emphasis on 
one’s financial support to the elderly in family and society and the relationship between 
birth control policy and maternity benefits. In view of the rapidly aging population, 
enterprise reforms and the heavy burdens of the state in retirement pensions in the 
country, supports from individuals is an alternative to relieve the state’s heavy financial 
burdens and satisfy the people’s contingent income needs. The success of the return of 
the financial support responsibilities to all members in the country will attest the 
accomplishment of Chinese socialism and give rise a new arena of study in social 
development.189
In sum, socialist economic system is a momentous force in establishing and 
guiding the institutions in China. In the transition to socialist market economy, the 
Communist Party of China accommodates the Confucian moral and value system to the 
socialist economic system. In this sense Confucian moral and value system is turned to 
be the tool being used for maintaining socialism and realising the ideals of the 
Communist Party of China. Therefore, Chinese socialism is a unique system in that the 
Confucian moral and value system is upheld for expediting the development of Marxist 
socialism. It is under this condition that the social insurance in China is characterised by 
Chinese socialism. Most importantly, the effects of Chinese socialism create the distinct 
features of social insurance in China that have not been explored before.
Limitations of this study and the need for further studies on social insurance in 
socialist developing countries
It was discussed at the beginning of this study with the examples of capitalist developed 
countries that the establishment and development of social insurance are largely framed
189 According to Midgley, social developm ent m eans ‘a process of planned social change 
designed to prom ote the well-being of the population as  a whole in conjunction with a dynamic 
process of econom ic developm ent’. (1996, p. 25)
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by the economic system of the country. For capitalist developed countries the 
development of social insurance are pushed by the forces from various aspects. These 
include the enlightenment on individual freedom, the growing of the capitalist and 
working classes in industrialisation and the break down of the services like income 
supports in family. Hence social insurance services in these countries are developed 
from some of the social relief programs to a multi-party contributory income 
maintenance system for the purposes of risk pooling and enhancing individual economic 
freedom.
It is reviewed from the Marxist structuralist perspective that social insurance as a 
state institution is determined by the country’s economic base. Therefore it needs to have 
an exploratory study in order to understand the particular features of social insurance in 
socialist country. Throughout this study the case of Guangzhou Shi in China is examined 
and it demonstrates certain features of the social insurance in relation with the country’s 
economic structure. It is particularly found that social insurance in Guangzhou Shi is 
regulated by the reinterpreted Marxist socialism in the country.190 However, the features 
of social insurance found in this study also shows that Chinese socialism has also 
embodied Confucian moral and social values in the ‘socialisation’ process. Because of 
these particularities social insurance in China is unique to the country.
This study has successfully made use of the ‘sociological study on social 
insurance’ to outline the research framework and the research questions to find out the 
particular features of social insurance in China. Most importantly, this study employed 
the Marxist structuralist view to determine why the features of social insurance in China 
are unique to the country in that particular way. This study methodology has the 
advantages of understanding the management and effectiveness of a state institution and 
its relation with the country’s economic base. However, its weaknesses and limitations 
are made clear by the presumption of Marxist structuralist that all state institutions are 
inactive and count on the economic base. Marxist structuralist perspective excludes the 
metaphysical factors such as the new values and moral standards of the people on 
contributory social insurance developed from the changing social and economic 
situations. The cultural studies on the social insurance from the social value system are
190 The CPC would maintain that it is not a question of “interpretation" but the living application of 
Marxism under current circum stances.
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also significant as that of the Marxist structuralist.
Marxist structuralism is good for examining the characteristics of the institutions 
in socialist countries because it focuses on the relationships between economic base and 
institutions. The data collected from the review on the literature, policy documents, and 
the structured and unstructured interviewing in field study on social insurance in this 
study exhibit that the party-state-work units-individuals relationship determines the 
format and effects of social insurance in China. Such relationship reflects that the 
socialist economic mode of production is very dominant in the country, which governs 
the functioning of the institutions, and determines the service formats. These 
arrangements, however, can hardly be found in the liberal-democratic state where the 
government is limited and the social and economic systems are checked and balanced.191 
In other words, the application of the Marxist structuralist perspective might have more 
limitations in pluralist society because of the existence of more independent variables 
(e.g. pressure and interest groups) in affecting the roles and functions of the institutions.
One of the most important implications of this study is the accentuated 
relationship between social development and economic development in socialist market 
economy. The significance of this study is that it calls for attention to the social 
development study approach that integrates social development with economic 
development. (Midgley 1996) The case of ‘social insurance with the characteristic of 
Chinese socialism’ in China exemplifies that social development hinges on the extent of 
economic development. Nevertheless, in view of the reforms in China that are deepening 
in all aspects, the socialist economic system will give ways to other economic ownership 
and production systems that will consequently lead to the rise of interest groups in the 
country. Social development in this way will ask for a ‘managed pluralist’ institutional 
approach that might change the existing social insurance system as well as the features. 
(Midgley 1996 p. 139-176) Midgley’s insight on social development study is far- 
reaching but it is also the time to apply it in socialist developing countries for enhancing 
the knowledge in social policy studies.
191 For the explanation on liberal-democratic s ta te  pleas refer to Finer 1984, C hapter 2.
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Questionnaire number:
Social insuarnc in Guangzhou Shi, Guangdong Provicne, China 
Field research questionnaire on social insurance in work units
Introduction: This questionnaire is for collecting information on social insurance
provisions in your work unit. There are three parts in this questionnaire. The first part is 
about the details of your work unit. The second part is for understanding the employees in 
your work unit. The final part focuses on the provisions of labour/social insurance in our 
work unit.
The inforamtion collected from this questionnaire interviewing is only for academic 
research purpsoes.
Part One: Details of the work unit
1. What is the nature of ownership of your work unit?
1. State-owned enterprise (commodity and products production).
2. State-owned business unit (e.g. business services).
3. Collective enterprise (commodity & products production).
4. Collective business enterprise (e.g. business services).
5. Party, government organisation.
6. Individual economy.
7. Foreign capital related enterprise (joint-venture, co-venture, etc.).
8. Private economy.
9. Share stocking.
10. Don’t know.
11. Others (please specify)_____________________ .
2. What is the background of the main owner if your work unit is not state or collective 
owned?
1. Local people (including those come from other provinces).
2. Hong Kong/Macau Chinese.
3. Taiwan Chinese.
4. Other country’s Chinese.
5. European (e.g. Russians, German, British).
6. American (e.g. South, North American people).
7. Japanese.
8. Others (please specify)_______________
3. What is the type of business of your work unit?
1. Industry.
2. Building, constructing.
3. Transportation.
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4. Business (except finance and insurance), catering, materials supplying, etc.
5. Finance and insurance.
6. Consultancy, information services.
7. Medical & health services unit.
8. Party organisation.
9. Government organisation.
10. Cultural, educational unit.
11. Others (please specify)____________________________________
4. How long has your work unit been established?
1. Below 1 year.
2. Below 3 years.
3. Below 6 years.
4. Below 10 years.
5. Below 15 years.
6. Below 20 years.
7. Below 30 years.
8. Below 40 years.
9. 41 years or more.
Part Two: Staff and workers in the work unit
5. How does your work unit recruit and employ the different types of staff and workers? 
(Multiple answers, show the answer with V)
Permanent Temporary Contract
system
Others
Disposed by the Bureau of Labour 1 2 3 4
Disposed by Labour Service 
Company
1 2 3 4
Disposed by the Personnel Bureau 
of the Organisation Office
1 2 3 4
The work unit recruit directly with 
the approval from the Personnel 
Bureau
1 2 3 4
The work unit recruit directly with 
the approval from the Bureau of 
Labour
1 2 3 4
The work unit recruits & employs 
independently
1 2 3 4
Others
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6. What were the percentages of different types of employees worked in your work unit in 
the past 12 months? (show the answer with V)
% 0 1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-
100
Permanent 0 1 2 3 4 5
Temporary 0 1 2 3 4 5
Contract system 0 1 2 3 4 5
Others 0 1 2 3 4 5
7. What is/are the usual method(s) of paying the different types of staff and workers in 
your work unit? (bonus: monthly bonus, year-end bonus, dividends, etc.) (multiple 
answers, with S  to show the method):
Hourly Pieces Daily Weekly Monthly Bonus
Permanent 1 2 3 4 5 6
Contract
system
1 2 3 4 5 6
Temporary 1 2 3 4 5 6
Others 1 2 3 4 5 6
8. How much did the different types of the on-the-post staff and workers earn per month 
in your work unit in the past 6 months? (Show the answer with a V. Incomes include: on- 
the-job supplements, basic salary, welfare supplements, bonuses such as monthly bonus, 
year-end bonus and divididends.)
RMB Permanent Temporary Contract
system
Others
less than 300 1 2 3 4
301-400 1 2 3 4
401-500 1 2 3 4
501-600 1 2 3 4
601-700 1 2 3 4
701-1,000 1 2 3 4
1,001-1,200 1 2 3 4
1,200-1,500 1 2 3 4
1,501 or more 1 2 3 4
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9. What were the household status of the on-the-post employees in Guangzhou Shi in the 
past 6 months? (add up to 100%)
Permanent
Households
Temporary
Households
Non Chinese 
Citizen
Permanent
Temporary
Contract
system
Others
Part Three: Social insurance provisions in vour work unit
10. How much does your work unit pay in average to each of your staff and workers per 
month on welfare expenses (e.g. laundrette, transportation, water and electricity charges, 
etc.) except post supplements, basic salary, and bonus?
RMB Permanent Contract
system
Temporary Others
0 1 2 3 4
1-30 1 2 3 4
31-50 1 2 3 4
51-80 1 2 3 4
81-100 1 2 3 4
101-120 1 2 3 4
120 or more 1 2 3 4
11. Does your work unit make the income ceiling/baseline as the condition of joining 
social insurance? (Show your answer with V)
No. Income baseline is 
the condition
Income ceiling 
is the condition
Medical & sickness benefits 0 1 2
Maternity benefits 0 1 2
OISH benefits 0 1 2
Unemployment benefits 0 1 2
Retirement pensions 0 1 2
Death benefits 0 1 2
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12. Does your work unit provide the following staff and workers with medical and 
sickness benefits? (please S  to show the answer)
No Partly Yes
Permanent workers 0 1 2
Contract system workers 0 1 2
Temporary workers 0 1 2
Others 0 1 2
13. How does your work unit provide medical and sickness benefits to your staff and 
workers? (multiple answers)
1. 100% free on consultation and medicine charges.
2. Allow them to claim certain amount of the expenses on medical and sicknes 
expenses.
3. Issue certain amount of medical and sickness benefits regularly (monthly or 
annually) to them whilst the concerned employee has to pay for all of the 
uncovered expenses.
4. Issue certain amount of medical and sickness benefits regulalry (monthly or 
annually) to them whilst the concerned employee has to pay for part of the 
uncovered expenses.
5. The medical and health expenses are paid by the insurance company to which 
the work unit contributes for the employees.
6. Others (please specify)____________________ .
14. Which is(are) the main source(s) for medical and sickesss benefits in your work unit? 
(multiple answer)
1. Allocated from the state.
2. Raised by the work unit (excluding the contributions from employees).
3. Insurance company (multi party contributions)
4. Contributions from workers.
5. Others (please specify)___________________ .
15. Is there any difference between the staff and workers in enjoying medical and sickness 
benefits in your work unit?
1. Yes.
2. No.
16. If there is difference, how important is(are) the following factor(s)? (Show the 
answers with V)
Factors/degree of importance least less modest more most
Personal income level 1 2 3 4 5
Family burden 1 2 3 4 5
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The nature and seriousness of sickness 1 2 3 4 5
Guangzhou Shi household or not 1 2 3 4 5
Job tenure (permanent or temporary) 1 2 3 4 5
Years of service in the work unit 1 2 3 4 5
Rank of post 1 2 3 4 5
Chinese citizenship 1 2 3 4 5
Others 1 2 3 4 5
17. Does your work unit provide the following staff and workers with retirement 
pensions? (please put S  to show the answer)
No Partly Yes
Permanent workers 0 1 2
Contract system workers 0 1 2
Temporary workers 0 1 2
Others 0 1 2
18. How does your work unit provide retirement pensions to your staff and workers? 
(multiple answers)
1. The retired employee receives retirement pensions from the insurance agency 
to which both the employee and work unit contribute.
2. The retired employee receives retirement pensions from the insurance 
company to which only the work unit contributes.
3. Work unit directly gives retirement pensions to the retired employee in 
regularly terms (e.g. monthly).
4. Work unit directly gives the employee a lump sum retirement pensions when 
retiring.
5. Work unit gives retirement pensions regularly (e.g. monthly) to employees in 
advance until they reach retirement.
6. Others (please specify)____________________ .
19. Is there any difference between the staff and workers in enjoying retirement pensions 
in your work unit?
1. Yes.
2. No.
20. If there is difference, how important is(are) the following factor(s)? (Show the answer 
with V)
Factors/degree of importance least less modest more most
The employee’s income level when retiring 1 2 3 4 5
Family burden 1 2 3 4 5
The length of the contribution period to 
the insurance agency
1 2 3 4 5
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The amount of money contributed to the 
insurance agency
1 2 3 4 5
Guangzhou Shi household or not 1 2 3 4 5
Job tenure (permanent or temporary) 1 2 3 4 5
Years of service in the work unit 1 2 3 4 5
Rank of post 1 2 3 4 5
Chinese citizenship 1 2 3 4 5
Others 1 2 3 4 5
21. Which is(are) the main source(s) for retirement pensions in your work unit? (multiple 
answers)
1. Allocated from the state.
2. Raised by the work unit (excluding the contributions from employees).
3. Insurance company (multi party contributions)
4. Contributions from workers.
5. Others (please specify)___________________ .
22. Does your work unit pay toinsurance agency for retirement pensions?
1. No.
2. Yes. About % of the monthly wages.
23. Does your work unit provide the following staff and workers with occupational 
injury, sickness and handicapped benefits (OISH)? (please S  to show the answer)
No Partly Yes
Permanent workers 0 1 2
Contract system workers 0 1 2
Temporary workers 0 1 2
Others 0 1 2
24. How does your work unit provide OISH benefits? (multiple answers)
1. The injured employee receives OISH benefits from the insurance company to 
which both the employee and work unit contribute.
2. The injured employee receiveed OISH benefits from the insurance ocmpany to 
which only the work unit contributes.
3. Work unit directly gives the injured employee a lump sum OISH benefits.
4. Work unit directly gives the injured employee OISH benefits in regular terms, 
e.g. monthly.
5. Work unit gives OISH benefits regualrly (e.g monthly) to emplolyees in 
advance that they cannot claim for the benefits when occuaptional injury 
happens.
6. Others (please specify)____________________ .
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25. How do you rate the following factors when deciding to give OISH bnefits to the 
injured employee? (Show the answer with V)
Factors/degree of importance least less modest More Most
The severity of injury 1 2 3 4 5
The cause of being injured 1 2 3 4 5
Family burden 1 2 3 4 5
Guangzhou Shi household or not 1 2 3 4 5
Job tenure (permanent or temporary) 1 2 3 4 5
Years of service in the work unit 1 2 3 4 5
Rank of post 1 2 3 4 5
Chinese citizenship 1 2 3 4 5
Others 1 2 3 4 5
26. Is there any difference between the workers in enjoying OISH benefits in your work 
unit?
1. Yes.
2. No.
27. Which is(are) the main source(s) for OISH benefits in your work unit? (multiple 
answers)
1. Allocated by the state.
2. Raised by the work unit (excluding the contributions from workers).
3. Insurance company (multi party contributions)
4. Others (please specify)___________________ .
28. How does your work unit provide maternity benefits toyuour staff and workers? 
(multiple answers)
1. Full paid maternity leave at about RMB_____ per month.
2. New bom child supplements.
3. Special supplements related to maternal matters at about RMB per month.
4. Work unit regularly (e.g. monthly) gives women workers maternity 
supplements in advance that they cannot claim for the benfits after the baby 
was bom.
5. Others (please specify)_________.
29. Does your work unit provide the following women employees with maternity
benefits? (please S  to show the answer)
No Partly Yes
Permanent workers 0 1 2
Contract system workers 0 1 2
Temporary workers 0 1 2
Others 0 1 2
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30. Is there any difference between the staff and workers in enjoying maternity benefits in 
your work unit?
1. Yes.
2. No.
31. If there is difference, how important is(are) the following factor(s)? (Show the answer 
with V)
Factors/degree of importance least less modest more most
Personal income level 1 2 3 4 5
The first, second, or other child 1 2 3 4 5
Family burden 1 2 3 4 5
Her wage level 1 2 3 4 5
Guangzhou Shi household or not 1 2 3 4 5
Job tenure (permanent or temporary) 1 2 3 4 5
Years of service in the work unit 1 2 3 4 5
Rank of post 1 2 3 4 5
Chinese citizenship 1 2 3 4 5
Others 1 2 3 4 5
32. Which is(are) the main source(s) for maternity benefits in your work unit? (multiple 
answers)
1. Allocated from the state.
2. Raised by the work unit (excluding the contributions from workers).
3. Insurance company (multi party contributions)
4. Others (please specify)___________________ .
33. Does your work unit provide the following staff and workers with unemployment 
benefits? (please put S  to show the answer)
No Partly Yes
Permanent workers 0 1 2
Contract system workers 0 1 2
Temporary workers 0 1 2
Others 0 1 2
34. How does your work unit provide unemployment benefits to your staff and workers? 
(multiple answers)
1. The unemployed received unemployment benefits from the insurance company 
(e.g. Social Insurance Services Bureau, insurance company, Bureau of 
Labour) to which both the employee and work unit contribute.
2. The unemployed received unemploymetn benefits from the insurance company 
to which only the work unit contributes.
3. Work unit directly gives unemployemt benefits to the unemployed in regular 
terms (e.g. monthly).
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4. Work unit directly gives unemployment benefits to the unemployed in lump 
sum format.
5. Work unit gives unemployment benefits regularly (e.g. monthly) to employees 
in advance that they cannot claim for the benefit whne unemployed.
6. Others (please specify)____________________ .
35. Is there any difference between the staff and workers in enjoying unemployment 
benefit in your work unit?
1. Yes.
2. No.
36. If there is difference, how important is(are) the following factor(s)? (Show the answer 
with V)
Factors/degree of importance least less modest more Most
Wage level when unemployed 1 2 3 4 5
Regularly unemployed or not 1 2 3 4 5
The length of the contribution period to 
the insurance company
1 2 3 4 5
The amount money contributed to the 
insurance company
1 2 3 4 5
Family burden 1 2 3 4 5
Guangzhou Shi household or not 1 2 3 4 5
Job tenure (permanent or temporary) 1 2 3 4 5
Years of service in the work unit 1 2 3 4 5
Rank of post 1 2 3 4 5
Chinese citizenship 1 2 3 4 5
Others 1 2 3 4 5
37. Which is(are) the main source(s) for unemployment benefits in your work unit? 
(multiple answers)
1. Allocated by the state.
2. Raised by the work unit (excluding the contributions from workers).
3. Insurance company (multi party contributions)
4. Others (please specify)___________________ .
38. Does your work unit provide the following staff and workers with death benefits or 
funeral supplements? (please S  to show the answer)
No Partly Yes
Permanent workers 0 1 2
Contract system workers 0 1 2
Temporary workers 0 1 2
Others 0 1 2
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39. How does your work unit provide death benefits or funeral supplements to your staff 
and workers? (multiple answers)
1. The family members of the deceased employee receive the benefits from the 
insurance company to which both the employee and work unit contribute.
2. The family members of the deceased employee receive the benefits from the 
insurance company to which only the work unit contributes.
3. Work unit directly gives the family members of the deceased employees the 
benefits in regular terms (e.g. monthly).
4. Work unit directly gives the family members of the deceased employees the 
benfits in a lump sum format.
5. Work unit regularly (e.g. monthly) gives the benefits to employees in advance 
that their family members cannot claim for the benefits at the death of the 
employee.
6. Others (please specify)____________________ .
40. Is there any difference between the workers in enjoying death benefits and funeral 
supplements in your work unit?
1. Yes.
2. No.
41. If there is difference, how important is(are) the following factor(s)? (Show the answer 
with V)
Factors/degree of importance least less modest more most
Personal wage level at death 1 2 3 4 5
Cause of death (e.g. work related or not) 1 2 3 4 5
Family burden 1 2 3 4 5
The length of the contribution period to 
the insurance agency
1 2 3 4 5
The amount of money contributed to the 
insurance company
1 2 3 4 5
Guangzhou Shi household or not 1 2 3 4 5
Job tenure (permanent or temporary) 1 2 3 4 5
Years of service in the work unit 1 2 3 4 5
Rank of post 1 2 3 4 5
Chinese citizenship 1 2 3 4 5
Others 1 2 3 4 5
42. Which is(are) the main source(s) for death benefits and funeral supplements in your 
work unit? (multiple answer)
1. Allocated by the state.
2. Raised by the work unit (excluding the contributions from workers).
3. Insurance company (multi party contributions)
4. Others (please specify)___________________ .
322
Appendix
43. Has your work unit ever adjusted the benefit levels of the above social insurance 
servcies?
1. Always.
2. Frequently.
3. Sometimes.
4. Occasionally.
5. Never. (Please skip to question no. 45)
44. What is(are) the reason(s) of the adjustment? (multiple answers)
1. Inflation.
2. Work unit has ample of resources.
3. It is stipulated in the national/regional regulations and policies.
4. The benefit recipients express their views.
5. Others (please specify)______________ .
45. How long does it take from the time your work unit received an application to the 
tiem the applaincant received the first sum of benfit?
1. Less than a week.
2. One to two weeks.
3. Within a month.
4. One to two months.
5. More than six months.
6. It depends.
46. Will your work unit provide supplementary benefits to the employees if they 
mentioned to you that the social insurance benefits are not enough to support the living?
1. No.
2. Sometimes/it depends.
3. Always/No special restrictions.
47. Does your work unit provide emergency financial assistance to the employees who 
have not joined the above social insurance services?
1. Yes.
2. No.
48. Apart form the above income protection services, does your work unit provide other 
assistance to the employees in urgent need? (multiple answers)
1. A lump sum supplement.
2. Loan with interest.
3. Interest-free loan.
4. Advance salary/wages.
5. Transfer them to other institutions (e.g. Bureau of Civil Administrtation, trade 
union, street committee, etc.).
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6. No.
7. Others (please specify)________________________ .
49. Does your work unit provide non-contributory temporary living benefits/supplements 
to the employees in urgent need?
1. No.
2. Yes. The condition(s) is(are):
1. Work performance.
2. Work unit assesses the magnitude of need.
3. The stipulations in the central/regional regulations and policies.
4. Political participation and performance.
5. Job tenure (e.g. permanent or temporary workers).
6. Rank of the post (high or low rank).
7. Recommendations from other organisations (e.g. trade unions).
8. No special requirement.
50. Please specify your title and department in your work unit:
Title:____________
Department:________________________________
(End of questionnaire and thank you for your cooperation!)
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Questionnaire number:
Social insurance in Guangzhou Shi, Guangdong Province, China 
Field research questionnaire on social insurance for staff and wokrers
Introduction: This questionnaire aims at exploring the views of staff and workers on 
social/labour insurance. You might need 15-20 minutes to answer this questionnaire. All 
information in this questionnaire are confidential and for academic research purpose only.
Part One: Personal information
1. Sex
1. Male
2. Female
2. Age
1. 16-25
2. 26-35
3. 36-45
4. 46-55
5. 56-65
6. 66-75
7. 76 or over
3. Level of education
1. I have never been to school.
2. Primary 1 - primary 3.
3. Primary 4 - primary 6.
4. Junior secondary.
5. Senior secondary/technical/vocational training.
6. College/University or above.
1. Household registration in Guangzhou Shi
1. Permanent
2. Temporary
2. Marital status
1. Single
2. Married
3. Widow/widower
4. Divorced/separated
5. Cohabit
6. Others
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Part Two: Your employment and work unit
3. What is your present employment situation?
1. Employed.
2. Unemployed.
3. Retired/Unfitted to work.
4. On leave (e.g. work injured, maternity)
5. Others (please specify)_____________________ .
4. What is/was the type of business of your present or last employment?
1. Industries.
2. Building, real estate.
3. Transportation.
4. Commerce, catering, trading.
5. Finance, tax and insurance.
6. Information and consultancy services.
7. Medical and health.
8. Political party institution.
9. Government institution.
10. Cultural and educational.
11. Others (please specify)_____________________ .
5. What is/was your employment status in the present /last job?
1. Contract system
2. Temporary
3. Permanent
4. Contract
5. Self-employed
6. Retired/unfit to work
7. Unemployed
8. Others (please specify)_____________________ .
9. What is/was the nature of ownership of the work unit of your present/last job?
1. State owned.
2. Collective.
3. Foreign capital related.
4. Private economy.
5. Individual economy.
6. Others (please specify)_____________________ .
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10. What is/was your wage basis in your present/last job? (multiple answers)
1. On bonus.
2. On pieces.
3. On hourly.
4. On daily.
5. On weekly.
6. On monthly.
7. Annual.
11. Could you please select and rank 3 main income sources of your family (including 
yourself) in 1994 from the list below? (To put 1 as the most important or the only income, 
2 and 3 as the second and third.)
Sources o f  income Ranking
Wages/salaries (including bonus and welfare supplements from work unit)
Off the record supplements
Medical and sickness benefits
Maternity benefits
OISH benefits
Unemployment benefits
Death benefits and funerla supplements
Retiremtn pensions
State relief/assistance
Profits or rent from business or investments
Supplements/borrowing from other family members, friends, relatives, etc.
12. What is(are) the main income source(s) in the present/last work unit? (multiple 
answers)
1. Work supplements.
2. Basic wage/salary.
3. Welfare supplements.
4. Bonus (e.g. monthly, annual, dividends, etc.)
5. Others (please specify)_________________ .
13. What is your type of work in the present/past work unit?
1. Production worker (Direct service or production, e.g. assembling, sales, etc.).
2. Non-production staff(e.g. management, planning & design, accounting, etc.).
3. Partner/shareholder/proprietor.
14. What is your skill level in the present/past work unit?
1. Non-skilled (e.g. manual worker, salesperson, waiter)
2. Semi-skilled (e.g. garment worker, driver, assembler)
3. Skilled (e.g. printer, chef, accounting clerk)
4. Technical (e.g. mechanist, computer operator)
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5. Professional/manager (e.g. teacher, nurse, graduate engineer, shop manager)
Part Three: Your family and family members (Family means those with direct relationship 
and live in the same accommodation unit. This definition applies in this questionnaires)
15. Number of family members living on your income in your family (excludes yourself):
1. 0
2 . 1
3. 2
4. 3
5. 4
6. 5
7. 6
8. 7 or more
16. How much is your monthly family income about? (RMB)
1. Less than 300.
2. 301-500.
3. 501-700.
4. 701-900.
5. 901-1,100.
6. 1,101-1,300.
7. 1,301-1,500.
8. 1,501-1,700.
9. More than 1,700.
17. Are you the main income earner (i.e. supply more than 80%) of your family?
1. Yes.
2. No.
18. Could you please state the number of your family members (including yourself) who 
are working in/running the following work units of different ownership? (please S  to 
show your answer)
Work unit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
State
Collective
Private economy
Individual economy
Foreign capital related
Other natures of 
ownership
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19. How many family members (including yourself) in your family are eligible for the 
following social insurance? (Please S  to show the answer)
Benefits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Medical and sickness benefits
Maternity benefits
OISH benefits
Unemployment benefits
Retirement pensions
Death benefits & funeral supplements
20. What kind of housing tenures of the accommodation in which your family is living?
1. Self-owned/self-built.
2. Privately rent.
3. Flat provided by work unit (with or without rent).
4. A unit in the dormitory of the work unit.
5. Others (please specify)__________________________ .
21. What household equipment your family owned? (multiple answers)
1. Television
2. Radio
3. Refrigerator
4. Visual system (video recorder, video camera)
5. Audio system (turntable, speakers, recorder, kara-o-k, etc.)
6. Telephone (shared or private use)
7. Air-conditioner
8. Electric fan
9. Microwave oven
10. Rice cooker
22. Has your family got the following household facilities? (multiple answer)
1. Tap water
2. Electricity
3. Gas/fuel cooking equipment
4. Drainage
5. Private toile^athroom
6. Private kitchen
23. Could you tell me your monthly family consumpiton pattern in percentage? (please V)
Not more than 10 10 30 40 50
Housing (includes rent, instalments or repayments) 1 2 3 4 5
Foodstuff 1 2 3 4 5
Transportation 1 2 3 4 5
Clothing 1 2 3 4 5
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Children's education 1 2 3 4 5
Medical/health care 1 2 3 4 5
Fuels, electricity, water, etc. 1 2 3 4 5
Entertainment (e.g. see movie, dine out, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5
Others 1 2 3 4 5
Part Four: Social/labour insurance for you and vour family
24. Had you/your family ever experienced sudden loss of income in the past 3 years?
1. No. (Skip to Question Number 27)
2. Yes.
What were the causes of such happenings? (multiple answers)
1. Unemployed.
2. Retired.
3. Permanently/long term unfit to work (e.g. chronic sickness, 
handicapped, etc.)
4. Temporary unfit to work (e.g. expecting a baby/post-natal recovery, 
serious illness, work injuries).
5. Death of family member.
6. Inflation.
7. Others________________________ .
25. How often had them happened?
1. Seldom
2. Occasionally
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Always
26. What did your family do when it was happening and affecting your family's livings?
1. Nothing. Just leave it aside.
2. Borrowing.
3. To apply for relief/assistance from work unit.
4. To apply for state reliefrassistance.
5. To find the second/another job.
6. To get along frugally.
7. To apply for labour/social insurance.
8. It depends.
9. Others
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27. Do you aware of the provisions of state relief' assistance?
1. Yes.
2. No.
28. Had your family ever applied for any state relief/assistance benefits to support your 
family’s expenditures in the past 3 years ?
1. Yes.
2. No.
29. Had your family ever received benefits (including cash and kinds) from state 
reliefrassistance in the past 3 years?
1. Never.
2. Occasionally.
3. Sometimes.
4. Frequently.
5. Always.
6. Not applicable.
30. Do you aware of the relief/assistance provided in work units?
1. Yes.
2. No.
31. Had your family members ever applied to work units for any relief/assistance benefit 
to support your family’s expenditures in the past 3 years ?
1. Yes.
2. No.
32. Had your family ever received benefits (including cash and kinds) from work unit in 
the past 3 years?
1. Never.
2. Occasionally.
3. Sometimes.
4. Often.
5. Frequently.
6. Always.
33. Which social insurance is provided in your work unit? (Please S  to show your 
answer)
Items No Yes Don't
know
Medical and sickness benefits 0 1 2
Maternity benefits 0 1 2
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OISH benefits 0 1 2
Unemployment benefits 0 1 2
Retirement pensions 0 1 2
Death benefits and funeral supplements 0 1 2
34. Are you enligible for any of the following benefits? (Please S  to show your answer)
Items No Yes Don't
know
Medical and sickness benefits 0 1 2
Maternity benefits 0 1 2
OISH benefits 0 1 2
Unemployment benefits 0 1 2
Retirement pensions 0 1 2
Death benefits and funeral supplements 0 1 2
35 . Do you know why you are not eligible for the benefits? (multiple answers)
1. Household registration problem (e.g.temporary household)
2. Work status problem (e.g. temporary worker)
3. Irregular incomes (i.e. piece or hourly work system)
4. Low rank in the work unit.
5. Short period of service in the work unit.
6. Don't know.
36. Have you ever received/are you receiving any of the following social insurance 
benefits? (put S  to show the answer)
Programs No Yes
Medical aned sickness benefits 0 1
Maternity benefits 0 1
OISH benefits 0
Unemployment benefits 0 1
Retirement pensions 0 1
Death benefits 0 1
37. Do you know why you haven’t received the social insurance benefits provided by the 
work unit eventhough you are eligible for them? (multiple answer) (This question is only 
for those elgible but didn’t receive social insurance benefits in the past three years. After 
completing this question please turn to Question 65.)
1. I didn’t join/contribute to the insurance programmes.
2. I can’t afford.
3. Social insurance can’t help me.
4. I don’t know what social insurance services are provided in my work unit.
5. I joined the non-statutory insurance programs.
6. I don’t like the social insurance programmes in my work unit.
7. I don't like the intervention of the work unit.
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8. I don’t know how to get the benefit.
9. I have no need.
10. Others (please specify)_______________________ .
38. How much does your family spend on medical and health services? (RMB)
1. Less than 50.
2. 51-100.
3. 101-150.
4. 151-200.
5. 201-250.
6. 251-300.
7. More than 300.
8. Not applicable/none.
39. Did the expenses on medical and health services in your family increase in the past 3 
years? (e.g. because by inflation)
1. Never.
2. Occasionally.
3. Sometimes.
4. Frequent.
5. Always.
6. Don’t know.
40. How much did your family receive from maternity benefits in the past 3 years? (RMB)
1. Less than 100.
2. 101-150.
3. 151-200.
4. 201-300.
5. 301-400.
6. 401-500.
7. More than 500.
8. Not applicable/none (please skip to question no. 45)
41. How long have you/your family to wait for getting the first sum of maternity benefits 
from the work unit?
1. Immediately.
2. Less than 1 week.
3.1-2 weeks.
4. 3-4 weeks.
5.1-2 months.
6. More than 3 months.
7. It depends.
8. Don’t know.
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42. How did the maternity benefits hand out?
1. A lump sum.
2. Multiple payments (e.g. monthly).
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
43. What was the format of the maternity benefits you received?
1. In kind.
2. In cash.
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
44. With the example of your family, had maternity benefits been adjusted in the past 3 
years? (e.g. augmented because of inflation)
1. Never.
2. Occasionally.
3. Sometimes.
4. Frequent.
5. Always.
6. Don’t know.
45. How much did your family receive from OISH benefits per month/per application in 
the past 3 years? (RMB)
1. Less than 100.
2. 101-150.
3. 151-200.
4. 201-300.
5. 301-400.
6. 401-500.
7. More than 500.
8. Not applicable/none (please skip to question no. 50 if chose this answer)
46. How long have you/your family to wait for getting the first sum of OISH benefits 
from the work unit?
1. Immediately.
2. Less than 1 week.
3. 1-2 weeks.
4. 3-4 weeks.
5. 1-2 months.
6. More than 3 months
7. It depends.
8. Don’t know.
9.
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47. How did the OISH benefits hand out?
1. A lump sum.
2. Multiple payments (e.g. monthly).
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
48. What was the format of OISH benefits you received?
1. In kind.
2. In cash.
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
49. With the example of your family, had OISH benefits been adjusted in the past 3 years? 
(e.g. augmented because of inflation)
1. Never.
2. Occasionally.
3. Sometimes.
4. Frequent.
5. Always.
6. Don’t know.
50. How much did your family received from unemployment benefits in the past 3 years? 
(RMB)
1. Less than 100.
2. 101-150.
3. 151-200.
4. 201-300.
5. 301-400.
6. 401-500.
7. More than 500.
8. Not applicable/none (please skip to question number 55 if chose theis answer)
51. How long have you/your family to wait for getting the first amount of unemployment 
benefits from the work unit?
1. Immediately.
2. Less than 1 week.
3. 1-2 weeks.
4. 3-4 weeks.
5. 1-2 months.
6. More than 3 months.
7. It depends.
8. Don’t know.
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52. How did the unemployment benefit hand out?
1. A lump sum.
2. Multiple payments (e.g. monthly).
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
53. What was/were the format of the unemployment benefits you received?
1. In kind.
2. In cash.
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
54. With the example of your family, had the unemployment benefits been adjusted in the 
past 3 years? (e.g. augmented because of inflation)
1. Never.
2. Occasionally.
3. Sometimes.
4. Frequent.
5. Always.
6. Don’t know.
55. How much did your family receive from retirement pensions per month in the past 3 
years? (RMB)
1. Less than 100.
2. 101-150.
3. 151-200.
4. 201-300.
5. 301-400.
6. 401-500.
7. More than 500.
8. Not applicable/none (please skip to question number 60 if chose this answer)
56. How long have you/your family to wait for getting the first amount of retirement 
pension from the work unit?
1. Immediately.
2. Less than 1 week.
3. 1-2 weeks.
4. 3-4 weeks.
5. 1-2 months.
6. More than 3 months.
7. It depends.
8. Don’t know.
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57. How did the retirement pensions hand out?
1. A lump sum.
2. Multiple payments (e.g. monthly).
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
58. What was the format of the retirement pensions you received?
1. In kind.
2. In cash.
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
59. With the example of your family, had the retirement pensions been adjusted in the past 
3 years? (e.g. augmented because of inflation)
1. Never.
2. Occasionally.
3. Sometimes.
4. Frequent.
5. Always.
6. Don’t know.
60. How much did your family receive from death benefits and funeral supplements per 
month in the past 3 years? (RMB)
1. Less than 100.
2. 101-150.
3. 151-200.
4. 201-300.
5. 301-400.
6. 401-500.
7. More than 500.
8. Not applicable/none (please skip to question number 64 if chose this answer)
61. How did the death benefits and funeral supplements hand out?
1. A lump sum.
2. Multiple payments (e.g. monthly).
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
62. What was the format of the death benefit and funeral supplements your family 
received?
1. In kind.
2. In cash.
3. It depends.
4. Not applicable.
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63. How long have you/your family to wait in getting the first amount of death benefits 
and funeral supplements from the work unit?
1. Immediately.
2. Less than 1 week.
3. 1-2 weeks.
4. 3-4 weeks.
5. 1-2 months.
6. More than 3 months.
7. It depends.
8. Don’t know.
64. Had you ever encountered any difficulties in applying/getting the insurance benefits? 
(multiple answers)
1. Never.
2. Bureaucraticism (e.g. complicated procedures)
3. Long application and waiting time.
4. Delayed/interrupted payments.
5. Personal problems/long distance.
6. Others (please specify)________________________ .
Part five: Your views on social insurance
65. Do you think the existing social insurance bebefit levels can maintain one’s general 
living in Guangzhou Shi?
1. Totally impossible.
2. Slightly possible.
3. partly possible.
4. Greatly possible.
5. Absolutely possible.
6. Don’t know.
66. In your opinion, which ownership type(s) of work unit can protect the employees with 
existing social insurance system? (multiple answers)
1. State-owned.
2. Collective.
3. foreign capital related.
4. Private economy.
5. Individual economy.
6. Others (please specify)________________________ .
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67. Which employment type(s) can protect the employees under the existing social 
insurance system? (multiple answers)
1. Contract system workers.
2. Temporary workers.
3. permanent workers.
4. Contract workers (short time, less than 6 months)
5. Self-employed.
6. others (please specify)________  .
68. Do you know there are reforms in social insurance in Guangzhou Shi?
1. I know.
2. I don’t know.
3. I am not sure.
69. Do you think the social insurance reforms can provide more income protection to 
you?
1. Totally impossible.
2. Slightly possible.
3. partly possible.
4. Greatly possible.
5. Absolutely possible.
6. Don’t know/no comments.
70. Do you think the social insurance reforms can provide short term income protection 
to you? (e.g. unemployed)
1. Totally impossible.
2. Slightly possible.
3. partly possible.
4. Greatly possible.
5. Absolutely possible.
6. Don’t know/no comments.
71. Do you think the social insurance reforms can provide long term income protection to 
you? (e.g. in chronic sickness, retired)
1. Totally impossible.
2. Slightly possible.
3. partly possible.
4. Greatly possible.
5. Absolutely possible.
6. Don’t know/no comments.
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72. According to the magnitude of importance, how do you rank the following social 
insurance services in the reforms? (‘1* is the most important, ‘2’ is the second and ‘6’ is 
the least)
Rank
Medical & health benefits
Maternity benefits
OISH benefits
Unemployment benefits
Retirement pensions
Death benefits and funeral supplements
73. Where did you get the information on social insurance?
1. Employer.
2. Mass media (newspapers, t.v.).
3. Colleagues/friends.
4. Others (please specify)___________________
(End of questionnaire, thank you very much!)
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Date Department/Organisation Place Person contacted
10/12/1994 Guangzhou Shi Labour Bureau Hong Kong Ms. Jiang Yuan
20/12/1994 Guangdong Province Economic Systems Reforms Committee 
(Social Insurance Section)
Guangzhou Shi Mr. Dong Binguang
20/12/1994 Guangdong Province Economic Systems Reforms Committee Guangzhou Shi Mr. Wu Yixin 
Mr. Li Binfei
29/12/1994 Guangzhou Shi Labour Bureau (Unemployment Management 
Section)
Guangzhou Shi Mr. Ye Wuxiong 
Mr. Young Bingzhao
29/12/1994 Guangzhou Shi Labour Bureau (General Office) Guangzhou Shi Ms. Zhang Qiuhong
30/12/1994 Department of Sociology, Zhongshan University Guangzhou Shi Professor Cai He
25/1/ 1995 Guangdong Province Economic Systems Reforms Committee 
(Social Insurance Section)
Guangzhou Shi Mr. Dong Binguang
25/1/1995 Guangzhou Shi Labour Bureau (General Office) Guangzhou Shi Ms. Zhang Qiuhong
26/1/1995 Department of Sociology, Zhongshan University Guangzhou Shi Professor Cai He
16/2/1995 Guangzhou Shi Civil Administration Bureau (Social Relief 
Section)
Guangzhou Shi Ms. Pun Yonghoan
24/2/1995 Guangdong Province Economic Systems Reforms Committee Guangzhou Shi Mr. Wu Yixin 
Mr. Li Binfei
25/2/1995 Guangdong Province Economic Systems Reforms Committee Guangzhou Shi Mr. Wu Yixin 
Mr. Li Binfei
25/2/1995 Department of Sociology, Zhongshan University Guangzhou Shi Professor Cai He
9-10/4/1995 Department of Sociology, Zhongshan University Guangzhou Shi Professor Cai He
9/4/1995 Guangzhou Shi Civil Administration Bureau (Social Relief 
Section)
Guangzhou Shi Ms. Pun Yonghoan
19/4/1995 Guangzhou Shi Labour Bureau Guangzhou Shi Mr. Ye Wuxiong 
Mr. Young Bingzhao
25/4/1995 Guangdong Province Economic Systems Reforms Committee Guangzhou Shi Mr. Wu Yixin 
Mr. Li Binfei
Appendix
May-July/1995 Department of Sociology, Zhongshan University Hong Kong Professor Cai He
28/8/1995 Guangdong Province Social Insurance Services Bureau Guangzhou Shi Mr. Long Huisi 
Mr. Fang Changxi
28/8/1995 Guangdong Province Academy of Social Science Guangzhou Shi Professor Zhang Nansheng
29/8/1995 Guangdong Province Social Insurance Services Bureau Guangzhou Shi Mr. Long Huisi 
Mr. Fang Changxi
29/8/1995 Department of Sociology, Zhongshan University Guangzhou Shi Professor Cai He
29/8/1995 Guangdong Province Society of Social Insurance Guangzhou Shi Mr. Zhang Guangyu
27/9/1995 Guangdong Province Society of Social Insurance Guangzhou Shi Mr. Zhang Guangyu
24-25/10/1995 International Conference on China’s Economic Reforms and 
Opening
Hong Kong Professor Wu Jianglian 
Mr. Zhao Shukai
9-10/2/1996 Guangdong Province Economic Systems Reforms Committee 
(Social Insurance Section)
Guangzhou Shi Mr. Dong Binguang
2/4/1996 Labour Personnel College, People’s University of China Hong Kong Professor Zhao Lukkuan
20/5/1996 Institute of SCRES (Social Survey Department) Beijing Mr. Sun Li
Mr. Zheng Weidong
21/5/ 1996 Department of Sociology, People’s University of China Beijing Professor Li Qiang 
Mr. Zhou Xueyin
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Case
No.
Name of work unit Ownership
nature
Business nature People interviewed
001 Guangzhou Shi Transportation Vehicles Manufacturing Plant 
40, Qianjin Lu
State-owned Manufacturing Mr. Bao Yongsheng
002 Rongfei Jewelry Company 
21, Yangzhong Jie, Beijing Lu
Individual
economy
Business
Services
Mr. Ren Feng
003 Zhonghua Transportation Team ,Guangzhou Golden Wheel Company 
Multi Storey Car Park, Shuijun Jiang, Huangshi Dong Lu
Collective-
owned
Business
Services
Mr. Liang
004 Southern China Sewing-machines Manufacturing Corporation 
Bianjiang Lu
State-owned Manufacturing Mr. Zhu
005 Forever Refrigerating Equipment Manufacturing Ltd. 
1, Shechu Lu, Shizhengchang Cun
Joint Venture Manufacturing Mr. Chen Chengyong
006 Guangdong Province Commercial Refrigeration Equipment Company 
Longgui Shengyao Cun
State-owned Manufacturing Mr. Sheng Jirong
007 Guangzhou Shi No.2 Rubber Plant 
90, Xinmin Dajie, Gexin Lu
State-owned Manufacturing Mr. Luo
008 Everlasting Electroplating Factory 
12, Miaoqian Zhijie, Huagui Lu
Collective-
owned
Manufacturing Ms. Liang Cuiqing
009 Red Star Cables & Materials Factory
Foushan Cun, Shijing Hongxing Zhen, Baiyuan Qu
Collective-
owned
Manufacturing Mr. Su Xiaohua
010 Guangzhou Hairdressing Equipment Factory State-owned Manufacturing Mr. Li Buwei
011 No. 11 Rubber Plant 
Gongye Da Du
State-owned Manufacturing Ms. Zhong Yongxian
012 Guangdong Province Postage and Communication Equipment Company 
21 Jiaocheng Xi Lu
State-owned Business
Services
Mr. Guo Zhengxian
013 Guangzhou Shi American Packing Co. Ltd. 
166, Cheongjiang Zhong Lu
Joint-venture Business
Services
Ms. Wu Lijuan
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014 Yide Jie Trade Union 
Yide Jie
State-owned Social Services Ms. He Yizhuang
016 Guangzhou Plastic Packing Factory 
164, Chang jiang Zhong Lu
Collective-
owned
Business
Services
Ms. Liang Bijuan
017 Maxitong Computer Company 
109 Liuhua Lu, Suite 901
Individual
economy
Business
services
018 Provincial Government Offices Branch, Guangdong Development Bank 
Dongfeng Zhong Lu
Collective-
owned
Business
Services
Mr. Wang Weihuang
019 Guangzhou Shi Jiebu Electrical Appliances Plant Individual
owned
Manufacturing Mr. Zhong Jinyao
020 Guangdong Province Business Machines Plant 
Liyou Tai, Sanyuan Li
State-owned Manufacturing Mr. Chen Guangquan
021 Guangdong Province Maternity and Child Health Hospital 
Dongfeng Yi Lu
State-owned Social Services Mr. Chen Juanfei
022 Guangzhou Paper Box and Carton Factory 
166 Changiiang Zhong Lu
State-owned Manufacturing M. Ruan Quanyi
023 Guangzhou Sanyu Guests House 
23 Sanyu Lu, Dongshan Qu
Collective-
owned
Business
Services
Ms. Ao Hongli
025 Guangshou Yuexiu Synthetic Gas Plant 
37 Lunqin Fang, Yide Dong Lu
Collective-
owned
Manufacturing Mr. Peng Zhenhong
026 Guangzhou Overseas Chinese Friendship Building State-owned Business
Services
Ms. Zhang Haiyan
050 Guangnan Labour Services Company 
15 Guangzhou Tielu Nanzhan, Huangsha Da Du
Collective-
owned
Social Services Ms. Wang Jianmei
Map 1 Guangdong Province in China (circled)
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